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1 
Abstract 
 
Imagine a democratic state in Africa where the Presidential-Executive and 
Parliament are constitutionally restrained from fundamentally reforming the 
institutions of land ownership and administration without the legal consent of 
traditional rulers (chiefs). This is the case in Ghana. Using the historical institutional 
theoretical approach, the study makes an original contribution to our understanding 
of how the political process of state formation between British colonial state makers 
and the rulers of traditional states in Ghana produced a type of state that I call the 
traditional-federal state in 1821-1831. The core legacies of this state are (i) the 
bifurcation of public authority between chiefs and government in the governance of 
land and people; and (ii) the complex interaction of informal-legal rules of 
customary law and formal-legal rules of common law. The study shows how these 
legacies have shaped institutional reforms within the dual ‘customary’ and ‘public’ 
sectors of land administration. The study argues that the traditional-federal state has 
constrained the development of transparent, accountable and efficient institutional 
framework of land administration.  
 
The study helps us to understand the origins and nature of the bifurcation of state 
authority between chiefs and government over land administration in Ghana. 
Secondly, the study helps us to understand the nature of institutions of chieftaincy 
for customary land administration. The study shows that informal-legal customary 
institutions of land administration are complementary to, and substitute for, the 
formal-legal institutions of land administration. Thirdly, the study shows that the 
potential of communal land ownership to promote development could be realized if 
government, chiefs, and citizens are committed to the creation and enforcement of 
formal-legal rules of accountable administration that distributes the benefits among 
stakeholders. Finally, the study reinforces the historical institutionalist argument that 
the critical juncture of institutional development matters for understanding 
subsequent endogenous and exogenous sources of institutional change.   
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Chapter 1 
 
The Traditional-Federal State in Ghana: The Problem for Analysis 
 
An English officer…presides in courts held by the natives, and administers to them a 
kind of law made up of native customs and of English forms and maxims. I think it 
likely enough that he does much good. But I never could find out by which law he 
does it (James Stephen, 1846, Minutes on cases in the Gold Coast).
1
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I set out the problem for analysis, the research questions which the 
study addresses, the analytical framework of the study, the justifications for the 
research, and the overall structure of the study. 
 
1.1 The Bifurcated State: Public and Customary Sectors of State Authority 
 
Transparent and accountable formal-legal institutions of land administration have 
been shown to promote efficient access to and use of land as well as good economic 
governance of land resources in developed countries (De Soto 2000; FAO 2007; 
Wallace and Williamson 2006; Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 
(CLEP) 2008a, 2008b; World Bank 2002a, 2003a; World Bank/IMF 2005). Yet, 
only two to ten per cent of Africa’s land is governed by formal-legal institutions 
(World Bank 2003a). In the West African region as a whole, it is estimated that only 
two to three per cent of the land is covered by formal administration (Toulmin 2008). 
Access to land and security of land rights in Africa is largely governed by informal 
customary institutions of traditional authorities (Bruce 1998a). It is known that 
informal institutions constrain transparency, agential accountability, and rule 
enforceability in the governance of resources within any state (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006; North 1990; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999; Tsai 2007). 
Particularly from the last decade of the 20
th
 century, many international development 
agencies have provided financial and technical support to African governments to 
                                                 
1
 James Stephen, Colonial Office, London, 28 January, 1846. Minutes on cases in the Gold Coast 
heard before the Judicial Assessor’s Court presided over by Governor George MacClean (Metcalfe 
1964, Great Britain and Ghana: Document of Ghana History, no.151).  
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reform public sector agencies and customary institutions of land administration to 
facilitate economic development. While some progress has been made in the reform 
of public sector agencies, reformers have not only struggled to conceptually 
comprehend the nature of customary institutions but have had limited success in 
reforming customary institutions (World Bank 2003; Quan et al. 2004). 
Developmental states with transparent and accountable formal-legal institutions 
cannot be wished into existence (Leftwich 2000). Developmental states are the 
historical products of the politics of state organization among political ruling elites. 
Using the case of Ghana, this study examines how the organization of the African 
state enables and constrains the development of transparent and accountable 
institutions of land administration to facilitate economic development.  
 
It is known that in many African states the mode of state authority and governance is 
bifurcated between two public spheres ruled by traditional authorities, on the one 
hand, and modern non-traditional political ruling elites, on the other hand (Ekeh 
1975; Englebert 2000; Mamdani 1996; Ray 1996). The public sphere of traditional 
governance is generally referred to as the customary sector. The public sphere of 
modern government is generally referred to as the public sector. Within the public 
sphere ruled by traditional authorities, every citizen of the state is subject to 
customary law which governs social, economic, and political relations in local 
communities. Simultaneously, social, economic, and political relations of citizens are 
governed by the constitutional rules and statutory enactments of the public sector. 
Therefore, the public and customary institutions of governance are complementary, 
substitutive, and competitive of each other within and outside African states. 
Scholars acknowledge that the bifurcation of state authority and governance in 
Africa is the legacy of the politics of colonial state making (Dia 1996; Ekeh 1975; 
Englebert 2000; Mamdani 1996). However, there is little research on how the public 
and customary institutions of the bifurcated state enable or constrain development in 
each other. This study seeks to contribute to our understanding of this problem.  
 
In this study, I use the concept of traditional-federal state to define the division of 
final state authority between chiefs (rulers) of the traditional states and central 
government concerning the administration of people, land, and the state, at the 
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formative moment of the colonial state in Ghana.
2
 This study will show how the 
process of colonial state formation in Ghana between British colonial state makers 
and the existing traditional states shaped the development of the traditional-federal 
state. The creation of the traditional-federal state preceded, and actually shaped, 
subsequent political negotiations that occurred between powerful chiefs and non-
chief political elites over the contentious demand for a federal system of government 
prior to Ghana’s independence from colonial rule in 1957 (Allman 1993; Austin 
1964; Gocking 2005; Ninsin 1991; Rathbone 2000a; Ray 1996). I shall argue that the 
traditional-federal state did not occur simply because “The British, indeed, 
envisioned the future constitutions of the Gold Coast in terms of a federation of the 
various indigenous states” (Arhin 1991:29). Rather, it was a political settlement that 
was bargained after a decade of war-making among the interested parties. The study 
will show how the configuration of the contested settlement of the traditional-federal 
state shaped the consolidation of the communal land ownership system managed by 
organizations of chieftaincy
3
, demands for the creation of accountable formal-legal 
institutions through which chiefs would manage communal lands on behalf of their 
subjects (as fiduciaries), and the creation of public sector agencies to manage the 
conflicting interests of government and chiefs in land.  
                                                 
2
 The concept of ‘federalism’ embedded in my definition of the traditional-federal state follows the 
argument of Riker (2007:613) that “federalism is a constitutionally determined tier-structure. If its 
constitutional feature is ignored, then it is merely some particular arrangement for decentralization.” 
The nature of the traditional-federal state and its organizational transformations is further elaborated 
in the next chapter. Useful discussions of the concept of federalism as used in the context of state 
formation have been provided by Follesdal (2007) and Riker (1975, 2007). The creation of the 
traditional-federal state was based on a negotiated peace treaty of state formation between chiefs of 
the existing traditional states and the new British colonial government officials.  
3
It is important to emphasize here that chieftaincy is an organization of institutions, actors, and 
agencies. It is not simply a single institution as the popular phrase ‘institution of chieftaincy’ used by 
constitution makers may suggest. Chieftaincy is used in this study to mean a political organization of 
chiefs and rules of customary law that govern local communities. The 1992 Constitution defines a 
chief as “a person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been validly nominated, 
elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed as a chief or queenmother in accordance with 
the relevant customary law and usage” (Article 277). The current 1992 Constitution of Ghana 
connects chieftaincy to national, regional and local state agencies. The national bodies on which 
chiefs serve include the Council of State, Judicial Council, Police Council, Prison Council, Forestry 
Commission, Lands Commission, National Commission on Culture, National Commission on Civic 
Education, and the Ghana Aids Commission (See Ninsin K. 2010, Ghana’s Traditional Authorities in 
Governance and Development, (Chapter 4) Accra: Institute of Democratic Governance (IDEG)). The 
Executive, Parliament and the National House of Chiefs also share state authority in the reform of all 
matters concerning chieftaincy (e.g. customary laws in local communities and land administration). 
Within the judicial system of the country, the Judicial Committees of Traditional Councils, Regional 
Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs have also been given original and appellate 
jurisdictions to hear and determine matters concerning chieftaincy (See Brobbey S.A. 2008. The Law 
of Chieftaincy in Ghana, Accra: Advanced Legal Publications).    
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Traditional authorities in Ghana manage about 80% of the country’s land through 
informal institutions of customary law (Antwi 2006; Hammond 2005; Kasanga and 
Kotey 2001; Quan et al. 2008; Ubink 2008). Land administration in Ghana is 
therefore largely embedded in a dense network of informal institutions of customary 
law controlled by organizations of chieftaincy. The current 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana guarantees the co-existence of the public spheres of government and 
chieftaincy. Entrenched constitutional rules that would require a referendum to be 
held throughout Ghana in order to make amendments have been used to guarantee 
the survival of institutions of chieftaincy.
4
 The constitution limits the authority of 
government and parliament to reform matters affecting institutions of chieftaincy – 
including customary institutions of stool/skin
5
 land administration – without the 
cooperation of chiefs (currently organized into a National House of Chiefs, ten 
Regional Houses of Chiefs, and nearly two hundred Traditional Councils). Similarly, 
the Constitution limits the authority of chiefs and their local communities to reform 
their informal rules of customary law into formal-legal institutions without the 
consent of government and parliament. In effect, state authority for the reform of 
land administration is shared between chiefs, parliament and government. I examine 
in this study how the traditional-federal state has enabled and constrained the 
creation of effective, transparent and accountable developmental institutions of land 
administration across the public and customary domains of government and chiefs.   
 
From 2001 to 2010, many international development agencies provided financial and 
technical support to the Government of Ghana to implement land administration 
reforms generally called the Land Administration Project (LAP) (World Bank 
2003b, 2003c).
6
 The LAP involved two key reform objectives that were at the core 
of the organization of traditional-federal state authority between government, 
parliament, and chiefs. The two reform objectives were (1) the restructuring of six 
                                                 
4
 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Articles 270(1), 289-292.  
5
 The skin of an animal (leopard, tiger, etc) is used in Northern Ghana to symbolise the office of a 
Chief (similar to the ‘throne’ which symbolise the office of a king in Europe). Thus, communally 
owned lands are referred to as skin lands. In Southern Ghana, the concept of stool lands is derived 
from the stool (a wooden seat) on which the Chiefs sits. Following the standard practice, I shall use 
the concept of stool land to refer to both stool and skin lands. I shall also use the terms ‘communal 
land’ and ‘customary land’ in reference to stool/skin lands.  
6
 The international development agencies that supported the LAP are the World Bank, the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the UK Department for International Development 
(DFID), the German Technical Assistance Corporation (GTZ), Kreditanstalt Fur Wierderaufbau 
(KFW) and the Nordic Development Fund (NDF) (World Bank 2003c; Toulmin et al. 2004).  
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public sector agencies of land administration into a single agency; and (2) the 
creation of transparent and accountable agencies of customary land administration. 
By 2010, four of the six public sector agencies of land administration had been 
restructured into a single agency. The creation of transparent and accountable 
agencies of customary land administration within the domain of traditional 
authorities achieved very limited results. The LAP created 37 agencies of customary 
land administration out of the intended target of 50. According to the project 
implementers, none of the 37 customary land administration agencies is a public or 
state agency with formal-legal institutions (DFID 2010; LAPU 2009; MASDAR 
2011a, 2011b). I shall examine how the organization of state authority between 
government and traditional authorities concerning land administration shaped the 
politics and outcomes of these reforms. 
  
1.1.1 The Thesis: Critical Juncture and Path Dependence 
 
The thesis of the study is that the politics of colonial state formation in the Gold 
Coast (now known as Ghana) shaped the emergence of the traditional-federal state 
with bifurcated state authority between government and chiefs over land 
administration; and, the traditional-federal state has largely constrained the 
development of a transparent, accountable and efficient institutional framework of 
land administration. This study therefore reinforces the historical institutionalist 
argument that the critical juncture of state formation matters for the subsequent 
politics and outcomes of state development. 
 
Within Ghana’s current traditional-federal state, the successful reform of the 
institutions and agencies of land administration require the collective authority of 
government, parliament, and traditional authorities. Efforts to develop transparent, 
accountable and efficient institutions and agencies of land administration should not 
ignore the reality of the bifurcated organization of state authority between traditional 
authorities and government. The study examines, firstly, the historical origins of the 
traditional-federal state in Ghana; secondly, how land administration is organized in 
the state; and thirdly, how the organization of the state has shaped the politics and 
outcomes of land administration reforms. The research questions, summary of the 
analytical framework and structure of the study are outlined below.   
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1.2 Research Questions 
 
The central research questions of the study are:  
 
 What is the provenance of the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs 
and government over land administration in Ghana?  
 
 How has the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government 
shaped the politics and outcomes of land administration reforms?  
 
In answering these questions I explore the following lines of enquiry: 
  
1. What is the nature of land administration reform in Africa generally? 
 
2. What is the provenance and nature of the traditional-federal state in Ghana? 
 
3. How has the organization of the traditional-federal state shaped land 
administration reform within the public sector of the state?  
 
4. How has the organization of the traditional-federal state shaped land 
administration reform within the customary sector of the state?  
 
I hope that my exploration of the above questions will illuminate how the bifurcated 
organization of state authority and governance between traditional authorities, non-
traditional political ruling elites, and citizens in Ghana has shaped the politics and 
outcomes of land administration reforms. A summary of the analytical framework 
used to investigate the above questions is outlined below.  
 
1.3 Analytical Framework: Historical Institutionalism 
 
It is clear that the task at hand requires an analytical approach that is historically 
sensitive to the process of state development and also probes political interactions of 
power between actors in the organization of state institutions and agencies. Many 
political scientists have contributed to the development of an appropriate theoretical 
approach generally referred to as historical institutionalism (Collier and Collier 
1991; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Mahoney et al. 2003; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; 
Pierson 2004; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Rokkan 1968; Steinmo et al. 1992). At the 
heart of the historical institutional analytical approach are four key propositions:  
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 First, institutions are created by human actors (individuals or their political 
agents) through political processes of cooperation, negotiation, and conflict; 
 
 Second, actors involved in the politics of institutional formation, maintenance 
and change bring to the process diverse forms of ideas, power and resources; 
 
 Third, actors are motivated by diverse reasons – social, cultural, economic, 
political and religious – to create, abide by, and enforce institutions; and,  
 
 Fourth, the process of institutional formation and change occurs within 
prevailing institutional contexts that are commonly a powerful restraint on 
the ideas, interests and power of the actors involved in the new process.  
 
The implications of the above core propositions of historical institutionalism are that 
explanations of processes and outcomes of institutional reform should begin by 
examining, firstly, the provenance of the institutions; secondly, how the institutions 
have been maintained; and thirdly, the role of political agency (internal, external or 
both) in initiating reform. In effect, for historical institutionalism, the role of political 
actors and the institutional context of reform are central to understanding processes 
and outcomes of institutional reform.  
 
The historical institutional analytical approach will elucidate the provenance of the 
traditional-federal Ghanaian state, the organization of state authority over land 
administration by the political ruling elites, and the political forces (both external 
and internal) that have sought to either maintain or change existing institutions of 
land administration. The core historical institutionalist argument of this study is that 
the ideas, interests and distribution of authority between state actors at the ‘critical 
juncture’ or ‘formative moment’ of the Ghanaian state produced ‘powerful inertial 
stickiness’ that characterise the developmental paths of land administration. I shall 
throw more light on this important point in the next chapter where I develop the 
historical institutional theoretical framework of analysis.  
 
My hope is that this study will contribute to a theoretical and empirical 
understanding of, firstly, the formation, maintenance, and change of institutions in 
the process of development; and secondly, how the organization of state authority in 
Ghana between traditional authorities and non-traditional political ruling elites 
concerning land administration has shaped institutional reform processes and 
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outcomes. The organization of state authority in a manner that requires the collective 
support of traditional authorities, government and parliament to reform institutions 
of land administration matters. The structure of the study is outlined next.   
 
1.4 Structure of the Study 
 
The study is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 sets out the conceptual, theoretical 
and methodological framework of the study. Chapter 3 discusses the nature of land 
administration reform in sub-Saharan Africa with particular emphasis on the 
customary sector. Chapter 4 examines the politics of colonial state formation in 
Ghana and the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government over 
land administration. Chapter 5 discusses how the colonial state incorporated chiefs 
and non-chief elites into the dominant ruling coalition; and, how the new ruling 
coalition reformed organizations of chieftaincy into a local government system 
through which chiefs administered communal lands, mobilized internal revenue for 
local development, and held accountable by their subjects. The colonial state 
transited from traditional-federalism into what I shall call the traditional-unitary 
state. Chapter 6 discusses the politics of decolonization and the modes of politics 
that separated organizations of chieftaincy from local government, the Executive and 
the Legislature to return the state to the path of traditional-federalism. Chapters 7 and 
8 discuss the dual nature of land administration within the public and customary 
sectors of the state in the post-colonial period prior to the implementation of the 
Land Administration Project in 2001. Chapter 9 discusses the politics and outcomes 
of the Land Administration Project across the public and customary sectors of land 
administration. Finally, chapter 10 summarizes the findings of the study by 
emphasizing how the institutional configuration of bifurcated state authority between 
chiefs and government over land administration matters for the creation of an 
effective, transparent and accountable system of land administration.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Analytical Framework: Historical Institutionalism 
 
Exploring the sources and consequences of path dependence helps us to 
understand the powerful inertia or ‘stickiness’ that characterizes many aspects of 
political development – for instance, the enduring consequences that often stem 
from the emergence of particular institutional arrangements (Pierson 2004:11).  
  
Introduction 
 
Understanding the nature and causal effect of the bifurcation of state authority 
between governments and chiefs over land administration in Ghana requires an 
analytical approach that probes the provenance of the Ghanaian state. The theoretical 
framework in political science broadly referred to as historical institutionalism has 
been employed for these empirical tasks. Historical institutionalists emphasize that 
the formative moment or critical juncture of institutional development matter in 
shaping subsequent development processes within the institutions. This theoretical 
perspective underlies the analysis of the institutional emergence of a traditional-
federal state with bifurcated state authority between government and traditional 
authorities concerning land administration; and, how the institutional legacies of the 
traditional-federal state has constrained land administration reforms. The research 
methodology suggested by the historical institutional theoretical perspective is 
generally referred to as comparative historical analysis. This chapter discusses the 
conceptual tools, theoretical framework, and research methodology that I used for 
the analysis of the thesis. The chapter is divided into five sections. The first section 
defines how I use the concepts of politics, political settlement, institutions, 
organizations, the state, and accountability in the analysis of the thesis. The second 
section outlines the historical institutional theory that underlies the thesis. The third 
and fourth sections discuss the research methodology and tools of data collection that 
I used. The fifth section concludes by emphasizing that it is more enlightening to 
diachronically analyze how the configuration of the traditional-federal state has 
evolved in Ghana to shape the political process of land administration reform. 
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2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
The concepts of politics, institutions, the state and accountability play key roles in 
understanding the thesis. I explain below what these concepts mean in the context of 
the theoretical and empirical analysis of the thesis.     
 
2.1.1 Politics and Political Settlements 
 
Following Leftwich (1983, 2004, 2007), I define politics broadly as all the activities 
of co-operation, conflict and negotiation involved in decisions about (a) the use, 
production and distribution of resources, and (b) the design of institutions and 
agencies to govern relations between human actors. Politics occurs wherever people 
have diverse interests, power, and preferences over these matters. Politics is not 
simply confined to the spheres of government as in its conventional usage. The 
parties to any political process might deploy different forms of power whether this is 
brute force, military, economic or ideological (Mann 1986). The extent of their 
power and how it is used will clearly influence outcomes. Though some theorists 
(Crick 2004) suggest that war or violence is not politics but represents the failure of 
politics, I prefer to see such violent conflict as a form of politics. In the often quoted 
dictum of Karl Von Clausewitz, ‘war is a continuation of politics by other means’.  
 
For the purpose of understanding the developmental path of the state in Ghana, I 
distinguish between three distinct but related forms of politics, 
 
namely; (i) politics 
without agreed rules between the actors; (ii) politics without agreed rules between 
the actors intended to establish agreed rules; and (iii) politics within agreed rules 
intended to establish new rules.
7
 In the modern world, it appears that politics without 
agreed rules between the actors is outdated. However, historically, it is analytically 
possible to separate (a) political activities of conflict between tribes or states that 
occurred without agreed rules and were not intended to establish any rules between 
the actors except to cause destruction; from (b) political activities of conflict that 
occurred without agreed rules but intended to establish rules to regulate future 
                                                 
7
 Leftwich (2007) identified two distinct but related levels of politics, namely (a) The level which 
concern rules of the game (institutions); and (b) The level at which games within the rules occurs. My 
categorization of three distinct levels of politics was based on his distinctions. What I have added is 
the level of politics without rules of the game (the game being conflict or war).   
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interactions between the actors. Traditional states and British colonial officials in the 
Gold Coast sometimes engaged in both forms of violent politics without agreed rules 
(e.g. politics of war-making among the Asante Confederacy of states, the Fanti 
States, Akyem Abuakwa state, British colonial officials, and many traditional states). 
In the politics of state-making, politics without agreed rules usually shaped politics 
of rule-making which in turn shaped politics within agreed rules. Following the 
formation of the traditional-federal state from 1821-1901, political interactions 
between British colonial officials, traditional rulers, were largely characterized by 
non-violent forms of politics to create new state institutions and agencies.  
 
Political agreements negotiated by contending political actors within historically 
specific periods of time is referred to in this study as political settlements (Di John 
and Putzel 2009; Laws 2010; Parks 2010). Political settlements include constitutions, 
peace treaties, and public policies. The concept of political settlement does not differ 
substantively from institutions. Perhaps, a useful distinction is that while a political 
settlement is a formal agreement negotiated among contending actors which reflects 
the distribution of power, not all formal institutions are the bargaining outcomes of 
political contentions (Di John and Putzel 2009). Examples of political settlements in 
this study are the 1831 MacClean Peace Treaty between British colonial officials, the 
Asante Confederacy, and some traditional states; the 1949 Coussey Committee 
Constitutional agreements between indigenous political elites; the 1953-57 
independent state constitutional agreements; and the 1992 constitutional agreements 
among political elites and citizens. Political settlement in this study does not refer to 
‘on-going political process’ (Laws 2010) or ‘rolling agreements’ (Parks 2010). 
Political settlement embodies empirically verifiable political intentionality and 
historical specificity to give it significant explanatory value in the historical analysis 
of development. The study will show that whiles some political settlements of state 
organization were consolidated by political ruling elites, others were reversed.    
 
2.1.2 Institutions and Organizations 
 
The concept of institutions is central to the shared thesis among diverse strands of 
new institutionalists that ‘institutions matter’ in shaping human development (Hall 
and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 2006). However there is no common definition of 
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the nature of institutions for the purpose of explaining exactly how institutions 
matter. It appears that the rational choice game theoretic definition of institutions as 
‘rules of the game’ has become the most popular definition of institutions (North 
1990; Rokkan 1968; Pierson and Skocpol 2002). The definition suggests that 
institutions are created by rational human actors to constrain social, economic and 
political interactions. Diverse interactions are metaphorically conceived as a game 
with the human actors as players of the game (North 1990). Institutions are defined 
in this study as humanly devised rules embedded with ideas, interests, power 
relationships and, usually, distribution of material resources that enable and constrain 
action (Hodgson 2006; Leftwich 2005; North 1990; March and Olsen 1989, 2004, 
2006; Olsen 2007, 2010; Searle 1995, 2005; Shepsle 2010).    
 
For the purpose of my research on how institutions matter, I shall draw an analytic 
distinction between formal and informal institutions. “There is less agreement…on 
how to distinguish between formal and informal institutions” (Helmke and Levitsky 
2006:5). Many scholars have followed North’s (1990) distinction between formal 
institutions defined as ‘usually written rules’ and informal institutions defined as 
‘usually unwritten rules’ (Leftwich 2007; North et al. 2009; Tsai 2007). This 
distinction however suggests that some formal institutions are unwritten and some 
informal institutions are written. Such unclear analytic definition is less useful. 
Helmke and Levitsky (2006:5) defined formal institutions as “rules and procedures 
that are created, communicated and enforced through channels that are widely 
accepted as official”; and “informal institutions as socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned 
channels.” This analytic distinction raises more problems than it resolves. O’Donnell 
(2006:289), in an afterword on the work of Helmke and Levitsky, pointed out that 
the attempt to categorize ‘indigenous legal systems’ as informal institutions on the 
basis of their ‘usually unwritten’ nature ignores the important fact that “indigenous 
legal systems and institutions are quite formally effected, including publicly 
appointed and legitimized authorities, detailed procedures, elaborate rituals, 
regularized sanctions and the like.” And there is much confusion about the nature 
and effect of informal customary institutions in Africa (Meagher 2007). 
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There is the need for a robust conceptual framework of formal and informal 
institutions not only for theoretical purposes (Collier et al. 2008), but also to inform 
knowledge about the type of institutions that are more likely to promote democratic 
and economic development (Chang 2007; Dahl 2005; Hare and Davies 2006; Grief 
2006; North 1990; North et al. 2009). For the purpose of my analysis of how state 
institutions matter I develop a typology of institutions based on a state-society 
framework of analysis. Using a state-society framework, I develop a typology of 
institutions based on their origin and form. The origin of an institution is meant 
whether the institution originates from the state in which case I refer to it as state 
institution or it originates from societal actors in which case I refer to it as societal 
institution. The form of an institution is meant whether the institution is written or 
unwritten. Written institutions are called formal institutions and unwritten 
institutions are called informal institutions (Galligan 2007; Harrington 2008; Schauer 
2008). Within the state, the two levels of analytic distinctions generate two types of 
institutions namely (i) formal state institutions and (ii) informal state institutions. 
Formal state institutions include written constitutions and statutory enactments. 
Informal state institutions are the unwritten rules of customary law that are 
recognized and enforced as part of the laws of the state. Informal state institutions 
have been noted to be the most difficult of legal orders to pin down (Galligan 2007; 
Harrington 2008). Within the society, the two levels of analytic distinctions generate 
two types of institutions namely (iii) formal societal institutions and (iv) informal 
societal institutions. Formal societal institutions include the written rules created by 
private businesses, non-governmental organizations, interest groups and diverse civil 
society associations. Informal societal institutions are the unwritten rules that 
regulate many aspects of social behaviour and relations in society (e.g. moral 
norms). Bratton (2007) and Hyden (2008) have discussed diverse informal rules of 
patron-client relations (clientelism and patrimonialism) that govern political 
behaviour in African countries. My thesis mainly deals with the creation, 
maintenance, reform and causal effect of formal and informal state institutions. The 
four types of institutions discussed above are shown below in Table 1.  
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Table 1: A typology of institutions based on state-society framework 
 
Origin Form Type of Institution 
State 
Written Formal state institutions 
Unwritten Informal state institutions 
Society 
Written Formal societal institutions 
Unwritten Informal societal institutions 
  
Lauth (2000) and Helmke and Levitsky (2006) have rightly argued that we need to 
know how diverse formal and informal institutions compete with, accommodate, 
substitute for, or complement each other. For instance, my study shows that informal 
rules of customary law (also referred to as informal-legal state institutions) 
governing chieftaincy-society relations of accountability play dual roles of 
complementing and substituting formal state institutions of accountability. The 
Courts and the Audit Service have found it almost impossible to hold chiefs 
accountable through formal-legal state institutions because unwritten rules of 
customary law are equally enforceable by the Courts. In September 2010, Parliament 
approved the codified rules of customary law governing aspect of chieftaincy-society 
relations in eleven traditional areas to enhance political order, transparency and 
accountability in traditional governance.
8
 The process took ten years to complete.  
 
For the purpose of my study I also attempt to address the analytic confusion in the 
literature over the concepts of ‘institutions’ and ‘organizations’ (Hodgson 2006; 
Leftwich 2007; North 1990; North et al. 2009). These two concepts are “so often 
used inter-changeably in the literature” (Leftwich 2007:11) in spite of attempt by 
many scholars to draw clear analytic distinctions between them. North (1990) draws 
an analytic distinction between ‘institutions’ defined as ‘rules of the game’ and 
‘organizations’ defined as ‘collective-actors’. This analytic distinction helps to 
explain the role of organizations in the process of economic and political 
development. The problem is that collective-actor organizations are usually created 
not only to function as ‘players of the game’ but also as part of the ‘rules of the 
game’ – particularly within the constitutional rules of a state. For this reason, the 
concepts of institutions and organizations are used inter-changeably in the literature. 
North acknowledged that “for certain purposes we can consider organizations as 
                                                 
8
 In Ghana, an informal rule of customary law assimilated by the common law is known as ‘common 
law rule of customary origin’ (Chieftaincy Act, 2008, Act 759).  
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institutions” (Hodgson 2006:19).9 For instance, Levi (2006:10) remarked that 
“institutions are empty boxes without leaders and staff who have the capacity to 
produce the public goods the public demands and the facility to evoke popular 
confidence even among those who disagree with particular policies.” In this context, 
the institutions that Levi talks about are collective-actor ‘organizations’. A second 
problem with the concept of organization is grammatical. As a noun, the concept of 
organization also means “the way in which the elements of a whole are arranged”.10 
It is in this grammatical context that I use the concept of ‘organization’ when I talk 
about the organization of the Ghanaian state. Within this grammatical context of 
meaning, North et al. (2009:258) emphasize that “All states are organizations of 
organizations.” Here one sees how the grammatical and analytic problems have 
combined to create conceptual confusion. It is therefore sometimes confusing as to 
whether the concept of organization refers to a collective-actor organization or to an 
arrangement of the elements of a political system of rules and actors.  
 
For analytical clarity, I shall use the concept of ‘agency’ to refer to collective actor 
organizations. Collective actor organizations that I shall deal with include six public 
sector land agencies namely the Lands Commission, Survey Department, Land Title 
Registry, Land Valuation Board, Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, and 
Town and Country Planning Department. The study also examines reforms intended 
to create agencies of communal land administration called Customary Land 
Secretariat (CLS). Collective-actor organizations “manifestly have their own internal 
norms, conventions, and rules which define the hierarchies and the functions, and 
which regulate and facilitate the behaviour and interaction of members” (Leftwich 
2007:11). However, the thesis is mainly concerned with the creation, maintenance 
and reform of the external institutions that regulate the existence and functions of 
collective actor organizations. For emphasise, institutions refer to the ‘rules of the 
game’, organization refers to the arrangement of rules and actors, and agencies refer 
to collective-actor organizations. I define in turn what I mean by the state. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 The acknowledgement was made in a series of letters exchanged between Douglas North and 
Geoffrey Hodgson that sought to clarify the confusion (Hodgson 2006:19-21).  
10
 Oxford English Dictionary, 6
th
 Edition, 2006.  
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2.1.3 The State: The Politics of State Development in Ghana 
 
This study is about the politics of state development. My thesis is that the current 
bifurcation of state authority between traditional authorities (or chiefs) and modern 
government over the administration of land and people in Ghana has been shaped by 
the critical juncture of colonial state formation from 1821 to 1831. To understand the 
origins and legacies of the Ghanaian state, it is crucial that I outline what is meant by 
the concept of the state in this study. The state is defined here as an organization of 
institutions (rules and agents) that claim final authority in the making and 
enforcement of legal rules, adjudication of disputes, and use of coercion against all 
other actors within a geographical territory (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987; Dryzek 
and Dunleavy 2009; Evans et al. 1985; Hall and Ikenberry 1989; Leftwich 2008c; 
Loughlin 2010; North et al. 2009; Weber 1968; Tilly 1992). 
 
There seems to be an emerging consensus among scholars concerned with the 
developmental capacities of states (North et al. 2009) that the dominant concept of 
the state in political science as a ‘single-actor representative agent’ (North 1989) 
should be jettisoned in favour of a conceptual framework that defines the state as an 
organization of rules and actors (Skocpol 1985). North et al. (2009:17) argued that 
“By overlooking the reality that all states are organizations, this [single-actor 
representative agent] approach misses how the internal dynamics of relationships 
among elites within the dominant coalition affect how states interact with the larger 
society.” Skocpol (1985:21) had also argued that an organizational perspective of the 
state is perhaps more important than the single-actor perspective for understanding 
developmental processes because,  
 
States matter not simply because of the goal-oriented activities of state officials. 
They matter because their organizational configurations, along with their overall 
patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group 
formation and collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the 
raising of certain political issues (but not others).
11
  
                                                 
11
 Theda Skocpol (1985) traces this organizational perspective of the state to Alexis de Tocqueville. 
The influential work of Evans et al. (1985) in ‘Bringing the State Back In’ was perhaps the turning 
point in shaping the success of the organizational perspective of the state among historical 
institutionalists in Economics and Political Science.  
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Scholars have noted that states that have been able to perform their traditional and 
modern functions effectively have also acquired a large and sophisticated 
administrative apparatus (North et al. 2009). In Africa, due to diverse economic, 
political and administrative problems, many states have been unable to create an 
effective organizational apparatus to perform the traditional functions of states, let 
alone promote economic prosperity for their citizens (Chabal and Daloz 1999; 
Englebert 2002; 2009; Meredith 2006). Many African states are therefore struggling 
with legitimacy deficits. Many scholars and international development agencies with 
interest in Africa’s economic and political developments have been fixated on 
promoting the democratization of African states (Diamond and Plattner 2010). Other 
scholars have been drawing attention to the need to focus on the creation of 
organizationally effective and efficient developmental states (Chang 2007; Leftwich 
2000). The organizational perspective of the state has helped to shed light on the 
limits of participatory democracy in the creation of representative state agencies 
(Diamond et al. 2010; O’Donnell 2010; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999; 
Tilly 2007). All democratic states – whether developed or developing – are largely 
administered by unelected civil and public servants in diverse agencies. The scope of 
participatory democracy rarely goes beyond the ruling Executive, the Legislature, 
and local government. I argue that any attempt to create democratic and 
developmental states in African countries should be situated within the history of 
ideas, beliefs, actors, resources and global interactions that have shaped the process 
of state development in Africa since the pre-colonial era. It has been noted that the 
historical context of state development has usually been ignored by scholars, donors, 
and national stakeholders (Booth et al. 2005). This study examines the historical 
process of state development in Ghana and explains its causal effect on efforts to 
create an efficient, transparent and accountable land administration system.  
 
For the purpose of generalizing some of the findings of the thesis across Africa, I 
shall give a brief overview of the politics of state development in Africa. At the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, the whole of Africa was ruled by “innumerable 
lineage and clan groups, city-states, kingdoms, and empires without any fixed 
boundaries” (Adu Boahen 2011:95). By the 1900, the innumerable African states and 
polities had been seized, occupied, and transformed into some forty colonial states 
by the European imperial power of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
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Belgium, and Spain (Adu Boahen 2011; Gann and Duignan 1969).
12
 Many scholars 
of African politics have recognized that the choice points of colonial state formation 
across African countries share the fundamental feature of the bifurcation of state 
authority between the existing rulers of African polities and newly created European 
central governments (Adu Boahen 2011; Dia 1996; Ekeh 1975; Mamdani 1996). 
Adu Boahen (2011:33-34) aptly explains that the process of colonial state formation 
across Africa occurred in the following three stages:  
 
The first stage was the conclusion of a treaty between an African ruler and a 
European imperial power under which the former was usually accorded protection 
and undertook not to enter into any treaty relation with another European power, 
while the latter was granted certain exclusive trading and other rights. … The 
second stage was the signing of bilateral treaties between the imperial powers 
usually based on the earlier treaties of protection which defined their spheres of 
interest and delimited their boundaries. ... The third and final stage was that of the 
European conquest and occupation of their spheres.   
 
The numerous African independent states and polities were integrated into the 
colonial states that were created. Consequently, the process of colonial state 
formation led to the emergence of (and confusion over) two spheres of state (or 
public) authority where pre-colonial African states and the new European central 
government both claimed the people within the same geographical territory as their 
subjects (Ekeh 1975; Mamdani 1996; Ray 1996).
13
 The subjects of the European 
governments later became known as citizens. Competition between ‘the two publics’ 
over the membership and allegiance of the subject-citizen has become one of the key 
legacies of colonialism in many post-colonial African countries.  
 
                                                 
12
 According to Adu Boahen (2011:27), many of the colonial states in Africa were created by the 
European imperial countries “within the incredibly short period between 1800 and 1900”. The subject 
of the nature of colonial state-making across Africa by the imperial European countries is discussed 
by other scholars in Gann and Duignan (1969). 
13
 For instance, Mamdani (1996:62-3) reports that after Great Britain had annexed the colony of Natal 
in South Africa in 1843, a British Commissioner noted the following state of affairs in 1846: “The 
natives own laws are superceded; the restraints which they furnish are removed. The government of 
their own chiefs is at an end; and, although it is a fact that British rule and law have been substituted 
in their stead, it is not less true that they are almost as inoperate as if they had not been proclaimed, 
from a want of the necessary representatives and agents to carry them out.” Later, we shall see the 
effects of similar proclamations of British colonial rule over Ghana from 1821. The point here is that 
following the creation of the colonial state the individual African became both a subject of the 
traditional African ruler and a subject (later citizen) of the European colonial government. After the 
“third and final stage” of colonial state formation in Africa (Adu Boahen 2011:34), the public sphere 
of the traditional states and African polities did not continue to lie outside the operation of the 
statutory rules of European colonial governments as Mamdani (1996) sometimes make it to appear.   
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The legacy of two spheres of public authority in post-colonial African countries has 
generated debates between those who support the reform, strengthening, and 
integration of traditional institutions into the ‘modern’ public institutions of the 
African state (Dia 1996; Logan 2011; Oomen 2003; Sklar 2003; Vaughan 2003) and 
those support the dismantling of traditional institutions for diverse reasons (Ntsebeza 
2005; Mamdani 1996). This study does not enter into this general debate for the 
simple reason that the sheer diversity of traditional institutions of authority across 
Africa, even within one country let alone an entire continent, “makes historical 
iconoclasm a risky business” (Parker and Rathbone 2007:110). This position is 
consistent with the historical institutional theoretical and methodological approach 
underlying this study, which I shall discuss later. From the case of Ghana we shall 
see that the legacy of ‘two publics’ within the same state has presented complex 
opportunities and challenges to the building of a developmental state. Ghana is one 
of many African countries where political elites have tried to reform and integrate 
the remnant of traditional state institutions into the modern state to perform diverse 
functions.
14
 For instance, Native Courts of traditional authorities were kicked out of 
the judicial system at the dawn of independence; but the independent state also 
reformed traditional institutions into Traditional Councils, Regional Houses of 
Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs with original and appellate judicial 
authority to hear and determine cases concerning chieftaincy. In Botswana, chiefs 
have been constituted into a National House of Chiefs to shape national legislation 
affecting institutions of chieftaincy. Moreover, Native Courts of chiefs have been 
integrated into the Botswana judicial system. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, traditional 
authorities constitute the Upper Senate of bicameral legislatures.   
 
Ironically, popular support for traditional authorities has surged across many African 
countries in the era of democratization (Logan 2008, 2011). Between 1999 and 2008, 
four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys across many African countries have 
consistently shown that organizations of traditional authorities enjoy widespread 
support and trust among citizens.
15
 The Afrobarometer surveys also show that in 
many African countries, citizens generally prefer to be ruled by their traditional 
                                                 
14
 A useful overview of the nature and role of traditional institutions in Southern, Eastern and Western 
Africa can be found in the research works edited by Buur and Kyed (2007) and Vaughan (2003).   
15
 See results of Afrobarometer surveys at http://www.afrobarometer.org/ (last accessed 24/03/2012). 
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authorities than to be ruled by military leaders, one party states and presidential 
dictators. Furthermore, traditional authorities in many African countries command 
higher levels of public trust than state agencies such as parliament, the police/army, 
local government and the courts. Comparative historical research projects are needed 
to understand how and why support for traditional governance has surged across 
Africa. I therefore support the call by Vaughan (2003: xiii) that “The ongoing crisis 
of the African state and the resilience of traditional institutions necessitate a critical 
interdisciplinary inquiry into the significance of indigenous structures in the 
governance of African communities during the colonial and postcolonial periods.” 
Unfortunately, there has been a lack of an appropriate conceptual framework to 
define the nature of the colonial state in which state authority was bifurcated 
between the African traditional states and the new European central governments 
who operated from within their castles and forts (Ntsebeza 2005; Ray 1996; Ray and 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; Sklar 2003; Vaughan 2003). An appropriate 
conceptual framework would enhance our analysis of the developmental character of 
the traditional ‘primordial public’ and the modern ‘civic public’ (Ekeh 1975; Shils 
1957), the colonial interactions between the two public spheres of state authority 
(Gann and Duignan 1970), and the nature of organizational change that has occurred 
in postcolonial African states (Adu Boahen 2011; Buur and Kyed 2007; Vaughan 
2003). The conceptual framework developed for this study is discussed in turn.   
 
In the context of Ghana, the bifurcation of state authority between the traditional 
states and the new British colonial central government concerning the administration 
of people and land is conceptualized as the traditional-federal state. The traditional-
federal state which was initially created from 1821-1831 has gone through major 
organizational transformations. At present the remnant of the traditional states have 
lost their authority to create and maintain their own military forces and sovereign 
states. However, the constitutional rules of the current fourth republic Ghanaian state 
(i) recognizes the customary laws of chieftaincy as part of the laws of Ghana, (ii) 
consolidates communal land ownership managed by traditional authorities in local 
communities, (iii) prohibits the transformation of communal lands (which constitute 
about 80% of the country’s land) into individual freehold lands, and (iv), crucially, 
limits the authority of government and parliament to reform institutions of 
chieftaincy without the authoritative consent of the chiefs (Brobbey 2008). 
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This study will show three major organizational transformations of the traditional-
federal state in Ghana. It will show how after the colonial military conquest and 
occupation of the traditional states in 1901, the British colonial government, 
traditional rulers (chiefs), and native non-chief educated elites cooperated from 
1902-1953 to gradually transform the traditional-federal colonial state into what I 
shall call the traditional-unitary state. Under the traditional-unitary colonial state, 
British officials, chiefs, and native non-chief educated elites became members of the 
ruling Executive and Legislature. Moreover, organizations of traditional states 
throughout the country were transformed into local government agencies – called 
Native Authorities – managed by the chiefs. Crucially, the traditional states retained 
ownership and administration of their communally owned (stool) lands. From 1954, 
the powerful class of native non-chief educated elites that had emerged replaced the 
chiefs in the Executive, the Legislature and the local government system. The 
acrimonious politics that developed between chiefs and the new ruling class of non-
chief educated elites did not only lead to the separation of chieftaincy from the local 
government system, but also led to the design of constitutional mechanisms that 
insulated chieftaincy from central government control. The colonial state teetered 
back to the brink of traditional-federalism. The quasi post-colonial traditional-federal 
state has persisted in Ghana and it has posed developmental challenges for all 
stakeholders. The three major state transitions are summarized below in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: The legacies of traditional-federal state formation: 1821-2010 
 
Historical 
period 
Type of State 
Composition of 
Executive and 
Legislature  
State authority over 
Traditional State  
administration 
Nature of the 
legal rules (laws) 
of the state 
1800-1820 Traditional state Chiefs 
Centralized in 
traditional states 
Rules of 
customary law 
1821-1901 
Traditional-federal 
state 
British colonial 
officials 
Divided between the 
Executive and 
traditional states 
Rules of 
customary law 
and common law 
1902-1953 
Traditional-unitary 
state 
British colonial 
officials, Chiefs, 
and Native non-
chief political 
elites 
Largely centralized in 
the Executive 
Rules of 
customary law 
and common law 
1954-2010 
Traditional-federal 
state 
Native non-chief 
political elites 
Divided between the 
Executive, Legislature 
and traditional states 
Rules of 
customary law 
and common law 
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The organization and legacies of the traditional-federal state shaped diverse politics 
of land administration in Ghana. The traditional-federal state created between 1821 
and 1901 shaped the emergence of a dual organizational framework of land 
administration divided between (a) the customary sector of land administration 
managed by traditional authorities, and (b) the public sector of land administration 
managed by civil servants controlled by the central government. I shall discuss how 
the distribution of state authority between chiefs and central government has shaped 
the politics creating diverse public sector agencies of land administration to manage 
the conflicting interests of the two ruling classes. I shall discuss how the distribution 
of state authority has shaped the politics and outcomes of reforms to create 
transparent and accountable agencies of customary land administration.  
 
The study will show how chiefs and their educated subjects successfully fought to 
maintain control of their customary land ownership system from state expropriation 
initiated by British government officials in the late nineteenth century. Under the 
traditional-unitary state, the chiefs and their educated subjects cooperated with 
British government officials to create formal-legal institutions of accountability 
within traditional states for the management of the communally owned stool lands 
(including land revenues). The separation of chieftaincy from the local government 
system, the Executive and the Legislature to return the state to traditional-federalism 
(1954-2010) ushered in renewed reforms to create new accountable agencies of 
customary land administration in local communities. Throughout the study I show 
that the nature of the organization of state authority between chiefs and government 
matters in shaping the politics of land administration reform in the country.   
 
We shall see that the current bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and 
government has significantly limited the power of government to ‘supply’ land 
administration reforms that are not supported by chiefs. The crucial theoretical point 
is that the colonial traditional-federal state continues to produce distinctive political 
processes and outcomes in matters concerning land administration. As earlier 
indicated, this study reinforces the historical institutionalist theoretical view that the 
critical juncture of state formation matters for the subsequent politics and outcomes 
of state development. I turn next to define what is meant by accountability.   
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2.1.4 Accountability: The Politics of State Accountability  
 
Recent land administration reforms implemented in Ghana sought to create 
“accountable systems for managing and administering land at local level…in line 
with the Constitutional provisions, in a way that protects the rights of all land 
holders, recognises the public interest in land management, and provides an effective 
interface with democratic local and national government” (Toulmin et al. 2004:12). 
The objective of the reforms was surely in line with the 1992 constitutional provision 
which oblige traditional authorities who manage customary lands on behalf of their 
subjects to be “accountable as fiduciaries.”16 It could be seen that both constitution 
makers and development actors have been concerned with the accountability of 
chiefs in communal land administration. The important question is what is 
accountability? There is some consensus among scholars that accountability refers to 
the process of holding agents (individuals or collective actors) responsible for their 
actions in the context of specified mandates (Fearon 1999; O’Donnell 1993; McGee 
and Gaventa 2010; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999). This definition 
meets the intentions of constitution makers and development actors to hold chiefs 
responsible for how they manage communal lands on behalf of their subjects.    
 
There are about four key interrelated theoretical assumptions underlying demand for 
accountability of political agents (Manin et al. 1999a, 1999b; McGee and Gaventa 
2010; Schedler 1999).
17
 First, it is assumed that that an actor (or a group of actors) 
has agreed to play the role of an agent by performing some responsibilities on behalf 
of some principal actor (or group of actors). Second, it is usually assumed that the 
principal actor who appointed, nominated or elected the agent has performed 
whatever obligations that are due to the agent (including the provision of agreed 
financial, human, material, and political resources), to enable the agent perform the 
mandates. Third, it is assumed that principal actors will actually hold agents 
responsible for their actions. Fourth, it is assumed that if agents are transparent in the 
performance of their responsibilities or mandates it would enhance the knowledge 
and power of principals to hold agents responsible for their actions.  
                                                 
16
 Article 36(8) of the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic of Ghana. 
17
 Useful discussions of the theoretical assumptions underlying issues of accountability can be found 
in the work of McGee and Gaventa (2010), Przeworski et al. (1999), Schedler et al. (1999).
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If all the above four conditions are met then there is effective accountability. In 
effect, accountability is the relation between agential mandates and the actual 
enforcement of sanctions or rewards by principals in response to agential actions. It 
should be noted that the outcomes of agential actions may not conform to what both 
principals and agents had envisaged. There could be unintended outcomes from 
agential actions because initial “conditions may change in such a way that the 
implementation of the mandate is no longer best” (Manin et al. 1999b:35). For that 
reason, the enforcement of rewards or sanctions by principals should be shaped by 
agential responsiveness (and non-responsiveness) to their institutional mandates. It 
should be based on what Stokes (1999) calls ‘mandate-responsiveness’; and not 
necessarily based on outcomes generated by the actions of an agent. It is also 
important for agents to be proactive to the interests of their principals.  
 
This study shall be concerned with the analysis of accountability of state agencies in 
land administration. For this purpose, the study uses a useful analytical distinction 
made by Guillermo O’Donnell (1998, 1999, 2010) between two types of state 
accountability, namely, (i) vertical accountability and (ii) horizontal accountability. 
Vertical accountability is defined as relationships of accountability between state 
agencies and non-state actors in society. Horizontal accountability refers to 
relationships of accountability between two or more state agencies.  
 
State agencies that manage land in Ghana include traditional authorities and public 
sector land agencies like the Lands Commission. Citizens expect their traditional 
authorities to be accountable to them in the use of public (stool) land revenues. 
Public sector land agencies are also expected to effectively deliver services 
concerned with the registration of land transactions. While chiefs are not directly 
elected or sanctioned by citizens (Brobbey 2008); civil servants in public sector land 
agencies are also not directly rewarded or sanctioned by citizens. Therefore it 
becomes difficult for citizens to practically sanction traditional rulers and civil 
servants for unsatisfactory performance of mandates. It is generally acknowledged 
that Ghanaians do not think that it is culturally appropriate to publicly hold their 
traditional rulers responsible for their actions (Busia 1968; Kludze 1987, 2000; 
Odotei and Awedoba 2006; Oseadeeyo Addo-Dankwa III 2004). The vertical 
accountability of chiefs and civil servants to citizens may therefore become highly 
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dependent on agential willingness. The potential ineffectiveness of vertical state 
accountability is what influenced Ghanaians to also create state agencies such as the 
Courts, the Auditor-General Department, and the Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to horizontally hold chiefs and civil servants 
accountable for their actions. Later we shall see how the ineffectiveness of 
chieftaincy-society relations of vertical accountability influenced colonial British 
government officials to negotiate with chiefs the creation of horizontal mechanisms 
of accountability. Currently, one of the legacies of the colonial politics of state 
making is the annual accountability of Traditional Councils of Chiefs to the office of 
the Auditor-General. Since the 1930s the Audit Service Department have tried to 
hold chiefs responsible for how they use stool land revenues. The practical examples 
from the Ghanaian context are used in Diagram 1 below to illustrate the nature of 
vertical and horizontal state accountability. 
 
Diagram 1: A model of vertical and horizontal state accountability  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
In Diagram 1 above, state agencies are not automatically given but are created by 
actors in society – whether through peaceful, violent or coercive means. For 
analytical purposes, it is assumed here that the set of state agencies ‘A’ and ‘B’ were 
created by Ghanaians through constitutional design. Citizens expect all the state 
State Agencies ‘A’ 
Traditional rulers, Members 
of Parliament, the President, 
Lands Commission 
Non-state Actors in Society: Responsible for the creation of state agencies as 
well as the vertical enforcement of rules of accountability to make their 
agencies responsive. Enforcement of mandates by non-state actors may be 
signalled by political actions including removal of agents and court actions.   
C
re
at
io
n
 o
f 
st
at
e 
ag
en
ci
es
 
Horizontal accountability 
V
ertica
l a
cco
u
n
ta
b
ility
 
Horizontal accountability 
C
re
at
io
n
 o
f 
st
at
e 
ag
en
ci
es
 V
ertica
l a
cco
u
n
ta
b
ility
 
State Agencies ‘B’ 
Auditor-General/Audit 
Service, the Courts, CHRAJ 
 
43 
agencies to be vertically accountable to them in the performance of mandates. 
However, as already indicated, traditional rulers, Members of Parliament and civil 
servants have also been made horizontally accountable to the Auditor-General 
department. Moreover, the Courts and CHRAJ are also used as agencies of 
horizontal accountability. There is some recursive horizontal accountability between 
the Auditor-General, Parliament and the Courts. The effectiveness of state 
accountability is dependent on the design and enforcement of a set of vertical and 
horizontal institutions of accountability. Many scholars have however noted that 
development practitioners have the tendency to demand the creation of questionable 
institutions of vertical state accountability (McGee and Gaventa 2010; O’Donnell 
2010; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999).   
 
Recent customary land administration reforms in Ghana have sought to “improve 
accessibility of information at the level of customary land administration on land use 
and holdings, land transactions and availability, and associated financial and 
cadastral records” (Toulmin et al. 2004:13). Reforms have also been implemented to 
strengthen horizontal accountability among the public sector agencies of land 
administration to enhance inter-organizational cooperation and effective public 
service delivery. The outcomes of the projects are discussed in chapter 9. We shall 
see that the ‘senior civil servants’ in Ghana who were tasked by international 
development agencies to create transparent and accountable agencies of customary 
land administration were aware that Ghanaian cultural norms prohibit the subjects of 
chiefs from publicly demanding accountability from their chiefs.
18
 In the context of 
chieftaincy-society relations where rules of customary law largely define the “logics 
of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 2004), I argue that the choice of horizontal 
institutions of accountability is more likely to be effective in holding chiefs 
accountable than the dependence on vertical institutions of accountability. The 
existence of “cultural power distance” (Hofstede et al. 2010) between chiefs and 
their subjects should be taken seriously. The choice of institutions of accountability 
should be sensitive to the historical context of the power relations between chiefs 
and their subjects. I move on to discuss the theoretical framework of analysis.  
 
                                                 
18
 Interviews with Dr Odame Larbi (Director of Land Administration Project), 1/12/2010, and, Mr 
Jimmy Aidoo (Deputy Director/Monitoring and Evaluation Officer of LAP), 1/12/2010. 
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2.2 The Historical Institutional Analytical Approach: Understanding the 
Origins and Causal Effects of State Institutions  
 
The theoretical approach called historical institutionalism is what this study uses to 
explain the origins and causal effect of the bifurcation of state authority between 
chiefs and government over land administration in Ghana. The central argument of 
historical institutionalists in political science is that the creation and consolidation of 
institutions – particularly state institutions – matters in explaining current 
development process and outcomes in countries (Abbott 2001; Collier and Collier 
2002; Evans et al. 1985; Hall 1986; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Pierson 2004; Pierson 
and Skocpol 2002; Sanders 2006; Smith 2008; Steinmo et al. 1992; Thelen 1999). 
Historical institutionalists argue that institutions reflect the economic and political 
opportunities and constraints that structure interactions among diverse actors in 
society. It is therefore important that scholars and development actors examine the 
historical trajectories of institutions to understand why and how institutions matter in 
shaping development processes. When translated into the context of my study, it is 
important to examine the political-history of state formation in Ghana in order to 
understand the origins and causal effect of the bifurcation of state authority between 
chiefs and government over land administration. In the tradition of historical 
institutionalism, the political-history of the bifurcation of state authority between 
chiefs and government over land administration is explored in this study. The 
theoretical propositions that underlie historical institutionalism and the research 
methodology suggested by the approach are discussed in turn.  
 
Historical institutionalism is not simply concerned with recounting historical events 
within a limited historical period as the popular phrase history matters may suggest; 
but, the analytical approach is concerned with the political analysis of the legacies of 
institutional formation in the course of historical development. As Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010:7) point out, historical institutionalists “view institutions first and 
foremost as the political legacies of concrete historical struggles.” Many scholars 
have argued that historical institutionalists should emphasize the primacy of human 
agency in the formation, maintenance and change of institutions (Leftwich 2007, 
2008a, 2009; Lieberman 2002; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Moe 2005; Smith 1992). 
It is theoretically misplaced to privilege the role of structure over human agency 
45 
(Hay and Wincott 1998; McAnulla 2002; Smith 2006). Thus, at the heart of 
historical institutionalism are (at least) the following four key propositions:  
 
 First, institutions are created by human actors (individuals or their political 
agents) through political processes of cooperation, negotiation, and conflict. 
 
 Second, actors involved in the politics of institutional formation, maintenance 
and change bring to the process diverse forms of ideas, power and resources. 
 
 Third, actors are motivated by diverse reasons – social, economic, political 
and religious – to create and enforce institutions.  
 
 Finally, the process of institutional formation and change occurs within 
prevailing institutional contexts that commonly enable or constrain the ideas, 
interests and power of the actors involved in the new process.  
 
Historical institutionalists emphasize that state institutions are created by political 
actors (or human agency) through political processes of negotiation, cooperation, and 
conflict between actors. Political institutions are not neutral structures (Leftwich, 
2004, 2007). The political process of institutional formation generates interests from 
diverse actors because, first, institutions are purposely devised to both enable and 
constrain action and distribution of resources, and, second, human beings differ in 
ideas, interests, power and values and therefore the process of institutional formation 
is bound to be contested among actors. Once institutions are created, they shape 
human interactions in defining social, economic and political development.   
 
Historical institutionalists emphasize that institutional formation and change occur 
within institutional contexts that often privilege certain ideas and interests over 
others. This important claim does not suggest that human actors are helpless captives 
of institutional structures. The claim is based on the theoretical assumption that 
actors who benefit from existing institutions would (and usually do) protect the 
survival of their interests. Political actors are therefore more likely to support new 
ideas and actors that enhance existing benefits than those that do not. Particularly, 
state institutions provide actors with justifications for the ‘mobilization of bias’ 
(Schattschneider 1960) against actors who have conflicting or threatening interests. 
This notwithstanding, the creation of new institutions must necessarily be carried out 
through existing institutional procedures, channels of legitimation, and political 
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processes of negotiations. Existing procedures of legitimation privilege certain 
interests, ideas, values, and choices over others.  
 
My study provides significant evidence to support the claim that the origin of state 
institutions do matter in shaping current process and outcomes. As we shall later see, 
the constitutional rules of Ghana do not only consolidate communal land ownership 
managed by pre-colonial traditional rulers, but the traditional rulers also negotiated 
constitutional rules that prohibits the creation from communal lands “a freehold 
interest howsoever described.”19 The World Bank which provided financial support 
for land administration reforms in 2001-2010 realised that the 1992 Constitution 
affects its interest to create individual freehold land titles (World Bank 2003c:33). 
Crucially, the World Bank also found out that democratically elected Ghanaian 
governments cannot change the constitutional rules of land administration without 
the consent of traditional rulers (the National House of Chiefs, Regional Houses of 
Chiefs and 196 Traditional Councils) and at least two-thirds of the Members of 
Parliament. These constitutional rules did matter in shaping reform outcomes.  
 
Historical institutionalists have largely focused their research on the provenance and 
causal effect of formal-legal state institutions and agencies – such as constitutional 
rules, electoral systems, the legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and public 
policies – rather than on informal institutions. This lopsided focus is quite 
understandable because it is usually impossible to delineate the origins of informal 
institutions. Harsanyi (1960:140) makes the important point that “if we want to 
restrict our analysis to a point shorter than the whole history of the human race, we 
have to admit as explanatory variables initial conditions which are already social 
variables.” Across all human societies, informal institutions are part of the initial 
conditions that enable the formation of new formal and informal institutions. In 
recent times, a number of scholars have looked at the nature and causal effect of 
informal institutions on development processes (Ensminger and Knight 1997; Farrell 
and Knight 2003; Grief 1994; Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Hodgson 2001; Lauth 
2000; O’Donnell 2006; Steer and Sen 2008; Tsai 2007). It has been recognized that 
informal institutions do have significant effect in shaping behaviour in society and 
                                                 
19
 1992 Constitution of Ghana, Article 167(5). 
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the effectiveness of formal institutions. Understanding how formal and informal 
institutions interact to shape development processes in developing countries has 
become an important focus of analysis (Bratton 2007; Helmke and Levitsky 2006). 
Part of my study examined how informal rules of customary law interact with 
formal-legal state institutions to enhance or constrain the accountability of traditional 
rulers who manage communal lands on behalf of their members. We shall see that 
informal rules of customary law have the capacity to complement, conflict with, and 
substitute for formal-legal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Tsai 2007).  
 
Many historical institutionalists have contributed to the development of a 
parsimonious theoretical model that is used to explain how the origins of political 
institutions tends to have enduring causal effects on distinct development processes 
and outcomes. The theoretical model of explanation is referred to in this study as the 
critical juncture-path dependence (CJ-PD) model. The theoretical thrust of the CJ-
PD model is to explain the development and legacies of “a limited range of 
institutions within a limited range of politics” (Rokkan 1968:175). The CJ-PD model 
is what I have used to explain, first, the provenance of the bifurcation of state 
authority in Ghana between chiefs and government over land administration; and, 
second, how the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government shaped 
the politics and outcomes of land administration reforms implemented from 2001-
2010. The CJ-PD framework of explanation is discussed below.  
 
2.2.1 The Critical Juncture and Path Dependence Explanatory Model 
 
The theoretical claim of the CJ-PD explanatory model is that some political 
institutional choices made at a particular point in time proved significant in 
structuring subsequent distinctive development processes and outcomes (Abbott 
2001; Collier and Collier 2002; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Pierson 2004). The initial 
political institutional choice is what is referred to as ‘critical juncture’ (CJ). The 
distinctive development outcome produced by the initial choice is referred to as ‘path 
dependent’ (PD) outcome. Following Rokkan and Lipset (1967), Rokkan (1968) and 
Collier and Collier (2002), I define a critical juncture as a period of time during 
which the core attributes of an institution, or a political process, or a political 
outcome was initially developed. A critical juncture is hypothesized to have 
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produced a distinct outcome. The definition of the period of a critical juncture cannot 
be done in abstract but through empirical historical analysis of the process of 
institutional formation. Collier and Collier (2002:33) emphasize that “The 
importance or lack of importance of a critical juncture cannot be established in 
general, but only with reference to a specific historical legacy.” Pierson (2004:11) 
also point out that “Claims about path dependence typically suggest that beginnings 
are very important.” The CJ-PD explanatory framework therefore contains two 
components: (1) the claim that a political decision, political settlement, or moment of 
institutional innovation occurred in the history of a given polity; and (2), that this 
event causally produced distinct legacies. The CJ-PD explanatory model does not 
seek to explain the origin of antecedent conditions that produced the CJ. It seeks to 
explain how the CJ was produced from the antecedent conditions.   
 
Methodologically, the CJ-PD explanatory framework suggests a causal analysis with 
a terminus ad quo (a starting point, origin, beginning, formative moment or choice 
point) and a terminus ad quem (a final or latest finishing point) (Collier and Collier 
2002; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Rokkan 1968). Rueschemeyer and Stephens 
(1997:57) rightly point out that “One needs diachronic evidence about historical 
sequences to explore and to test ideas about causation directly.” The diachronic 
evidence seeks to emphasize the historical institutionalist claim that historical 
choices matter. I shall return to the methodological implications of the CJ-PD 
analytical model. I discuss below how the CJ-PD model is applied to the study. 
 
My study sought to examine the origin and causal effect of the constitutional 
bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government over land 
administration in Ghana. From the analysis of the historical records, my argument is 
that the initial creation of the Ghanaian state during the colonial period is the critical 
juncture that structured the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and 
government over land administration. The initial colonial state that was negotiated 
between 1821 and 1831 is conceptualized as the traditional-federal state. British 
colonial state makers declared colonial rule over Ghana (then called the Gold Coast) 
in 1821. The pre-colonial period was characterized by the existence of powerful 
traditional states with their political organizations of governance called chieftaincy. 
The political institutions that governed chieftaincy-society relations are generally 
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referred to as informal rules of customary law. Traditional states also administered 
land under a system of communal ownership. The study will show that the failure of 
British colonial officials and their military forces to supersede the traditional states 
and claim ultimate ownership of their stool lands led to the creation of a colonial 
state with bifurcated authority between chiefs and government over the 
administration of land. The creation of the traditional-federal state is hypothesized as 
the CJ which shaped the development of the current 1992 constitutional bifurcation 
of state authority between chiefs and government over land administration.  
 
The study explains how the initial development of the traditional-federal state in 
1821-1831 shaped diverse path dependent political processes and outcomes from 
1832 to the present. For the purpose of my historical analysis of the causal effect of 
the configuration of traditional-federal state authority on the politics and outcomes of 
land administration reforms, I limit the periodization to 2010. The first phase of a 
long term land administration reform project came to an end in 2010. The diagram 
below depicts the CJ-PD framework that underpins my empirical explanations.  
 
Diagram 2: The CJ-PD Model of Historical Institutional Analysis
20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The colonial state that was created between 1821 and 1831 integrated the pre-
existing traditional states and their communal land ownership systems. The nature of 
the critical juncture produced diverse outcomes including (i) conflicts between chiefs 
and government over land ownership leading to political settlements that 
                                                 
20
 See Collier and Collier (2002:30) and Mahoney (2001:113) for similar theoretical depictions of the 
CJ-PD explanatory framework.  
Step 2: Historical institutional analysis of causal 
effects of the CJ on PD 
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Antecedent Conditions 
1800-1820 
Step 1: Explanation of the political 
process that produced the CJ 
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consolidated communal land ownership, (ii) political reforms that sought to unify the 
dual authorities of chiefs and government within a single governmental structure 
from the national level to the local level, (iii) attempts to reform the informal rules of 
customary law to ensure transparency and accountability in chieftaincy 
administration, (iv) the sharing of stool land revenues between chiefs and 
government, (v) the creation of ‘public sector’ agencies to grant concurrence to 
communal land transaction, and (vi) constitutional rules that prohibits government 
and parliament to autonomously reform matters affecting chieftaincy without the 
consent of chiefs. Currently, the critical juncture has shaped demands from the 
World Bank, and resistance from chiefs, for the transformation of the communal land 
ownership system into individual freehold lands.   
 
Thus, the critical juncture of state formation in 1821-1831 has produced many 
relevant legacies that I have discussed in the study. The key point is that the critical 
juncture matters for understanding the outcome of bifurcated state authority between 
chiefs and government. The pre-colonial antecedent condition, the critical juncture of 
state formation in 1821-1831, and diverse path dependent outcomes and processes 
that I have discussed in the study are summarized below in Table 3.  
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Table 3: Antecedent Conditions, Critical Juncture and Path Dependence of the Traditional-Federal State in Ghana 
 
Antecedent 
conditions before 
1821 
Critical Juncture (CJ) 
of state organization: 
1821-1831 
Colonial Path Dependent (PD) Political Processes & Outcomes: 
1832-1956 
Post-colonial Path Dependent (PD) Political 
Processes and Outcomes: 1957-2010   
Existence of pre-
colonial traditional 
states with ruling 
organizations of 
chieftaincy. Chiefs 
administered 
communal lands 
through informal 
rules of customary 
law. 
Declaration of colonial 
rule over the Gold 
Coast by Britain and 
the failure of British 
colonial state makers to 
supersede the pre-
existing traditional 
states through war-
making. This led to the 
creation of the 
traditional-federal state 
with division of final 
state authority between 
the traditional states 
and the new British 
colonial Government.  
 
 
1831 
Creation of the traditional-federal state through Peace Treaty 
negotiated between ‘Governor’ George MacClean and the 
traditional states. 
 
1957-
2010 
 
Consolidation of the traditional-federal 
state with integration of the rules of 
customary law in local communities into 
the laws of Ghana. 1844 
Consolidation of 1831 MacClean Peace Treaty through the 
signing of the ‘bonds’ of 1844 between Central Government 
and traditional states. 
1877-
1901 
Consolidation of stool (communal) land ownership and tenure 
administration by chiefs following the failure of governments to 
claim, particularly through the 1894 and 1897 Crown Land 
Bills, ultimate state (‘public’) ownership of all lands. 
1957-
2010 
(i) Consolidation of stool land ownership 
and tenure administration by chiefs with 
constitutional prohibition on the creation 
of individual freeholds from stool land. 
(ii) Land administration reforms in 2001-
2010 to create accountable agencies of 
stool land administration. 
1878-
1951 
1878/1927 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and 1944 Native 
Authority Ordinance formally transform organizations of 
chieftaincy into agencies of local government (Native 
Administration system).  
1957-
2010 
Separation of organizations of chieftaincy 
from the local government system.  
1916-
1953 
The creation of a dominant ruling coalition comprising chiefs, 
non-chief indigenous political elites, and British officials within 
the Executive and Legislative Councils.   
1969-
2010 
Co-optation of chiefs into Presidential-
Executive decision-making through the 
Council of State.  
1926-
1932 
Chiefs created Provincial Councils of Chiefs and the Joint 
Provincial Council of Chiefs to strengthen chieftaincy 
governance and promote ‘national-state’ building.  
1957-
2010 
Transformation of the Provincial Councils 
of Chiefs and Joint Provincial Council of 
Chiefs into ten Regional Houses of Chiefs 
and the National House of Chiefs 
respectively.   
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Table 3 continuation: Antecedent Conditions, Critical Juncture and Path Dependence of the Traditional-Federal State in Ghana 
 
Antecedent 
conditions before 
1821 
Critical Juncture (CJ) 
of state organization: 
1821-1831 
Colonial Path Dependent (PD) Political Processes & Outcomes: 
1832-1956 
Post-colonial PD Political Processes and 
Outcomes: 1957-2010   
  
1907-
1945 
Dominant ruling coalition of British officials, chiefs, and non-
chief indigenous elites created the Survey Department (1907), 
Lands Department (1925?), and Town and Country Planning 
Department (1945) to govern access to and use of land. 
1957-
2010 
Town and Country Planning Department 
consolidated. Lands Department 
Secretariat transformed into Lands 
Commission Secretariat in 1980s. Survey 
Department integrated into Lands 
Commission in 2008.   
1932-
1951 
i) Creation of formal-legal rules of Native Revenue 
Administration to govern chieftaincy administration. 
ii) Revenue and expenditure of State Councils of chiefs 
audited by Audit Service Department. 
1957-
2010 
Revenue and expenditure of Traditional 
Councils of chiefs still audited by Audit 
Service Department. 
1949 
i) Coussey Committee separated organizations of chieftaincy 
from local government. Political settlement implemented from 
1951 with no alternative formal-legal rules created to govern 
stool land revenue administration.  
ii) Coussey Committee agreed over the sharing of stool land 
revenues between chiefs and local government agencies.  
1957-
2010 
i) Organizations of Chieftaincy remain 
separated from local government. 
ii) Office of the Administrator of Stool 
Lands (OASL) is the current agency 
constitutionally created to collect and 
share stool land revenues.   
iii) Land administration reform in 2004-
2010 to create new accountable formal-
legal institutions and agencies to manage 
stool lands in local communities.   
1952-
1956 
Chiefs and the non-chief political elites negotiated 
constitutional limitations on the authority of government and 
parliament to reform institutions of chieftaincy without the 
consent of chiefs.   
1957-
2010 
Constitutional limitations on the authority 
of government and parliament to reform 
institutions of chieftaincy consolidated in 
the 1957, 1969, 1979 and 1992 
constitutions.  
1821-
1956 
Definitions of the geographical boundaries of the state. Final 
boundary defined in 1956.   
1957-
2010 
Consolidation of the geographical 
boundaries of the Ghanaian state.  
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The path dependent processes shown in Table 3 are “grounded in a dynamic of 
increasing returns” (Pierson 2000:251) to the critical juncture of the traditional-
federal state. While some PD processes that were subsequently produced were not 
sustained or consolidated, many others have been consolidated to the present. It 
could be seen from Table 3 that the politics of land administration in Ghana is 
embedded within complex set of rules of state organization that structures political 
relations of authority between chiefs and government. This makes the analysis of the 
politics of land administration reform a complex, and usually frustrating, adventure. 
The CJ-PD analytical framework will help us to understand why the customary land 
administration regime managed by chiefs remains the dominant form of land 
administration in Ghana. We shall see that the organization of the traditional-federal 
state continues to shape the politics and outcomes of land administration reform. 
Under the current traditional-federal Ghanaian state, organizations of chieftaincy 
(remnants of the traditional states) still retain some degree of final authority in the 
creation and reform of institutions of chieftaincy and stool land administration.  
 
In sum, historical institutionalists emphasize that the initial development of 
institutions usually produce powerful inertial stickiness in shaping subsequent 
political outcomes. This study argues that the political settlement negotiated between 
British officials and rulers of traditional states to produce the traditional-federal state 
in the Gold Coast, between 1821 and 1831, continued to have a causal effect on the 
sharing of state authority between chiefs and government over the institutional 
development of chieftaincy and land administration. It does not appear that Ghanaian 
political elites and ordinary citizens are willing to abrogate the path of the current 
legacies of the traditional-federal state (Brobbey 2008). To understand why the 
modern Ghanaian state limits the authority of government and parliament to reform 
institutions of chieftaincy and land administration, one would have to examine the 
provenance of the configuration of state authority between chiefs and government. It 
would become clear that there is a causal linkage between the political dynamics that 
shaped the initial development of the state and the current outcomes. This study has 
pursued such analysis by using the CJ-PD model of explaining the historical 
development of the Ghanaian state. The CJ-PD analytical model has an implicit 
research methodology that I discuss below in the context of my study.     
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2.3 Research Methodology:  Comparative Historical Analysis 
 
Lieberman (2001:1011) pointed out that “Although the emerging streams of 
historical institutional analysis have generated substantial insights in the field of 
comparative politics, this scholarship has lacked a self-conscious approach to 
methodology.” A number of scholars have elaborated upon the methodological 
approach suggested by the CJ-PD explanatory framework (Abbott 2001; Collier and 
Collier 2002; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003; Pierson 2004). As earlier indicated, 
the CJ-PD methodological approach entails, first, a specification of the CJ from the 
antecedent conditions and, second, a causal analysis of the effect of the CJ on 
subsequent PD outcomes. Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003:10) emphasize that the 
methodology focuses on “a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes 
over time, and the use of systematic and contextualized comparison.” Harsanyi 
(1960) conceived it as ‘a problem of comparative dynamics’ between ‘initial 
conditions’ of development and the ‘subsequent external influences’. In the context 
of my study, the two-step comparative historical analysis
21
 involved: 
 
1. Historical analysis of the origins of the present traditional-federal state.  
 
2. Comparative historical analysis of the causal effect of the critical juncture of 
traditional-federal state formation on the subsequent organization of 
Chieftaincy-Government state relations over land administration.   
 
The concern of the study was to understand, first, the provenance of the 1992 
constitutional bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government over land 
administration, and second, how the critical juncture of the bifurcated traditional-
federal state have shaped the politics and outcomes of land administration reforms. I 
emphasize that the CJ-PD analytical model is not simply to present a parsimonious 
explanation of political outcomes but to explain the historical development of the 
traditional-federal state and its causal effect on land administration. 
 
                                                 
21
 Comparative historical analysis is defined in this study to mean “[explanation of] similarities and 
differences in the development over time of different societies or different parts of the same society, 
in terms of the initial conditions (i.e. the conditions prevailing at some arbitrary point of time chosen 
as the starting point of our investigation) and in terms of the subsequent external influences (boundary 
conditions) affecting their development” (Harsanyi 1960:136). Diverse strategies of comparative 
historical analysis in the social sciences are discussed in Abbott (2001), Mahoney (2001), Mahoney 
and Rueschemeyer, eds. (2003), and Mahoney and Terrie (2008).       
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The methodological approach of the study focuses on sequential analysis of the 
causal linkages between the initial formation of the traditional-federal state and 
subsequent path dependent processes of state development. I take the traditional 
states and their systems of chieftaincy, communal land ownership and informal rules 
of customary law as historically given. I do not seek to explain the origins of these 
antecedent conditions. Before I discuss the research methods that I employed for 
data collection and historical analysis, I discuss below the problem of case selection 
from many path dependent outcomes of communal land administration reforms.   
 
2.3.1 The Problem of Case Selection from Numerous PD Outcomes 
 
From 2001 to 2010, Ghana implemented land administration reforms in 37 
communities intended to create accountable agencies of communal land 
administration. The reforms included other objectives that I discuss later. The 
problem of case selection had little to do with matters of theoretical interest (Gerring 
2006, 2008). It was clear enough that there is a causal linkage between the 
integration of traditional states into the traditional-federal state and the subsequent 
communal land administration reforms in the 37 local communities. The problem 
was inadequate research funding to pursue an in-depth study of all the 37 cases of 
communal land administration reforms. Faced with acute research funding 
constraint, I selected for in-depth case study analysis three cases of communal land 
administration reform located within the powerful Asante Kingdom. The reasons for 
the choice of reform cases from the Asante Kingdom are explained below.  
 
a. Falling within the pathway: Maintaining the dynamics of power 
relations at the critical juncture of traditional-federal state formation 
 
The most important consideration in the selection of cases for CJ-PD analysis is the 
selection of cases that fall within the pathway of the hypothesized critical juncture to 
enable the researcher probe causal mechanisms (Gerring 2008; Lieberman 2001). On 
theoretical grounds, therefore, the balance of power relations between traditional 
states and government within the traditional-federal state needs to be maintained as 
much as possible to help examine the effects of external variables on the stability of 
the critical juncture. Colonial British officials and numerous traditional states in the 
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then Gold Coast (now Ghana) recognized that the most decisive factor for the 
creation of a stable colonial state was the willingness of the Asante Empire to 
negotiate a political settlement that granted independence to the other traditional 
states. The choice of cases of stool land administration reform in the Asante 
kingdom, the most powerful remnant of the traditional states, sought to enable 
hypothesis testing of causal mechanisms produced by the internal dynamics of power 
relations at the critical juncture of traditional-federal state formation.  
 
The key objective of the Land Administration Project (LAP) was to create 
transparent and accountable administrative agencies to manage stool lands to 
enhance market transactions in stool lands (Quan et al. 2008; Toulmin et al. 2004; 
World Bank 2003c). The most important criterion used by the LAP for institutional 
reform in stool land owning areas was “economic viability” indicated by the 
following; demand for land relative to supply of available land; size of available 
land, potential for income generation from land transactions to support agencies once 
established, and the nature of land based economic and social activities. The centre 
of the Asante Kingdom called Kumasi traditional area typically met the reform 
conditions. The Kumasi traditional area witnessed three cases of reform processes to 
create Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) as transparent and accountable agencies 
of stool land administration. The three cases were used for in-depth analysis.  
 
Interestingly, areas with high economic transactions in stool lands in Ghana are also 
areas controlled by very powerful traditional authorities with acrimonious historical 
relations of power struggle with Government (Aryeetey et al. 2007; Austin 1964; 
Rathbone 2000a). From a political science perspective, it made much sense to 
analyse how the constitutional configuration of the traditional-federal state interacts 
with the variable of economic development to shape the politics of land 
administration reform. It is interesting to note that the history of state formation in 
Europe shows that the areas with high concentration of capital tend to have high 
concentration of political coercion, control, power, and conflict (Tilly 1992). 
Political and economic variables therefore tend to be the most crucial variables that 
shape processes of formation and the developmental paths of states. I move on to 
discuss the research methods that were used to collect data for historical analysis.  
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2.4 Research Methods: Documentary Analysis and Interviews 
 
Historical institutionalists have devoted some attention to elaborate on specific 
research methods that could be used to investigate ‘causal mechanisms’ or ‘historical 
causation’ of institutional paths of development (Abbott 2001; Gerring 2008; 
Lieberman 2001; McAdam et al. 2008). The CJ-PD comparative method of historical 
analysis suggests that the choice of appropriate research methods should be informed 
by the periodization of the outcome of research interest, accessibility of historical 
records, and accessibility of the actors who created the institutions of research 
interest. These matters do have implications for practical research considerations 
such as time constraint and availability of funding to pursue relevant data.   
 
The periodization of the political outcome of research interest did matter for the 
choice of research methods. For instance, it is inconceivable that the political actors 
who negotiated the initial organization of the state from 1821 are alive to be 
interviewed for their perspectives about the outcome. However, to understand the 
outcomes of the Land Administration Project (LAP) implemented from 2001-2010, I 
could have access to existing historical records, official documents, relevant 
secondary literature, and the living actors who implemented the LAP. I discuss 
below how I collected research data from secondary literature, historical records, 
official documents and interviews to answer the research questions.  
 
2.4.1 Secondary Sources of Research Data 
 
There is an extensive secondary literature describing the legal and organizational 
framework of the dual state authority over land administration between chiefs and 
government.
22
 There also exist some detailed historical accounts of the political 
struggles between chiefs and non-chief indigenous political elites over the control of 
state authority over political governance during the dying moments of colonialism 
and the early post-colonial period.
23
 Such historical studies served as useful maps in 
helping me get an idea of how far I needed to go into history to identify the critical 
                                                 
22
 Comprehensive accounts of the dual system of land administration usually come from the work of 
legal scholars such as Ollenu (1962), Bentsi-Enchill (1964), and Woodman (1997). 
23
 Outstanding detailed historical accounts of this exciting politics include the work of Austin (1964), 
Gocking (2005), and Rathbone (1993; 2000a).  
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juncture of chieftaincy-state relations, and also where to get the primary historical 
data for such analysis. What is less apparent in the extensive secondary literature is 
systematic theoretical explanation of the provenance of the bifurcation of state 
authority over land administration between chiefs and government, and the causal 
effects of this power configuration on the politics and outcomes of land 
administration reform.
24
 In a conversation with Richard Rathbone who has done 
extensive field research on the politics of chieftaincy-state relations in Ghana over 
the past forty years, he offered me this advice, “In order to answer the questions you 
pose, there is no escaping the absolute necessity of working in the archives.”25 He 
was right. What I did not anticipate was the high financial cost associated with 
archival research. I discuss below the kind of data that I collected from the archives.  
 
2.4.2 Examining Historical Records for Sequential Evidence 
 
The study relied solely on historical documents to account for the provenance of the 
traditional-federal Ghanaian state as well as the causal effect of the CJ on the 
subsequent structuring of power relations between chiefs and government over land 
administration, prior to the 2001-2010 land administration reforms. The study then 
relied partly on official documents produced by diverse actors who implemented the 
2001-2010 land administration reforms to explain how the organization of state 
authority between chiefs and government shaped the politics and outcomes of the 
land administration reforms. The types and sources of historical documents that were 
collected for comparative historical analysis are described below.  
 
In a 779-page book titled Great Britain and Ghana – Documents of Ghana History, 
1807-1957, G. E. Metcalfe (1964) has published [on behalf of the University of 
Ghana] diverse historical documents from the British and Ghana National Archives 
concerning the historical development of the Ghanaian state prior to, and during, 
British colonial rule. The 515 documents are made up official letters, annual reports 
on political and economic developments in the Gold Coast, minutes of British 
officials in London about events in the Gold Coast, political agreements between 
British colonial governors and traditional states, reports of indigenous political 
                                                 
24
 Notable exception can be made of the research works of Apter (1959) and Ray (1996). 
25
 Richard Rathbone, email conversation, 28 July, 2011.  
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groups (e.g. Fanti Confederacy), minutes of Legislative Council debates, minutes of 
Executive Council debates, diverse constitutional settlements, etc. The rich historical 
documents compiled by Metcalfe proved to be an invaluable source of information 
for understanding the provenance of the traditional-federal state and the bifurcation 
of state authority between chiefs and government over land administration. 
Metcalfe’s chronological presentation of historical events in the Gold Coast offered 
me the opportunity to do diachronic analysis of the historical sequences of state 
development. It helped me to explore and test ideas about causation directly.  
 
The University of York online library also enabled me to access important official 
documents on political developments in Ghana kept in the British National Archives. 
I obtained relevant information from the Hansard of the UK Parliament (House of 
Commons and House of Lords) on important political developments concerning 
colonization and decolonization in the Gold Coast. The documents obtained from the 
Hansard of the UK Parliament have not been used directly in the study but they form 
part of the rich background knowledge that indirectly shaped my analysis.    
 
During my eight months of fieldwork in Ghana, I collected relevant historical 
documents from the Public Records and Archives Administration Department 
(PRAAD) in Accra. In particular, I collected historical records on debates between 
traditional authorities, colonial British officials and merchants, and the ‘new’ 
indigenous political elites that took place in the Executive Council, the Legislative 
Council, the Legislative Assembly, and Parliament. Gold Coast annual reports on the 
administration of chieftaincy organizations (Native Authorities) played a key role in 
my understanding of institutional reforms negotiated between chiefs and British 
governors, particularly from the 1920s to the 1940s, to transform organizations of 
chieftaincy into transparent and accountable state agencies. Very little research work 
has been done by scholars about the important colonial state reforms that occurred 
although the reforms have left important institutional legacies of state accountability 
between organizations of chieftaincy and the Audit Service Department.  
 
The Ghana Publishing Corporation in Accra which prints state official documents 
was also an important source for acquiring all the post-colonial constitutions of 
Ghana and statutory enactments such as the 1971 and 2008 Chieftaincy Acts. 
60 
Analyzing the historical sequence of state constitutional settlements since colonial 
rule is very important to understand the origins of the current 1992 constitutional 
bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government. It would be seen that 
such diachronic analysis of the sequence of constitutional settlements played an 
important role in my causal claims of path dependent outcomes.   
 
Concerning the analysis of the politics and outcomes of the Land Administration 
Project (LAP) implemented from 2001-2010, I collected official and unofficial 
documents from the Land Administration Project Unit (LAPU), Customary Land 
Secretariats (CLSs), the Lands Commission, the National House of Chiefs, and 
individual actors who played diverse roles in the reform process. The annual LAP 
implementation progress reports, from 2001-2010, were analyzed. I also obtained 
and analyzed some of the minutes from the meetings of the Land Sector Steering 
Committee (LSTC), the Land Policy Steering Committee (LPSC), and the LAPU to 
help me understand the variables that shaped the reform outcomes. The historical 
analysis of diverse documents produced from the LAP will clearly show that the 
constitutional organization of state authority between chiefs and government was the 
key factor that shaped the so-called ‘supply-led’ and ‘demand-led’ customary land 
administration reform strategies pursued by reform officials. The evidence from the 
LAP documents therefore plays a crucial role in supporting the CJ-PD thesis.    
 
2.4.3 Interviews: Adding Little Colour to Stiff Accounts?        
 
The information obtained from official documents concerning the 2001-2010 land 
administration reform did not always satisfy my quest to understand the nature of the 
reform processes and outcomes. I considered it important to interview relevant actors 
who were involved in the reform in order to clarify some unclear reform processes 
and outcomes. The use of interviews to complement official documents in my 
comparative historical analysis should not be seen as an attempt “to add a little 
colour to otherwise stiff accounts” (Rathbun 2008:685).  
 
Political institutions are created by human actors whose intentions matter for 
understanding the success or failure of institutional formation, maintenance and 
change. The land administration reforms implemented from 2001-2010 involved 
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diverse actors of international development agencies, civil servants, political elites,
26
 
traditional authorities and private consultants. To clearly understand the land 
administration reform outcomes I conducted unstructured interviews with 18 
purposely selected individuals who participated in the reforms. I also conducted 
some kind of focused group discussions with four groups of actors.  
 
The term individual unstructured interview is used here to refer to a research 
interview in which some or all of the questions that individual respondents are asked 
varies as a result of differences in respondent roles, knowledge, or other factors that 
is of interest to the researcher (Bryman 2008). Traditional authorities, civil servants, 
political elites, international development agencies and other reform participants 
usually did not have the same interest in the reforms. Individual unstructured 
interview with relevant reform participants was used to clarify reform processes and 
outcomes reported in official documents. The heads of the public sector land 
agencies (Lands Commission, Land Title Registry, Land Valuation Board, Survey 
Department, OASL, and TCPD) were interviewed to understand why they supported 
or resisted the reforms as well as their perspectives on the reasons for the reform 
outcomes. My interviews focused on the heads of the agencies because they had 
been constituted into a Land Sector Technical Committee (LSTC) to play key 
advisory and supervision roles in the reform process.  
 
Government decision-making about the reform was largely dependent on the 
technical advice of these ‘senior civil servants’ (Kotey et al. 1998). ‘Junior staffs’ of 
the public sector land agencies played little role in the politics and outcomes of the 
organizational reform process (MASDAR 2011b). Notwithstanding the influential 
roles played by the senior civil servants in the reform process, they shared the 
consensus that the organization of the land sector agencies in the constitutional rules 
of the state played an important role in shaping reform outcomes. For instance, there 
was consensus among the heads of the agencies that the old Lands Commission and 
the OASL could not be restructured into a single agency because they had been 
                                                 
26
 I use the concept of ‘elites’ here to refer to people who occupy political leadership positions in 
government and other state agencies. Leftwich (2010) has attempted to pin down the vague concept of 
elite. I use the term ‘political ruling elites’ to refer to the political leaders who participate in Executive 
and Legislative decision making in Ghana. They include Paramount chiefs within the 50-member 
National House of Chiefs whose legislative authority is required by Government and Parliament 
before institutions of chieftaincy can be reformed.    
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constitutionally structured to operate as separate agencies. What was less apparent to 
them was that the conflicting interests of chiefs and government had shaped the 
constitutional structuring of these agencies. The individual unstructured interviews 
provided further evidence to support the thesis that the bifurcation of state authority 
between chiefs and government over land administration matters for reform.         
 
Focus group interview (FGI) is used here to describe a research interview where the 
researcher interviews a group of people about a specific situation or event that is 
relevant to the group and of interest to the researcher.
27
 I interviewed three groups of 
traditional authorities responsible for the administration of communal lands in their 
respective local communities. They had played key roles in the attempt by the LAP 
to create transparent and accountable CLSs in their communities. Communal land 
administration reforms implemented under the LAP had a vaguely defined reform 
objective to ensure “effective accountability” in communal land administration. FGIs 
with traditional authorities at Gbawe and Nkawie local communities where CLSs 
had been created were intended to clarify the nature of the reform outcomes. For 
instance, the interview with traditional authorities at Nkawie produced evidence that 
contradicted the report in official document that the Nkawie CLS was “effectively 
operational” (LAPU-CLAU 2008). The Nkawie CLS project had become moribund 
due to some complex chieftaincy conflicts (MASDAR 2011b). The FGI with the 
Nkawie traditional authorities and CLS staff threw light on the nature of the conflict 
and how the organization of the traditional-federal state matters in the resolution of 
such conflicts. I also held a FGI with a group of civil servants who worked in the 
Auditor-General’s Department in order to understand the challenges they faced in 
auditing the stool land revenues and expenditure of Traditional Councils of chiefs. 
The FGI with the staffs of the Audit Service also sought to understand how the 
interaction between formal-legal rules and informal-legal customary laws in the 
administration of chiefs over communal lands affect their capacity to effectively 
audit the administration of chiefs.
28
 Table 4 below summarizes the nature of the 
informants and interview approaches used. 
 
                                                 
27
 I use the definition of Bryman (2008:197) that “In the case of group interviews or focus groups, 
there is more than one, and usually quite a few more than one, respondent or interviewee.”  
28
Initially, I had intended to conduct individual interviews with them but they suggested that a focus 
group interview would generate more interesting discussions. And certainly it did.       
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Table 4: Nature of Interviews Conducted 
 
Nature of 
Interview 
Categories of interview Participants 
Number  
interviewed29 
Individual 
unstructured 
Interviews  
Staff of the new Lands Commission 3 
Staff of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) 2 
Staff of the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) 2 
Staff of the LAPU (former and present) 4 
Staff at the Asantehene Land Secretariat30  2 
Private LAP project consultants, political elites, and other 
informants  
5 
Total 18 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
(FGIs) 
i. Traditional authorities (Council of Elders) of the Nii Tetteh Kwartei 
family in Gbawe with some members of the local community 
present.31 The Nii Tetteh Kwartei family owns large family lands for 
which a CLS had been established. 
 
ii. Land Management Committee (LMC) appointed by the Council of 
Elders of the Nii Tetteh Kwartei family to administer both the family 
lands and the CLS. 
 
iii. Traditional authorities and CLS staff of the Nkawie divisional area 
who manage stool lands within the Kumasi Traditional area of the 
Asante Kingdom.  
 
iv. Officials of the Auditor-General’s Department who among many 
functions audits the accounts of Traditional Councils of Chiefs.  
 
 
                                                 
29
 Refers to only the number of interviewees referenced in the study.   
30
 The Asantehene Land Secretariat rejected the new name of Asantehene Customary Land Secretariat 
(CLS) and so I use their preferred old name. The reasons for their rejection of the CLS project are 
discussed later in the study (chapter 9).   
31
 The Council of Elders was composed of the chief of Gbawe, sub chiefs and the Djaasetse. The 
Djaasetse is the head of the council and leader in the appointment of chiefs for the Gbawe local 
community. In the encounter, the Djaasetse was the main speaker with his linguist (Okyeame). The 
interviewer experienced a function of the Council on the day of the interview. This was the arbitration 
functions. People with diverse problems come to the Council for solutions. There was a case of a man 
who had complained to the Council that his supposed land (acquired from the Council) had been 
occupied by another person. Upon investigation the Council realized that the land did not belong to 
the complainant and that he had misjudged the location of his land. He was shown the appropriate 
location of his land and he was satisfied with the outcome. There was another case of land litigation 
and the person who reported the issue was found not to have been paying the rent. He was asked to go 
and settle all the rent before the case could be dealt with. He settled the dues with the Land 
Management Committee (LMC) and a new arbitration date was scheduled for his case to be heard. 
My participation in the arbitration proceedings and subsequent public interview with the Council gave 
me a deeper insight into the prospects, challenges and outcome of the Gbawe CLS project. The 
Gbawe CLS was regarded by the LAP as the best CLS project (Quan et al. 2008). Permission was 
sought to digitally record the interviews but they refused on grounds that they might make statements 
which might be misinterpreted out of context. They only permitted handwritten notes and 
photographs to be taken. My interviews with the Council of Elders and the LMC proceeded after I had 
paid the ‘drink money’ as a customary requirement to speak with the traditional authorities.   
 
64 
The reform actors who were interviewed did not always fall into neat categories as I 
wished. For instance, the Regional Director of the Land Title Registration Division 
of the Ashanti Regional Lands Commission was a chief who usually assisted in the 
administration of the Asantehene Lands Secretariat. I sometimes asked him 
questions in his capacity as the Director of the Land Title Registration Division of 
the Ashanti Regional Lands Commission; and at other times I asked him questions in 
his capacity as a chief of a local community entrusted with the authority to 
administer customary lands on behalf of his subjects. The same duality of status was 
encountered at the regional office of the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
whose head was the Chief Linguist (Akyeamehene) of the Asantehene – the powerful 
King of the Asante Kingdom. It therefore becomes difficult to categorize these 
unique actors as either traditional authorities or public servants. The situation 
symbolises the problems and opportunities faced in the organization of rules and 
actors within the traditional-federal state. The privilege of interviewing these two 
senior civil servants and high-level traditional office holders within the Asante 
Kingdom helped me to know more about the internal dynamics of stool land 
administration in the Asante Kingdom. They also helped deepen my understanding 
of the extent to which the chiefs of the Kumasi Traditional Council supported the 
objective of the Land Administration Project (LAP) to create transparent and 
publicly accountable agencies of stool land administration. In Table 4 above, I have 
added these two actors to the category of ‘other informants’.   
 
2.4.4 Other Sources of Primary Data 
 
During the period of my fieldwork in Ghana, officials of the LAP were busy trying 
to wind up the remaining activities of the first phase of the project. The research 
benefited from my participation in three important group activities. First, I was 
invited to a workshop organized by the LAP for the National House of Chiefs 
(located in Kumasi) and the LAP legal team to discuss the content of the second 
draft of a Lands Bill. Aspects of the Lands Bill dealt with institutional mechanisms 
intended to enhance the accountability of chiefs in land administration. Some of the 
interesting issues that emerged are discussed in the empirical chapters of the study.  
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Second, I was lucky again to have been invited to a workshop organized by the Land 
Tenure Centre of the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology 
(KNUST) for the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs to discuss the implications of 
the new Lands Commission Act for customary land administration. This time the 
invitation came from staffs of the Asantehene Lands Secretariat and researchers at 
the Land Tenure Centre who were aware of my research interest in the issues. The 
knowledge gained from this workshop shaped my understanding about the position 
of the members of the Ashanti Regional House of Chiefs towards the CLS project. 
 
A third opportunity to learn more about the views of chiefs and the general public on 
matters concerning chieftaincy and land administration availed itself during the 
consultative meetings of the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC). The CRC 
was established by Government in 2010 to review and clarify among many other 
things ‘the public character of chieftaincy institutions’. I participated in the 
consultative meetings of the CRC in the Ashanti, Eastern, Western, Greater Accra, 
and Central regions of Ghana to learn what the ordinary Ghanaian citizen, traditional 
authorities, and political elites think about their informal institutions of chieftaincy – 
particularly concerning their role in customary land administration.  
 
The relevant information that I got from my participation in the above workshops 
and the CRC consultative meetings combined with the information I obtained from 
historical records to shape my conviction that the bifurcation of state authority in 
Ghana between chiefs and government over land administration is important in 
shaping the success or failure of land administration reforms.  
 
2.4.5 Academic Integrity and Research Ethics 
 
Research in the Department of Politics is regulated by rules of academic integrity 
and ethical conduct supervised by the Politics Department Research Committee and 
the University’s Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee (HSSEC). Both 
committees approved the research proposal and methodological procedures after I 
had passed the academic integrity examination.   
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The rules of ethical conduct of the University of York were followed during the 
collection of research data in Ghana. Particularly, I made my research participants 
aware that the data being collected would be used solely for this academic purpose. 
The consent of interview participants was obtained to either digitally record the 
interview or take notes. As earlier indicated there was only one occasion where my 
interview participants (Gbawe Kwartei family Council of Elders) did not permit me 
to digitally record the interview but permitted the taking of notes.  
 
Relevant interview participants were sent copies of the final draft to verify that 
confidentiality agreements have been met before the study was submitted for 
examination. Concerning matters of academic integrity, except for quotations that I 
have duly attributed to the work of the relevant researchers to support my thesis, I 
affirm that this study is my own original work and does not contain plagiarised 
material. Thus, to the best of my knowledge, the University’s Code of Practice and 
Principles for Good Ethical Governance have been met in conducting this study. 
 
2.5 Conclusion: Critical Juncture of Institutional Development Matters 
 
The constitutional rules of Ghana divide final state authority over land 
administration reform between chiefs and government; and, therefore limit the 
authority of government to autonomously reform the land administration system 
without the consent of chiefs. A hypothesis of this study is that the initial formation 
of the colonial state in the Gold Coast between British colonial officials and 
powerful chiefs of traditional states is the provenance of the current bifurcation of 
state authority between chiefs and government. The failure of British colonial state 
makers to end the political and institutional legacies of the existing powerful 
traditional states shaped the subsequent development of a state that divided final 
authority over land administration between chiefs and government. I have 
conceptualized the nature of the initial and present Ghanaian state as the traditional-
federal state. The key point is that the 1992 constitutional bifurcation of state 
authority over land administration between chiefs and government is largely a 
reproduction of many incremental political settlements between chiefs, governments, 
and non-chief political elites that emerged from the political and institutional logics 
underlying the initial formation of the traditional-federal state in 1821-1831.  
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The historical institutional approach that I have used to examine the provenance and 
causal effect of the traditional-federal state “focuses on a limited range of institutions 
within a limited range of politics” (Rokkan 1968:174). In historical institutionalist 
language, the current bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government 
over land administration is the path dependent outcome of the critical juncture of 
traditional-federal state formation in 1821-1831. The critical juncture of state 
formation matters. Historical institutionalists recognize that the critical juncture and 
path dependence (CJ-PD) explanatory model appears forbiddingly schematical, 
deductive, law-like, and mechanical (Steinmo and Thelen 1992; Goldstone 1998; 
Tilly 2001; Pierson 2004). But, as Rokkan (1968:199) explains, “this is not the 
purpose: the object is to single out in the multifaceted flow of events [in each unit] 
those choice points which proved most significant.” In fact, behind the screen of 
parsimonious explanation lies an in-depth historical analysis and rigorous testing of 
the historical evidence. It is only through the analysis of the available historical 
evidence that the analyst is be able to reduce to the smallest possible number the 
range of explanatory variables required to account for a particular outcome.  
 
Much of the diachronic evidence that supports the causal claims that I have made in 
the study comes from diverse historical records on state development in the pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. The study also used some interviews 
with key actors involved in recent land administration reforms to clarify the nature of 
reform processes and outcomes. It is my hope that the evidence that I collected from 
diverse sources to empirically support the CJ-PD thesis is adequate.  
 
The important historical institutionalist argument that I have emphasized in the study 
is that when, how and why Ghanaian governments succeed or fail to reform 
dysfunctional state institutions and agencies of land administration should be 
understood by analyzing, first, the provenance of those institutions, and, second, the 
nature and reach of the authority of government to reform the institutions. The 
critical juncture of state organization between chiefs and non-chief political actors 
during the colonial era did matter in shaping the path of post-colonial state 
development. In the next chapter I discuss the nature of land administration in Africa 
before I move into the historical analysis of the Ghanaian story of why and how state 
authority over land administration is divided between chiefs and government.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Land Administration in Africa – A Literature Review 
  
Many factors reinforce the uncertainty about the purposes of a (land) tenure 
policy – the multitude of different stakeholders, the contradictory agendas; the 
interaction of various government departments; resistance within the political and 
administrative class, some of whose members see their interests threatened; and 
the conditionality imposed by funders and experts (Delville 2000:121). 
 
Introduction 
 
Here, I undertake a thematic review of the literature on land administration in 
African countries. The chapter highlights the conceptual and policy debates, the 
problems of, and challenges to, the creation of transparent and accountable formal 
institutions of land administration in Africa where the institutional environment is 
dominated by traditional authorities and their informal customary rules, norms, and 
organizational structures of power. Pre-colonial political organizations of chieftaincy 
in the majority of African countries continue to wield significant power over land 
administration. The review underscores the point that land administration reform in 
the majority of African countries is a political process that usually involves 
negotiation, cooperation and conflict between traditional authorities and government. 
The historical legacies of colonial state formation in Africa therefore matter for the 
current nature of land administration. The objective of this chapter is to highlight the 
historical legacies and challenges of state development in Africa in the context of 
customary land administration reform. 
 
The chapter is structured into four sections. Section 3.1 begins the discussion by 
looking at the underlying concept of land administration. Section 3.2 discusses the 
land administration systems in Africa. Section 3.3 examines some of the customary 
institutional reform paths that have been suggested by scholars. Section 3.4 
concludes the chapter by emphasizing the need for a deeper historical understanding 
of the provenance, challenges and prospects of the bifurcated African state in which 
traditional authorities and governments compete for control over land administration. 
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3.1 What is Land Administration? Issues of Land Ownership and Tenure  
 
The politics and outcomes of state formation in western countries have led to the 
dominant theoretical view that the state is (or claims to be) the ultimate owner of the 
land (Bruce 1998a; Gran 2005, 2007; Mahoney et al. 2007). Moreover, from the 
European perspective, all individual or group ownership rights are subject to 
“ultimate” ownership by the state. From an international relations perspective of 
state-to-state relations, the general convention is that every state has sovereign 
ownership over its territory. Generally, according to the dominant European view of 
land ownership, 
  
With a few exceptions (such as Antarctica) the ultimate owner of the land is the 
state, which retains the right to acquire private property for public purposes and to 
control the manner in which the land is used, for instance through planning 
legislation. The state may also retain the right to minerals and hydrocarbons. 
Subject to this, many societies permit private land ownership with rights held 
either in freehold, which represents the maximum degree of freedom for the 
landowner, or leasehold in which there are greater limitations on how and when 
the land may be used (Mahoney et al. 2007: 2-3).  
 
But the most important empirical point here is that while the claim of “ultimate” land 
ownership by the state may be valid within the internal politics of many countries in 
Europe, the paths of state formation in Africa have often followed a different 
trajectory (Boone 2003, 2007; Bruce 1998b; Dia 1996; Englebert 2002; Mamdani 
1996). Unfortunately, how different paths of state formation in countries uniquely 
shape different systems of land ownership is usually ignored by many western 
scholars and practitioners who seek to replicate the western model of land 
administration in Africa. In the majority of African countries, land is largely owned 
by traditional states and customary authorities (Bruce 1998b; World Bank 2003a; 
Toulmin 2008). We shall soon see how the western model of the state’s claim to 
ultimate ownership of land differs from the African context where land ownership is 
largely under the control of traditional authorities. In Ghana it is estimated that the 
state owns just about 20% of the land while traditional authorities own the remaining 
80% (Ministry of Lands and Forestry 2003). While the state claims final authority 
over all other actors within it geographical boundaries, it does not always claim 
ultimate ownership over land – in physical terms.   
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Land ownership should also be distinguished from land tenure. The legal term 
‘tenure’, as noted by Bruce (1998b), comes from English feudalism and is derived 
from the Latin term for “holding” or “possessing”. This implies that a person may 
not have any ‘ultimate’ ownership claims over the land he/she possesses. Land 
tenure therefore means the terms – especially rights and obligations – under which 
land is legally possessed. Thus, the secondary ownership of tenure rights over land is 
distinct and dependent on the primary or ‘ultimate’ ownership. In Ghana, there are 
diverse land tenure arrangements between land owners and land tenants. We shall 
come to see that a key issue of debate in Ghana’s land administration reform is the 
definition of the nature of land tenure held by indigenous members of communal 
land owning groups.   
 
Having clarified what I mean by land ownership and land tenure, I shall now try to 
establish a common understanding of what is meant by land administration. There is 
much confusion among scholars and practitioners about the concept of land 
administration (UNECE 1996; Dale and McLaughlin 1999; Williamson 2000; van 
der Molen 2003; EU 2004; Williamson et al. 2008). Let us review some of the 
conceptual definitions in order to establish some common understanding, and, if 
possible, arrive at a formal definition of what land administration is all about.  
 
In the Land Administration Guidelines of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE 1996:14), land administration is defined as “the process of 
recording and disseminating information about the ownership, value and use of land 
and its associated resources. Such processes include the determination (sometimes 
known as the ‘adjudication’) of rights and other attributes of the land, the survey and 
description of these, their detailed documentation and the provision of relevant 
information in support of land markets.” This definition limits land administration to 
societies where systems of record keeping and dissemination have been developed 
rather than to all societies. Critical questions about who is recording land 
information, how it is recorded, and the purpose for which the information is being 
recorded or disseminated cannot be answered from the definition. UNECE therefore 
noted that the term land reform may also “involve changes in the tenure of the land, 
that is, in the manner in which rights are held, thus abolishing complex traditional 
and customary rights and introducing more simple and streamlined mechanisms of 
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land transfer” (UNECE 1996:13). Peter Dale, who was chairman of the 8-member 
UNECE task force that came out with the Land Administration Guidelines, together 
with John McLaughlin, offered an alternative definition of land administration (Dale 
and McLaughlin 1999). Land administration was defined to “refer to those public 
sector activities required to support the alienation, development, use, valuation, and 
transfer of land” (Dale and McLaughlin 1999:1). This new definition once again 
confined the activities of land administration to the public sector and still left our 
question unanswered. The exclusion of the private sector runs counter to the UNECE 
view that “Sustainable development is dependent on the state having overall 
responsibility for managing information about the ownership, value and use of land, 
even though the private sector may be extensively involved” (UNECE 1996:3).  
 
Paul van der Molen (2003) made suggestions for updating the definition of land 
administration. He noted that in spite of some criticisms to the UNECE definition of 
land administration, and the alternative definition offered by Dale and McLaughlin 
(1999), the UNECE definition has “proven to be the guiding principle in policy 
documents, research programmes and education and training” because it allows for a 
broad interpretation of the concepts ‘ownership’, ‘value’, and ‘use’ (van der Molen 
2003:1). Van der Molen (2003:2-3) however emphasized this crucial point: 
 
Unlike many other geographic information systems, which provide information 
about geographical objects and their attributes, land administration systems reflect 
in principle the social relationship between people concerning land, as they are 
recognized by a community or a state. Therefore such a system is in no way just a 
‘GIS’ [Geographical Information System]. Data recorded in a land administration 
system may have a social and legal meaning, and are based on accepted social 
concepts. That concerns both owners, rights and land objects. It is not relevant 
whether these concepts are laid down in the law or in unwritten customs. In both 
cases the rights to land, the right-holders and the land itself are understood by the 
people who determine the content and meaning of the land administration system. 
These rules, constituting the basic principles for the system and justifying its 
existence, form the institutional context for land administration.
32
  
 
In effect, van der Molen was emphasizing the “paramount importance” of the 
“institutional aspects” of land administration over the dominant technical concerns. 
He urged the UNECE Working Party on Land Administration to consider new 
                                                 
32
 I have made grammatical corrections to the original to make the quotation meaningful.   
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developments at the institutional level when they update the UNECE Land 
Administration Guidelines. UNECE is yet to incorporate this important institutional 
perspective into its definition of land administration (UNECE 2005).  
 
In fact, the new institutional perspective on land administration may be hard for all 
scholars to initially appreciate. Williamson (2000:22) emphasized that “One of the 
major weaknesses in establishing land administration projects is that they focus on 
establishing land administration institutions, not land administration processes. The 
focus should be on the key cadastral processes of land adjudication, land transfer and 
mutation (subdivision and consolidation). All institutional and legal arrangements 
should be focused on these processes.” In his opinion, “The key performance 
indicators for a successful land administration system [LAS] are whether the LAS is 
trusted by the general populace, protects the majority of land rights, provides 
security of tenure for the vast majority of land holders and is extensively used. If 
these criteria are not generally met then there is a fundamental problem with the 
system” (Williamson 2000:16).  
 
The World Bank, thus, clearly noted that the “issues relating to the institutional 
framework presents the biggest challenge to land administration reform” (World 
Bank 2003a:13). Notwithstanding widespread misunderstandings about the new 
institutional perspective of land administration emphasized by van der Molen, it 
appears that it is gradually gaining grounds among scholars and in policy documents, 
even if it is less understood. The EU Land Policy Guidelines for support to land 
policy design and land policy reform processes in developing countries notes that “a 
land tenure system is made up of rules, authorities, institutions and rights. Land 
administration itself (maps, deeds, registers, and so on) is only one part of a land 
tenure system” (EU 2004:2-3). Again, in the policy guidelines of the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), land administration is now defined as “the way in 
which the rules of land tenure are applied and made operational…land tenure is the 
relationship, whether defined legally or customarily, among people with respect to 
land” (FAO 2007:3). It is this institutional perspective of land administration that I 
shall fully take up in the study to explain how the institutions of land administration 
are created, maintained and reformed.  
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Land administration systems are best understood in institutional terms, that is, as 
systems of rules that define social relationships concerning how diverse interests in 
society should gain access to and use of land. This new understanding is crucial for 
effective policy design and implementation of land administration systems in 
developing countries, whether in the public sector, the private sector or the 
customary domain of traditional rulers in Africa. The institutional perspective of land 
administration shall help us to understand debates over what has come to be known 
as ‘legal formalization’ of customary land administration systems in Africa.  
 
Legal formalisation is associated with the creation of official written rules and 
statutes in documents that give precise, explicit and clear definition of who owns 
what parcel of land, where it is owned, when it was owned, how it is owned, and 
what the rights or obligations of the owner are in relation to other interests (de Soto 
2000; CLEP 2008b; Sjaastad and Cousins 2009). It is usually contrasted with the 
unwritten customs that govern customary land tenure. Legal formalization of norms, 
customs, and informal structures that govern the customary systems of land 
administration in Africa sometimes ignites political conflict.  
 
This study defines land administration as the process whereby diverse actors with 
interest in land are involved in the creation and application of legal rules and 
organizational structures to (a) govern social relationships between people and land 
concerning land ownership, land tenure, and land valuation; and (b) to shape social, 
economic, and political outcomes. The underlying rules that define ownership, 
access, tenure or use, and value of land in institutional structures of administration 
are never static, but; “the humankind to land relationship in all countries is dynamic” 
(Williamson 2000:7). The institutional rules and structures of land administration 
that establish relationships of trust or distrust among powerful and less powerful 
interest groups are in a constant flux through conflict, negotiation, and cooperation. 
Land administration is fundamentally shaped by an unending political process.  
 
It is the wish of some scholars and practitioners that “land administration systems 
should if possible be non political and should be concerned with putting in place an 
efficient land administration infrastructure to manage the humankind to land 
relationship” (Williamson 2000:7). The Commission on Legal Empowerment of the 
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Poor (CLEP) noted that poor people are usually disempowered of their land rights by 
powerful actors like the state without compensation. It noted that, “Rules are 
resources that can easily be subverted to serve the interests of the few, for example 
through corruption and lack of transparency. Hence, the governance structure and 
performance of such systems should be reviewed, and as necessary reformed. The 
separation of the powers of land registration and public land management is one such 
reform that will reduce the risk of abusive practices” (CLEP 2008a:66). The politics 
of institutional reform is less explored.  
 
The reality is that all aspects of land administration (as is the case with all other 
institutions governing common pool resources) are profoundly political. According 
to Silva (2007:28), even the institutionalization of technology like Spatial Data 
Infrastructures (SDIs) in a developing country such as Guatemala “implies the 
exercise of power, alignment, and enrolment of different actors as the creation of 
alliances.” Enemark (2008:10-11) also notes that in a global perspective, land 
administration is basically about people, in terms of human rights, engagement and 
dignity; politics, in terms of land policies and good government; places, in terms of 
shelter, land and natural resources; and power, in terms of providing equity and legal 
empowerment of the poor.  A non political perspective of land administration would 
therefore be largely misplaced (Leftwich 2004; Silva 2007; van der Molen 2003). A 
political perspective of land administration starts from the premise that the evolution 
or creation of institutions to govern social relationships relating to the use of land in 
all countries is profoundly a political process. We shall see that the creation of 
institutions to define land ownership rights, transparent access to land, and 
relationships of accountability between traditional authorities of communal land 
owning groups and their members have been intensely political since colonial rule. I 
discuss next the general situation of land administration in Africa.   
 
3.2 Land Administration in Africa: The dominance of customary 
institutions or the legacies of traditional-federal states?  
 
The literature review from this section shall specifically discuss the nature of land 
administration in Africa and the current reforms to create modern land 
administration systems. I look at four major thematic issues concerning land 
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administration reforms in Africa; first, the general land ownership and tenure 
situation in Africa; second, the conceptual debate on the definition of the nature of 
‘customary’ land tenure; third, the argument for legal formalization of customary 
land tenure, and; lastly, the argument against legal formalization of customary land 
tenure. The important matter that I seek to raise is whether the dominance of 
customary institutions of land administration across African countries is a symptom 
of the widespread existence of de facto or de jure traditional-federal states 
bequeathed by critical junctures of colonial state formation.   
 
3.2.1 Land Ownership and Administration in Africa 
 
More salient in sub-Saharan Africa is the fact that land tenure administration has 
been dominated by customary institutional structures of authority that predate the 
modern state (Bruce 1998b; Herbst 2000; World Bank 2003a). The area of land 
under formal legal tenure covers only between 2 and 10 percent of total land (World 
Bank 2003a). In the West African region as a whole, it is estimated that only 2 – 3% 
of land is covered by formal legal documentation (Toulmin 2008). The percentage of 
land covered by formal tenure registration in the form of legal title in Ghana is 
estimated to be 20%, in Burundi it is estimated to be only 1% (Toulmin 2008). There 
is some agreement among scholars that the dominance of customary tenure is due to 
the chequered path of state formation through the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-
colonial periods (Bruce 1998b; Dia 1996; Donald 1996; Herbst 2000; Mamdani 
1996; Ray 1999). However, the crucial challenge that has faced many scholars and 
policy makers concerns how to reform the dominant customary estate controlled by 
traditional authorities. The general land policy and tenure situation in African 
countries is presented below in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Land Tenure Policies in sub-Saharan Africa (Source: Bruce 1998b) 
 
Country 
Official Tenure 
Objective 
De Facto 
Dominant 
Tenure Type 
Private 
Ownership 
State 
Leasehold 
Recognizes 
Customary 
Tenure33 
Angola 
Private ownership/ 
state leasehold 
Customary 
tenure  
No  Significant34 No 
Benin 
Individual land 
ownership 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists No 
Botswana  
Customary tenure/ state 
leasehold 
Customary 
tenure  
Exists Significant No 
Burkina 
Faso 
Individual and collective 
registration 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
Burundi Private ownership 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Significant No 
Cameroon 
Individual land 
ownership 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Significant No 
Cape 
Verde 
Individual land 
ownership 
Individual 
land 
ownership 
Exists Exists No 
C.A.R. 
Individual/private 
registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists No 
Chad 
Private titling 
registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists No 
Comoros Mixed  
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Unknown Yes 
Congo - B 
State owned “individual” 
registration 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Private registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists No 
Congo 
D.R. 
State land/individual 
leasehold 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
 
Djibouti  
Unknown Unknown Exists Unknown Yes 
Eritrea State leasehold 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
Ethiopia State ownership 
Customary 
tenure 
No Significant No 
Gabon 
Individual registration of 
land 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists No No 
Gambia 
Customary tenure and 
title freehold in urban 
areas 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Ghana 
Individual registration/ 
customary tenure 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
                                                 
33
 The terms ‘customary tenure’, ‘indigenous community-based’ and ‘Community-based’ were used 
interchangeably by the researchers (Bruce 1998b). 
34
 ‘Significant’ does not refer to percentage of land area under private ownership or state leasehold but 
the impact of the nature of tenure on national tenure policy and practice (Bruce 1998b). Following 
Herbst (2000), countries listed as having between “significant” and “exists” for the extent of state 
leasehold is coded as “exists”. 
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Table 5 continuation: Land Tenure Policies in sub-Saharan Africa  
 
Guinea Individual registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists No No 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Individual registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists No Yes 
Kenya Private ownership 
Private 
ownership 
Significant No No 
Lesotho 
Customary tenure/ 
state leasehold 
Customary 
tenure 
No Significant No 
Liberia 
Individual ownership 
and registration 
Customary 
tenure and 
freehold 
Significant Unknown Yes 
Malawi 
Private ownership/ 
state leasehold 
Customary 
tenure  
Significant Significant Yes 
Mali Private registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists No 
Mauritania 
Individual 
landownership 
Customary 
tenure/Islamic 
Significant Significant No 
Mozambique State leasehold 
Customary 
tenure 
No Significant No 
Namibia 
Private ownership/ 
state leasehold 
Private 
ownership 
Significant Exists Yes 
Niger 
Individual registration 
of land/titling 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Nigeria 
Individual registration 
through certificates 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
Rwanda Mixed 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Senegal Individual “lease hold” 
Customary 
tenure 
No Exists No 
Sierra Leone Individual registration 
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Somalia Unknown Unknown No Significant No 
South Africa Private Ownership 
Private 
Ownership 
Exists Exists Yes 
Sudan Mixed  Unknown  Exists Exists No 
Swaziland 
Customary tenure/ 
private ownership 
Customary 
tenure 
Significant Exists Yes 
Tanzania 
Unclear but state 
ownership 
Alternative 
community-
based 
No Significant No 
Togo Registered  
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Uganda Mixed  
Customary 
tenure 
Exists Exists Yes 
Zambia State leasehold 
Customary 
tenure 
No Significant Yes 
Zimbabwe 
State leasehold/ 
customary tenure 
Customary 
tenure 
Significant Exists Yes 
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From the above land policy and tenure situation across western, eastern and southern 
countries in Africa, it is clear that customary institutional structures of power 
dominate land administration in African countries. The indigenous institutions of 
land administration in the numerous pre-colonial traditional states in Africa, together 
with their political structures of authority, were largely left intact by the colonial 
state established by European countries. The indigenous institutional foundations of 
the pre-colonial state were legitimated through long-held cultural values and wars of 
conquest. The modern state in Africa therefore inherited the colonial state, with its 
dominant customary land tenure institutions, through shallow democratic processes. 
 
The official land tenure policies in African countries paint an interesting picture 
about the contentious internal land politics and the powerful influence of customary 
authorities on the state. As of 1996, it was only a handful of countries such as 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Zambia that had legally asserted state ownership 
of the land as official tenure policy. While western scholars and some African 
political elites may assert that the state is the ultimate landowner; many governments 
hesitate to wield the same discourse in their domestic land politics. The internal 
politics over tenure policy has undoubtedly affected this institutional reform process 
of legal formalization. 
 
In reality, formal land tenure policy in the modern African state is usually a 
reflection of the inherited formal structures of power at the top-level of government, 
and the indigenous informal customary structures of authority that dominate land 
administration in local communities. The emerging land tenure policy in Africa 
simultaneously integrates both the formal and customary institutional structures of 
power into the state. Consequently, the power of the modern democratic state to 
formally assert a coercive monopoly over land administration is effectively blunted 
by its underlying heterogeneous institutional structures. The large area of land 
covered by informal or customary institutions of land tenure has been the primary 
focus of recent legal formalization programmes by national governments and 
international policy actors. 
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3.2.2 What is Customary Land Tenure? 
 
The exact definition of the nature of ‘customary’ land tenure in Africa has generated 
controversies (Alden Wily 2008; Feeny et al. 1990). Interestingly, existing 
conceptions of legal formalization of customary land tenure in Africa are grounded 
in the western conception of the state as “ultimate landowner” (Quan et al. 2004:13). 
Scholars and practitioners concerned with Land in Africa joined African politicians 
at a conference convened in London to grasp the nettle of real-politique and redefine 
the African state as ultimate landowner (Quan et al. 2004). From this western 
European perspective, the conference participants argued: “The accumulation of land 
and power over it by the state itself represents an alienation of rights of landholding 
groups, which merits either restitution or compensation” (ibid). While the notion of 
the state as ultimate landowner is asserted against rival customary claims, the 
specific character of the internal politics of the modern state is fatally ignored. 
 
This new discourse being wielded in European capitals is however not consistent 
with the general land policy situation in many African countries where governments 
explicitly recognize customary land tenure as deriving from indigenous institutional 
structures of power rather than the modern state. In other words, in spite of the 
powerful chorus about the African state as “ultimate landowner”, that is being sung 
by scholars and African politicians in European capitals, the internal reality of tenure 
conflicts and policy uncertainty has cast its shadow over the appropriate 
conceptualization of the ownership and nature of the ‘customary’. According to 
Atwood (1990:659),  
 
Land titling or registration, in the African context, refers to legally sanctioning 
primary land claims which are already recognized informally by the local 
community (although they may have been previously ignored or denied in formal 
law). It involves taking these claims out of the realm of informal lineage or 
community land ownership and making them fully legal, formal and individual; 
measuring precisely the boundaries of each claim; recording claims in a formal, 
state-administered land records system; and, under the Torrens system of title, 
providing a state guarantee to the claim that appears in the land records system.  
 
This conventional land tenure institutional reform implies that any previous informal 
claims held by traditional authorities, rulers, chiefs, or kingdoms over land 
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ownership is declared void by the state and then defined as derived from grants made 
by the state. In reality, however, many African states jointly share land ownership 
rights with the dominant customary institutional structures of power. 
 
The term ‘customary’, according to Leonard and Longbottom (2000:18), “is perhaps 
best used to describe the derivation of authority under indigenous systems of 
authority rather than the rights themselves.” This perspective tries to separate the 
land tenure rights claimed by indigenous authorities from the “indigenous systems of 
authority.” In their Land Tenure Lexicon produced from Francophone and 
Anglophone West African usage, Leonard and Longbottom acknowledged that it is 
difficult to “invent new terms such as ‘derived rights’” because “terminology is 
continuously evolving, and at any given moment, different terms or translations may 
be favoured by different people. …where these terms differ from those used in 
Europe, the lexicon is targeted at researchers, policy makers and development 
practitioners familiar with European terminology” (Leonard and Longbottom 
2000:2). Nevertheless, the attempts to describe land tenure in Africa within 
European templates to enhance research and policy understanding in western 
countries may have created more conflicts than it has resolved.   
 
Alden Wily (2008) argues that the concept of “common property” as a status derived 
from the intervention of the state as in European countries is fundamentally different 
from the origin and nature of the ownership of customary land tenure in Africa. In 
his opinion, the failure by scholars and external development actors to properly 
distinguish between these two concepts has been the bedrock of all the conceptual 
confusions and the major hindrance to the development of an appropriate customary 
land tenure policy. Common property, “is real property that may be mapped, 
described and its owner (s) identified”; however, customary tenure in Africa “is a 
regime of land administration comprising norms, regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms, and which, when clarified essentially involves identification of the 
customary authority (traditionally chiefs and today often elected community 
councillors)” (Alden Wily 2008:44-45).  
 
Alden Wily (2008) argues that the distinctive feature of customary tenure is that it is 
indigenous and rooted in the community level within villages and families rather 
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than one that arises from government legal intervention. In his view, “The customary 
reality is that such lands are the shared property of specific communities, either at 
village, village cluster or tribal level” (Alden Wily 2008:44). Alden Wily (2008:46) 
further point out that “Logically, customary interests cannot be recognized in their 
own right without at the same time recognising the existence of the (customary) 
regimes which sustain them.” This is the crucial point which also finds support in 
this study – that customary land rights are inseparable from the political jurisdiction 
of customary organizational structures of authority.   
 
3.2.3 Capitalist Development and Institutional Reform in Customary Land 
 Tenure Administration in Africa 
 
It has been noted that “land administration structures in Africa suffer from the same 
weaknesses as other components of the state: they are often highly centralised in 
structure and attempt to implement decisions in a top-down down manner, yet are 
ineffective in practice because of resource constraints, corruption and ‘capture’ by 
private interest groups” (Cousins 2000:170). Moreover, the international business 
community points out that it is more costly to gain access to land in sub-Saharan 
Africa than anywhere else (see Table 6 below) (World Bank/IMF 2005).  
 
Table 6: Time and cost to register property across regions of the world 
 
Region Days of property 
registration 
% Cost of property 
registration 
OECD High income 34 4.8 
East Asia and the Pacific 51 4.2 
Middle East and North Africa 54 6.8 
South Asia 56 6.1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 62 5.6 
Europe and Central Asia 133 3.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa 116 14.4 
Source: World Bank/IMF (2005:36). 
 
From the above data in Table 6, it is clear that improving the efficiency of public 
sector land agencies in sub-Saharan Africa becomes more crucial to enable capital 
formation and development. It is from such widespread negative evaluations among 
scholars, practitioners, and the international business community that the public and 
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customary institutional domains of land administration have been put on the reform 
agenda of international development partners in Africa. The reform of customary 
institutions of land administration and public sector agencies to improve access to 
land for business growth becomes more critical as “Banks prefer land and buildings 
as collateral since they are difficult to move or hide” (World Bank/IMF 2005:33). 
For instance, according to investors, in Zambia, 95% of commercial bank loans to 
businesses are secured by land and in Uganda 75% (ibid). It is argued that “The 
functioning of the property administration agency and land administration bodies is 
critical for the poor” (CLEP 2008a:66). According to international development 
actors, the lack of transparent, accountable, and enforceable rules governing legal 
formal land registration in Africa has constrained access to land for foreign direct 
investment, the establishment of new businesses, and capital formation from 
financial institutions (CLEP 2008a, 2008b; de Soto 2000; World Bank/IMF 2005).  
 
Many scholars and practitioners have supported the argument that the legal 
formalization of rules and structures that govern social relationships to land among 
diverse social interests is what shapes the path to capitalist development (CLEP 
2008a, 2008b; de Soto 2000; Wallace and Williamson 2006; Williamson et al. 2008). 
According to Williamson et al. (2008:4), modern land administration systems were 
“originally created on behalf of taxpayers merely for better internal administration of 
taxation, and, more recently, titling of land in support of more efficient and effective 
land markets.” The evolution of land markets as the foundation for capitalist 
development in the economies of western countries is schematised by Wallace and 
Williamson (2006) in Diagram 3 below. 
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Source: Wallace and Williamson (2006:125). 
Diagram 3: The Evolution of Land Markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wallace and Williamson (2006:125) 
84 
In the above diagram, the emergence of market stages of land trading, land markets, 
and complex commodities markets is made possible by the process of legal 
formalization of fundamental rights claimed by diverse interests over land. It also 
makes it possible for land to be transferred from less productive owners to more 
productive forces of capital who seek access to land. The modern system of land 
administration functions as “the conversion process” to transform ‘dead land’ into 
the wealth of nations – in the form of formal legal title documentation over the land.  
 
The argument for legal formalization of customary land tenure in developing 
countries is best captured in the following statement by Deininger and Binswanger 
(1999:248-9):  
 
With share tenancy, tenants receive only a fraction of their marginal product. It is 
therefore difficult to motivate tenants to work hard enough, a phenomenon that is 
known as ‘Marshallian inefficiency.’ Share tenancy relations are still more 
efficient than wage labour however. They may be an ‘optimal choice’, given the 
constraints faced where markets for credit and insurance are incomplete.  
  
Cutola and other scholars (Cutola et al. 2004:3) have summarized the arguments for 
legal formalization of customary land tenure in Africa as follows: 
 
i. Land registration stimulated more efficient use of the land, because it 
increases tenure security and removes disincentives to invest in the longer 
term management and productivity of the land;  
 
ii. enables the creation of a land market, allowing land to be transferred from 
less to more dynamic farmers and consolidated into larger holdings; 
 
iii. provides farmers with a title that can be offered as collateral to financial 
institutions; thereby improving farmers’ access to credit and allowing them to 
invest in land improvements; and,  
 
iv. provides governments with information regarding landholders and size of 
fields, which can provide the basis for a system of property taxes.  
 
The UNDP Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) also argues 
that the world’s poorest happen to hold their land properties in regions where 
customary institutions of authority dominate land administration. According to the 
CLEP, many rural poor in developing countries own about 9.3 trillion dollars worth 
85 
of landed assets that if legally formalized with title by governments can lift this 
bottom billion poor out of endemic poverty. In his influential book, The Mystery of 
Capital, Hernando de Soto argues that the lack of formal legal rights to land in 
developing countries deprives landowners from meaningfully stepping outside their 
communities to interact with other potential investors who have a convergence of 
economic interest (de Soto 2000). Through the Institute for Liberty and Democracy 
(ILD) and the CLEP, de Soto has led many legal formalization programmes in 
African countries to revive the ‘dead capital’.  
 
The view that poverty among the poor is not caused by a lack of assets among the 
poor but the lack of formal ownership of those assets is synonymous with the 
conventional negative perception held by some scholars and practitioners about land 
tenure systems in Africa. Atwood (1990:659) has noted that “The conventional view 
of ‘traditional’ or informal systems of African land rights is that they impede 
agricultural development, and that land titling or registration is needed to encourage 
land transfers to more productive farmers, improve farmer access to credit, and 
create incentives for investment in land improvement, soil conservation and new 
technology.” Later I discuss some criticisms and resistance to legal formalization of 
informal rights over land tenure.  
 
The World Bank’s publication Building Institutions for Markets also emphasized 
that “Without land titling institutions that ensure property rights, poor people are 
unable to use valuable assets for investment and income growth” (World Bank 
2002a: iii). Since the publication of its Land Reform: Sector policy Paper in 1975, 
the World Bank has been trying to create market oriented formal property rights 
institutions from informal customary land tenure regimes in Africa (World Bank 
1975). For several decades, its main goal was to replace communal land tenure with 
market-oriented individual freehold lands (Cutola et al. 2004). In the view of the 
World Bank (1975:20) the prevailing conditions of “traditional-communal” land 
tenure in Africa “are the major impediments to development.” Since the 1990s, the 
World Bank has aided many governments in African countries like Ghana to 
implement land administration reforms targeted at the transformation of customary 
land tenure systems into marketable individual freeholds (World Bank 2003c). Later 
we shall see the politics and outcomes of such efforts in Ghana.  
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In any case, almost all African governments have historically been involved in a 
power struggle with customary authorities in their attempt to extend the formal legal 
powers of the state beyond urban political enclaves (Herbst 2000). Thus, the huge 
support received from international development agents only acted as a strong 
catalyst. Customary institutional reform agents at the international level have 
included the United Kingdom Department For International Development (DFID), 
the World Bank, the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the United 
States Agency for International Aid (USAID), the Institute for Liberty and 
Democracy (ILD), the UNDP-CLEP, the French Development Agency (AFD) 
(Atwood 1990; Benjaminsen et al. 2009; Bruce et al. 2006; Larmour 2005; Toulmin 
et al. 2004). In terms of actual policy direction, we shall see that there has been less 
coordination of interests among these agents in Ghana. 
 
Through the powerful instrument of loan conditionality to governments of poverty-
stricken African countries, international reform agents like the World Bank have 
been very powerful in selling market-oriented individual property rights land 
administration reforms to governments (Bruce et al. 2006; Larmour 2005). In Sudan, 
political elites in Khartoum have committed themselves to the implementation of 
customary land tenure reform as part of a post-conflict peace accord (Alden Wily 
2008). Across Africa, meaningful institutional reforms in customary land tenure have 
occurred in countries at rare moments or critical junctures such as during revolution 
(such as in Egypt) or during the initial organization of the post-colonial state (such as 
in Botswana).  
 
3.2.4 Resistance to Institutional Reform in Customary Land Tenure 
 
Notwithstanding the advantages of individual land rights for capitalist development, 
many scholars, and even political elites in Africa, have cast doubts on an 
unequivocal relationship between customary land tenure reforms, increased demand 
for individual rights in land, increased investment, and access to credit (Alden Wily 
2008; Bromley 2009; Cutola et al. 2006; Cutola et al. 2008; Kanji et al. 2005; Quan 
et al. 2004; Sjaastad and Cousins 2009). The neo-liberal ideological deconstruction 
of customary land tenure in Africa has been caught in unending intellectual debates 
among scholars and practitioners as well as political controversies in the internal 
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politics of some African countries like Ghana and South Africa. According to 
Sjaastad and Cousins (2008), customary land tenure reform has received 
considerable support from politicians while the academic community has been more 
reluctant to support the formalization-wealth creation thesis.  
 
Opponents have argued that the creation of individual property rights from 
customary land could lead to landlessness among poor land users like women and 
lead to elite capture of customary land, and thus potentially increase conflicts over 
communal land (Sjaastad and Cousins 2008; Tsikata 2004). Moreover, the 
promotion of individual property land rights in Africa may impoverish the bottom 
billion rural poor whose subsistence livelihood depends on common access to 
customary land, rather than lift them from poverty into the global club of capitalism. 
It is argued that the transformation of customary land tenure into individual land 
rights would strip the complex web of secondary land use rights held by women, 
migrants, peasants, pastoralists and the youth on the customary largesse (Cutola et al. 
2008; Kanji et al. 2005; Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009).  
 
A conference of scholars, practitioners and African political elites concerned with 
Land in Africa, agreed that “there is a clear consensus that imported solutions of 
tenure individualisation and titling are not workable in the African context” (Quan et 
al. 2004:11-12). This bloc of strong opposition to customary land tenure reform in 
favour of individualization should be worrying for advocates of legal formalization 
of customary land tenure along the western market oriented model. At the same time 
the above opposition bloc of elites may have given hope to the powerless peasants, 
farmers, women and youth whose common access to customary tenure is threatened 
by programmes of tenure individualization. 
 
The strong resistance from a powerful elite bloc of scholars and pro-poor civil 
society actors appears to have led to some policy retreat from the original customary 
land tenure policies pursued by international reform agents. For instance, the World 
Bank has not only acknowledged the shortcomings of its market oriented customary 
land tenure reforms but has also put forward some interesting policy modifications 
(World Bank 2002a, 2003a). The World Bank now makes the following arguments:  
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This shift toward individual rights tends to undermine the ability of traditional 
systems to ensure that all members of the extended family have access to land. 
This feature of their land systems has helped some countries in Africa to avoid the 
extremes of poverty and landlessness that are common in Asia and Latin 
America: traditional systems have provided secure land tenure and encouraged 
farmers to invest in their land. In such cases, encouraging individual land 
registration and titling may be undesirable. Where traditional systems have failed 
to provide clear land rights, land titles and registration are useful (World 
Development Report 1990:65 in World Bank 2003a:89). 
 
And 
   
Secure and transferable land rights can be provided by both informal and formal 
institutions. Such systems must provide the information on who owns the land, 
who has secured interest in the land, where land transactions are registered, and 
how to access this information. The community-defined ownership or use rights 
in parts of Africa, for example, perform these functions. … In the past such land 
tenure systems were thought to provide insufficient tenure security to induce 
farmers to make necessary investments in land. But research has shown that such 
systems can be effective (World Bank 2002a:34, 37).  
 
And 
 
Failure to give legal backing to land administration institutions that enjoy social 
legitimacy can undermine their ability to draw on anything more than informal 
mechanisms for enforcement. By contrast, institutions that are legal but do not 
enjoy social recognition may make little difference to the lives of ordinary people, 
and have therefore proven to be highly ineffective (World Bank 2003a: xxiii).  
 
The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) synthesized findings from research 
works in Africa to argue in favour of indigenous land tenure systems as follows: 
  
The idea that individual titling can provide adequate security of possession for 
African indigenous people runs counter to what we now know about the effects of 
individual tiling schemes on these vulnerable groups. We now know that the 
promotion of individual land titling may cause more harm than good, leading to 
discrimination against subordinate rights-holders (or at least those perceived to be 
subordinate) – the urban poor, women, elders, people who rely on herding 
(including pastoralists, hunters, gatherers and other minorities), and, as in Niger, 
the multiplication of arbitration authorities can increase local insecurity. The fact 
that security of rights to land under African communal systems is usually based 
upon social identity and that the rules of social classification may be manipulated 
to suit certain groups, means that administrators must be careful when they start 
talking about fundamental reforms of the social relations governing communities’ 
access to land, the main source of indigenous peoples’ livelihoods (FAO 2004:73-
74). 
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Moreover, in 2006, the Issues Paper prepared for the High-Level Consultative 
Workshop on Land Policy in Africa convened by the African Union (AU) 
Commission emphasized that “Despite their extent and legitimacy, customary 
systems of tenure are under strain, because of demographic pressure, land scarcity 
and competition, growing urbanization, inter-group and wider civil conflicts, 
breakdowns in customary authority, and pluralistic systems of law” (AU 2006:5).  
 
The new customary land tenure policy direction is clearly caught between the 
promotion of the land market agenda and the social protection of customary land 
tenure values against market-oriented interests (AU 2006; Cousins 2002; Quan et al. 
2004; Toulmin and Quan 2000; van den Brink 2010; World Bank 2003a; 2003c). 
The modified ideological perspective of the World Bank is particularly interesting 
for this study as we shall soon be examining an empirical case of customary land 
tenure institutional reform in Ghana where the Bank is a leading reform agent.  
 
Some scholars have raised questions about the unclear tenure policy directions put 
forward by international reform agents (Boone 2007; Delville 2000; Fitzpatrick 
2005; Quan 2000a). Delville (2000:118) notes that “once the allocation of formal 
title is no longer seen as absolutely vital to the process of agricultural intensification, 
the tenure issue shifts from the economic to the social arena.” Quan (2000a:36) has 
raised two crucial questions about the vague policy direction, namely, (a) under what 
conditions do customary land tenure institutions fail? and (b) where there is failure, 
what specific policy interventions are appropriate?  
 
The World Bank gave the following justifications for the transformation of 
communal land tenure systems into individual freehold lands (World Bank 
2003a:90): (i) Where there has been a breakdown in customary tenure systems, or 
when traditional lines of authority have been severed and loyalties to lineage and 
communal groups eroded; (ii) where land encroachment by outside interests is 
common or increasing; (iii) where defensive registration is needed to safeguard 
individual or group rights; (iv) where there are high levels of fragmentation, 
disputation and inheritance problems; (v) where there are inter-or intra-ethnic 
conflicts over land; and (vi) where there is a demand for titles, as a result of a range 
of reasons, including changing social norms, the need for credit. The World Bank 
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argues that although there may be difficulties with programmes to implement mass 
land titling across the length and breadth of a country, however, clear cases of 
customary institutional failures particularly in economically productive urban and 
peri-urban areas (such as Greater Accra in Ghana) provide enough grounds for some 
special intervention programme (World Bank 2003a:91).  
 
In Ghana, critics of the World Bank’s advocacy for the conversion of customary land 
tenure into individual land titles argue that the major cause in the break of customary 
land tenure institutions of authority in Greater Accra is political interventions by 
governments in customary land administration (Kasanga 2000; Kasanga and Kotey 
2001). These opponents have therefore argued that strengthening customary land 
tenure institutions against political onslaught from national governments would be a 
more effective way of securing customary land tenure rights of the poor. My study 
does not get into the arguments for or against customary land tenure reforms. I shall 
however discuss the politics and outcomes of support for and resistance to attempts 
by the World Bank to achieve its interest from the mid-1980s to 2010.  
 
We can see that while there are powerful economic grounds for governments and 
pro-capitalist agents to transform customary land tenure systems into individual 
freehold lands, there are equally strong grounds to support customary land tenure 
institutions from failing in the first place. This powerful debate between scholars and 
development practitioners has seriously impacted on the development of any clear 
customary land tenure policy (Alden Wily 2008; Delville 2000a; Quan et al. 2004). 
We shall see how land administration reforms in Ghana from 2001-2010 became an 
ideological battle ground even among international development agencies. 
 
The unending conceptual and policy disagreement among scholars and practitioners 
therefore raises a big question mark over how much is known about the origin, 
nature, and forms of the informal customary land tenure institutions of authority 
(Tsikata 2004; van den Brink 2010). The customary land tenure policy modifications 
made by the World Bank and other pro-capitalist reform agents does little to resolve 
fundamental confusions among scholars and practitioners over the appropriate 
definition of ‘customary’ land tenure institutions in Africa as well as the specific 
policy interventions required to reform customary land tenure. Defining the specific 
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nature of the appropriate policy interventions in customary land tenure systems has 
opened another phase of conceptual and policy controversy. 
 
3.3 Paths to Legal Formalization of Customary Land Tenure 
  
Against the background of unresolved controversies over the nature or institutional 
character of the customary land tenure in Africa and its relationship to the state, the 
major problem facing institutional reformers is not so much about what is to be done 
but how the ‘customary’ should be reformed to promote pro-poor growth and 
effective land administration (Firmin-Sellers 1995; Quan et al. 2004). Many 
institutional reform strategies have been proposed by scholars, many of which have 
at some time been implemented in some African countries (Alden Wily 2008; de 
Soto 2000; Fitzpatrick 2005; McAuslan 2000).  
 
The main reform strategy that has dominated the literature is the replication of 
Botswana’s transparent and publicly accountable Land Boards, as the model of best 
practice model in customary land administration in Africa. Many international 
development agencies have supported the replication of Botswana’s customary land 
administration system managed by Land Boards in other African countries. The 
crucial question is why Botswana has been successful in its customary land 
administration but other countries such as Ghana have not succeeded. The popularity 
of Botswana’s Land Boards among reformers calls for some historical analysis of 
how the Land Boards were established. Such analysis is needed to understand the 
prospect for, and challenges to, its replication in other African countries. A brief 
discussion of the nature and origin of the Botswana Land Boards is given in turn.  
 
3.3.1 Institutional Transfer of Botswana’s Land Boards?  
  
The Land Boards, established from 1970 through the 1968 Tribal Lands Act, have 
devolved responsibilities of land allocation, dispute adjudication, land use planning, 
and collection of rents (Adams et al. 2003; Nkwae 2008). Botswana’s Land Boards 
has become the model of best practice among international development agencies 
(Burns 2007; Deininger et al. 2010; World Bank 2003a). However, many scholars 
and international development agencies who advocate for the replication of 
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Botswana’s Land Boards in other African countries usually fail to take into account 
the nature of politics within Botswana’s dominant ruling coalition that enabled the 
evolution of the Land Boards. Therefore I shall first highlight the historical evolution 
of the Land Boards and then the some reform lessons suggested by scholars.  
 
Prior to the creation of the Land Boards, customary land administration matters were 
controlled by powerful customary authorities or chiefs (Kgosis) as custodians of land 
in the political community (morafe). The erosion of chiefship authority over 
customary land administration began with the landmark Native Administration 
Proclamation of 1933/34 by British colonial authorities to promote democratic 
accountability and transparency in local administration by the Kgosis. Among other 
things, this colonial policy transferred “the money and other revenue raised from 
rents, tax, fines, levies, and similar sources into a tribal fund kept apart from the 
chief’s personal income, and to pay him a salary based upon an estimate of his 
annual value. But in the past there was no such distinction between public and 
private revenue; it was all used and controlled by the chief” (Shapera 1938:66 in 
Vaughan 2003a:35). We shall later see how similar reforms in chieftaincy 
administration initiated by British colonial governments in Ghana were reversed by 
Ghanaian political elites before the end of colonial rule. 
 
Seretse Kharma, the Democratic Party leader and Prime minister of the newly 
independent Republic of Botswana was also a de facto traditional ruler of the most 
powerful kingdom in the country.
35
 Therefore, as Vaughan (2003a:66) point out, “the 
constitutional reforms he embraced were thus more acceptable to his people since 
Tswana rulers had to adapt customs to historical changes.” As a result of this rare 
historical moment whereby the embodiment of long-held customary laws and 
modern formal statutory laws found expression in the same political leader, the 
Botswana state was able to avoid the dilemma of the traditional-federal state that 
prevail all over Africa. The Tribal Land Law of 1968 passed by the National 
Assembly that established Botswana’s modern land administration system managed 
by Land Boards followed the path of administrative reforms began by colonial 
                                                 
35
 The senior grandson of Kgosi Kharma III, and true heir to the bogosi (chieftainship) of the largest 
Twsana morafe – Ngwato. The unfortunate racial politics in the colonial period leading to Seretse 
Kharma’s abdication of his chiefly seat is recounted by many scholars (Vaughan 2003a).  
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administrators. The 1968 law changed customary institutions of land administration 
in the following ways: (a) removing communal land administration from the domain 
of the Kgosi (chief) to the domain of the Land Boards; and (b) formalising the 
informal rules of customary land administration into accountable legal rules (Adams 
et al. 2003; Nkwae 2008; Vaughan 2003a). The 1968 law did not change the 
communal ownership of land into individual freeholds or state lands. It only 
removed the administration of communal lands from the domain of the Kgosi and 
placed under the domain of Land Boards. The chiefly representatives on the Boards 
gradually lost their position to non-chief elected officials. Interestingly, as Table 7 
below shows, Governments in Botswana have been committed to converting state 
lands into communal lands since independence. This shows Botswana’s strong 
support for customary norms of communal land ownership.  
 
Table 7: Categories of land tenure in Botswana, 1966-1998 
 
Year Tribal land State land Freehold land 
Area % Area % Area % 
1966 278,535 48.8 270,761 47.4 21,356 3.7 
1979 403,730 69.4 145,040 24.9 32,960 5.7 
1998 411,349 70.9 144,588 24.9 24,572 4.2 
 
Source: White (1999, in Adams et al. 2003:2) 
 
The politics of customary land administration in Botswana is not one that can be 
taken out from its historical context and technically fixed in other countries. Since 
independence, the traditional rulers and their subjects have cooperated in reforming 
the existing ‘tribal land’ administration system while maintaining the communal 
nature of land ownership (Adams et al. 2003; Nkwae 2008). The absence of 
competitive multi-party elections in Botswana’s de facto one-party system has also 
ensured the consolidation of the political settlements and reforms agreed by the 
dominant ruling coalition (Subudubudu and Molutsi 2009; Vaughan 2003a). 
Therefore, underlying the successful evolution of the transparent and accountable 
Lands Boards in Botswana has been the willingness of the political ruling elites to 
negotiate over the reform of the informal rules of customary law and traditional 
organizations of chieftaincy that governed ‘tribal lands’.  
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Many scholars like Hernando de Soto (2000) have proposed that other African 
governments should embark on a national integration of informal customary land 
laws into their legal formal institutional system. McAuslan (2000:94) also identifies 
two approaches to the successful integration of customary and formal land tenure 
systems, namely (i) the enactment of a unified national land law, and (ii) leaving the 
general law to the local communities to replicate the evolution of the English 
common law. Sjaastad and Cousins (2008:6) also suggest that governments should 
“mimic key elements of customary law through national legislation” rather than 
attempt a complete unification of customary and formal land law due to wide 
variations in customary land laws from one ethnic community to another. It could be 
seen that there is widespread recognition of the existence of dual legal structures of 
authority in African states. There is however little empirical analysis of whether or 
not customary authorities and governments have the political will and financial 
resources to integrate their bifurcated legal systems of authority.   
 
Some attempts have been made by countries like Uganda, Malawi and Zambia to 
replicate Botswana’s Land Boards (Burns 2007; Kapitango and Meijs 2010; World 
Bank 2003d). So far, what is known from its replication in Uganda is that “The cost 
of Land Boards has been a real issue in Uganda. …Subsequent investigations have 
indicated that the cost is neither viable nor sustainable and changes in the legislation 
have had to be developed” (World Bank 2003d:91). It appears that the political 
leaders in other African countries are not prepared to bear the financial and material 
cost of creating and sustaining a publicly accountable agency of customary land 
administration (World Bank 2003d). We shall see that while many international 
development actors advocated for the creation of accountable agencies of customary 
land administration in Ghana, government officials were not prepared to bear the 
financial cost of providing the administrative structures, personnel, and resources 
required for the functioning of such an agency. Botswana’s developmental Land 
Boards cannot be wished out of their political, economic, and cultural context.  
 
Some leading scholars, practitioners, and interested political elites who convened at 
the Land in Africa conference in London concluded that “Although there is broad 
consensus, reflected at the conference, that the law should protect legitimate 
customary rights, and that customary and formal tenure systems should be integrated 
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there was less agreement about how to do so in practice, and how to devise 
appropriate land administration systems” (Quan et al. 2004:12). The World Bank has 
also reported that “Despite numerous initiatives during the last decade in sub-
Saharan Africa to implement new land administration systems or to modernize 
existing ones, limited results have been achieved” (World Bank 2003d:22). The 
limited progress indicates that “more still needs to be known about customary land 
tenure institutions within the modern nation state” (Tsikata 2004:92). Boone 
(2007:558) has pointed out the most significant aspect of land politics that has been 
neglected in the debate: “Analysts tracking recent political liberalizations in Africa 
have not paid much attention to the constitutional aspects of land politics, and 
political science has largely ignored the links between questions of rural property on 
the one hand and deeper questions of African political development on the other.” 
Later we shall see how the politics of state formation and constitutional organization 
in Ghana underlies a prevailing dual system of ‘customary sector’ and ‘public sector’ 
land administration. Paths of state formation shape the paths of land politics. There is 
the need to understand the nature of customary institutions of land administration in 
the organization of power and authority within African states.  
 
3.4 Conclusion: Understanding Customary Institutions of Authority 
 
The path of state formation development in African countries matters for current 
outcomes of land administration. Limited progress in the reform of customary land 
administration in Africa clearly shows the need for a deeper understanding of the 
nature of the African state. There is the need to understand the extent to which the 
formal-legal institutions of the state complement, conflict with, or substitute for the 
informal organizations of traditional authorities that dominate land administration. It 
is emphasized that we need to understand the ways in which different stakeholders 
interact over time in often diverse and dense institutional contexts to promote, 
negotiate or block change in the rules and structures governing land administration. 
These interactions are profoundly political. It emerges that the creation of transparent 
and publicly accountable formal-legal institutions of communal land administration 
in Africa cannot be wished into existence because of the inter-locking nexus of 
power between formal structures of government and customary institutional 
structures of traditional authority that pre-date the modern state.  
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The lack of conceptual and policy consensus over the nature of customary land 
tenure institutions shows that not much is known about these supposedly ‘informal’ 
institutions. Contextual historical analyses of customary land administration systems 
within African states are needed if any meaningful progress is to be made in the 
design and implementation of appropriate reform policies. In the chapters that 
follow, I discuss how the colonial process of modern state formation occurred in 
Ghana; and, the causal effect of bifurcated state authority between chiefs and 
government on subsequent land administration reforms.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Politics of Traditional-Federal State Formation and Political Settlements 
Over Land Ownership in the Gold Coast: 1800-1901  
 
I have, in every public and private meeting, declared that every individual who 
resided under the British flag must consider himself as amenable to British law 
(Governor Sir Charles MacCarthy, Governor of the Gold Coast, 1821-1824).
36
 
 
Traditional institutions…ha[ve] prevailed in that country from time immemorial 
and the local Government possesses neither the right nor the power to interfere 
with it (Captain George MacClean, ‘Governor’ of the Gold Coast, 1830-1843).37 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, and the two that follow, I analyse the politics of state organization of 
authority over land administration in Ghanaian history. It is the central thrust of the 
three chapters that land tenure administration in Ghana today has been shaped by the 
historical organization of state authority and power between actors with interests in 
land tenure ownership and administration. In this chapter, I shall argue that the 
failure of British colonial Governments to conquer the existing traditional states and 
establish a unitary state shaped the evolution of a traditional-federal state that left the 
traditional states with substantial power over land ownership and land tenure 
administration. The nature of state organization between British colonial 
Governments and the traditional states constrained the former from reforming the 
land ownership system. The legacy of the traditional-federal state explains the dual 
institutional structures of authority that governs land tenure administration in Ghana 
today. My purpose in this chapter is to outline the complex unfolding politics that 
shaped the organization of land tenure administration in the traditional-federal state 
as well as the sources of demands for, and resistance to, land tenure reform.  
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 presents the story of the failure 
of the British colonial Government to create a unitary state after the Gold Coast was 
                                                 
36
 Sir Charles MacCarthy to Earl Bathurst, 16 May, 1822, (Metcalfe, 1964, document No. 75). 
37
 Captain George MacClean was elected by the British merchants as President of the government 
following the withdrawal from the Gold Coast in 1828 of direct British Crown rule. MacClean 
assumed the title of ‘Governor’ and ruled until 1843 when direct Crown rule resumed. 
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officially declared a British colony in 1821. Section 4.2 presents how the British 
colonial governments negotiated with traditional states for the establishment of the 
colonial state that I call the traditional-federal state.
38
 Section 4.3 discusses how the 
influx of European capital into the mining sector (the gold rush) forced governments 
to define the question of land ownership. Section 4.4 discusses how British 
Governments attempted to reform the land tenure administration system against 
strong opposition from Chiefs and African intelligentsia. Section 4.5 concludes the 
chapter by emphasizing the implications of the bifurcation of state authority between 
chiefs and government over land administration for subsequent developments.  
 
4.1 The Failure of the Colonial Unitary State Project: 1821-1830 
 
At the beginning of 1800, there was no national government in the Gold Coast but 
many sovereign traditional states and a number of merchant companies from 
powerful European countries (Britain, Portugal, Netherlands, Denmark and later 
France and Germany) who competed for trading influence and territorial rights. 
There were no national military, police, and judiciary organizations on the Gold 
Coast to enforce order, contracts, and obligations. European merchants relied on 
“prudence and caution”; material “dashes” to the Kings, chiefs, and Headmen; 
treaties with the rulers of traditional states; and the “customs and usages” of the 
traditional states to trade their guns, gunpowder, rum, and other wares to the natives. 
The merchants, in return, mainly bought slaves.  
 
The most powerful traditional state on the Gold Coast was the “much dreaded” 
Asante Confederacy which could command an army of 20000 – 40000 men when 
invading another traditional state to either force it into its confederacy or enforce the 
existing allegiance and payment of tribute to the Asante King (the Asantehene). By 
1800, the Asante Confederacy had reached the peak of its power after conquering 
almost all the other traditional states in present day Ghana.  
 
                                                 
38
 The Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS), a protest movement formed by chiefs and the 
intelligentsia to resist land reforms, saw the colonial state as “a federal union of the Native States” 
(Metcalfe, No. 483). Governor MacClean referred to it as “a confederacy” (Metcalfe, No. 98). 
99 
From the time the British Parliament formally decreed the ending of the slave trade 
in 1807, British Governments sought measures to effectively abolish the slave trade 
by British merchants in the Gold Coast. The promotion of ‘legitimate’ trade and 
African ‘civilization’ became additional tasks. Therefore, in 1821 the British Crown 
vested in itself all the forts, possessions, and property of the African Company of 
British merchants in the Gold Coast to establish colonial rule. Sir Charles MacCarthy 
was appointed by the Crown as the first Gold Coast Governor. Earl Henry Bathurst, 
the British Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, explained to MacCarthy the 
new colonial policy in the Gold Coast as follows: 
 
The consequence will be that many local regulations and customs which have long 
prevailed in those forts will be altogether superceded and repealed: and you will 
find it necessary to make some general notifications to the inhabitants, in order to 
guard them against being implicated in any illegal proceeding by continuing to 
adhere to ancient usages, which may now be inconsistent with the law.
39
 
 
Not long after MacCarthy arrived in the Gold Coast he reported to London, “I have, 
in every public and private meeting, declared that every individual who resided 
under the British flag must consider himself as amenable to British law.”40 
MacCarthy’s proclamations however infringed on existing powers and customs 
within territorial claims of the Asante Confederacy over the Fante territory on the 
cost. The claims of Asante had been recognized in 1820 by Joseph Dupuis, the 
British Consul for the Kingdom of Asante.
41
 Soon, the Asante Confederacy and the 
new colonial government waged the first of many wars, 1824-1901, that would 
determine the fate of the two imperial powers on the Gold Coast.  
 
Governor Charles MacCarthy succeeded in forming an alliance
42
 with some of the 
native states “who had been reduced under the power of the King of Ashantees, and 
                                                 
39
 Letter of Earl Bathurst to Sir Charles MacCarthy, 19 September, 1821 (Metcalfe, No. 52).  
40
 Letter of Sir Charles MacCarthy to Earl Bathurst, 16 May, 1822 (Metcalfe, No. 53). 
41
 The Dupuis Treaty with Asante (Metcalfe, No. 42 & 43). 
42
 The Oath-Taking at Nyankumasi, 20 December, 1923 (Metcalfe, No. 63). The alliance between the 
traditional states and the new imperial British government led by Sir Charles MacCarthy is reported to 
have been made in the following manner: “The whole of the native chiefs who joined … against the 
Ashantees were not satisfied until they had evinced their sincerity by swearing allegiance in their 
fashion, as follows. The person about to swear took a sword in his right hand and with great 
animation, whilst expressing his determination, called heaven to witness that he would be faithful to 
the cause, continually putting the sword upwards at the Governor’s head, and flourishing it round his 
own, so near at times that His Excellency’s eyes were frequently in imminent danger. They would 
also swear on the bible (white man’s fetish as they termed it), but before any of them would consent 
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who readily embraced an opportunity to throw off his yoke”.43 The traditional states 
were promised independence and protection from the Asante Kingdom. However, in 
the ensuing ‘Battle of Nsamanko’ in 1824, MacCarthy was killed and beheaded by 
the Asante army. The British Government sent Lieutenant-Colonel A. Grant to deal 
with the crisis in the Gold Coast. He arrived with military reinforcement, re-
organized the native allies, and managed to temporarily repulse the Asante army.  
 
Major-General Turner, the new Governor-in-Chief for the Gold Coast, was duly 
authorized to conclude a definitive treaty of peace with the Asante Kingdom; but, 
“without reference to any former treaty or convention which may have been 
concluded under the authority or sanction of the late African Company…with the 
Ashantees”.44 In his review of MacCarthy’s failed policies, Turner commented,  
 
Here we have no territory, sovereignty or subjects; consequently no right to 
administer laws, power to enforce them, or colonists to receive them. Therefore, 
when the Colony of Cape Coast is alluded to, it can only mean the fort. … Sir 
Charles MacCarthy evidently looked at things through a flattering medium, and 
trusted much in the power of proclamations and fine words. 
 
Major-General Turner embarked on the peace negotiations with the Asante Kingdom 
but failed in his bid to secure the independence of the rebel states before he 
contracted fever and died. Soon the Asante army was once again on the offensive 
against the rebel states. Lieutenant-Colonel Purdon led a new alliance with 
traditional states and won a decisive, but costly, victory in the Battle of Katamansu 
in 1826.
45
 In 1828, the British Crown withdrew its imperial rule from the Gold Coast 
and once again handed over the forts, possessions, and property to British merchants. 
The Crown supported the merchants with a yearly grant of £3500-4000. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
to join the war against the Ashantees, Sir Charles was obliged to assure them that he would never 
make peace with that tribe without acquainting them with his intentions, and that their interest would 
ever be considered” (ibid). The reason for the oath-taking at Nyankumasi was that the native chiefs 
distrusted the intentions of the new colonial government because “in 1807… [the Assin fugitives] 
arrived at Cape Coast, expecting to find protection, but on the contrary the governor, colonel Torrane, 
seized Cheeboo [Tsibu] their king, an old, infirm and blind man, and delivered him over to the 
Ashanntees…at Annamoboe, where he was put to death with the most excruciating torture” (ibid).    
43
. Dispatch from Lt.-Col. A Grant to Earl Bathurst, 31 July, 1824 (Metcalfe, No. 65). 
44
 Letter of Earl Bathurst to Major-General Charles Turner, 29 October, 1824 (Metcalfe, No. 66). 
45
 Governor Purdon reported that his force amounted to nearly twelve thousand men of which eight 
thousand were killed and two thousand wounded. The number of Asante army killed, wounded, or 
taken prisoners was estimated to be at least five thousand men (Metcalfe, No. 75).  
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The political experience of the Crown in the Gold Coast contributed in shaping two 
key policies when crown rule returned to the Gold Coast in 1843. First, it shaped the 
policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of the native states – especially the 
“much dreaded” Asante Kingdom. Second, it shaped the policy of negotiation with 
the native states for the acceptance of British jurisdiction. The British Crown had 
learnt some political lessons from the unsuccessful unitary-state project.   
 
4.2 Merchants Rule and the Traditional-Federal State Project: 1831-1842 
 
This study argues that the creation of the colonial state and the organization of state 
authority between the traditional states and the British central government over land 
ownership shaped the nature of land administration reforms in Ghana. But a 
debatable question is what was the “Magna Carta” that established the colonial 
traditional-federal state (Adu-Boahen 2000)? Many scholars regard the series of 
treaties signed in 1844 between some independent native states and the British local 
government as the Magna Carta of the traditional-federal state in Gold Coast history 
(Cartland 1947; Metcalfe 1964). Collectively, the series of treaties, negotiated from 6 
March 1844 to 2 December 1844, are generally known as the ‘Bond of 1844’. 
Through the ‘Bonds’ the traditional states recognized British political jurisdiction 
over them, the protection of individuals and property, and the moulding of 
customary law according to the general principles of British law.   
 
Many scholars do not look at the fundamental question of how those ‘bonded native 
states’ were able to gain their independence from the Asante confederacy. If that 
question is answered satisfactorily the critical juncture of the formation of the 
traditional-federal state will move backwards to 1831 (Adu-Boahen 2000). The 
Committee of Merchants which ruled the Gold Coast for fourteen years, 1828-1842, 
before Crown rule returned in 1843, established the nucleus of the modern 
traditional-federal state through the 1831 Peace Treaty. This peace treaty was 
negotiated by ‘Governor’46 George MacClean between the British merchant 
                                                 
46
 When the Crown Government handed over to the British merchants the administration of the 
settlements, the President elected by the merchants, Captain George MaClean, was told not to assume 
the title of Governor. But, as MacClean usually pointed out, the situation in the Gold Coast (and not 
in London) dictated the appropriate course of politics. Not surprisingly, MaClean was sometimes 
accused by the merchants of setting aside the rules to govern independently (Metcalfe, No. 105).    
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government and their allies of victories native states, on the one hand, and the 
defeated Asante Kingdom, on the other hand. Following the Battle of Katamansu in 
1826 in which the Asantes were defeated, the terms on which a peace treaty was to 
be offered to the King of Asante was immediately prepared on 10 November 1827. 
The 1831 Peace Treaty recognized the following agreement between the parties:
47
 
 
a. The King of Asante has renounced for himself, his heirs and successors 
forever, all and every right to collect tribute (as a token of dependency) from 
any of the native states in alliance with Great Britain; and that he do 
acknowledge all of these states to be free and independent.  
 
b. The parties will engage in “free commerce” and “lawful commerce”; and shall 
ensure “perfectly open and free” access to markets for all persons engaged in 
lawful trade; “without forcing them to purchase at any particular market”; 
 
c. If any of the allied kings or chiefs “refuse to abide by the decision of the 
governor, or his representative, with the chiefs assembled with him in council, 
in that case he or they will no longer be considered as a confederacy, and must 
arrange his or their disputes as they best can.” 
 
d. The King of Asante has deposited in the Cape Coast Castle, in the presence of 
the parties, “the sum of 600 ounces of gold48, and having delivered into the 
hands of the Governor two young men of the royal family of Ashantee named 
‘Ossor Ansah’ and Ossoo Inquantamissah’, as security that he will keep peace 
with the said parties in all time.” The securities shall remain in Cape Coast 
Castle for the space of six year from the date of the treaty.  
 
e. “Panyarring, denouncing and swearing on or by any person or thing whatever, 
are strictly forbidden, and all persons infringing on this rule shall be rigorously 
punished; and no master or chief shall be answerable for the crimes of his 
servants, unless done by his orders or consent, or when under his control.”  
 
f. “As the king of Ashantee has recounced all right or title to any tribute or 
homage from the Kings of Dinkera, Assin, and others formerly his subjects, so, 
on the other hand, these parties are strictly prohibited from insulting, by 
improper speaking or in any other way, their former master, such conduct 
being calculated to produce quarrels and wars.” 
 
g. That all the parties accept the jurisdiction of the Governor-in-Chief of His 
Britannic Majesty’s possessions on the Gold Coast (or his representative in the 
absence of the Governor) to decide “all ‘palavers’ relating to the agreements, 
with the assistance of two or more of the Kings and chiefs as a council.  
                                                 
47
 The 1831 Peace Treaty is reproduced in Metcalfe, No. 98. It may be compared with Sir Charles 
MacCarthy’s dubious treaty of alliance made with some Fante and Assin states before he met a fatal 
end in the battle of Nsamanko (Metcalfe, No. 63).   
48
 The 1831 Peace Treaty accepted the 600 ounces of gold bargained by the King of Asante instead of 
the 4,000 ounces of gold initially demanded in the existing terms prepared on 10 November 1827. 
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The above peace treaty became the basis of the traditional-federal state; and, for that 
matter, the modern Ghanaian state which incorporates the political organizations, 
institutions, and customary laws of the traditional states (Adu-Boahen 2000). How 
did Governor MacClean succeed where Major-General Turner and Lieutenant-
Colonel Purdon had failed? During his visit to Accra, Governor MacClean succeeded 
in redeeming an Ashante princess called Atianvah “after much labour and difficulty, 
besides incurring considerable expense.”49 It appears that the Asante princess had 
earlier been captured by some of the traditional states during a war with the Asantes. 
The princess who had “much influence with the king…declared that she will use 
every endeavour to bring about a peace betwixt the British settlements and Ashantee, 
provided she can be safely conveyed to Coomassie.”50 MacClean and his 
government used princess Atianvah “to induce the king to come into their [our] 
arrangement for peace.” MacClean’s foresight produced the new “confederacy”.  
 
The merchant government established a local militia and attached to the palaces of 
each of the parties to the peace treaty a militia who served as the link of effective 
communication with the Cape Coast traditional-federal government.
51
 And for a 
period of thirty-two years (1831-1863) there was no war between the British local 
government and the Asantes. Dr R.R. Madden who was sent by Her Majesty’s 
Government in England to the Gold Coast to report on the state of affairs wrote: 
 
The trade of Cape Coast has considerably increased. …The cessation of warfare 
between the Ashantee and Fantee nations has caused the paths to be opened, from 
the interior to the coast; and the merchants of Ashantee now come down from 
Coomassie …to Cape Coast or Anomaboe, without let or hindrance. This journey, 
which formerly was considered one of great peril and difficulty, is now easily 
performed in 60 hours’ travelling. …During the last nine or ten years, the trade 
has gone on steadily increasing. In the year 1831, the imports into Cape Coast 
were £130,851. 3s 11 1/2d., and in 1840 they amounted to £423,170. The same 
steady increase is to be noted in the exports. These from Cape Coast Castle in 
1831 amounted to £90,282,9s 6d, and in 1840 they had increased to £325,008.
52
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 Minutes of the Council of the Committee of Merchants, 23 August, 1830 (Metcalfe, No. 95).  
50
 Minutes of the Council of the Committee of Merchants (Metcalfe, No. 95). The political 
negotiations that resulted in the peace treaty is covered from Metcalfe No. 94-99.  
51
 In 1883 Captain Knapp Barrow was sent by Governor Sir S. Rowe to Kumasi to enquire about the 
causes of the disintegration of the Asante Kingdom. In his report Captain Barrow recorded, “All 
urged me to beg your Excellency to come to their assistance, to put their country straight for them, so 
that they may all be ‘of one mind’ as in the time of Governor MacClean whom they still revere and 
call to this day ‘Obrodie Badaie’ which means, ‘The time of the white man when everybody slept 
sound.’” (Captain Knapp Barrow, Report on his mission to Ashanti, 5 July, 1883 (Metcalfe, No. 339). 
52
 Dr R. R. Madden’s Report on the Gold Coast (Metcalfe, No. 132). 
104 
The achievement of Governor MacClean led Her Majesty’s Government to restore 
Crown rule to the Gold Coast in 1843. MacClean was given the new position of 
Judicial Assessor and magistrate to exercise British jurisdiction within and outside 
the forts. The Judicial Assessor is assigned the function of helping the native courts 
of the traditional states, based on their consent, to decide cases “whether according 
to British laws or the laws there prevalent.” He continued to govern the Gold Coast 
until the arrival of Lieut.-Governor H.W. Hill, as new governor, in February 1844.
53
 
 
4.2.1 Return of Crown Rule and the Bonds of 1844 
 
The transfer of government and relegation of MacClean from the forefront of 
political decision-making began to shake the peaceful foundations of the colonial 
state, as both the independent states and the Asante Confederacy appeared to distrust 
the new political arrangements. On 6 March 1844, “several of the chiefs from 
different parts of the country” visited the new Governor “to pay their respects on the 
transfer of the Government.”54 Governor Hill seized the “opportunity” to “hurriedly” 
signed the first of a series of ‘bonds’ with chiefs who once again acknowledged “the 
power and jurisdiction” of the British government. These series of political 
agreements between the chiefs and the British government came to be known as the 
‘Bond of 1844’. The short content of the famous Bond of 1844 is reproduced below. 
 
1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her 
Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within diverse countries and 
places adjacent to Her Majesty’s forts and settlements on the Gold Coast, we, 
the chiefs of countries and places so referred to, adjacent to the said forts and 
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 In 1913, Casely Hayford in presenting a toast at a banquet held in honour of Governor Hugh 
Clifford had this to say about Governor MacClean: “He was able to inspire the sympathy and loyalty 
of the people, and he ruled with a success that has scarcely been matched since” (Hayford, 1913:155).  
54
 According to Governor Hill, the real intent of the chiefs for their visit was for them to clarify the 
rumour that Her Majesty’s Government intended “to pronounce freedom to all slaves within the limits 
over which jurisdiction has been exercised.” The chiefs who maintained large numbers of domestic 
slaves in their traditional states had good grounds to be worried if the rumour were true. Governor 
Hill was however afraid to confirm to the chiefs the full truth in rumour because, he wrote, “an 
attempt to carry out any such measure would cause a revolution. The chiefs were delighted on my 
informing them that it was quite an idle report, and that the export slave trade was all that we 
prohibited. They expressed satisfaction on my telling them they were not at liberty to ill-use their 
domestic slaves, and if a person inherited a slave, that person was not at liberty to sell the slave again, 
but such slave was to be considered a member of the family. … The chiefs expressed great 
satisfaction at the appointment of Captain MacClean to preside over the trial of offenders” (Metcalfe, 
No. 144). Ghana derived its date of independence from British colonial rule, 6
th
 March 1957, from the 
commencement date of the famous Bonds of 1844.     
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settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare 
that the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and property. 
 
2. Human sacrifices and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are 
abominations and contrary to law. 
 
3. Murders, robberies and other crimes and offences will be tried and inquired 
before the Queen’s judicial officers and the chiefs of the district, moulding 
the customs of the country to the general principles of British law. 
 
Between 6
th
 March – 2 December, 1844 eleven of such ‘Bonds’ were signed with 
chiefs. Unlike many scholars (Austin 1964; Gocking 2005; Pellow and Chazan 
1986), I do not consider the series of Bonds signed in 1844 as the critical juncture 
that shaped the evolution of the modern traditional-federal state. The significance of 
the Bond of 1844 pales in comparison to the Peace Treaty of 1831 which, first, 
gained the independence of some traditional states from the Asante Confederacy and, 
second, created what MacClean called “a confederacy” made up of the newly 
independent traditional states, the remnant of the Asante Confederacy, and the local 
representatives of the British Crown. Commenting on the significance of the Bond of 
1844, the Ghanaian historian Adu-Boahen (2000:41) wrote,  
 
This bond is certainly not as important as estimated by some historians. It cannot 
be said to be the Magna Carta of Ghana or the legal basis for British rule in 
Ghana. In the first place, the bond was not even a treaty between the British and 
the Fante and their allies, but a mere declaration on the part of the latter, and the 
British who prepared it never considered themselves bound by it. Moreover, as 
indicated in the first clause, the signatory chiefs were merely recognising the 
power that had already been exercised. In other words, the bond did not create 
MacCleans’s power but it merely acknowledged it formally.   
 
The change from the merchant-elected Governor MacClean to crown-appointed 
Governor Hill did not affect the organizational framework of the ‘confederacy’ that 
had been created by the 1831 Peace Treaty. For many chiefs within the Gold Coast 
Protectorate and the Asante Kingdom, the 1831 Peace Treaty of MacClean marked 
the period of “Obrodie Badaie’ – which means, ‘The time of the white man when 
everybody slept sound.”55 That was the time when the traditional-federal state with a 
national government was formed. The effects of colonial state formation on land 
ownership and administration are discussed in turn.     
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 See the Report written by Captain Knapp Barrow, 5 July 1883, from his mission to the Asante 
Kingdom to ascertain the causes of its rapid disintegration (Metcalfe, No. 339).    
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4.2.2 The Creation of Public Lands: A Necessary Feature of States 
 
Between 1821 and 1874, colonial government interferences in stool land ownership 
and administration were confined to the compulsory acquisition of stool lands as 
public lands and the ‘consensual’ adjudication of disputes over stool lands. Before 
1821, British merchants in the Gold Coast acquired lands from the chiefs for their 
settlements. The merchant ‘governors’ kept a “Register of Town Lands dating from 
1818.” When the possessions of the merchants under the African Company were 
vested in the British Crown in 1821 their land acquisitions became Crown property. 
The Minutes of the Executive Council of MacClean’s government states:  
 
It would appear that erroneous ideas were entertained…by the authorities in 
England, who seemed to suppose that the local Government were bound to pay 
these allowances in the name or in lieu of ground rent. This, as the Council well 
knew was not the case – not only the ground on which the castle is built, but a 
very large extent of country having long been the actual property of the Crown – 
in proof of which, it may be sufficient to state that the greater part of even the 
native inhabitants, hold the ground on which their houses are built by grants from 
the Crown, which grants have always been given by the Governor for the time 
being, of which he (the President), has, during the last five years, given many, and 
[of] which a regular registry is kept in the Castle with ground plans annexed.
56
   
 
The creation of the colonial state and its expansion required governments to acquire 
lands from chiefs to be used for public purposes (construction of state buildings, 
roads, railway, etc). State owned lands are public lands. The authoritative research of 
Bentsi-Enchill (1964:20-2), recognises that “lands held by the Crown or Government 
of Ghana” became public lands. Bentsi-Enchill also commented,  
 
To be sure, the British had acquired during the nineteenth century what was 
acknowledged to be an irregular jurisdiction over many of these coastal states; but 
the annexation had nevertheless something of the character of a surreptitious 
encroachment, protected allies waking up suddenly to find themselves 
transformed into a British colony and their citizens British subjects.  
 
Lack of resistance from chiefs to the “surreptitious encroachment” could also be 
explained by payment of “allowances” to the chiefs. The absence of powerful 
indigenous protest movements during the early periods of colonial administration 
enabled the peaceful creation of public lands.  
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 Minute of the Council of Merchants, 10 August, 1835 (Metcalfe, No. 107). 
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4.2.3 The Fante Confederation: In Search of an Accountable Chieftaincy? 
 
The intelligentsia in Cape Coast, from the early days of their emergence on the 
political scene, found it more beneficial to work with their weakened chiefs to 
establish what they called a confederation of Fante states in 1868 towards self-
government from British rule. The Fante confederacy was also established in order 
to create a strong force against their “common enemy” the Asante Kingdom.57 The 
immediate catalyst for the formation of this political movement was an exchange of 
forts between the British and the Dutch governments in 1867 for effective control 
over the native states and introduction of customs duties.  
 
The exchange of forts led to the placement of some Fante states under the Dutch, 
who had been strong allies of the Asantes.
58
 In the words of British Governor, H. T. 
Ussher, the Fante states “now find themselves in a precarious position; at enmity 
with the Dutch, on unfriendly terms with Her Majesty’s Government, divided among 
themselves, and finally threatened by Ashantee.” The strong historical relationship 
between the Dutch and the Asantes was given by Major-General Turner as follows: 
 
In everything with Elmina there is much difficulty, as I have reason to apprehend 
that Earl Bathurst considers it a respectable Dutch settlement with European 
authorities and troops. ...Although the flag of the Netherlands is flying 
there...there are no European soldiers or merchants,...the people are all Africans 
(chiefly Ashantees) by whom, and not by the nominal Governor, all questions of 
importance are decided.
59
 
 
It was through Dutch merchants that the Confederacy of Asante States acquired 
much of their guns and modern military weaponry that they used against both the 
British and the Fantes.
60
 The Fantes looked upon the Dutch as feudatories to the 
Asantes. As Governor Ussher also wrote, “this opinion is unfortunately strengthened 
by the fact of the payment to the King at Coomassie, of a yearly tribute by the Dutch 
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 About twenty four Fante kings and chiefs signed the constitution of the ‘Fante Confederation’.  
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 The Asantes bought much of their guns from the Dutch aside from the yearly payment of stipend by 
the Dutch to the Asante King. See Metcalfe No. 274.   
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 Letter of Major-General Turner to Lt.-Col Purdon, 18 October, 1825 (Metcalfe, No. 71).  
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 The British constantly expressed their desire to the Netherlands Government to buy off the Dutch 
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Asante Confederacy, and, second, to ward off threats of French incursions into the Gold Coast. 
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for the ground upon which Elmina stands.”61 Certainly, the transfer of forts involved 
many complications which became “daily more alarming, and threaten to involve the 
Protectorate in ruin.”62 Logically, all the Fantes, including those still under British 
protection, interpreted the transfer to the Dutch as a betrayal by the British to their 
mortal enemy. It is for this reason that the Fante states sought “to support and protect 
themselves, regardless of British interests or protection.”63 Governor Ussher wrote, 
“Their loyalty had been shaken to its foundations.”64 The Fantes did not understand 
why the British, “a Power for so many years their ally and protector”,65 had sold 
them to the Asantes.
 The Fantes were “inclined to throw off British allegiance”66 to 
form their own confederacy. 
 
Indigenous political elites who organized the governance structure of the Fante 
Confederation imitated British institutions of government, and layered them on 
existing weak institutions of chieftaincy. At the top of the governance structure was 
the ‘king-president’ to be elected from the body of kings. The day to day 
administration of the Confederacy was to be managed by ‘the Ministry’ made up of 
“men of education and position.”67 The judicial functions of the confederacy were to 
be performed by provincial assessors appointed in each province or district. The 
Confederacy’s constitution however stated that parties dissatisfied with judicial 
decisions in the confederacy may appeal to the British Courts. The British 
government was kept in an advisory relationship.   
 
More important to the study, one of the objectives of the Fante Confederation was 
“To develop and facilitate the working of the mineral and other resources of the 
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 Letter of H. T. Ussher to Sir A. Kennedy, 6 April, 1868 (Metcalfe, No. 262). 
62
 Letter of Ussher to Kennedy, 19 March, 1868 (Metcalfe, No. 261). The complications of the 
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 Constitution of the Fante Confederacy (Metcalfe, No. 279). 
109 
country.”68 It is reasonable to suggest that men who had gone through British formal 
education were dissatisfied with the management of land resources by their chiefs. 
Moreover, the imitation of British formal institutions of rule also suggests the 
preference of educated Ghanaians, if not the chiefs, for a more transparent and 
accountable system of local administration. The political objectives of the Fante 
Confederation marked the beginnings of the long search for an accountable 
chieftainship, and, for that matter, accountable customary land administration.  
 
Generally, the Fante Confederation did not receive support from colonial 
government officials. Herbert. T. Ussher,
69
 described the educated members of the 
Confederation as “A small class of discontented and unprincipled natives, (who 
appear to be an evil inseparable from all negro communities).”70 W. H. Simpson71 
identified two things with the new political movement. First, he identified the 
“pernicious interference of the ‘scholars’ or semi-educated natives, hitherto in 
uncontrolled ascendancy.”72 Second, he identified the need for devising a system of 
rule that is consistent with the prerogatives of the Crown, a union for self-defence 
between the different nations within the protectorate, and a platform for training the 
natives towards self-government.
73
 C. S. Salmon
74
 arrested almost all the officials of 
the Ministry because he saw the creation of the Fante Confederation as a “dangerous 
conspiracy [that] must be destroyed for good or the country will become altogether 
unmanageable.”75 He saw the creation of the Confederacy as an attempt by the non-
chief educated elites to usurp the authority of their chiefs: 
 
The worst feature in the new constitution is the complete manner in which all 
power is taken from the native kings and placed in the hands of ‘Ministry’ and 
‘Executive Council’, composed of young men, some of doubtful respectability, 
and none with any means, or holding any position in the country.
76
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Clearly, colonial government officials were unwilling to share power with the new 
class of educated native ‘young men’. However, from the 1880s, this view changed 
and the colonial government began to co-opt the African intelligentsia into the ruling 
coalition. Crucially, about eight decades later, the emerging class of educated 
“unprincipled” ‘young men’ succeeded in taking away almost all state power from 
the native kings. In the next chapter we shall know how this happened; and, more 
importantly, how they used their power to transform chieftaincy.  
 
Until then, the activities of the Fante Confederation led to serious problems with the 
Asantes who began to invade the member states of the Confederacy. C. S. Salmon 
was proved right that neither the educated men nor the chiefs of the Fante 
Confederacy had the means to defend themselves against the Asante “should serious 
complications arise”.77 However, the Asantes not only directed their anger against 
the Fante states but also drew the colonial government into another war. Whenever it 
comes to a war with the Asantes, “that great native power” as Governor Ussher had 
described them,
78
 the Fante states and the British Government both realized that they 
needed the support of each other. The reason was best offered by John Pope-
Hennessy, Acting Governor in Chief of West African Settlements (1872-73): 
 
Up to this, the Gold Coast differed from all other colonies in one important 
respect...that is, in the absence of the first element of government – power. The 
West Indian Troops in Cape Coast Castle gave the Government no real power in 
the Protectorate. Experience shows that they were not physically fit for any 
operations in the interior. As Imperial troops, an Administrator ran great risk in 
using them. The chiefs in the interior have not been slow to learn this; and when, 
of late years, an administrator was weak enough to utter threats, the chiefs have 
laughed at them.
79
 
 
In Weberian conceptions of the state, the Government not only lacked a monopoly 
on the legitimate use of coercion or violence, but, more seriously, its weak military 
force could not withstand the geographical conditions in the bush in the event of war 
with powerful Asante states in the interior. The temporal remedy for Government lay 
in strengthening the traditional-federal system of government with ‘loyal’ traditional 
states wherever they may be found. The British local Government was not unaware 
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 Ussher to Kennedy, 6 April, 1868. 
79
 Letter of John Pope-Hennessy to Kimberly, Sierra Leone, 29 October, 1872 (Metcalfe, No. 286).  
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of the precarious nature of its dependence on the military forces of loyal traditional 
states. Therefore, Government also began to create its own national coercive 
machinery made up of “a mixed force, partly Mohammedans and partly pagans, that 
is, made up of the Houssas and of the Fantee police.”80  Such a national force would 
become more stable, effective, and permanent, and gradually more powerful over the 
forces of the traditional states. In fact, when C.S. Salmon, began to lay the 
foundations of a national military and police force, Pope-Hennessy noted: 
 
It is clear that the local Government are obtaining, for the first time, some real 
power, independent of the precarious and costly imperial troops. With that power 
at his disposal, the Administrator can establish district magistrates in the interior, 
by whom trade can be protected and something like an administration of justice 
secured, in concert with the native chiefs.
81
 
 
The majority of recruits for the national military and police forces that were 
developed by Government from the 1890s were Hausa tribal men from the Northern 
territories. And the first national Military school was called the Hausa Military 
School. It is important to point out that the Gold Coast British Government also 
lacked another important element of an effective state – territorial sovereignty.  
 
The Berlin Conference of 1884-5 was yet to take place and the Asante Confederacy 
largely remained uncooperative. It is for these reasons that the British Crown 
proclamations of territorial sovereignty over the Gold Coast Colony in 1874 would 
not only be vaguely defined and ineffective; but also no formal act of annexation was 
made till 1901.
82
 Until then, let us turn to another British war with the Asantes, 
arising from the provocations of the Fante Confederacy.        
 
4.2.4 The Defeat and Disintegration of the Asante Confederacy 
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The new Asantehene, Kofi Karikari, “in direct contravention of the Treaty of 
1831”,83 made “preposterous demands”84 to restore to the Asantes all the states under 
British protection that were formerly subjects of the Asantes. This led to the 
‘Sagrenti War’85 of 1873-4 between the British with their allies and the Asantes. Sir 
Garnet Wolseley who was sent by the British Government to lead the war organized 
a strong military force from the armies of protected states, 200 of the 2
nd
 West India 
Regiment, the Naval Brigade, and the 42
nd
 Highlanders. The Sagrenti war struck the 
fatal blows that led to the rapid disintegration of the Asante Confederacy and its 
subsequent integration into the Gold Coast Protectorate in 1901. Kumasi, the capital 
of the Asante Confederacy, was burnt down during the Sagrenti war.  
 
The content of the new Peace Treaty that was made at Fomena on 13 February 1874 
remained almost the same as that of the 1831 Peace Treaty. It reaffirmed the 
independence to the victorious allied states, the freedom of trade, and the protection 
of human rights to life. Bolstered by the great victory over the Asante Confederacy, 
governments, supported by the Colonial office in London, began to expand the 
formal administrative frontiers of the Gold Coast traditional-federal state. The defeat 
of the Asante Confederacy in 1873-4 brought a sense of political stability in the Gold 
Coast Colony. Colonial governments, European capitalists, chiefs, and ordinary 
people seized the best opportunities for political, economic, and social advancement. 
 
4.3 European Capital Development and the Question of Land Ownership   
 
Hardly had the British and their allies conquered the Asante states when European 
capitalists began to troop into the Gold Coast mining sector to prospect for gold. In 
1877, the Earl of Carnarvon who was Secretary for the Colonies asked Sanford 
Freeling, Governor of the Gold Coast, to give some encouragement to the mining 
industry. Governor Freeling responded that for the influx of European mining to 
have a chance of success it “would entail the assumption of the soil by the 
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Government, for the tribes would never alienate it willingly even if a large payment 
were made.”86 His justification for this was that, 
 
The rightful owners of the soil in the Protectorate are the kings and chiefs and 
their people, and not the Government. I consider that Her Majesty’s Government 
have no territorial rights whatever over the various districts of the Protectorate. 
The limits of British territory are…strictly speaking…only the forts… There is no 
land absolutely unoccupied, in the sense of being without an owner; it is either the 
property of the occupant of the Stool or of certain chiefs and headmen. These 
allow others to occupy and do so on payment of a certain portion of the yield, 
whether of gold or provisions; but the occupier obtains no fixed tenure, and the 
duration of his occupancy is purely arbitrary on the part of the owner. … Land 
cannot be entirely alienated. It is held with tenacity and there is no subject which 
gives rise to disputes of so much acrimony and pertinacity as disagreements 
relating thereto. At present there is a disagreement of the kind which has for many 
years past been a source of trouble and anxiety to the Government.
87
  
 
 
Governor Freeling concluded that any compulsory alienation of land from the 
rightful owners would not only be unjust but, critically, more likely to ruin the 
indispensable cooperation between Chiefs and the Government. Interestingly, today, 
the view that stool land cannot be entirely alienated has gained firm currency among 
many legal scholars, within the country’s judicial system, and in the 1992 
constitutional framework (Brobbey 2008; Kludze 2000). It is a view which has been 
challenged by some scholars who emphasize that it was an invention by chiefs and 
colonial government officials (Amanor 2010; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Hill 1963).   
 
For present purposes, the crucial point is that the inability of British Governments to 
compulsorily alienate stool lands from Chiefs was because of the logical outworking 
of the traditional-federal system of indirect rule, in which British governments 
largely depended on the coercive structures of traditional states to maintain political 
conditions required for the growth of European merchant capitalism. This was the 
era of the well-known colonial system of indirect rule. The path of state formation 
where governments possess monopoly over coercion, law making and adjudication, 
and all other actors within a territory, had been pursued by Sir Charles MacCarthy in 
1821-4. But MacCarthy’s coercive-intensive path of state formation (Tilly 1992) had 
ended in fatalism leading to the withdrawal of Crown rule from the Gold Coast.  
                                                 
86
 Letter of Governor Freeling to Carnarvon, 29 May, 1877 (Metcalfe, No. 318). 
87
 Freeling to Carnarvon, 29 May, 1877.  
114 
The lessons from MacCarthy’s coercive-intensive path of state formation influenced 
subsequent mercantilist governments to choose the alternative path of negotiating 
with traditional states, for recognition of British sovereignty and acquisition of land 
with compensation. The view of Government that “the rightful owners of the soil in 
the Protectorate are the kings and chiefs and their people, and not the Government” 
would become firmly consolidated in legal, constitutional, and scholarly discourses 
(Brobbey 2008; Hayford 1913; Kludze 2000; Sarbah 1904). However, what still 
remains to be settled is the question of the relative position of the kings and chiefs 
and their subjects in the ownership and administration of Stool lands. How the 
Government attempted to settle this crucial question is the issue that I discuss next.   
 
4.4 Resistance to Reform in Stool Land Ownership  
 
I discuss in this section a serious of legislative processes initiated by Government to 
reform the stool land administration system in the Colony, Ashanti, and the Northern 
Territories. In 1878, in the Gold Coast Colony, when Government made the first 
attempt to clearly define the limits of power to be exercised by Chiefs, Government 
gave Chiefs the authority to administer some vaguely defined ‘unoccupied lands’. 
However, in the 1890s, when Governments attempted to reform the administration of 
the ‘unoccupied lands’ through the famous Land Bills, the legislative initiatives gave 
rise to the kind of acrimony that governor Freeling had predicted in 1877. I discuss 
below the attempts by successive Governments to reform stool land administration. 
 
4.4.1 Bifurcation of State Authority in Land Administration: Administration 
of ‘Unoccupied Lands’ by Chiefs and Government 
 
The 1878 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance, which was repealed and re-enacted in 1883, 
strengthened the powers of Native Authorities by giving them the authority to make 
bye-laws for purposes of administering, among other things, “Unoccupied lands and 
forests”, “Land Marks and fences”, and “Mines and mining.”88 The Ordinance also 
created Native Tribunals with civil jurisdiction to determine “All suits relating to the 
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ownership or possession of lands held under native tenure, and situated within the 
particular jurisdiction of the Tribunal.”89 Head Chiefs, with the concurrence of their 
Councillors (Chiefs, Captains, Headmen, and others who by native customary law 
are the Councillors of the Stool) were also given the authority to make bye-laws “for 
promoting the peace, good order, and welfare of the people of his division.”90 In 
effect, the state was strengthening the indirect system of rule through the chiefs. 
Interestingly, there was almost no acrimonious debate between Government, Chiefs, 
and African intelligentsia over the definition of “unoccupied lands.” So long as the 
administration of “unoccupied lands and forests” remained in the domain of Chiefs, 
Government got the full support of chiefs and their educated natives.  
 
Thus, Governor Sir Samuel Rowe got the support of both the Chiefs and African 
intelligentsia to establish the system of deeds registration in the Gold Coast. Under 
the Land Registry Ordinance of 1883, a Land Registry office was established for 
those who wanted to register their documents covering stool land transactions. This 
proved to be an important step in the country’s history of land administration. Deeds 
registration continued to be the system of land registration in the post-colonial era, 
until 1986 when Government attempted to replace it with the more secure system of 
land title registration. The transition from deeds registration to title registration 
would however create conflicts between offices of the Land Registry and new 
agencies of land title registration. I shall return to discuss this matter in the context of 
the politics of land administration reform in Ghana. 
 
The introduction and growth of the cocoa industry in the 1890s proved wrong 
Governor Freeling’s view that land could not be entirely alienated by chiefs through 
market forces (Hill 1963). Attempts by colonial Governments to reform the land 
administration system in 1894 and 1897 would be met with a well organized 
opposition from Chiefs and African intelligentsia. The successful opposition would 
become a lasting historical monument to be cherished by African political elites.  
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4.4.2 The 1894 Crown Lands Bill: Vesting ‘Waste Lands’ in Government 
 
The dramatic injection of European capital into the mining sector and indigenous 
capital into the cocoa industry (Hill 1963) made government change its opinion 
about the capacity of chiefs to manage stool lands. In 1874, the first European 
Company for gold mining was formed in the Gold Coast. By 1902 the mining sector 
had been “overrun by prospectors…and during the year no less than 2,825 
concessions were taken up and filled in the Colony”.91 The value of mining 
concessions and land for cocoa farming rose dramatically in the 1890s. Finding 
trustworthy native interpreters to transact business between chiefs and European 
prospectors was not a problem at all as Governor Freeling had thought in 1877.
92
 
According to Governor John Roger, “Unfortunately, many native chiefs appear to 
sell or lease…Stool lands, which they hold as tribal trustees, without imposing any 
conditions as to the manner in which such rights may be exercised.”93 Native lawyers 
benefited from the increasing cases of land litigation and native merchants also 
profited from land speculation. Governments therefore felt the need to control the 
reckless alienation of stool lands by chiefs. But Governments would not find strong 
support from Chiefs and their educated subjects until the 1930s.  
 
In 1894, Governor Sir W. B. Griffith introduced the Crown Lands Bill in an attempt 
“to prevent the continuance of this reckless improvidence”94 by the chiefs. Almost 
throughout the Colony, chiefs and the ‘educated native community’95 (largely made 
up of lawyers and merchants) joined forces to violently protest against the attempt by 
the government to vest in the Crown “the forests, waste lands, and minerals.”96 The 
Fante Confederation and other organized movements in the Gold Coast also sent 
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protest petitions to the British Government in England. Griffith’s decade-long reign 
as Governor of the Gold Coast came to an end the same year he introduced the Bill. 
Governor William Edward Maxwell, who succeeded Griffith, generally supported 
the desirability of the Bill but opposed aspects of the Bill on three technical grounds. 
In the view of Governor Maxwell, first, the relative interests of the British 
Government, the Gold Coast Colony, and the native population had not been “clearly 
laid down by law”; second, the nature of land tenure within the Colony had not been 
surveyed to make it possible for government to clearly identify and possess waste 
lands; and, third, ‘Native Law’ recognised by the Bill had not been ascertained and 
codified and therefore was “something quite unknown”.97 Governor Maxwell 
therefore deferred the passage of the Bill “for sometime longer.”98  
 
Towards future legal enactment on lands, Governor Maxwell pointed out that the 
enactment will deprive “the right of the paramount authority to deal with natural 
products, and with land which has not been turned to account.” He emphasized, “the 
right – if it exists – of making grants to strangers, particularly to Europeans, of waste 
lands and of minerals and of concessions of forest land, will be taken away.” The 
reasons he gave were that “The practice of making such grants and concessions is 
quite modern, and is probably illegal according to Native Law and Custom.”99  
 
Governor Maxwell asked the Colonial Secretary to give him the necessary legal 
powers that “would greatly strengthen [his] hands in dealing finally with this 
troublesome question”. Even if the requested legal powers were given, would he be 
able to take away the powers of the chiefs over the so-called waste stool lands? Are 
legal powers enough to fill any gaps that may be created from lack of cooperation by 
the powerful chiefs and their people? Or, as Governor Freeling saw it, was it the case 
that “the time…certainly has not yet arrived”? Just three years after Government 
withdrew the Crown Lands Ordinance, a reshaped version called the Lands Bill was 
presented to the chiefs and their people. This will help us know the empirical 
answers to the questions. What happened to this redressed Bill is discussed below.   
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 Maxwell to the Marquis of Ripon, 9 May, 1895. Governor Maxwell based his ideas about the 
Crown Lands Bill as well as the direction of future policy on his long experience with native 
authorities in the Malay States, in the Malay Peninsula, where he had served from 1865-94.   
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4.4.3 The 1897 Public Lands Bill: Defining Stool Lands as Public Lands 
 
The Colonial Government reshaped the Crown Lands Bill and in 1897 introduced 
the Bill to the Legislative Council constituted by six official members appointed by 
the British Crown. The major innovations in the 1897 Lands Bill included:  
 
a. the redefinition of stool lands as “public lands” to be administered for the 
benefit of the people;  
 
b. the concurrent rights of Government and chiefs to administer such public 
lands as trustees; 
 
c. the removal of the authority of chiefs to create any private right in public 
land, without the consent of the Governor; and, 
 
d. the reversion of abandoned lands to public lands after a period of three 
consecutive years.     
 
The reshaped Bill attempted to curtail the power of chiefs to administer stool lands 
like private property. C. J. Bannerman, the counsel for the chiefs, however argued in 
the Legislative Council that the intent and form of the redrafted Bill was the same as 
that of 1894 and that “this is another way of getting into the room through the 
window if the doors are locked.”100 Responding to the rhetoric of the counsel for the 
chiefs, Governor Maxwell stated: 
 
What it does is this: it distinguishes between public rights and private rights. It 
recognises the fact that the stool lands of a tribe are really public lands which 
ought to be administered for the benefit of the people…to see that native chiefs do 
not abuse their position, and exceed their powers, by encroaching upon the rights 
of those for whom they are really trustees, and by dealing illegally and 
improvidently with stool lands, which are…the public lands of the tribe.101  
 
The formal distinction between “public rights” and “private rights” was to make it 
possible for members of the stool to hold their chiefs accountable in the 
administration of a public resource. In fact, the position taken by the Governor on the 
definition of ‘stool lands’ as ‘public lands’ had firm roots in the principles of 
customary law known to native legal scholars who were leading members of the 
ARPS (Hayford 1903; Sarbah 1904). John Mensah Sarbah – an influential educated 
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 C. J. Bannerman, Legislative Council Debates, Accra, 29 June, 1897 (Metcalfe, No. 418). 
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 C. J. Bannerman, 29 June, 1897. 
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Ghanaian legal scholar and unofficial member of the Legislative Council –, 
suggested that the period of three consecutive years given for undeveloped lands to 
revert to the domain ‘public lands’ should be extended to ten years. Governor 
Maxwell agreed to Sarbah’s suggestion to modify that section of the Bill. There 
appeared to have been consensus between the famous Ghanaian guardian of 
customary law and the Governor. It appeared that the Colonial Government was 
better prepared than before to overrun strong opposition from native legal scholars.  
 
The chiefs mounted stronger opposition to the Bill. In 1898, a protest movement 
called the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) was formed by the chiefs 
and educated elites to lead the fight against the Bill. The ARPS sent a delegation to 
England to fight their opposition to the Bill. Government’s control over the 
Legislative Council and articulation of a better argument were not enough to secure 
victory over the chiefs and the protest movements. Between 1897 and 1899, the 
British Colonial Government found itself in heated races with France and Germany 
for the control of territories in the northern part of the Gold Coast. Government 
required the support of the Chiefs in the Colony to protect its loosely defined 
territorial boundaries. The Lands Bill was once again withdrawn by the Government.  
 
The victories achieved by the ARPS over the Land Bills shall become a lasting 
historical monument in Ghanaian politics. The dependence of colonial government 
on traditional states to rule indirectly is what made it impossible for government to 
act alone in land administration reforms. In 1916, government would begin to co-opt 
chiefs and non-chief intelligentsia into the Legislative Council to facilitate political 
cooperation. But the Ghanaian political elites made it clear to British government 
officials that they would cooperate in all matters except any attempt to reform the 
land tenure system (Hayford 1913).  
 
In 1900, when it seemed that the complications of international boundary 
demarcations with competing European powers had been settled, the remnants of the 
Asante states mounted their last resistance to colonial rules in what came to be 
known as the Yaa Asantewaa war of 1900-1. Government required the support of 
loyal traditional states in the Colony and in Ashanti to prosecute its war agenda. 
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4.4.4 Crown Lands and Intra-state Transfers of Stool Land in Ashanti    
 
The rapidly disintegrating Asante Confederacy found a new King in Kwaku Duah 
III, better known as Nana Agyeman Prempeh. In 1894-5 the new King tried to 
rebuild the Confederacy. War broke out first among the Asante states and later 
between the Kumasi state and other states that were under the protection of the 
Colonial Government. The Colonial Government was not going to tolerate the 
rebuilding of an Asante military organization that would be used to cause internal 
political instability. Governor Maxwell led a military expedition to Kumasi, seized 
the King of Kumasi, and brought the King to the Colony. This resistance was fatally 
crushed and many of the Asante chiefs were either arrested or killed in the war. Nana 
Prempeh was shipped out of the Gold Coast to live in exile in Seychelles Island until 
1924. On 26 September 1901, the Ashanti Order in Council finally incorporated the 
Asante states into the defining boundaries of the Gold Coast Protectorate.  
 
In 1901, Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies
102
 suggested to 
Captain Donald Stewart, the British Resident of Kumasi, to make two changes in the 
ownership of land in Ashanti: “first, the taking by the Crown of lands of the tribes 
that rose against British rule; and, secondly, the transfer to loyal tribes of lands of 
disloyal tribes.”103 Governor Matthew Nathan104 and Captain Stewart were however 
of opinion that the proposed confiscation of the lands of the tribes to the Crown 
“would not be desirable.” 105 They argued that:  
 
a. The Colonial administration is “not in a position to dispense, over any 
considerable part of Ashanti, with the assistance of these chiefs”. 
 
b. Although it had become necessary for the colonial administration “to take 
from [Chiefs] some of their sources of wealth and therefore of power”, the 
administration should rather put the chiefs “in a position to get considerable 
rents for their lands”, to “compensate them, to some extent, for depriving 
them of less legitimate sources of revenue.”106  
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Asante states had been deprived of “less legitimate sources of revenue” because “They can no longer 
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c. The colonial administration had already “secured to the Government, by the 
provisions of the Concessions Ordinance, a good revenue from the mines, 
apart from any rents of lands”.  
 
d. Allowing the chiefs to keep their lands would facilitate co-operation between 
the chiefs and mining companies: “Leaving to the chiefs their lands and the 
rents they will derive from them, will give them a special interest in keeping 
their countries quiet, and will be a guarantee for their good conduct.” It 
would also assist the mining companies to get help from the chiefs in getting 
labour. 
 
e. The confiscation of land would take away the revenue that the chiefs and 
people would use to pay the direct tax that was going to be imposed on them 
because “The Ashantis are neither agricultural nor industrial”. 
 
f. The “absence of any reliable survey” and “complete information” on current 
ownership of land would make it difficult to define and demarcate the lands. 
Against such background, any confiscation would involve the Government in 
“the land palavers which are a constant dispute between the native tribes”, 
and which the Government is “often able to settle as a disinterested arbiter.”  
 
With regard to the policy of “the transfer to loyal tribes of lands of disloyal tribes” 
Governor Nathan and the Resident Commissioner of Ashanti, Captain Stewart, 
agreed to proceed with the policy with some restraint and discrimination in order not 
to arise “claims based on an ownership lost in war 70 to 80 years ago”.107 Thus, on 
the one hand, they were “strongly opposed to allowing the claims of the king of 
Denkyira to land on the north and east of the Offin river”108 due to strong opposition 
from “the loyal king of Bekwai…with the Adansis against the Denkyira being 
allowed to come to the north or east of the Offin.”109 On the other hand, they decided 
to give to the king of Bekwai “the villages of Chinabusu and Odumasi…as part of 
his reward. … The villages were taken from Adansi as part of the punishment of that 
people for their disloyal and treacherous conduct.”110 Such intra-states land transfers 
led to future land conflicts between some chiefs in Asante (Berry 2001).  
 
In the absence of the exiled Asantehene, the British colonial government 
subsequently vested the administration of the Kumasi town lands in the British 
                                                                                                                                          
increase their riches by raiding their neighbours for slaves and loot, and even in their courts of justice 
they cannot get the large fees and fines they formerly obtained”. 
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Crown, by the Ashanti Administration Ordinance of 1902. The lands vested in the 
British Crown included all land within a one mile radius of the Kumasi Fort, later 
defined by the 1928 Kumasi Town Boundary Ordinance as ‘Part One Lands’. To 
date, the Kumasi ‘Part One’ lands are administered by Government. 
     
The above land policies in Ashanti largely re-affirmed the view outlined by 
Governor Freeling in 1877 that the “The rightful owners of the soil in the 
Protectorate are the kings and chiefs and their people, and not the Government.”111 
Moreover, without the cooperation of the chiefs, Government lacked an effective 
coercive power and land administration agencies to embark on a policy of 
confiscation of stool lands to the state. The dangerous policy of “the transfer to loyal 
tribes of lands of disloyal tribes” was however going to have some effect on conflicts 
of land ownership between the Asante states in the post-colonial era (Berry 2001). 
The politics of inter-stool land disputes in Ghana is better understood when placed 
within the context of the colonial politics of state-making.  
 
The defeat of the Asante states in 1901 ended the period of intra-state wars in the 
Gold Coast. On 26 September 1901, the British Government enacted the “Order in 
Council defining boundaries of the Gold Coast Colony and annexing all Territories 
within such Boundaries hitherto unannexed.”112 In 1956, British Togoland (placed 
under UK Trusteeship by the United Nations following the defeat of the Germans in 
the Second World War) voted to join Gold Coast to complete the boundaries of 
present day Ghana. From 1902 to 1947, British officials incorporated chiefs and non-
chief Ghanaian political elites into the dominant ruling coalition. The new ruling 
coalition largely cooperated to consolidate the communal land administration 
system, reform the political institutions governance from the national to the local 
levels, and expand infrastructure. The colonial traditional-federal state made a 
gradual transition to what I call the traditional-unitary state in which the bifurcated 
authorities of chiefs and government were unified in national and local structures of 
governance. The politics of traditional-unitary state building, chieftaincy 
organizational reforms, and land administration are discussed in the next chapter.     
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4.5 Conclusion: The Legacies of the Traditional-Federal State Matter 
 
I have sought to show that the failure of British colonial Governments to establish a 
unitary state that claims monopoly over land ownership, and the legitimate use of 
coercion over all other actors living on the land, left the traditional states with their 
substantial power over land ownership and land administration. In a system of 
traditional-federalism where Government largely relied on the organizations of 
chieftaincy to rule indirectly, the strong opposition mounted by the Chiefs and 
intelligentsia to Government land tenure reform initiatives in the 1890s succeeded. 
The dynamics of power in the politics of land tenure administration reform is clearly 
reflected in the dynamics of intra-Asante states stool land transfers and the vesting of 
the Kumasi town ‘Part One Lands’ in the British Crown in 1901, and to be re-vested 
in the Asantehene in 1943. Land politics in Ghana continues to capture the power 
struggle between chiefs and government within the traditional-federal state.      
 
I have also shown that it was not for want of trying that the British Governments 
were not able to overrun the power of the traditional states. Sir Charles MacCarthy 
followed the coercive-intensive approach of state making (Tilly 1992) in an attempt 
to supersede the traditional states and repeal the local regulations and customs, but 
he failed with fatal consequences. The failure of that approach is what shaped the 
critical juncture of traditional-federal state formation by Governor MacClean in 
1831. And successive governments committed themselves to that path until 1916 
when the British colonial government began to co-opt Chiefs and African 
intelligentsia into the government machinery towards the establishment of a unitary 
state. The themes of colonial state reform, the co-optation of Chiefs and African 
intelligentsia into government, and the effect of these reforms are what I will take up 
in the next chapter. For now, I will try to explain the above political processes from 
1800-1916 through the conceptual lenses of historical institutionalism.  
 
Until British colonial rule was officially declared in 1821, there existed within the 
traditional state only one sphere of public organizational arena, the sphere of 
chieftaincy. However, in the conceptual framework of historical institutionalism, I 
have argued that the creation of the traditional-federal state in 1831 was the critical 
juncture at which the modern public institutional arena – with its own set of formal 
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judicial rules, government, coercive machinery, and limited sovereignty – distinct 
from the public arena of the traditional state, was created. Paradoxically, at the 
inception of the new public arena, the subjects of chiefs who lived under the British 
forts were now considered by the British colonial officials as subjects of the British 
Crown – and therefore subject to the common laws of England. Consequently, there 
emerged two public arenas (Ekeh 1975) that competed for the allegiance of the 
subject-citizen in African local communities (Mamdani 1996).  
 
For the subject-citizen, the two competing public arenas presented the opportunity 
for institutional shopping from whichever arena offered the greatest satisfaction of 
effectiveness and efficiency. Interestingly, Chiefs followed suit. The competition for 
institutional legitimacy between the two public organizations shaped a process of 
institutional ‘imitation’ and ‘indigenization’ (Leftwich and Hogg 2008). The 
interaction of customary laws and English common laws made it extremely difficult 
for the British Colonial Office in London to understand by which law an English 
Judicial Assessor who presided in the Native Courts of Chiefs administered 
justice.
113
 An irreversible path of political, legal, and institutional dualism of power 
and authority defined the character of the traditional-federal state.  
 
Many historical institutionalists accept the definition that a critical juncture refers to 
the period of the initial development of an institution or organization that proved 
significant in shaping subsequent processes or outcomes (Collier and Collier 2002; 
Rokkan 1968). An important theoretical question is how does a critical juncture 
become established? In the context of my analysis, the question will be this: ‘How 
was the traditional-federal state established’? The answer should be clear. Without 
the intervention of British colonial adventurers (the exogenous variable) in the 
politics of the traditional states (the antecedent conditions), the traditional-federal 
state would not have been created between 1821 and 1831 (the critical juncture). 
Therefore, it is not possible to define a critical juncture without the intervention of an 
exogenous variable – the British colonial state-makers.  
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The above historical analysis of state formation could help us resolve some 
theoretical controversy among historical institutionalists surrounding the 
periodization of a critical juncture. The controversial issue is “How long do critical 
junctures last” (Collier and Collier 2002)? Collier and Collier (2002:32) argue that 
“critical junctures may range from relatively quick transitions…to an extended 
period.” Capoccia and Kelemen (2007:348) however argue that “the duration of the 
critical juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path-dependent process 
that it instigates.” I argue that the periodization of a critical juncture should not be 
resolved in the abstract but with reference to an actual process of institutional 
formation. In the above historical analysis, prior to 1821 there was only one public 
sphere of legality controlled by traditional states. In 1821 a new public sphere of 
legality was declared by British colonial state-makers. As we have seen, the British 
colonial state-makers did not intend to create what Ekeh (1975) calls ‘the two 
publics’ shared between traditional states and central government. The declaration of 
a new public therefore marked the beginning of the politics of war-making that led to 
the creation of the traditional-federal state in 1831 with ‘the two publics’. 1831 is 
therefore marked off as the terminus ad quem of the critical juncture because that 
was the point when the “institutional form” (Thelen and Mahoney 2010:15) of the 
state with bifurcated authority divided between chiefs and government was initially 
created. The institutional form of the outcome of research interest is important in 
defining the periodization of a critical juncture.  
 
Following Collier and Collier, I suggest that a critical juncture should be defined as 
the period when the “the core attributes of the legacy – that is, the basic attributes 
produced as an outcome of the critical juncture” were initially created (Collier and 
Collier 1991:31). In the absence of the core attributes of the legacy, the outcome of 
research interest could not have been produced. In the case of my historical analysis, 
without the creation of a colonial state in 1831 with bifurcated authority between 
chiefs and government, the current post-1992 constitutional configuration of the 
Ghanaian state with bifurcated authority between chiefs and government could not 
have been produced. It should be emphasized that the formation of an institution is a 
political process that could either take a long period or a short period (Leftwich 
2004; Rokkan and Lipset 1967). It would therefore be theoretically misplaced to 
emphasize that the period of a critical juncture should be short or long.  
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From the above discussions, what I have tried to show is that the emergence of ‘the 
two publics’ sharing state authority over the citizen-subject and a dual system of land 
administration is explained by the failure of British colonial rulers to extinguish the 
antecedent public sphere of the traditional states. The form of the current 1992 
constitutional rules of state organization remains fundamentally the same as it was in 
1831. The stability of the stool land tenure system is explained by the failure of the 
British colonial state-makers to supersede the traditional states and their rules of 
customary law governing stool land administration; and, leading to the creation of a 
state with bifurcated authority between chiefs and government over the 
administration of land, the people and the state. The conflict that subsequently 
occurred between chiefs and British government officials over the 1894 and 1897 
Land Bills was one of the legacies of the critical juncture of state organization. 
  
It is important to emphasize that both the Chiefs and their subjects (whether with or 
without formal education) mounted strong resistance to the 1894 and 1897 Land 
Bills. It is importance to point out the role played by the Ghanaian intelligentsia in 
resisting the land reforms because of the tendency among some scholars (Amanor 
2010; Aryeetey et al. 2007; Ninsin 1989) to over-emphasize the role of Chiefs, but 
largely ignore the strong support offered to the chiefs by the Ghanaian intelligentsia, 
who were primarily lawyers (Hayford 1913; Sarbah 1904). In fact, land ownership 
reform never became a class issue among Ghanaians during the colonial era (Crook 
1986). Radical reform of the communal land tenure system is likely to succeed if 
there is strong support from Chiefs, the intelligentsia, Government, business 
interests, and citizens. Moreover, the direction of reform must be clearly defined – 
whether stool lands should be redefined as state lands or the creation of individual 
property rights from stool lands should be allowed. In the next chapter, I discuss how 
British government officials incorporated the chiefs and the non-chief Ghanaian 
educated elites into the dominant ruling coalition; and, how the new dominant ruling 
coalition created transparent and accountable formal-legal institutions through which 
chiefs managed communal lands on behalf of their subjects.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Transition to the Traditional-Unitary State, 1902-1953: Nation-State Building 
and Accountability in Chieftaincy Administration 
 
Leaving to the chiefs their lands and the rents they will derive from them will give 
them a special interest in keeping their countries quiet, and will be a guarantee for 
their good conduct (Governor Matthew Nathan to Joseph Chamberlain, 1901). 
 
Our land tenure system and our institutions are founded upon a rock, and we trust 
that they will find…a sure defence (J. E. Casely Hayford to Governor Hugh 
Clifford, 19 May, 1913). 
 
Our Land Policy is to recognise that the land belongs to the natives of the country; 
to devise such legislation as would lead to a satisfactory and economical 
settlement of land disputes; to provide facilities for owners to obtain a clear title 
to their lands; and finally, to acquire equitably such lands as may be required for 
public works necessary to the development of the country in the interests of its 
inhabitants (Governor Gordon Guggisberg to Legislative Council, 1926). 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the analysis of how British government officials, chiefs and 
non-chief educated elites negotiated the reform of chieftaincy organizations into 
accountable agencies of local government through which chiefs administered stool 
lands and mobilized internal revenue for local community development. The reforms 
occurred between 1902 and 1953. I suggest that the reforms in chieftaincy 
administration provide valuable lessons for current attempts to reform organizations 
of chieftaincy into transparent and accountable agencies of stool land administration. 
The development of an accountable chieftaincy through which chiefs administered 
communal lands, mobilized internal revenue for community development, and were 
held accountable by government and their subjects, occurred through a complex 
process of change shaped by four main factors; namely, (a) the consolidation of the 
stool land administration system, (b) the incorporation of chiefs into the dominant 
ruling coalition, (c) the willingness of government and chiefs to share authority, 
responsibilities, and revenue through the local government system, and (d) the 
emergence of a class of educated citizens who demanded and enforced 
accountability in chieftaincy administration. The complex interaction of these factors 
to shape chieftaincy accountability in local government is what I discuss here.     
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The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 5.1 discusses the commitment of 
the British-led government to consolidate the communal land administration system 
in order to secure political cooperation from chiefs and the non-chief educated elites. 
Section 5.2 discusses the political incorporation of chiefs and non-chief Ghanaian 
elites into the dominant ruling coalition through a series of constitutional reforms. 
Section 5.3 discusses the reform of organizations of chieftaincy into a transparent 
and accountable system of local government through which chiefs administered stool 
lands, mobilized internal revenue for local community development, and were held 
accountable by government and their subjects. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter by 
emphasizing that the creation of a transparent and accountable chieftaincy for stool 
land administration depends upon three things: first, the willingness of chiefs and 
government to reform organizations chieftaincy into impersonal systems of 
accountable governance, second, the sharing of stool land revenues between chiefs 
and government, and, third, the interest of subjects of chiefs to enforce the 
impersonal rules of accountability governing chieftaincy administration.   
 
5.1 Consolidation of Communal Land Ownership: Cocoa Boom, Economic 
Revolution and Conflict over Stool Lands 
 
Here I discuss the commitment of British governments and the Ghanaian educated 
elites to consolidate the communal land ownership system in spite of increasing 
commercialization of stool lands by chiefs. The commercialization of stool lands was 
the result of increasing investment by Ghanaians in commercial agriculture, 
particularly in cocoa farming, from the 1890s. Hill (1963) and Firmin-Sellers (1995) 
have argued that the cocoa boom made chiefs realize that they could derive long 
term rents from land if they preserve the communal land ownership system than if 
they sell the lands outright to farmers. This argument is plausible. However, it 
should also be acknowledged that the mass production of semi-educated elementary 
school graduates by the mid-1920s significantly checked the behaviour of chiefs in 
stool land sales in local communities (Austin 1964; Hailey 1951). Furthermore, the 
emergence of educated Ghanaian elites who joined forces with chiefs in 1897, to 
form the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) for the protection of 
communal land ownership from state appropriation, is a crucial variable that helped 
the consolidation of the communal land ownership system, beyond the era of 
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colonial rule. The consolidation of communal land ownership was therefore shaped 
by the complex interactions of bottom-up top-down and politics. Understanding the 
factors that shaped the consolidation of the communal land ownership system is 
important for understanding why British government officials and chiefs later 
negotiated accountable institutions to govern the mobilization and utilization of stool 
land revenues in local communities. I shall first discuss the cocoa boom and its 
concomitant effect on stool land sales and, second, the reasons for the change in 
colonial government land policy to consolidate the stool land ownership system.   
 
5.1.1 The Cocoa Boom and Increasing Stool Land Sales: The Invention of 
Customary Rules of Stool Land Ownership?   
 
Up to 1890s, trade in the Gold Coast was largely restricted to natural jungle produce 
such as palm oil, palm kernel oil, and rubber (Adu-Boahen 2000; Metcalfe 1964). 
The 1889 report on ‘Economic Agriculture in the Gold Coast’ commented that 
Cocoa is “a product worthy of every attention”114 because “The culture is cheap, and 
the preparation is simple, so that it should receive the attention of small 
cultivators.”115 In 1890, the curator of Government gardens, on his visit to Mampong 
saw a cocoa plantation of about 300 trees that belonged to a native called Tetteh 
Quashie who had brought his experimental cocoa beans from Fernando Po.
116
 It is 
generally acknowledged that Tetteh Quashie’s successful cocoa plantation became 
the foundation of the cocoa boom during the first decade of 1900.  
 
In 1906, Governor John Roger noted that “the principal feature of the year was the 
rapid development of cocoa plantations, which now extend from the Western side of 
the Aburi hills, through Akim and Kwahu, until they reach and even cross the 
borders of Ashanti.”117 Cocoa farming spread rapidly in Southern Ghana where the 
futile lands supported its growth. By the first decade of the C20th cocoa had become 
Ghana’s chief export and Ghana became the leading producer of cocoa in the world. 
Table 8 below shows the consistent growth and export of cocoa from 1905-1931.  
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Table 8: Volume of Cocoa Exports in the Gold Coast, 1905-1931 
 
Year Tons Value £ (F.O.B)118 Year Tons Value £ (F.O.B) 
1905 7,000 187,000 1919 176,000 8,278,000 
1906 8,000 336,000 1920 125,000 10,056,000 
1907 10,000 515,000 1921 133,000 4,764,000 
190 13,000 541,000 1922 159,000 5,841,000 
1909 21,000 755,000 1923 197,000 6,567,000 
1910 22,000 866,000 1924 223,000 7,250,000 
1911 41,000 1,613,000 1925 218,000 8,222,000 
1912 39,000 1,641,000 1926 231,000 9,181,000 
1912 52,000 2,489,000 1927 210,000 11,728,000 
1914 53,000 2,194,000 1928 225,000 11,230,000 
1915 78,000 3,651,000 1929 238,000 9,704,000 
1916 73,000 3,848,000 1930 191,000 6,970,000 
1917 92,000 3,147,000 1931 244,000 5,493,000 
1918 67,000 1,797,000 1932 --- --- 
 
Source:
 
The statistics in have been compiled from the Address of Governor Guggisberg to the 
Legislative Council on 6 March 1924 (Metcalfe, No. 467) and the Address of Governor Slater to the 
Legislative Council on 1 March, 1932 (Metcalfe, No. 478).  
 
From Table 8, we can see that in 1931 Ghana exported the highest quantity of cocoa 
to the global market but earned the least amount of revenue.
119
 Later I shall discuss 
how the decrease in government revenues from cocoa exports due to 1930s global 
economic depression influenced government to negotiate with chiefs over the 
creation of new laws that enabled chiefs to mobilize internal revenue from taxation 
for local development. In 1931, new horizontal and vertical rules of accountability in 
chieftaincy administration were created. Local taxation by chiefs led to an increase 
in bottom-up demand from the subjects of chiefs for accountability in chieftaincy 
administration. The reforms in chieftaincy administration from the early 1930s were 
influenced by the complex interaction of many factors.        
 
The rapid spread of cocoa farming and the massive wealth that it produced for 
Ghanaians led to the rapid appreciation in land prices, increasing land sales by chiefs 
and increasing land conflicts between chiefs (Alence 1990; Green and Hymer 1966; 
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 The increase in export of cocoa in 1931 was “entirely due to the cocoa ‘hold-up’” by cocoa 
farmers “from the end of October, 1930 to the beginning of January, 1931” (Governor Sir R. Slater’s 
speech to the Legislative Council, 1 March, 1932, Metcalfe, No. 478). The reason for the cocoa hold-
up was largely due to the effect of the economic depression on cocoa prices.  
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Hill 1963; Firmin-Sellers 1995). There was a scramble for stool lands between all 
social classes – both the chiefs and their subjects – leading to “innumerable inter-
tribal boundary disputes which “caused so much protracted and regrettable 
litigation.”120 Many Chiefs did not only make huge investments in cocoa farming but 
they also took steps to strengthen their claims over stool land ownership. In 1912, 
the Belfield Report on the Alienation of Native Lands in the Colony and Ashanti had 
this to say on the prevailing system of communal land ownership: 
 
Notwithstanding the communal principles on which the native system of land 
tenure was based, and the unquestionable right of every member of the tribe to 
participate in the use of the land and in the profit accruing from it, the result of the 
administration of the reserve land by the chiefs and headmen has been that they 
have by degrees arrogated to themselves the profits arising from such 
administration, until, at the present time, the mass of the people derives from it no 
advantage other than the privilege of cultivating allotted portions, and any 
revenue which is obtained from it is absorbed by their superiors.
121
 
 
The indiscriminate sale of stool lands to cocoa farmers led to the creation of 
individual and family land rights from stool lands in many parts of Southern Ghana 
(Hill 1963). In 1917, Governor Hugh Clifford noted that “though all land still 
theoretically belongs to the Stool, the vested interest of the cocoa farmers has 
brought into being a measure of individual property in real estate, such as was never 
contemplated by ancient tribal customs.”122 Governor Clifford noted that “The 
acquisition of considerable wealth by individuals who would otherwise enjoy no 
high status in the tribe” entailed “a great social revolution in their social 
structure.”123 He cautioned that “the political results which this shows signs of 
producing should be jealously guarded by all who desire to see the tribal 
constitutions, which their ancestors have evolved, preserved from the disintegrating 
forces of too rapid innovation.”124 In spite of remarkable institutional innovations 
that the chiefs initiated to guard their power, they were unable to prevent the social, 
economic and political revolutions from pushing chieftaincy to the margins of the 
modern state. Organizations of chieftaincy remained the dominant political structures 
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of rule in the modern colonial state until the mid-1950s when they were pushed out 
by the non-chief educated elites. How this occurred is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
Before the chiefs lost their central role in the governance structures of the modern 
state in the 1950s they were able to re-assert their authority over communal land 
ownership in the country. Hill (1963) and Firmin-Sellers (1995) emphasize that the 
emergence of wealthy non-chief cocoa farmers in Southern Ghana made chiefs 
realize that they could derive considerable rent from cocoa farmers if they enforce 
the ‘theoretical’ rules of customary law that prohibits the outright sale of stool lands 
to individuals. Nana Sir Ofori Atta, the paramount chiefs of the Akyem Abuakwa 
State and a member of the (national) Legislative Council, led the process of 
“reinventing tradition, defining a version of customary land tenure favourable to 
themselves” (Firmin-Sellers 1995:867). So long as the rules of customary law 
remained informally defined, many powerful chiefs like Nana Ofori Atta were able 
to successfully re-assert the claims of the traditional states over ‘allodial’ ownership 
of stool lands that they had previously sold. This raises questions over whether 
‘tradition’ was reinvented or re-asserted. The informal rules of customary law that 
organized chieftaincy-society relations at the critical juncture of colonial state 
formation remained uncodified into formal-legal statutes. To date the situation 
remains largely the same. I move on to discuss why the British-led government 
supported the chiefs to consolidate the communal land ownership system.  
 
5.1.2 Consolidation of Communal Land Ownership: Explaining the Change in 
Colonial Government Land Policy 
 
Notwithstanding the increasing land conflicts, ruinous litigations, and “the existence 
of some diversity of opinion with respects to ownership”125 throughout the Gold 
Coast; Colonial Governments resigned themselves to the view that any “general 
appropriation by the Crown as was contemplated by the Land Bill of 1897 is…out of 
the question.”126 In 1926, Governor Guggisberg emphasized: 
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Our Land Policy is to recognise that the land belongs to the natives of the country; 
to devise such legislation as would lead to a satisfactory and economical 
settlement of land disputes; to provide facilities for owners to obtain a clear title 
to their lands; and finally, to acquire equitably such lands as may be required for 
public works necessary to the development of the country in the interests of its 
inhabitants.
127
 
 
Moreover, concerning any future land administration reform, Governor Guggisberg 
re-assured those who had doubts that “if Government adopted any other policy, it 
would not receive the support of the Secretary of State.”128 The Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, W. G. Ormsby-Gore, also made it clear 
after his visit to the Gold Coast in 1926 that “any radical alteration in the general 
policy of the Government in regard to the land is neither practical nor desirable”.129 
Clearly, at least after the second decade of the C20th, the colonial Governments were 
committed to consolidate the stool land ownership system.  
 
In 1931, the colonial Government enacted the Land and Native Rights Ordinance 
(No. 8) to vest in the Governor the administration of Native Lands in the Northern 
Territories. Governor Alexander Slater stated the objects of the law as follows:
 
 
  
a. To preclude the natives from the temptation to dispose of their lands outright, 
with regard for the requirements of their descendants, and for totally 
inadequate payment;  
 
b. To ensure that such profits as are derived from the land are used for the 
benefit of the community as a whole and not of any particular section or 
individual member of it; and  
 
c. To minimize the possibility of ruinous litigation.130 
 
Commenting on the 1931 Land and Native Rights Ordinance governing the Northern 
Territory, Governor Slater stated that “had a similar Ordinance been applied to the 
Gold Coast Colony some forty or fifty years ago, certain of the states would now be 
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in a far more prosperous and happier condition than they are today.”131 As we now 
know, the nature of colonial state-making before the C20th, when Government 
depended heavily on the military forces of the southern states to ensure law and 
order or prosecute war against the powerful Asante states, made it almost impossible 
for similar policies to be pursued in Southern Ghana. The important point is that 
government now supported the Chiefs to administer their stool lands.  
 
The position of colonial Governments did not change through the remaining period 
of colonial rule. Colonial Governments limited themselves to the establishment of 
agencies for the registration of land titles. The Survey Department was established in 
1909 to help land owners obtain a clear title to their lands. The Lands Department 
was later created out of the Survey Department in the 1920s to facilitate the payment 
of compensation by Government to those whose stool lands were compulsorily 
acquired by the state for purposes of public infrastructural development.  
 
The question that needs to be answered is why the colonial Government changed its 
position from state appropriation of land in the 1890s to support the chiefs to manage 
the system of communal land ownership. Three political and economic reasons are 
offered here to explain the colonial Government’s support for the consolidation of 
the communal land ownership system. They are (i) the need for the colonial 
government to obtain widespread political support from chiefs and the non-chief 
educated elites in the process of state building, (ii) the capacity of the communal 
land ownership system to support European capitalism, and (iii) the capacity of 
chiefs to mobilize revenue from stool lands to support local development. The first 
two reasons are further explained below. The third reason shall be explained later in 
a separate sub-section because it was bundled with the complex political process of 
reforming organizations of chieftaincy into an effective system of local government 
in the country. Communal land administration was, and still remains, intertwined 
with chieftaincy administration in local communities.   
 
Firstly, I argue that the change of colonial government policy from state 
appropriation of communal lands to state consolidation of the communal land 
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administration system was a political trade-off with the chiefs and the educated 
Ghanaian elites to enhance the political legitimacy of the fragile colonial state. When 
the Asante Confederacy was finally defeated by the British-led armies in 1901, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, suggested to Captain 
Donald Stewart, the British Resident of Kumasi, “the taking by the Crown of lands 
of the tribes that rose against British rule.”132 As indicated in the previous chapter, 
Governor Matthew Nathan and Captain Stewart pointed out that “Leaving to the 
chiefs their lands and the rents they will derive from them, will give them a special 
interest in keeping their countries quiet, and will be a guarantee for their good 
conduct.”133 Politically, by 1901, the British colonial government had not succeeded 
in “[reducing] the traditional rulers and their people from the status of protégés to 
that of subjects of the British” as suggested by Adu-Boahen (2000:60).134 By 1902, 
the British colonial government was far from consolidating its administrative 
authority and jurisdiction beyond the Colony. One of the key strategies employed by 
the British Governors to enhance the legitimacy of the state and secure political 
order was to gain the political support of the chiefs and their subjects. To succeed, 
Governor Nathan and Captain Stewart rightly advised their superiors in London to 
abandon the attempts to claim ultimate ownership of the ‘native’ lands.   
 
Following the failure of the 1894 and 1897 Land Bills, many chiefs and non-chief 
educated elites became more interested in protecting their lands from state 
appropriation. On 26 December 1912, Sir Hugh Clifford became Governor of the 
Gold Coast. Interestingly, five months after his arrival, the Aborigines Rights 
Protection Society (ARPS) held a successful banquet for him. It is important to be 
reminded that the ARPS was the political movement (composed of powerful chiefs, 
educated native traders and lawyers) described in the 1912 Belfield Report as a 
society that “exists for the avowed purpose of opposing and blocking any action by 
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the Government or by any persons, which may, in the opinion of the members, be 
subversive to their interests, or likely to be prejudicial to their native customs or their 
canons of land tenure.”135 The banquet organized by the ARPS in honour of 
Governor Clifford was therefore a carefully prepared political stage where the 
members of the ARPS reminded the new Governor Clifford of “the assurance as 
regards our lands that the pledges given to us by Mr Chamberlain will not be set at 
naught nor our right to them in any way interfered with.”136 Governor Clifford chose 
the path of “co-operation” (Hayford 1913) that had been laid out before him by the 
ARPS. The bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government over land 
administration was strongly defended by the educated elites. 
 
Secondly, the colonial British Government supported the communal land 
administration system because the customary land administration supported the 
economic interest of European capitalists as well as the growth of indigenous capital. 
Government’s commitment to land tenure reform was not shaped by a concern that 
the stool land tenure system constrained access of the poor to available land. It is 
important to emphasize this point because of recent pro-poor concerns that tend to 
emphasize that the stool land tenure system constrains access of the poor to available 
communal land. It was shaped by the concern that the prevailing land tenure system 
was likely to constrain the expansion of European capital and, perhaps to some 
extent, indigenous capital. However, by the end of the first decade of 1900 these 
concerns had become unfounded. European mining companies had no problem at all 
in securing access to stool land as Governor Freeling had thought in 1877 (Addo-
Fening 2006). In contrast to the thinking of Governor Freeling, alienations of stool 
lands to European mining interests did not “entail the assumption of the soil by 
Government.”137 The capability of the stool land tenure system to facilitate access to 
land for European capital is an important reason for the change in colonial 
Government land policy at the turn of the twentieth century.  
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Concerning the growth of indigenous capital, the rapid growth of the cocoa industry 
was facilitated by the ease with which non-members of particular stools (commonly 
referred to by scholars as ‘strangers’) were able to purchase stool lands for cocoa 
farming and other commercial forms of agriculture (Hill 1963). This broke the myth 
among British government officials that access to stool lands was determined by 
one’s tribal lineage to a stool land owning group. Access to stool land became 
largely dependent on the availability of capital and not one’s communal membership, 
gender, or access to the traditional power structure. There is no doubt that the role of 
capital in determining access to land worked against the poor in areas where there 
was high demand for scare land. But in an expanding market economy, how long 
could one advocate on behalf of the poor for free access to land based on 
membership of a land owning community? The stool land tenure system also 
supported government’s economic interests at the local level by helping government 
to mobilize internal capital from land through the payment of royalties by mining 
companies and the payment of property rates. We shall later see that stool land 
revenues became the second largest source of internal revenue mobilized by chiefs to 
help promote local development. Government became convinced that the stool land 
tenure system neither constrained access to land nor local revenue mobilization. 
Therefore, it became hard for government to find any powerful economic motivation 
to reform the communal land system.  
 
From the above, a combination of political and economic reasons underpins the 
change in government land policy. The capacity of the communal land ownership 
system to promote European and indigenous capitalist growth was important in 
changing the ideas of British government officials about the economic potential of 
the existing land ownership system. Moreover, the chiefs and their educated subjects 
made it clear to British Governors that they were unwilling to cooperate with 
colonial rule unless their communal land ownership system was defended. The 
change in government land policy was therefore a strategic political trade-off that 
enabled the British colonial governments to secure political cooperation from the 
chiefs and their subjects. I discuss below how the British dominant ruling coalition 
incorporated chiefs and non-chief educated political elites into the dominant ruling 
coalition, from 1916 to 1953. The reforms enabled the British-led ruling coalition to 
reform chieftaincy organizations into accountable agencies of land administration.  
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5.2 Reforming the Dominant Ruling Coalition: Incorporation of Chiefs and 
Non-chief Educated Elites into the Legislative and Executive Councils  
 
Here, I discuss the nature of political incorporation of chiefs and non-chief educated 
political elites into the British-led dominant ruling coalition.
138
 By 1902, all the 
traditional states in the Gold Coast had been militarily defeated by British-led 
armies. However, as Governor Nathan and Captain Stewart realized after the 
conquest of the Asante states, British colonial government officials required political 
strategies other than military coercion to ensure the ‘good conduct’ of the chiefs and 
their subjects. Aside abandoning the policy of state appropriation of the ‘native 
lands’, British government officials also adopted the political strategy of 
incorporating chiefs and non-chief educated political elites into the dominant ruling 
coalition. Table 9 and 10 below show how chiefs and non-chief educated political 
elites were gradually incorporated into the Legislative and Executive Councils.
139
  
 
Table 9: Incorporation of Chiefs and Non-Chiefs into the Legislative Council  
 
Date of 
reform 
Ghanaian Representatives European Representatives 
 
Total Chiefs Non-chiefs 
Official 
Members 
Unofficial 
Members 
1915 1 1 5 2  
1916140 3 3 11 3 20 
1926 6 3 16 5 30 
1946141 13 5 7 6 31 
1951142 17 58 5 80 
1954143 0 104 0 104 
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Table 10: Incorporation of Chiefs and Non-Chiefs into the Executive Council  
 
Date of 
reform 
Ghanaian Representatives European Representatives 
Total144 
Chiefs Non-chiefs 
Official 
Members 
Unofficial 
Members 
1915 0 0 5 0 5 
1916 0 0 5 0 5 
1926 0 0 5 0 5 
1946 1 1 5 0 7 
1951 0 8 4 0 12 
1954 0 11 1 0 12 
 
Table 9 shows that before 1951 the chiefs were the dominant political representatives 
of the Ghanaian population in the Legislative Council. From Table 10, however, it 
could be seen that the Executive Council remained out of the reach of the chiefs and 
the non-chief Ghanaian educated elites until 1946. By 1946, the fragile traditional-
federal state created in 1831 had made a gradual transition to what I call the 
traditional-unitary state. Within the traditional-unitary state, the political authority of 
chiefs across all the sovereign traditional states and the authority of the British 
colonial government became unified within a national dominant ruling coalition and 
within a unified system of local government.  
 
From 1949, however, the non-chief educated Ghanaian political elites began to 
reverse all the political settlements that unified the authority of chiefs and 
government. By 1954 the non-chief Ghanaian political elites had forced out the 
chiefs from the dominant ruling coalition as well as the local government system. 
The state turned backwards to the defaulting path of traditional-federalism with 
divided authority between chiefs and government. From 1949, the political rivalry 
that emerged between chiefs and the non-chief educated political elites set the 
pattern of constitutional settlements in which state legislative authority concerning 
the reform of matters affecting chieftaincy was divided between chiefs and 
government. The division of state authority between chiefs and government 
impacted on the power of government to autonomously reform stool land 
administration and the rules of customary law governing chieftaincy-society 
relationships of accountability. How the chiefs were kicked out of the dominant 
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ruling coalition by non-chief political elites and the consequence for chieftaincy-
government relations in land administration are discussed in the next chapter.  
 
5.2.1 Monarchical Democracy versus Republican Democracy: The Paradox of 
Subject-Citizen Representation in the Dominant Ruling Coalition   
 
In 1816, the African Committee of Merchants in the Gold Coast recommended that 
“it would be a most important advantage if the King of Ashantee and some of his 
chiefs could be prevailed upon to send one or more of their children…to be educated 
at the expense of the Committee.”145 Before Britain formally declared colonial rule 
over the Gold Coast in 1821, the Company of Merchants and many Christian 
Missionaries that operated in the Gold Coast deliberately targeted the children of 
chiefs to be educated about Western civilization because the chiefs were considered 
to be the centres of authoritarian rule and barbaric acts across the traditional states. 
By 1890, as many as 5,076 children had been enrolled in numerous Christian 
Mission schools and in Government schools.
146
 In 1915, Governor Clifford reported 
that “at the present time, there is a considerable number of literate chiefs, both in the 
Eastern and the Central Provinces, and the tendency throughout the Colony is 
markedly in the direction of the annual increase of that number.”147 By the mid-
1920s the Gold Coast was turning out annually some 4,000 to 5,000 elementary 
school graduates.
148
 In 1948 a University College was opened in the Gold Coast. The 
point that I am driving at is how the spread of Western educational values of 
democratic representation led to conflicts between chiefs and their educated subjects. 
 
From the second decade of the C20th, when the British colonial Government decided 
to incorporate chiefs into the dominant ruling coalition to help build a developmental 
state, the emerging class of non-chief educated Ghanaians opposed chiefly 
representation in the dominant ruling coalition. The non-chief educated elites argued 
that it is against the customary laws in the Gold Coast for a chief to communicate 
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directly with another person but only through his linguist (or spokesperson).
149
 The 
non-chief educated elites also argued that “according to the African system, no 
Headman, Chief, or Paramount Ruler has an inherent right to exercise Jurisdiction 
unless he is duly elected by the people to represent them, and that the appointment to 
political offices also entirely depends upon the election and the will of the 
people.”150 Therefore, the non-chief educated elites “from time to time agitated for 
the recognition of the elective principle.”151 There emerged conflict between the 
chiefs and their educated subjects over who has the right to represent the ‘subject-
citizen’ (Mamdani 1996) in the dominant ruling coalition. British Governors used 
the “unwholesome differentiation”152 between political representatives for educated 
urban communities and representatives for uneducated rural communities.  
    
In 1916, Governor Clifford argued that the critical challenge to state building in the 
Gold Coast was that “The Gold Coast…is not a single entity, but instead a mosaic 
composed of a number of mutually independent, and often mutually antagonistic, 
Native States, who derive such cohesion as they possess from their common loyalty 
and allegiance to His Majesty the King.”153 Many subsequent Governors agreed with 
Governor Clifford’s position that the dominant ruling coalition should be reformed 
to incorporate “the Paramount Chiefs, who are the natural leaders of the people, live 
in close communication with them, and are intimately acquainted with their needs 
and interests”;154 rather than introduce elective representation for diverse interests, 
tribes and states as demanded by the non-chief educated elites. The chiefs were 
considered to possess widespread legitimacy, public authority to ensure public order, 
and “intimate knowledge of native affairs or first-hand experience in local provincial 
administration.”155 Governor Clifford argued that the non-chief educated 
communities should move from “a good deal of rather loose talk on the subject of 
representative government” to put forward a practical proposal “which would be 
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applicable to local conditions.”156 On this challenge, it appears that it is rather the 
chiefs who later innovated an indigenous solution to the problem of how to group 
together several traditional states for the purpose of electing representatives.  
 
In 1926, Governor Gordon Guggisberg did not only increase the representation of 
chiefs in the Legislative Council, but, he assured the Chiefs that “they will be 
supported by the full force of the Central Government” to develop their 
institutions.
157
 He argued that “If the people of the Gold Coast are ever to stand by 
themselves, it must be by the gradual development of their own institutions and 
customs to meet the demands of more modern and advanced civilisation.”158 
Guggisberg asked the Ghanaian representatives in the Legislative Council to protect 
their natural institutions and customs in the interior from the “disintegrating 
influence” of the gradual extension of education, trade, and mining. He emphasized 
that “there is a danger that what are called Western civilization and Western customs 
will swamp the natural institutions and customs of the interior.”159 During 
Guggisberg’s nine-year transformational leadership he supported chiefs to reform the 
organizations of chieftaincy governed every African in the Gold Coast; “In order to 
preserve their nationality, their racial characteristics, their institutions and customs, 
and yet at the same time to retain their position as a free people in the world.”160  
 
With the support of Governor Guggisberg, the most important innovation that was 
made by chiefs in their organization of chieftaincy was the development of higher 
level organizations called Provincial Councils (now called the Regional House of 
Chiefs) and, later in 1932, the Joint Provincial Council (now called the National 
House of Chiefs). The Provincial Councils of Chiefs grouped together the chiefs of 
the traditional states within a Province for the purpose of electing their 
representatives to the Legislative Council, resolving chieftaincy conflicts between 
Paramount Chiefs, and to unite the chiefs “in defence of native rule and institutions 
against the disintegrating effect of modern civilization, while at the same time giving 
them an opportunity of conferring on the problems which the advent of modern 
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civilization must inevitably introduce into any country.”161  The educated elites, 
particularly the lawyers led by Casely Hayford, initially opposed the use of 
Provincial Councils as the political mechanism for elective representation on the 
grounds that “the choice of men elected to the Legislative should be the choice of the 
people and not the choice of the Amanhene [Paramount Chiefs].”162 Nana Ofori Atta, 
Paramount Chief (Omanhene) of the Akyem Abuakwa State, quoting from the book 
of Casely Hayford (1903) to debunk the criticisms, emphasized: 
 
At the head of the Native State stands prominently the Ohin (King) who is the 
Chief Magistrate and Chief Military Leader of the State. He is first in the 
Councils of the Country, and the first Executive Officer. …He it is who represents 
the State in all its dealings with the outside world; and, so long as he keeps within 
constitutional bounds, he is supreme in his own State.
163
  
 
Nana Ofori Atta rightly asked the non-chief educated political elites, “Why then 
suggest now than an Omanhene cannot constitutionally represent his state in its 
dealings with other States or with the Government?”164 Nana Ofori Atta then argued 
that “If the Gold Coast is to remain under the present system of monarchical 
democracy and not come under republican democracy, then I should submit that the 
principle of the new Constitution is a perfect one. It gives the people of this country 
a chance to develop through their own system of rule.”165 He urged the “so-called 
guardians of native customs” to help develop native institutions and custom in the 
interest of the country whenever it was thought possible and necessary. He 
emphasized, “To say that the old and ancient customs which had been found 
incompatible with the present state of affairs should remain without any change 
could only mean one thing;...to render us impotent, and to make it impossible for us 
to march with the times.”166 The non-chief educated elites, who appeared to have 
been deflated by the educated chiefs with their own earlier intellectual works, 
gradually cooperated with the chiefs to reform chieftaincy organizations and 
strengthen chieftaincy administration (Adu-Boahen 2000).  
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In 1934, a joint delegation of chiefs and the non-chief intelligentsia went to England 
to submit a petition demanding diverse political reforms.
167
 Among the political 
demands, they proposed that the Provincial Councils of chiefs should “be 
empowered to elect as Provincial Members of the Legislative Council any persons 
who are certified as able to read and speak the English language sufficiently well to 
enable them to take an active and intelligent part in the proceedings of the Council, 
irrespective of whether or not such persons are Chiefs.”168 The delegation also 
demanded that Africans should be represented on the Executive Council.  
 
Interestingly, the 1934 joint delegation to England also petitioned that the ‘Kumasi 
Part One Land’ that was vested in the British Crown after the 1901 Yaa Asantewaa 
war should be returned to the Asantehene. The petition read as follows:  
 
The Africans whom they represent are seriously concerned with the land question 
of Kumasi, the Ashanti capital town. The land within a one mile radius of the 
centre has been for a long time treated as Government property. …the land 
outside the radius never was and is not now Government property and its 
treatment as Government property threaten the whole security of tenure of land in 
Ashanti.
169
  
 
In 1942, according to Governor Burns, the Asantehene rejected an offer of a seat on 
the Executive Council because “he feared that he would lose the confidence of his 
chiefs.”170 It is not surprising that in 1943 the British-led government returned to the 
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Asantehene the ‘Kumasi Part One Lands’. It was an important step taken by the 
Government to win the hearts of the chiefs and people of Ashanti.    
 
The 1946 Burns Constitutional reform provided, for the first time, an African 
majority on the Legislative Council and two African representatives to the Executive 
Council. The Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs elected two non-chiefs among its 
representatives to the Legislative Council “to disperse the allegation that the Chiefs 
were selfish as they were unwilling to cooperate with that section of the country 
known as the intelligentsia.”171 For the first time in the history of Ghana the 1946 
constitutional reform incorporated two Ghanaian representatives on the Executive 
Council. By 1946, the Chiefs and the intelligentsia had made significant progress, 
and had shown practical commitment, towards a solution of the paradox of ‘subject-
citizen’ elective representation to the dominant ruling coalition.  
 
I suggest that by 1946 the traditional-federal state had been replaced with the 
traditional-unitary state which “combined the Central Government and the native 
authority into one body; and provided that the native authority continued to 
command popular support” (Ward 1967:364-5). Ward (1967:364) rightly noted that 
“By 1944, the old distinction between direct and indirect rule was becoming 
meaningless. To talk of direct rule implies that Government, native authority, and the 
people are three distinct entities.” David Apter (1955:80) hypothesized that “Some of 
the structures crucial to the maintenance of the tribal system substantively conflict 
with and would, if maintained, contravene crucial Western patterns of social and 
political organization around which a structural reintegration of society is taking 
place”.172 In contrast to some scholars (CDD-Ghana 2001), I argue that the resilience 
of chieftaincy in Ghana today confirms Apter’s hypothesis concerning the survival 
of chieftaincy in the process of Ghana’s political modernization (Apter, 1955, 1960, 
1963). Nana Ofori Atta had equally shared Apter’s view by emphasizing, “To say 
that the old and ancient customs which had been found incompatible with the present 
state of affairs should remain without any change could only mean one thing; to 
render us impotent, and to make it impossible for us to march with the times.” Many 
chiefs used their ‘new interpretive frames’ of modernization acquired through 
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Western education to reform their traditional institutions. I now move on to discuss 
how the dominant ruling coalition of British officials, chiefs and non-chief 
intelligentsia cooperated to develop an accountable system of local government 
through which chiefs administered stool lands and local development.  
 
5.3 Negotiating Accountability in Chieftaincy Administration: 1927-1944 
Local Government Reforms  
 
Here, I analyze how British government officials, chiefs and non-chief educated 
elites negotiated formal-legal accountable institutions of local government to govern 
the administration of chiefs in local communities. I shall also discuss how the rules 
were enforced horizontally by government and vertically by the subjects of chiefs to 
achieve the desired results. Conceptually, accountability has been defined in this 
study as the process of holding agents (individuals or collective actors) responsible 
for their actions in the context of specified mandates (Fearon 1999; O’Donnell 1994; 
McGee and Gaventa 2011; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999; Taylor 
1989). The complex theoretical assumptions underlying the concept and practice of 
accountability has already been discussed in chapter 2. It should be noted that the 
commitment of all interests groups to consolidate organizations of chieftaincy and 
the stool land ownership system were the pre-requisites for demanding the 
accountability of chiefs in stool land administration.  
 
5.3.1 Reforming Informal Rules of Chieftaincy Administration into 
Transparent and Accountable Formal-Legal Rules 
 
At the critical juncture of colonial state formation in 1821-1831 the chiefs of the 
numerous traditional states governed their subjects according to the informal 
customary rules governing chieftaincy-society relationships. Before 1900, British 
Governors commonly secured the cooperation of chiefs to create peaceful political 
conditions for commerce by paying stipends and offering gifts to chiefs. The use of 
economic incentives complemented the fragile political settlement that underpinned 
the traditional-federal state. In 1871 Governor Sir Arthur Edward Kennedy
173
 argued 
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that “the system of giving stipends to native chiefs surrounding settlement has 
proved beyond doubt to be the cheapest and most effectual mode of keeping peace 
and keeping the roads open for commerce.”174 It was not until the 1880s that the 
colonial government begun the process of changing the personal character of 
government-chieftaincy relations into impersonal formal-legal rules that clearly 
specifies the authority and responsibilities of chiefs within the colonial state.  
 
The gradual transformation of chieftaincy organizations into accountable local 
government agencies started when the government passed the 1883 Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance. However, as we have already seen, the era of state-making 
through violent wars was not yet over until the 1901 Yaa Asantewaa war. Therefore 
the 1883 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance which sought to define the mandates of 
chiefs did not work. It was only when the British government incorporated many 
chiefs and non-chief educated elites into the dominant ruling coalition from the 
second decade of the C20th that the triple ruling elites negotiated the transformation 
of chieftaincy into an effective local government system.  
  
In 1926, following repeated failures of Government to reform chieftaincy 
administration in a manner acceptable to all ruling interests, the Paramount Chiefs on 
the Legislative Council, led by Nana Ofori Atta, requested for permission to 
introduce a new Native Jurisdiction Bill to replace the 1883 Native Jurisdiction 
Ordinance.
175
 Nana Ofori Atta outlined the principles of the new Bill as follows:
176
 
 
1. To recognise the customary rights and powers of the State or Oman Councils 
in the management of affairs connected with Stools. 
  
2. To recognise the Government as Central Authority to have the final decision 
in regard to all political differences and disputes affecting Stools within the 
legitimate purview of recognised native institutions and customary law. 
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3. To regulate and place on a sound basis the powers and jurisdictions of the 
Tribunals, in their order of precedence and within their territorial limits, with 
the necessary powers for enforcing their judgements and verdicts.  
 
4. To facilitate the means for preventing and checking abuses in the Tribunals 
by Government through its Commissions. 
 
5. To utilize the Provincial Councils for administrative and judicial purposes, 
subject to the Executive Government and to the Judiciary. 
 
6. To provide means for codifying the Native Customary Laws. 
 
Two important things concerning the definition of the mandate of chiefs in the new 
local government system need to be highlighted. First, it is important to note the dual 
nature of the mandates of chiefs in the new local government system. The Native 
Jurisdiction Ordinance sought to recognize the customary mandates of chiefs defined 
by their subjects within the territorial limits of the traditional state. In the context of 
this study the crucial bottom-up mandate of chiefs was the mandate to manage stool 
lands on behalf of the traditional state. Granting state recognition to the bottom-up 
negotiated mandate of chiefs therefore implied the recognition of Government as the 
Central Authority to horizontally enforce the customary mandate of chiefs “within 
the legitimate purview of recognised native institutions and customary law.” Second, 
the chiefs realized that the informal nature of their customary laws promoted 
disputes among chiefs and with their subjects, and, therefore, the chiefs sought the 
codification of their informal customary laws to ensure legal interpretive certainty, 
administrative transparency and effective accountability (Addo-Fening 2006). The 
enactment of the 1927 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance helped to formally define some 
of the customary mandates of chiefs within their traditional states. The complete 
codification of the informal rules of customary law that governed chieftaincy-society 
relationships however never occurred in any of the traditional states.  
 
The increasing level of trust and cooperation between chiefs, non-chief educated 
elites and British Government officials was crucial in the development of an 
accountable Native Administration system in the Gold Coast. Firmin-Sellers 
(1995:871) noted that “Ofori Atta convened a series of meetings with both chiefs and 
educated men of the Eastern Province to draft the new legislation.” However, 
generally, the reform of chieftaincy organizations in traditional states into 
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accountable agencies of local government depended more on political cooperation 
between chiefs and British government officials than on the support of the non-chief 
educated elites. This is shown in the discussion that follows.  
 
The 1930s global economic depression had affected government revenues and the 
people were also noted to “have developed that sort of irritated militant spirit which 
is quite foreign to them.”177 In 1931, Governor Sir Alexander R. Slater asked 
Members of the Legislative Council to support the passage of legislation to raise 
internal revenue through direct taxation in spite of the fact that “Government fully 
understands and appreciates the objection which people have to a poll-tax, and a hut-
tax”.178 The educated elites sought to use the opportunity to negotiate for their 
increased representation in the Legislative Council. The non-chief educated elites 
argued that their support for direct taxation would be based on the “strictly and 
inviolate…principle that taxation goes with effective representation.”179 Dr. Nanka 
Bruce, who was very influential among the intelligentsia, summed up the position of 
the educated elites as follows: 
 
Is Government prepared to give to this country full representation, and is 
Government prepared to give the control of our finances to the people of this 
country? If not, it is better that we remain where we are and try to balance out 
budget in some other way.
180
 
 
The Paramount Chiefs in the Legislative Council also complained to Governor Slater 
that in comparison to Governor Guggisberg’s “Government of co-operation”, they 
had “on three successive occasions brought to the notice of Government their lack of 
co-operation with the Unofficial Members.”181 However, the Joint Conference of 
Provincial Councils of chiefs passed a resolution that “Government should introduce 
measures enabling the States to assume properly and adequately the requisite 
responsibilities’ so that ‘the duties and responsibilities of Government towards such 
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states may be lightened.”182 Thus, the support of the chiefs was conditioned on the 
enactment of a legislation that would empower them to collect the taxes and to use 
the taxes for local development.  
 
Governor Slater chose the political option offered by the chiefs. He argued that “The 
Most important condition for the proper development of native administrations is the 
delegation to the Native Authorities of financial responsibility, which can only be 
fully exercised if the duty of raising revenue locally, as well as of disbursing it, is 
entrusted to them.”183 Logically, Governor Slater chose the negotiation package 
offered by the chiefs because the chiefs did not only outnumber the non-chief 
educated elites on the Legislative Council, but, also possessed legitimate 
organizational mechanisms to collect the taxes. Moreover, the demands that were 
made by the non-chief educated elites were not within the powers of Governor Slater 
to fulfil. Reform of the constitution of the ruling coalition would have required a 
lengthy process of securing support from the British Government in London.  
 
The establishment of a Treasury was used by the British-led Government as the key 
condition for granting authority to chiefs to implement the 1831 Native Revenue 
Administration Ordinance in their traditional states. The Native Administration 
agencies with established Treasuries also had to prepare annual budgets of revenue 
and expenditure estimates that were approved by the Government through Provincial 
Commissioners. Further, the Audit Service was empowered to enforce the horizontal 
accountability of chiefs to government and the vertical accountability of chiefs to 
their subjects. The new institutions of accountability were widely accepted by chiefs, 
non-chief educated elites and ordinary subjects of chiefs.    
 
In 1933, Governor Sir Shenton Thomas noted that only a few of the State Councils 
operated effective systems of financial administration and, therefore, it was 
necessary “to exercise proper supervision over the…expenditure of stool 
revenue.”184 Lord Hailey who had written a confidential report to the British 
                                                 
182
 Address by Governor Sir Alexander Slater, Legislative Council, 1 March, 1932 (Metcalfe No. 
477). 
183
 Address by Governor Sir Alexander Slater, Legislative Council, 1 March, 1932. 
184
 Speech of Governor Sir Shenton Thomas in Legislative Council, 22 March, 1933 (Metcalfe, 479). 
151 
Government, after his journeys to the Gold Coast and other African countries in 
1939-40, observed the situation in the Gold Coast as follows:  
 
In the absence of any provision for the establishment of Treasuries or for their 
control when established, Chiefs and their Councillors were left free to dispose of 
the proceeds of concessions or of the revenues derived from the sale or leasing of 
Stool lands, with only such check as might be provided by the discontent of those 
who had not shared in the proceeds (Hailey 1951a:201). 
 
It was not until 1939 that the dominant ruling coalition passed the Native 
Administration Treasuries Ordinance which compelled Chiefs to establish central 
and divisional treasuries within their states to be managed by qualified Finance 
Committees (Crook 1986; Firmin-Sellers 1995; Hailey 1951; Ward 1948).  
 
Perhaps what the chiefs did not foresee was that the enforcement of the 1931 Native 
Administration Revenue Ordinance in their traditional states would lead to 
increasing demands from their subjects for political participation in traditional 
governance, as well as increasing demands for the accountability of chiefs (Addo-
Fening 2006; Firmin-Sellers 1995). Internal pressures for reform increased 
particularly from educated citizens who failed to find jobs in the Native 
Administration system. It was the numerous internal pressures for reform that led to 
the 1942 Blackall Committee of Inquiry
185
 into the Native Administration system.
 
There is agreement among scholars (Crook 1986; Hailey 1951; Rathbone 2000a, 
2000b) that the damning report presented by the 1942 Blackall Committee of Inquiry 
and strong external pressures from Whitehall for reform fortified the Government to 
pursue radical reforms in chieftaincy administration in 1944. It must also be 
acknowledged that the chiefs did not resist reforms in chieftaincy administration. 
Nana Ofori Atta, stating the position of the chiefs, emphasized:  
 
Provided there is nothing which is in direct conflict with some of the fundamental 
principles of the native constitution, we will co-operate with Your Excellency in 
bringing up any measure which in the judgement of the Government will help to 
smoothen the administration of this country.
186
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In 1944, the Legislative Council passed the Native Authorities Ordinance and the 
Native Courts Ordinance to created three state agencies of local government 
administration; namely, the Native Authority, the State Council, and the Native 
Courts. The organs of local government were to be Native Authorities who were to 
be appointed by Government and not Chiefs. The Ordinance specified that if the 
Governor found it inexpedient to appoint a Chief, a Native Council or a group of 
Native Councils to function as the Native Authority, he might appoint either any 
person from among the natives of a given area or an Administrative Officer to 
function as the Native Authority. Native Authorities were given authority to perform 
a wide range of responsibilities including the maintenance of a treasury, police, 
prisons, native courts, health facilities, and schools. On the fiscal side, the Native 
Authority Ordinance appropriated all stool revenues – inclusive of stool land 
revenues – for the Native Authorities.  
 
The State Councils were to perform functions relating to the declaration of 
customary laws; the election, installation or deposition of a Chief; and the recovery 
or delivery of Stool property. Such functions were considered to be concerned with 
the constitutional matters of the traditional states. Customary laws declared by a 
State Council were however to have the force of law only if it were approved by the 
Governor. Today, the functions of Traditional Councils remain generally the same as 
in 1944. The only difference is that the declaration of customary laws now passes 
through a lengthy procedure involving the National House of Chiefs, Parliament and 
the President. The Native Courts Ordinance transformed the Native Tribunals of the 
traditional states into Native Courts under the judicial apparatus of the modern state 
(Crook 1986; Hailey 1951, 1956; Rathbone 2000a, 2000b).  
 
The uniqueness of the 1944 reforms lies in the fact that the independent authority of 
Chiefs became integrated into a unitary state organizational framework. In practice, 
it was in rare cases that the Governor failed to appoint chiefs to manage the Native 
Authorities (Hailey 1956).
187
 The radical nature of the reform lies in the fact that 
Chiefs who were appointed as Native Authorities now discharged their functions as 
Government employees who could be fired for bad governance. Ward (1958:363) 
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captured the effect of the 1944 Native Administration Ordinance as follows: “The 
Ordinance abandoned the old conception of the central Government and the native 
authorities as two separate powers, which might co-operate but need not. It replaced 
this by a new conception: both central Government and native authorities were parts 
of one unified Governmental system.” In essence, the gradual reforms in the 
dominant ruling coalition and chieftaincy administration shaped the transition of the 
traditional-federal state to a traditional-unitary state.    
 
During the same year, 1944, British government officials, chiefs, and the non-chief 
educated elites completed their negotiation of reforming the dominant ruling 
coalition.
188
 For the first time in the history of the country, one chief and one non-
chief educated Ghanaian were appointed into the Executive Council. Moreover, as 
shown in Table 9 above, the 1946 Burns Constitutional reform gave the majority of 
seats on the Legislative Council to the elected Ghanaian representatives. The reforms 
were described by Governor Burns as “a historical event of some significance.”189 It 
was critical step towards self-government. From 1902 to 1946, the traditional-federal 
state that was initially created in 1821-1831 had made a gradual transition into the 
traditional-unitary state in which the separate powers of Chiefs and British 
government became fused at the national and local levels of government.  
 
By 1946, organizations of chieftaincy and the dominant ruling coalition were 
reformed from what North et al. (2009) call ‘limited access’ organizations into ‘open 
access’ organizations. The sharing of new interpretative frames of democratic 
governance among British government officials, chiefs, and the subjects of chiefs 
appears to be the most important variable that underlies the reforms within the 
dominant ruling coalition as well as chieftaincy administration in local communities. 
North et al (2009:148) point out that “Societies do not leap from limited to open 
access. Transitions occur in two steps where first the relations within the dominant 
coalition transform from personal to impersonal, and then those arrangements are 
extended to the larger population.” We have seen that the larger population in the 
Gold Coast did not play a passive role in the creation of inclusive and accountable 
systems of governance at the national and local levels (Adu-Boahen 2000).  
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5.3.2 The Practice of Accountability in Chieftaincy Administration: Bottom-
up Enforcement of Chieftaincy Accountability  
 
“An ounce of experience is better than a ton of theory”, said Nana Ofori Atta.190 
Therefore I examine below how accountability in chieftaincy administration worked 
in practice and whether the new system of Native Authorities earned the trust of the 
subject of chiefs. There were 95 functioning Native Authorities with legally 
established treasuries – 48 in the Colony, 35 in Ashanti, and 12 in the Northern 
Territory – through which the state reached local communities to offer social 
services, maintain law and order, and mobilize revenue.
191
  
 
Table 11 below shows the nature of revenue mobilization by the Native Authorities 
created in Nana Ofori Atta’s Akim Abuakwa state, the Asantehene’s Kumasi state, 
and the Ga state where the capital of Colonial state was located. The period 1947-48 
is used here because it was the period preceding the famous 1949 Coussey 
Committee political settlements in which chiefs and the educated Ghanaian elites 
agreed to separate organizations of chieftaincy from the local government system. 
This will later help us to understand the nature of the Coussey Committee political 
settlements concerning chieftaincy-government relations in land administration. 
 
Table 11: Sources of Revenue for Native Authorities, 1947-1948 
 
Sources of Revenue 
NATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Ga Kumasi Division Akim Abuakwa 
£ £ £ 
Annual rate (direct tax) 3,171 58,877 13,551 
Native courts 4,223 21,722 10,316 
Lands 6 51,685 29,434 
Fees and Tolls 116 7,884 12,468 
Licences 155 3,233 1,339 
Interest - 112 44 
Miscellaneous 951 1,636 1,003 
Grants-in-aid - 19,937 13,013 
Transfers from Reserve Fund - - 2,601 
Total Revenue 8,622 165,086 83,769 
Source: National Archives of Ghana, Accra, ADM 5/1/49 
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From Table 11 above, one can see that the Kumasi Division and the Akim Abuakwa 
Native Authorities derived significant revenues from their Stool lands. The 
Asantehene Lands Office that had been established in 1943 to manage the Kumasi 
Town lands was very instrumental in the mobilization of land revenue. Stool land 
revenue derived by the Kumasi Division accounted for about 36% (£51,685) of 
internally generated revenue (£143,401).
192
 In Accra where land was largely owned 
by Government and families it is understandable why the Ga Native Authority 
derived almost nothing from land transactions. The dependence on chiefs on stool 
land revenues help us to understand why there has been conflicts between chiefs and 
government over the sharing of stool land revenues after the chiefs were kicked out 
from the local government system, the Executive, and the Legislative Assembly. 
 
Throughout Ashanti and the Colony, receipts from stool lands constituted the second 
largest source of internally generated revenue for Native Authorities.
193
 It was 
important for the subjects of chiefs to ensure that Stool land revenues were brought 
to the treasuries. Creating institutions of accountability is one thing. And the 
enforcement of the institutions by the subjects of chiefs is another thing. As we shall 
see later, to date, many educated Ghanaians share the view that it is considered 
customarily inappropriate for the subject of a chief to publicly demand 
accountability from the chief. Particularly, in a period during which the subjects of 
chiefs were beginning to change their ideas of political governance and human 
rights, the demand for the accountability of the traditional rulers was more likely to 
be culturally challenging. In Ashanti, Hailey (1951b:30) noted:  
 
The introduction of the Native Authority system in Ashanti has encountered a 
number of obstacles, not least of which has been the disinclination of Divisional 
Chiefs to agree that monies received from the sale or lease of communal lands or 
similar sources (such as Forest or Mining concessions) should be brought to 
account in the Native Treasury, thus enabling a distinction to be drawn between 
the amount to be allocated for the expenditure of the Chiefs or their Stools and 
that available for expenditure on local services.  
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The elementary school graduates who had learnt about the “strictly and 
inviolate…principle that taxation goes with effective representation”194 were also 
beginning to back their demands with violence (Addo-Fening 2006, Firmin-Sellers 
1995). In 1936, a year after the introduction of the Native Treasury Ordinance in 
Ashanti, youth groups forcefully demanded accountability from their chiefs. The 
relationships between chiefs and youth groups deteriorated to the extent that the 
Asante Confederacy Council unanimously made the following resolution to abolish 
the positions of the representatives of youth groups from the hierarchy of chieftaincy 
organization: “The positions of Nkwankwaahene and Asafoakye, also Asafo should 
be abolished from the whole of Ashanti in view of the fact that they are the cause of 
political unrest in Ashanti.”195 But the chiefs could not stem the tide of political 
demands for change. In 1948, it was reported, “The Kumasi Divisional Council now 
includes a representative of each ward of the Town of Kumasi and representatives of 
the geographical areas in which the Division is organized; this organization is 
arranged for administrative convenience and takes the place of the previously very 
centralised system.”196 The chiefs were slow to recognize that the educational and 
economic revolution that had taken place by the C19th “were changing orientations 
and undermining traditional attitudes of docility” (Addo-Fening 2006:335). 
 
In the Akyem Abuakwa State, the State Council also offered seats to “two 
representatives of the Scholar’s Union, three of the ‘strangers’ community, the Legal 
Advisor of the Council (a barrister) and two representatives of the Church” (Hailey 
1951a:206). Nana Ofori Atta had long realized that “the easy-going days are gone, 
and they must be prepared to march with the times” of democratic governance no 
matter the “inconvenience.”197 Nana Ofori Atta emphasized that “There was a time 
when an illiterate chief thought it was no good to send his heir to school. That has 
very nearly brought us to the verge of ruination and complete national disaster. The 
effect was discovered just in time, and the need for sending heirs to school to be 
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given as much education as possible is much more emphasised.”198 Changes in the 
ideas of the chiefs did matter as much as changes in the ideas of their subjects.  
 
Hailey (1951a:206) noted that there was a growing tendency by State Councils to 
include ‘commoners’ in their membership and “an analysis of the composition of the 
State Councils as a whole, shows that about 30 per cent do not belong to the category 
of Divisional or Sub-Chiefs, stoolholders, or traditional title holders.” Table 12 
below suggests that local communities in the Kumasi state and Akim Abuakwa state 
placed great value on the role of education in promoting change. This was translated 
into greater expenditure of Native Authorities on formal education.  
 
Table 12: Nature of Expenditure of Native Authorities 
 
 
Nature of Expenditure 
NATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Ga Kumasi Division Akim Abuakwa 
£ £ £ 
Administration 3,034 29,143 16,688 
Treasury 1,314 10,460 4,489 
Native Courts 2,228 11,895 4,975 
Police 1,351 6,732 4,499 
Prisons - 1,180 1,924 
Agriculture - 126 279 
Forestry - 327 - 
Medical - 42 107 
Health 59 4,711 10,849 
Education 200 30,282 16,302 
Recurrent works, communications 
and services 
276 8,364 4,213 
Miscellaneous 1,131 14,781 7,490 
Extraordinary 81 27,441 16,811 
Contributions to reserve fund - 7,783 1,000 
Total Expenditure 9,674 157,285 89,626 
 
Source: National Archives of Ghana, Accra, ADM 5/1/49 
 
It seems that the huge expenditure on education in Ashanti and Akyem (Akim) 
Abuakwa states were influenced by the value that the subjects of chiefs placed on 
education. Ideational change among chiefs and their subjects about the nature of 
governance was influential in shaping demands for political institutional reforms in 
chieftaincy administration as well as in the dominant ruling coalition. The perception 
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among some historical institutionalists that the critical juncture-path dependence 
theoretical model is incapable of comprehending “endogenous developments that 
often unfold incrementally” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:2) is quite erroneous. 
Paying attention to the ideas, interests, power and resources of actors at the critical 
juncture of institutional development can help us “comprehend both exogenous and 
endogenous sources of institutional change” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:7). Blyth 
(2002a, 2002b) and Lieberman (2002) have pointed out that many historical 
institutionalists have failed to take seriously the role of ideational transformations in 
their explanations of institutional change. Leftwich (2004, 2007, 2008, 2009) and 
Moe (2005, 2006) have also noted that the nature and role of human agency in 
institutional formation and change is yet to be taken seriously by many historical 
institutionalists. I shall return to this matter in the concluding part of the study.  
 
The accountability of chiefs to their subjects is also influenced by the capacity of 
their subjects to demand accountability and enforce sanctions against non-
responsiveness. We can see that the chiefs in Ashanti and Akyem Abuakwa tried to 
respond to the interests of their subjects, particularly in matters of education. In 
formal and informal institutional environments, interest-responsiveness could be 
used as a yardstick for measuring the accountability of political leaders to their 
citizens. In political and administrative systems where the mandates of political 
agents are vaguely defined or not directly negotiated with citizens (as is largely the 
case in many countries), the best standard for assessing the accountability of such 
political agents is the extent to which they are responsive to the interest of citizens.   
 
Firmin-Sellers (1995) has strongly argued that the analysis of chieftaincy 
accountability in Ghana during the historical period under review, 1902-1950, 
suggests that the more chiefs responded to the interests of their subjects, the more the 
subjects provided revenue to their chiefs to be used in the interest of subjects. Table 
13 below suggests that such positive correlation between chieftaincy accountability 
to their subjects and increased internal revenue mobilization is very plausible.   
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Table 13: Native Authorities Revenue and Expenditure, 1942-1948 
 
Territorial 
division 
1942-3 1943-4 1944-5 1945-6 1946-7 1947-8 1948-9 Total 
REVENUE 
£ £ £ £ £ £ £ £ 
Colony 143,899 186,185 242,563 293,194 373,974 460,902 625,324 2,326,041 
Ashanti 49,841 72,329 109,920 167,035 264,500 343,489 468,673 1,475,787 
N.T’s 71,375 85,715 105,035 132,727 133,737 266,535 302,929 1,098,053 
Total 265,115 344,229 457,518 592,956 772,211 1,070,926 1,396,926 4,899,881 
 EXPENDITURE 
Colony 133,035 174,470 229,390 287,829 366,375 465,301 569,713 2,226,113 
Ashanti 44,745 58,497 87,207 137,576 235,476 307,774 387,413 1,204,688 
N.T’s 66,891 79,648 92,504 114,950 136,856 185,484 254,327 930,660 
Total 244,671 312,615 409,101 540,355 738,707 958,559 1,211,453 4,415,461 
 
Source: National Archives of Ghana, Accra, ADM 5/1/49 & ADM 5/1/50 
 
We can clearly see that successive increases in expenditure were rewarded with 
successive increase in revenue mobilization across the three territorial divisions of 
the colonial state. Subjects became convinced that chiefs were not using public 
revenues for their private benefits (Firmin-Sellers 1995; Ward 1958). I suggest that 
the successive increase in the revenue of chiefs is more likely to be explained by the 
responsiveness of the chiefs to the developmental interests of their subjects. Data on 
government revenue during the period (Table 14 below) shows that the increase in 
the revenue of chiefs was not due to an expansion of the Gold Coast economy.  
 
Table 14: Gold Coast Trade and Revenue, 1942-1946 
 
Date 1942-3 1943-4 1944-5 1945-6 1946-7 
 £ £ £ £ £ 
Imports 9,877,298 10,167,566 9,828,094 10,103,940 12,633,612 
Exports 12,550,174 12,631,282 12,314,200 15,126,147 19,616,874 
Revenue 4,331,894 4,720,394 5,866,665 7,171,618 7,567,589 
Source: Metcalfe (1964, Appendix D) 
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It could be seen that from 1942 to 1946, the chiefs increased their revenue by 191% 
(from £265,115 to 772,211) whiles Government increased its revenue by only 74% 
(from £4,331,894 to 7,567,589). Particularly, the increase in revenues of chiefs and 
government in 1945 and 1946 demonstrate the developmental appeal of chiefs to 
their subjects. While the chiefs increased their revenue by 30%, the Government 
increased its revenue by only 5%. It is clear that the interest-responsiveness and 
accountability of chiefs to their subjects increasingly produced positive results for 
both the chiefs and their subjects. Firmin-Sellers (1995:879) point out that the 
politics of chieftaincy administration reform shows that “Institutional creation is 
both coercive and contractarian in nature.” Historical research across traditional 
states is required to know the relative weight that the subjects of chiefs put on 
coercive or contractarian mechanisms to ensure the accountability of their chiefs.  
 
It is quite strange that notwithstanding the positive political progress made by chiefs 
and their subjects in reforming chieftaincy administration, organizations of 
chieftaincy were kicked out from the local government system from 1951. The 
politics of state reform that led to the return of the traditional-unitary state to the 
default path of traditional-federalism, and its consequences for land administration 
reform, is discuss in the next chapter. Here, I suggest that the politics of colonial 
state reform from 1902 to 1950 contain important lessons for current attempts to re-
create accountable agencies of chieftaincy for stool land administration.  
 
5.4 Conclusion: Institutional Legacies, Ideational Change, and Political 
Power Matter for Understanding Institutional Change  
 
I have sought to show how British government officials, chiefs and non-chief 
educated elites negotiated the reform of chieftaincy organizations into accountable 
local government systems through which chiefs administered stool lands and 
mobilized internal revenue for local community development. The historical analysis 
shows that the development of accountable organizations of chieftaincy 
administration in local communities occurred through the complex interaction of 
political, economic, social and ideational processes of change in the country. They 
include (a) the consolidation of the stool land ownership system, (b) the 
incorporation of chiefs into the dominant ruling coalition, (c) the willingness and 
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commitment of government and chiefs to share state authority, responsibilities, and 
revenue through an impersonal system of local government, and (d) the emergence 
of a class of educated subjects of chiefs who demanded political participation and 
accountability in chieftaincy administration. The interaction of these factors played a 
crucial role not only in the development of an accountable system of chieftaincy 
administration in local communities but, also, in the gradual transition of the 
traditional-federal state to a traditional-unitary state in which both central 
government and chieftaincy were parts of one unified governmental system.      
 
We have seen that after the military conquest of the traditional states by the British 
colonial state makers, the latter turned its attention to building developmental 
organizations capable of promoting their economic, political and ideological 
interests. However, British government officials realized that the task of building a 
developmental colonial state required political stability and the widespread support 
from the population rather than the use of military coercion. To achieve its goals, the 
British government strategically traded-off with the chiefs and their subjects the 
initial government policy to expropriate the native lands. British government 
officials in the Gold Coast and England then committed themselves to defend the 
customary land ownership system. In return, the chiefs and their educated subjects 
co-operated with the British colonial state-makers to build a developmental state that 
could promote their common interests.  
 
The commitment of the British government, chiefs and the larger population to 
defend the customary land ownership system was a necessary preliminary to 
building political trust and cooperation among these actors in the process of 
developmental state building. It was also the pre-condition for the development of 
transparent and accountable institutions of customary land administration within 
organizations of chieftaincy. The credible commitment of all the political 
stakeholders to defend communal land ownership is the precondition for realising the 
economic developmental potential of communal land.  
 
British colonial state-makers also realized that the politics of developmental state 
building required more than simply leaving the land to the chiefs and their subjects 
to secure political order and widespread support. Crucially, it required that political 
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leaders possess “intimate knowledge of native affairs” and the creation of institutions 
that are accepted by the population as legitimate. British governors realized that 
beyond their effective coercive capacity they lacked both intimate knowledge of 
contextual conditions and internal political legitimacy. To fill the intellectual and 
political gaps they incorporated the chiefs and the non-chief educated elites into the 
dominant ruling coalition. Political cooperation between the ‘triple ruling elites’ 
enabled them to reform indigenous organizations of chieftaincy into accountable 
developmental agents of the colonial state.  
 
It should be noted that British government officials could not have bridged the 
communication and political gaps identified in the dominant ruling coalition if the 
ideas of the chiefs and their subjects had remained the same as at the critical juncture 
of colonial state formation. Ideational change among the chiefs and their subjects, 
through formal education, did matter in enabling British government officials to 
support endogenous processes of institutional change. Historical institutionalists 
should pay attention to ideational change among actors who initiated critical 
junctures of institutional development to explain endogenous sources of institutional 
change (Blyth 2002; Lieberman 2002). 
  
The analysis also shows that the capacity of the stool land administration system to 
produce public revenue for local community development is dependent on the 
commitment of government, chiefs and citizens to transform the informal customary 
institutions formal-legal institutions. Chiefs gradually realized that “the old and 
ancient customs which had been found incompatible with the present state of affairs” 
should change to make it possible for them to “march with the times”. It was clear to 
them that informal institutions of customary law are not supportive of the 
governance principles of transparency and accountability. The chiefs and their 
subjects therefore sought help from British Government officials to provide the 
means for codifying the ancient customary laws. In other words, the Chiefs 
advocated the need for a transition from their ancient informal-legal rules to modern 
formal-legal institutions of administration. It is not surprising that the chiefs took the 
initiative to design the 1927 Native Jurisdiction Ordinance and also establish 
Provincial Councils of Chiefs that helped them stem the tide of political conflicts 
with their subjects. The institutional reforms initiated by the chiefs to protect their 
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organizations from extinction have played a significant role in enabling the survival 
of chieftaincy. The crucial point is that a transition from informal rules of customary 
law to formal-legal institutions is inevitable for the delineation of transparent 
mandates, rewards, and sanction mechanisms in the administration of chiefs. 
Without formal-legal institutions there cannot be an effective democratic system of 
accountability.   
 
Finally, the analysis suggests that citizens are more likely to strongly demand and 
enforce accountability in chieftaincy administration if they are made to invest 
economic resources in chieftaincy administration. We saw that the demand by the 
subjects of chiefs for interest representation and accountability in chieftaincy 
administration was largely influenced by the annual direct taxes collected by chiefs 
from their subjects. The maxim of ‘no taxation without representation’ soon caught 
up with the traditional ruling elites. It is unlikely that citizens will strongly demand 
accountability from their chiefs if the chiefs make no economic or political demands 
on their subjects. In the absence of economic and political incentives to demand 
accountability from chiefs, what remain are cultural motivations. We shall later see 
that the termination of the functions of chiefs in revenue mobilization through direct 
taxation has led to a general lack of interest among citizens to demand accountability 
in chieftaincy administration. Cultural motivations have not been found to be 
appropriate incentives for demanding accountability from traditional rulers. The 
developmental potential of chieftaincy and communal land ownership is intricately 
linked to the economic and political interest of government and citizens.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Reproduction of the Traditional-Federal State in Ghana, 1948-1957: The 
Politics of Nationalism, Electoral Democracy and Federalism  
 
The whole institution of chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our 
communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they 
symbolise in our society are so vital that the subject of their future must be 
approached with the greatest caution (Coussey Committee for Constitutional 
Reform, 1949: paragraph 36).   
 
This is a critical time for the Gold Coast. …The Gold Coast is about to make a 
great constitutional advance. The world...is asking whether the people of the Gold 
Coast have the capacity and the determination to shoulder their new 
responsibilities and undertake their complex task of building up and carrying on a 
good government under a new constitution (Governor Sir Charles Arden Clarke, 
1949-1957, Speech in Legislative Council, 19 January, 1950). 
 
Introduction 
 
Here I discuss how the legacies of the traditional-federal state were renegotiated by 
Ghanaian political elites, from 1948-1957, to set the pattern for the current 
constitutional bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government over land 
administration. Ghanaian political elites separated the unified authority of Chiefs and 
Government in the local government system and in the dominant ruling coalition to 
return the traditional-unitary state to the path of traditional-federalism. Chiefs 
retained control over stool land ownership but they lost the transparent and 
accountable formal-legal institutions of the local government system. It would 
thereafter become more difficult for government, state agencies, chiefs and citizens 
to ensure transparency and accountability in stool land administration. Theoretically, 
the politics of reversing the institutional choices that created the traditional-unitary 
state sits uncomfortably with institutionalists who tend to privilege the role of 
institutions over human agency. I argue that the role of human agency in the politics 
of institutional creation does not support the view that once a particular institutional 
option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial 
point. Political institutions persist because of the dynamics of power relations that 
underly them, and not because of the self-reinforcing role of institutions.  
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The chapter is divided into five sections. In section 6.1, I discuss the 1948 political 
riots that accelerated the transition from colonialism to political independence. In 
section 6.2, I consider some key state reform ideas provided by a three-member all-
British Commission of enquiry into the 1948 political riots. In section 6.3, I discuss 
the two critical political settlements reached by the 39-member all African Coussey 
Committee for Constitutional Reform. In section 6.4, I discuss the political conflicts 
and settlements between Chiefs and non-Chief ruling elites over the integration of 
chieftaincy into the Ghanaian state. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter by 
emphasizing that the legacies of the critical juncture of state formation do matter in 
shaping the politics of state development.   
 
6.1 The 1948 Political Riots: Cocoa Disease and Nationalist Politics      
 
The turbulent political crisis that shaped the road to Ghana’s independence in 1957 
has received extensive research attention from scholars (Apter 1955; Austin 1964; 
Crook 1986; Killingray 1983; Rathbone 1968, 2000a). I will therefore not delve 
deeply into it but only outline the nature of the crisis of rule and how it shaped 
subsequent political events of state-making by Ghanaian political elites.  
 
In the late 1930s, a viral disease called the ‘swollen shoot disease’ began to attack 
cocoa farms in the Gold Coast. There was no known cure for the disease and the 
golden basket of cocoa was faced with the possibility of total destruction. By 1945, 
the swollen shoot disease was spreading at an alarming rate and the Government was 
forced to invoke its powers to adopt the unpopular policy of cutting-out diseased 
cocoa trees with or without the consent of cocoa farmers. In the face of strong 
opposition from cocoa farmers, the Government persuaded Chiefs to help implement 
the policy of cutting-out diseased cocoa trees. In the Ashanti region, the Ashanti 
Confederacy Council passed its own swollen shoot disease control ordinance but 
“opposition from farmers was so great that disease control had to be stopped.”199  
 
Generally, as opposition to the cutting-out policy mounted, the Chiefs – many of 
who were cocoa farmers and leaders of farmers associations (Austin 1964; Hill 
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1963) – and the non-chief African political elite withdrew their support for the 
unpopular Government policy of cutting-out diseased cocoa trees. To some extent, 
opposition to the cutting-out of diseased cocoa trees “was largely politically-
inspired” by African political elites.200 Opposition to the policy was also influenced 
by the failure of the Cocoa Research Institute (CRI) to convince cocoa farmers, 
Chiefs, and non-chief African political elites about the efficacy of the measures 
adopted to combat the disease. For instance, the Ashanti Confederacy Council 
travelled to the CRI to see what scientific measures could be adopted to deal with the 
crisis, but they were not provided convincing answers.
201
 The Chiefs therefore 
supported the opposition to the cutting-out of their cocoa trees. This affected the 
cordial political relations between Government and Chiefs (Austin 1964).  
 
In August 1947, Dr J. B. Danquah – who had been part of the 1934 delegation to 
England to demand constitutional reforms and financial support for Chieftaincy 
administration – now led some of his companions to form a nationalist movement 
called the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to demand a bigger role for 
educated non-chief elite in the governance of the country. Interestingly, the UGCC 
also argued that (a) the contact of chiefs and government is unconstitutional, and (b) 
the position of the chiefs on the Legislative Council is anomalous.
202
 It is important 
to emphasize that the demand of the UGCC was not for the immediate 
decolonisation of the Gold Coast, but full self-government for “the people and their 
chiefs in the shortest possible time” (quoted from Austin 1964:53).  
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The return of Kwame Nkrumah from London to the Gold Coast in December 1947, 
to take up the position of UGCC General Secretary brought new radical ideas into 
Gold Coast politics. In addition to the widespread opposition of cocoa farmers and 
Chiefs to the swollen shoot disease cutting-out policy, the UGCC also took 
advantage of discontent among ex-servicemen about post-war resettlement packages, 
the effect of post-war economic hardship, shortage of goods in shops, and sharp 
price increases. In February-March 1948, the UGCC, energised by the fresh radical 
ideas of Kwame Nkrumah, was actively involved in the widespread organization of 
violent demonstrations, trade boycotts, and looting of merchant shops. The violent 
activities “cripple[d] the forces of imperialism”,203 and shocked the world (Apter 
1955). Government suspended the cocoa ‘cutting-out’ policy. The violence claimed 
29 lives, and 266 people were seriously injured.
204
 It was this violent nationalist 
politics that threw the country into a crisis of rule and hastened decolonization. The 
top 20 issues that caused the 1948 riots are presented in Table 15.  
 
Table 15: Top 20 issues that influenced the 1948 riots
 
  
 
No. Matters Discussed in Memoranda 
References as 
cause of riots 
Ranking 
1 High prices and distribution of goods 42 1st 
2 Swollen shoot and cutting out of cocoa trees 39 2nd 
3 Constitutional development and self-government 27 3rd 
4 European settlement and allegations of racial discrimination 22 4th 
5 Africanisation of the civil service 20 5th 
6 Education 20 5th 
7 The disturbances 19 6th 
8 The boycott 16 7th 
9 Industrial development 15 8th 
10 Political position of the Chiefs  15 8th 
11 Emergency powers and detention of six men 14 9th 
12 Ex-servicemen’s grievances 13 10th 
13 Gold 12 11th 
14 Agricultural development 12 11th 
15 Local government; Native administration finance; Position of 
District Commissioners 
12 11th 
16 Individual grievances connected with disturbances 12 11th 
17 Trading discrimination 9 12th 
18 Land acquisition  9 13th 
19 Public relations and the press 8 14th 
20 Cocoa Marketing Board 6 15th  
Source: The Watson Commission, 1948, Analysis of 187 Memoranda, Appendix 5.  
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In Table 15, it can be seen that out of the top 20 issues discussed by individuals and 
groups in the memoranda submitted to the Watson Commission, the number of 
references made to the position of Chiefs in the ruling coalition as grounds for the 
riots ranked 8
th
 whiles references that concerned the administration of Chiefs in the 
local government system ranked 11
th
. Grievances concerning the communal land 
tenure system – specifically, issues about land acquisition – ranked 13th, and thus of 
less concern to the Gold Coast population. The successful organization of the crisis 
of rule by nationalists was largely made possible by the post-war effect on economic 
conditions, the economic effect of the swollen shoot cocoa disease in local 
communities, and lack of employment of the educated youth in the civil service. 
Governor Guggisberg had been proved right that the annual production of 4000-5000 
unemployed youth by the educational system would certainly “lead to disaster in the 
not distant future” because “they fall a natural victim to discontent and consequently 
to unhappiness.”205 The nationalists used the unemployed educated youth to their 
political advantage (Adu-Boahen 2000; Austin 1964).  
 
Richard Rathbone (1968:209) argued that the inability of the country to successfully 
manage “the worst civil disturbances ever seen in the Gold Coast” was due to a 
period of weak governments that began from mid-1947 until the end of 1949.
206
 The 
capacity of a government to deal with political crisis is crucial for political stability. 
It is doubtful whether the existence of a strong colonial government would have been 
enough to effectively deal with the global political support for decolonization and the 
harsh economic conditions that were unleashed in the aftermath of the Second World 
War (Adu-Boahen 2000). From 1951 to 1957, during a period of strong government, 
the political crisis did not vanish but manifested in diverse forms (Austin 1964; 
Nkrumah 1957). For instance it took many years for the swollen shoot disease to be 
brought under control. Governor Sir Charles Noble Arden-Clarke, who presided over 
the transition of the Gold Coast into independence, between 1949 and 1957, 
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commented that “During that time we lived in an atmosphere of perpetual crisis” 
(Arden-Clarke 1958:35). The key argument is that the explanation of the success of 
the 1948 organized riots should go beyond the analysis of the capacity of ‘strong’ or 
‘weak’ government in dealing with the crisis. It is important to examine the nature of 
the exogenous political variables that interacted with favourable antecedent political 
conditions to shape the crisis of rule.  
 
6.2 The Watson Commission Reform Proposals: Exogenous Ideas?  
   
Following the 1948 political crisis, a three-member all-British Commission chaired 
by Mr. Aiken Watson was established to enquire into the underlying causes of the 
political disturbances; and to make recommendations for reform. The Watson 
Commission pointed out two major causes of the political crisis. First, it pointed out 
that “the 1946 Constitution was outmoded at birth” because it had been “conceived 
in the light of pre-war conditions.”207 Second, that there had been “A failure of the 
Government to realise that with the spread of liberal ideas, increasing literacy and a 
closer contact with political developments in other parts of the world, the star of rule 
through the Chiefs was on the wane.”208 I shall focus on the Watson Commission’s 
reform proposals concerning, first, the role of chieftaincy in the state, and second, 
the communal land tenure administration system.   
 
The Watson Commission argued that the chiefs should have a limited role to play in 
the future political and economic development of the country otherwise it would 
constrain development. In their own words, the Commission stated: 
 
We are unable to envisage the growth of commercialisation in the Gold Coast 
with the retention of native institutions… Our sole concern is to see that in any 
new constitutional development there is such modification as will prevent existing 
institutions standing in the way of general political aspirations.
209
  
 
From the historical analysis of the process of state-building in the Gold Coast, it is 
difficult to see how the retention of native institutions had constrained development. 
The Watson Commission’s opposition to the role of chieftaincy in the state had 
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received support from some influential African political elite. The chairman of the 
UGCC, Mr A. G. Grant (a timber merchant), had told the Commission: 
 
We were not being treated right, we were not getting the licences for the import of 
goods, also we were not pleased with the way our Legislative Council handled 
matters, because we had not the right people there. …The chiefs go to the Council 
and approve loans without submitting them to the merchants and tradesmen in the 
country. Thereby we keep on losing.
210
  
 
During the public hearings of the Watson Commission, stronger opposition to the 
role of Chiefs in the Legislative Council had come from youth associations in many 
parts of the country (Austin 1964; Rathbone 2000a). For instance, the Ashanti Youth 
Association (AYA) stated its opposition to the role of the Chiefs on the Council as 
follows:  “The public vehemently disapproves the representation of Chiefs at the 
Legislative Council…we want a complete upheaval of the present Constitution of the 
Gold Coast Legislative Council…the removal of our chiefs from the council.”211 
However, the Watson Commission realized that the position of Chiefs on the 
Legislative Council is “a matter upon which Africans themselves are not in 
agreement.”212 Therefore, in the Watson Commission’s reform proposals concerning 
the composition of the Legislative Council, “the door [was] left open to any Chief to 
climb the political ladder to a seat in the legislative chamber.”213 The position of 
chieftaincy in the state was a major political issue that was left for African political 
elites to decide for themselves. The Commissioners conceded: 
 
We found great difficulty in getting any universal agreement on the precise place 
to be occupied by the Chief in any new political system. In our discussions we 
endeavoured to press the matter to its logical conclusion without result. There 
appears to be no doubt that so long as he occupies the Stool the Chief partakes of 
some measure of divinity. But it is a divinity with territorial limitations. Equally it 
is a divinity he loses the moment he is destooled.
214
  
 
In the opinion of the Watson Commission, the middle course suggested by “Africans 
with modern political outlook”215 was that “[the Chief] must either remain on his 
                                                 
210
 Minutes of Evidence submitted by Mr A. Grant before the Watson Commission (Austin, 1964:51). 
211
 Memorandum presented by the AYA to the Watson Commission, (in Austin, 1964:57).         
212
 Memorandum presented by AYA to the Watson Commission.  
213
 Report of the Watson Commission, paragraph 114. 
214
 Report of the Watson Commission, paragraph 109. 
215
 Report of the Watson Commission, paragraph 110. 
171 
Stool and take no part in external politics or forgo the office – he should not attempt 
a dual role.”216 Here lies the root of the 1992 constitutional provision (Article 
276(1)) that states that “A Chief shall not take part in active party politics; and any 
chief wishing to do so and seeking election to Parliament shall abdicate his stool or 
skin.” This is one of the legacies of the project of traditional-federal state building. It 
clearly illustrates the historical institutional argument concerning the path 
dependence of current institutional configurations and political outcomes. Certainly 
the Ghanaian state is an historical product of the ideas and power of diverse political 
interests. The position of chieftaincy in the state was a matter that became the most 
hotly debated issue in the Gold Coast. I shall return to this later.   
  
The Watson Commission proposed that chieftaincy and local government structures 
should be separated and “the administration of local government in relation to purely 
local affairs should be entrusted to Local Authorities.”217 Whatever is meant by 
‘purely local affairs’ was not defined. The Commission however proposed that a 
specified proportion of non-Chief adult males should be represented on the Local 
Authorities. The existing Native Authorities had appropriated the management of 
stool land revenues. Therefore, as we shall see, the separation of chieftaincy from 
local government structures would have far reaching consequences on the politics of 
stool land revenue administration between chiefs and government.  
 
Perhaps due to the post-war economic hardship across the country, the Watson 
Commission also proposed the abolition of the direct annual taxes imposed by 
Native Authorities. It is important to note that annual deliberations by members of 
local communities over local taxes had shaped not only their participation in local 
government but also the nomination of non-chiefs to the State Councils. The 
abolition of direct taxation was therefore likely to have an effect on bottom-up 
interest in local democracy.  
 
The Watson Commission recognized that “problems of land tenure could not strictly 
be described as a proximate cause of recent disturbances.”218 In Table 15 above, we 
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saw that out of the 187 memoranda received from the general public, there were only 
9 references made to land matters – specifically matters of land acquisition – as a 
cause of the disturbances. The Watson Commission however remarked: 
 
The general fear of the African…is that if alienation of tribal lands continues 
unrestricted there is a great danger that a landless peasantry may result. … We are 
of the opinion that some positive steps should now be taken to prevent the 
possibility of an avaricious chief, with the assent of venial elders, effectively 
alienating tribal lands for personal gain or some temporary enrichment of the 
tribe. On the other hand if industrialisation of the country is to succeed to any 
extent accompanied by the expansion of commerce, not only must security of 
tenure be given to those who invest capital, but land which is alienated must 
become an asset capable of providing real security for borrowed capital.
219
  
 
In the opinion of the Watson Commission, since the issue of land tenure is intimately 
connected with future development, it was important that fundamental land tenure 
administration reforms should be undertaken to ensure the following: “(i) securing 
that the alienation of tribal lands shall only take place for approved purposes; (ii) that 
the consideration passing on such alienation shall accrue for the benefit of the 
community selling and (iii) securing to a purchaser on these terms an indefeasible 
title.”220 The Commission also proposed that a Land Court should be established to 
deal with cases of land litigation, approve the purchase price of 99-year leases, and 
issue a Certificate of indefeasible leasehold title to land purchasers.  
 
The Commission noted that not every form of stool land alienation required 
intervention by the judiciary. Therefore it recommended that the proposed customary 
land tenure administration reforms should “exclude what may be termed customary 
alienation where the interest in the land passing to the grantee is limited to user for a 
specific purpose for a term not exceeding 14 years with no right of renewal.”221 This 
implied that the acquisition of land for long term projects such as cocoa farming, the 
backbone of the Gold Coast economy, was to be removed from the control of chiefs. 
We shall see that the removal of stool land administration from the chiefs is not a 
matter that the Ghanaian political elites have been willing to entertain.   
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The Watson Commissioners had recognised that the informal nature of ‘customary 
Native Law’ administered by the Native Courts were in a “state of uncertainty” and 
needed to be formally codified and fused into the common laws of the country. The 
general concern about the role of chiefs in stool land administration was that the 
unwritten rules of customary law had made it difficult for members of local 
communities to hold chiefs accountable through the formal-legal rules that had been 
negotiated to govern chieftaincy administration. The uncertain nature of informal 
rules of customary law was one of the key reasons why the chiefs had demanded in 
1927 that government should help to provide the means for codifying the rules of 
customary law. We shall see that this is a problem that has continued to plague the 
effectiveness of the Audit Service and the Courts to horizontally hold chiefs 
accountable in the use of stool revenue. The uncertainty of informal rules of 
customary law continues to undermine the efforts of horizontal state agencies to 
ensure transparency and accountability of chieftaincy administration. 
 
The reform proposals made by the Watson Commission required the approval of the 
British Government in England as well as the approval of the people of the Gold 
Coast if they were to be implemented. I discuss below how these political 
constituencies of power received the proposed reform ideas.    
 
6.2.1 The British Government’s Response to the Watson Commission 
 
In a period of political crisis, British Government officials in England, as well as in 
the Gold Coast, were very cautious in dealing with matters of chieftaincy and land 
tenure administration reform. These were highly inflammable political matters. The 
British Government largely agreed with the proposed reforms concerning the 
structure of central and local government. The British Government however opposed 
the view that the annual local taxes imposed by Native Authorities on local 
communities should be abolished because it would be “inconsistent with the process 
of decentralisation and the building up of a local sense of responsibility.”222 
Furthermore, the ideas of the Watson Commission concerning the reform of 
customary land administration were rejected by the British Government. The British 
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Government argued that there were legislative regulations in the Gold Coast that 
adequately catered for the concerns raised about the developmental potential of 
customary land administration. The British Government pointed out that the Joint 
provincial Council of Chiefs had taken steps to resolve the remaining problems. The 
fears of the British Government to support land tenure administration reforms can be 
seen from the following statements made by His Majesty’s Government:        
 
The Gold Coast Government have long recognised the need for security of tenure, 
for the protection of tribal lands from alienation, for some form of registration of 
titles and for the settlement of tribal and private boundaries. The subject is a 
highly technical one and must be handled with the utmost care since…the public 
is intensely suspicious of any action taken by the Government with regard to land. 
…The recommendations with regard to the control of alienation will be 
considered by the Gold Coast Government; but it must be pointed out that all 
customary alienation would have in any case to be excluded from them, and not 
merely customary alienation for periods not exceeding fourteen years…since 
customary alienation is not limited to any term of years.
223
  
 
The position of the British Government that all customary alienations would have to 
be excluded from the proposed land tenure administration reforms meant an outright 
rejection of the reform proposals made by the Watson Commission. As I have 
already shown in previous chapters, the issue of land tenure administration reform in 
the Gold Coast was more than a ‘highly technical’ issue. It had been a highly 
political issue that threatened the political stability of the country whenever reform 
attempts were initiated. The British Government’s rejection of the customary land 
tenure administration reforms proposed by the Watson Commission was a safer 
course of political action during a period of unprecedented political crisis.  
 
The views of the British Government and of the Watson Commission had to be 
accepted by the people of the Gold Coast before they could be implemented. The 
British Government, the chiefs, and the new African nationalist movements agreed 
that an all-African Committee for Constitutional Reform should be established to 
examine the reform proposals. I discuss next the political settlements reached by the 
all-African Committee for Constitutional Reform, commonly known as the Coussey 
Committee. I shall focus on the political settlements concerning chieftaincy-
government future relations in the state and stool land administration.   
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6.3 The Coussey Committee Political Settlements: Endogenous Ideas?  
  
In December 1948, the 39-member all-African Committee,
224
 chaired by Justice J. H. 
Coussey, was established to examine the reform proposals made by the Watson 
Commission, the British Government’s statement on the proposals, and advise on the 
question of constitutional reform (Arden-Clarke 1958).
225
 In August 1949, the 
Coussey Committee completed its work. Their political settlements, with slight 
modifications, became the 1951 Coussey Constitution. It was the first constitution 
designed by Africans in the Gold Coast. The Coussey Committee did not make any 
significant changes to the reform ideas proposed by the Watson Commission. 
However, the political agreement reached by the Committee over the administration 
of stool land revenue defined a new path that has lasted to the present. 
   
Before I examine the relevant political settlements reached by the Coussey 
Committee, it is important to first examine the composition of the Committee which 
has been described by some scholars as “packed with chiefly representatives” (Crook 
1986:84, note 22). In fact, the Committee was made up of 9 Chiefs and 30 non-
Chiefs.
226
 It included 14 members of the Legislative Council and six leading 
members of the UGCC. Kwame Nkrumah was not invited into this Committee 
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because the British Government perceived Nkrumah to be affiliated with communist 
networks (Austin 1964; Nkrumah 1957; Report of Watson Commission 1948). The 
39 members of the Coussey Committee were however the crème de la crème of the 
African political elite in the Gold Coast at the time. Now I move on to discuss their 
political settlements concerning the constitutional organization of the state.  
 
The Coussey Committee unanimously rejected the Watson Commission’s negative 
view about chieftaincy and its role in the future development of the country. In what 
was to become a famous statement for scholars, Chiefs, and post-independent 
constitutional makers, the Coussey Committee stated its strong support for the 
retention of chieftaincy in the African state with the following words:  
 
The whole institution of chieftaincy is so closely bound up with the life of our 
communities that its disappearance would spell disaster. Chiefs and what they 
symbolise in our society are so vital that the subject of their future must be 
approached with the greatest caution. No African of the Gold Coast is without 
some admiration for the best aspects of chieftaincy, and all would be loath to do 
violence to it any more than to the social values embodied in the institution itself. 
Criticisms there have been, but none coming from responsible people whom we 
have known or met is directed towards the complete effacement of chiefs.
227
  
   
The strong support of African political elites for the retention of chieftaincy in the 
state cannot simply be explained by pointing to the composition of the Coussey 
Committee as allegedly packed with Chiefs or people with royal connections to 
chieftaincy (Apter 1963; Crook 1986). This is because radical non-chief political 
elites like Kwame Nkrumah, who was not a member of the Coussey Committee, also 
strongly supported the consolidation of chieftaincy (Nkrumah 1957, 1961). The basis 
of widespread support for the institution of chieftaincy in modern Ghana is not a 
matter that I shall delve into in the study. Other scholars have examined the reasons 
for the resilience and increasing power of chieftaincy in Ghana (Logan 2008, 2011; 
Owusu 1996). However, I wish to emphasize that researchers have to go beyond the 
recent processes of democratization to examine exactly how the whole organization 
of chieftaincy has been, and continues to be, so closely bound up with the life of 
members of local communities since the pre-colonial period (Owusu 1989).   
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The Coussey Committee unanimously agreed that Chiefs should be retained in the 
legislature. However, there was strong disagreement over whether the Chiefs should 
be retained within a unicameral legislature or within the Second Chamber of a 
bicameral legislature. This was the only issue which the Coussey Committee decided 
to settle by using the rule of secret voting. The secret voting revealed that the 
majority of 20 to 19 members supported the creation of the bi-cameral legislature to 
accommodate the Chiefs in the Second Chamber. The 19 members who disagreed 
argued that their alternative preference should be outlined in the final report to the 
British Government. I shall later discuss the conflict and negotiations that emerged 
over the position of Chiefs in the legislature. 
 
The Coussey Committee unanimously agreed with the Watson Commission that 
organizations of chieftaincy should be separated from the local government system. 
In the opinion of the Coussey Committee, if the State Councils of Chiefs are 
separated from the administration of Local Authorities it would promote democratic 
participation of the majority of the people in local government. The State Councils of 
Chiefs were however to “retain their power to declare native customary laws, and to 
settle constitutional disputes connected with the stools.”228 The formal institutions of 
accountability that governed local government agencies no longer covered the State 
Councils. While the Audit Service Department would continue to audit the public 
accounts of State Councils, the revenue and expenditure of Chiefs were no longer 
subject to government approval. The new political settlement took the state 
backwards to the era of strong traditional-federalism where organizations of 
chieftaincy existed as semi-autonomous entities beyond the direct reach of central 
government. In the post-colonial era, chiefs and the non-chief political elites would 
negotiate new constitutional rules that limit the authority of government to reform 
institutions of chieftaincy, including those governing stool land administration.  
 
One of the legacies of the Coussey Committee political settlements is the recurrent 
theme of whether or not to maintain the separation of chieftaincy from the local 
government system in the dynamic political process of state building. This theme is 
also at the core of how to develop an effective and efficient indigenous system of 
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stool land administration in local communities (Quan et al. 2008; Toulmin et al. 
2004). It is therefore appropriate that I highlight the reasons given by the Coussey 
Committee for separating chieftaincy from the local government system. The 
Coussey Committee provided four reasons that informed their settlement: 
 
[First] The existing system of local government has proved unable to meet the 
requirements of an efficient and democratic administration. This failure has arisen 
from the narrow basis of representation in the Chief’s Councils. The Head, the 
Chief, is chosen from members of a group or groups who by tradition are heirs to 
the stool in question, and the Councillors, with a few exceptions, are appointed by 
virtue of certain social and historical reasons. The addition, by nomination, of a 
few other persons from outside these traditional interests tends to accentuate 
rather than to weaken the privileged position of the overwhelming majority of the 
traditional members of the Councils. A second defect is the predominance of 
illiteracy among members, which is a serious handicap under modern conditions. 
In the third place there is the large size of the councils, especially in relatively 
small states. They are, therefore generally expensive and unwieldy, and their 
leisured procedure, due in part to illiteracy, makes them still more cumbrous. A 
fourth defect of the existing system is the lack of a sufficient number of suitably 
trained and qualified personnel on the staff of the Native Authorities.
229
   
 
From the above reasons, it can be inferred that non-chief political elites, chiefs, and 
the general population accepted the view that organizations of chieftaincy were not 
the appropriate vehicles to meet the “popular cry throughout the country for 
universal adult suffrage”230 in the election of local and national representatives of 
government. The two new political parties that had emerged in the Gold Coast (i.e. 
the UGCC and CPP) maligned the organizations of chieftaincy with British 
imperialism in the ideological battle to wrestle political leadership (Amamoo 1958; 
Nkrumah 1957). Particularly, local leaders of the CPP orchestrated “spasmodic 
waves of destoolment of chiefs which swept the country between the period 1949 to 
1952” (Amamoo 1958:99). In the moment of national frenzy for electoral 
democracy, “The chiefs, therefore, felt that their position was at stake; and their 
institutions in danger of being abolished” (ibid). It is not surprising that “These 
Chiefs were not only aware of the limitations of the present system but were quick to 
respond to the suggestions put forward for reform.”231 Thus, the separation of 
chieftaincy from the local government system was supported by all interests.  
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The decision of the Coussey Committee to separate chieftaincy from the local 
government system, while maintaining the traditional role of the State Councils in 
local communities, was informed by the widespread view that chieftaincy exists to 
perform functions that are different from the promotion of electoral democracy. This 
view persists among Ghanaians. The general view that organizations of chieftaincy 
perform functions other than electoral democracy could help explain why chieftaincy 
in Ghana consistently enjoys strong support among citizens (Logan 2008, 2011). 
Moreover, the failure of the experiment of electoral democracy in Ghana, from 1951 
to 1991, has influenced military rulers and the general population to support the re-
integration of chiefs into national, regional and local state agencies (Austin and 
Luckham 1975; Owusu 1986, 1989, 1996). The Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs 
was renamed the National House of Chiefs in the 1969 constitutional redesign. The 
National House of Chiefs has played an influential role in the co-optation of chiefs 
into many state agencies in the attempt to ensure effective governance and political 
stability. The co-optation of chiefs into state agencies shall later be discussed.     
 
The Coussey Committee did not comment on the land tenure administration reform 
proposals made by the Watson Commission. The Coussey Committee however 
realized that their decision to separate chieftaincy from the local government system 
had implications for stool land revenue administration. Stool land revenues were 
managed by chiefs through the local government system. The Coussey Committee 
recommended the sharing of the stool land revenues between the local government 
agencies and Chiefs.
232
 The specific settlement was as follows: 
 
We recommend therefore that in each Local Authority area, by agreement with 
the traditional authority, a fair proportion of the sums thus collected should be 
paid to the Local Authority. The actual proportion should be determined in situ 
and will depend on local circumstances and on the amounts involved. The 
remainder of the money will remain the perquisites of the traditional authority for 
the maintenances of the positions of the chiefs. In cases of disagreements the 
Regional Administration should decide the matter. In all cases the local 
government bodies should act as estate agents for the whole of the revenue 
accruing to the Stools. This will be necessary as they alone will have the 
necessary staff for this work.
233
 
 
                                                 
232
 Report of the Coussey Committee, paragraph 107(d).   
233
 Report of the Coussey Committee, Paragraph 207. 
180 
The politics of sharing stool land revenue between chiefs and local government 
agencies set the pattern of conflict between chiefs and government until political 
elites arrived at the current 1992 constitutional formula of sharing of stool land 
revenues. One can see how the nature of the critical juncture of state formation 
continued to shape conflicts and negotiations between chiefs and government. 
Following the recommendations of the Coussey Committee, the 1992 Constitutional 
makers would emphasize that the share of stool land revenues given “to the stool 
through the traditional authority [is] for the maintenance of the stool in keeping with 
its status.”234 Interestingly, because the expenditure of chiefs was no longer governed 
by formal-legal rules of accountability, there would emerge conflicts between chiefs 
and development practitioners over how stool land revenues are used (Crook et al. 
2007; Quan et al. 2008; Toulmin et al. 2004). The Coussey Committee emphasized 
that the role of the state in the administration of stool land revenues “should not, 
however, deprive the Stool of any rights of ownership over their lands.”235 Chiefs 
and non-chief political elites ignored the reform proposals put forward by the 
Watson Commission concerning customary land tenure administration.  
 
I wish to emphasize three key legacies concerning the Coussey Committee political 
settlements. First, the committee supported the consolidation of stool land ownership 
and administration. Second, the Committee agreed that stool land revenues should be 
shared between Chiefs and local government agencies. And, third, the Committee 
separated chieftaincy from organizations of local government. The legacies of these 
political settlements have defined the politics of Government-chieftaincy relations in 
land administration. The failure of Government and chiefs to create new formal-legal 
rules of accountability to substitute for those that govern the local government 
system, explains the attempt to create such rules under the 2001-2010 Land 
Administration Project (LAP). The politics and outcomes of the LAP shall later be 
discussed. I move on to discuss the conflicts and negotiations between Chiefs and 
non-chief political elites over the position of Chiefs in the dominant ruling coalition. 
It was this conflict that shaped the political settlements concerning the separation of 
chiefs from the Legislature and the Executive, and the negotiation of constitutional 
rules that insulated chieftaincy from government political interference.     
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6.4 Bifurcation of State Authority between Chiefs and Government 
Concerning Matters Affecting Chieftaincy: 1949-1957  
 
Notwithstanding the support of Ghanaian political elites for chieftaincy, the process 
of integrating the chieftaincy into the Ghanaian state did not occur without intense 
conflict and negotiation between chiefs, non-chief political elites, and British 
Government officials. I argue that the conflict that shaped state integration of 
chieftaincy was not influenced by support for or resistance to the retention of 
chieftaincy in the state. Instead, it was fuelled by non-chief political elites who 
competed to win the support of chiefs in the battle to capture state power through 
general elections. The integration of chieftaincy into the Ghanaian state should 
therefore not be seen as the result of a power struggle between Chiefs and non-Chief 
ruling classes. I discuss below the manifestations of this conflict and how it led to 
the bifurcation of state legislative authority between chiefs and government.            
 
6.4.1 Chiefs Reject a Second Chamber of Legislature  
 
When the Coussey Committee submitted its report to the British Government in 
October 1949, the British Government rejected the creation of a bicameral legislature 
in support of a unicameral legislature. The key reason for the British Government’s 
rejection of the bicameral legislature is stated by Mr Obitsebi Lamptey, one of the 
UGCC Legislative Council members who supported bicameralism:  
 
[It] is purely a party reason, for the Labour Government had been clamouring to 
clip the wings of the Second Chamber in Britain and therefore cannot come to the 
Gold Coast here and give us a Second Chamber, for if they had done that we all 
know what the Conservatives would have told them during the last election.
236
  
 
The Labour Government, following its electoral victory in 1945, had led the crusade 
to reform the House of Lords in England. Crucially, the Labour Government could 
not afford to pursue a contradictory policy in the Gold Coast when it was seeking re-
election in 1950. The strong opposition of British Government officials in the Gold 
Coast towards the establishment of the bicameral legislature is therefore sufficiently 
accounted for by external events in England.  
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However, in the Gold Coast, the non-Chief African political elites were also 
preparing for their first ever general elections in 1951. The UGCC, led by Dr J.B. 
Danquah, was campaigning for the creation of a bicameral legislature to 
accommodate Chiefs in the Upper Chamber. Kwame Nkrumah who had broken 
away from the UGCC to form the CPP also supported the creation of a bicameral 
legislature for chiefs. On 20 November 1949, Nkrumah convened what he called the 
Ghana People’s Representative Assembly (GPRA) “to coalesce public opinion 
against the Coussey Report and to urge the people into effective action” (Nkrumah 
1957:113). The GPRA rejected the Coussey Report as “unacceptable to the country 
as a whole” (ibid); but, interestingly, they approved “a moderate draft constitution of 
a bicameral legislature (a Senate of chiefs and elders)” (Austin 1964:87).  
 
In late 1949, Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP intensified their campaign of ‘Positive 
Action’ leading to lawlessness, violence, and a declaration of a state of emergency. 
In January 1950, Kwame Nkrumah was arrested, tried and sentenced to three years 
imprisonment. Between 28 February and 28 March 1950, while Kwame Nkrumah 
was in prison, the Legislative Council debated and accepted the Coussey Committee 
constitutional reform proposals, except the proposal for the creation of the bicameral 
legislature. On 22 March 1950, Dr J.B. Danquah moved the motion for the 
establishment of the bicameral legislature. Danquah made a very passionate appeal 
to the chiefs and their representatives to support the motion.  
 
Interestingly, the chiefs were opposed to the creation of a Second Chamber for 
Chiefs and Elders. The Northern Territories Territorial Council (NTTC) made it 
clear that if the Legislative Council adopted the bicameral system they would not be 
interested because the Northern Territories “have not reached a sufficient stage of 
development to enable them adequately take part in a bicameral system of 
government.”237 The Ashanti Confederacy Council (ACC) also viewed the creation 
of a Second Chamber as an attempt to destroy chieftaincy because the Lower House 
of Commoners has been given power to override the power of their Chiefs in the 
Second Chamber. The Standing Committee of the Joint Provincial Council (JPC) of 
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Chiefs also recommended to their members to accept a unicameral legislature
238
 
because “a Second House could never have any power but would be subordinate to 
the Lower House.”239 Nana Sir Tsibu Darku IX, a member of the JPC, questioned the 
motive of the UGCC and other sponsors of the bicameral system as follows:  
 
In the press, on the platform and in the highways and byeways, it has been 
suggested and re-echoed by the very people who clamour for Two Houses that 
Chiefs do not and should not take part in politics. As recently as 23
rd
 December, 
1949, the ‘Ghana Statesman’ the organ of the United Gold Coast Convention, 
under the heading ‘Chiefs in Politics’, categorically objected to Chiefs taking part 
in politics. Then the question arises, if Chiefs are not to take part in politics, what 
would be the role of the Chiefs in an Upper House? Would they be there merely 
for ceremonial purposes?
240
  
 
The Chiefs opted to be part of a more powerful unicameral legislature even if it 
meant sitting with their subjects or commoners. After intense debate on the matter, 
the motion for the creation of a bicameral legislature was put to a vote. By a majority 
of 21 to 5, with one abstention, the motion was lost. Not a single Chief voted in 
favour of the motion. A highly disappointed Dr. J.B Danquah not only accused the 
Government of influencing the minds of the Chiefs; Danquah also ironically blamed 
the lack of support from Chiefs on Kwame Nkrumah’s “unfortunate” support for the 
motion.
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 Nene Azzu Mate Kole, Omanhene of Western Nzema, saw the conflict 
over the position of Chiefs in the legislature as needless, and he stated:  
 
I wonder why we went to such length in debating this matter. There is one 
consolation I have and that is that it brought out forcefully, and is on record also, 
that everybody in this House is very jealous of our native institutions and is 
desirous to see that it is preserved and that it shall prevail at all times. That is 
sufficient. …The most important thing that this new proposal for a constitutional 
reform has set out is that the body [Cabinet] that will initiate policy shall be the 
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body which will be responsible to the Assembly and that it shall be the body 
which consist of members chosen by this country, and every other thing is a 
fitting in of this general structure.
242
    
 
What was more important to the chiefs was to negotiate constitutional rules that 
would insulate their organizations from the power of government. The non-chief 
politicians who lost their demand for a bicameral legislature later repackaged their 
argument and demanded a federal form of Government. Led by J. B. Danquah, the 
opposition forces argued that a federal form of government would best protect 
regional political and economic interests as also promote the regional development 
of chieftaincy administration. The Asante Confederacy, the Akyem Abuakwa State, 
and many chiefs now supported the re-packaged demand for federalism (Austin 
1964; Osei-Akoto 1992; Rathbone 2000a). The CPP also refined its position to 
champion the interest of the ordinary citizen against the “feudalistic” interests of 
chiefs (Nkrumah 1957). The outcome of this conflict is discussed below.  
 
6.4.3 Politics of Federalism: The Creation of a Unitary State or the 
Reproduction of Traditional-Federalism?  
 
I have argued that the organizational default of the modern Ghanaian state is the 
traditional-federal state created by British colonial state makers and chiefs in 1821-
1831. Here, I further argue that the creation of constitutional rules – during the 1949-
1957 politics of constitutional design – that guaranteed the existence of chieftaincy 
in the state, and also insulated chieftaincy from the political control of the CPP 
Government, was not simply a reflection of the will of “the people as a whole” 
(Arhin 1991:27), but it was a political settlement negotiated from the violent battle 
lines that were drawn between Nkrumah’s CPP and the chiefs.  
 
The year 1951 changed the political fortunes of the CPP in the Gold Coast and the 
Conservative Party in the UK. The political changes brought some interesting swings 
in political support for, and resistance to, the creation of the bicameral legislature. I 
still argue that the complex politics over the position of Chiefs in the state that 
gripped the Gold Coast, from 1951 to 1957, was generated by non-Chief political 
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interests. It is important to pay attention to the dynamics of this politics in order to 
understand not only the consolidation of the institution of chieftaincy in the state, but 
also state-chieftaincy relations of authority and power.  
 
In the 1951 popular elections, the CPP won a landslide victory. Kwame Nkrumah 
who was still in prison was elected for the Accra Central municipal seat with “the 
largest individual poll so far recorded in the history of the Gold Coast” (Nkrumah 
1957:134). The British Government was faced with no choice but to release Kwame 
Nkrumah from prison to form a parliamentary government. Governor Arden-Clarke 
(1958:33) gave the following reasons for releasing Nkrumah from prison:  
 
It was…obvious that the CPP would refuse to cooperate in working the 
Constitution without their leader. Nkrumah and his party had the mass of the 
people behind them and there was no other party with appreciable public support 
to which one could tum. Without Nkrumah, the Constitution would be stillborn 
and if nothing came of all the hopes, aspirations and concrete proposals for a 
greater measure of self-government, there would no longer be any faith in the 
good intentions of the British Government and the Gold Coast would be plunged 
into disorders, violence and bloodshed. After all, one cannot govern effectively 
without the consent or, at least, the acquiescence of the majority of the governed, 
except by force. Force was out of the question and it was clear that that 
acquiescence would not be forthcoming. So Nkrumah was released. 
 
The situation was a classic case of, first, the enabling role of political institutions (the 
1951 Constitution) and, second, the instrumental role of political elite in the creation 
and functioning of political institutions. This reinforces the political institutionalist 
view that “institutions are empty boxes without leaders and staff who have the 
capacity to produce the public goods the public demands and the facility to evoke 
popular confidence even among those who disagree with particular policies” (Levi 
2006:10). The success of the entire experiment of decolonization in the Gold Coast 
rested on cooperation between the British Government officials and the few African 
political elites rather than on the entire general population. Governor Sir Arden-
Clarke would later describe the success of the transition as follows: 
 
It was, indeed, unnerving at times to observe as we worked our way from one 
Constitution to the next, how much depended upon the personal relationships 
between a few leading personalities – between the Governor and the elected 
leaders of his Government, between one or two senior officials and the African 
Ministers (Arden-Clarke 1958:32-33).  
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When Kwame Nkrumah was released from Prison he also claimed that his CPP 
government had not only put on trial the 1951 Constitution which he had described 
as ‘bogus and fraudulent’, but he remained “unalterably opposed to imperialism in 
any form” (Nkrumah 1957:138). According to Nkrumah, the new situation 
demanded a changed of his political strategy from “positive action” to “tactical 
action” (Nkrumah 1957). Within the framework of the 1951 Coussey Constitution, 
one may describe the nature of the new system of government where power was 
shared between the CPP and the British Governor as a diarchy (Apter 1955; Austin 
1964; Rathbone 2000a). However, the process of the transition to independence also 
depended on the strong cooperation of the opposition parties and the Chiefs.  
 
In June 1952, Kwame Nkrumah initiated the process to review the 1951 Coussey 
Constitution. After Nkrumah formed his CPP Government, he no longer supported 
the creation of the bicameral legislature. He now strongly argued that “there is an 
inherent danger in having two Houses. … It would be preferable, therefore, that the 
Territorial Councils [or Provincial Councils of Chiefs] should remain and so enable 
the Traditional Authorities to express their views on national questions in their own 
forum and convey them direct to the Government.”243 Interestingly, the sponsors of 
the bicameral system of legislature also now appeared to have gained the political 
support of the Conservative Party Government in the UK. In 1952 the new Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, Sir Oliver Lyttelton conducted a tour of the Gold Coast. By 
1953, the Asante Confederacy Council, the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs, and 
the Northern Territories Territorial Council had suddenly changed their positions and 
strongly demanded for a Second Chamber as practised in the House of Lords. In fact, 
out of 131 interest groups that responded to the CPP Government’s request for 
memoranda on matters for constitutional reform, only the CPP and six other bodies 
were in favour of continuing with a single House.
244
 The CPP Government faced a 
very formidable opposition from the advocates of bicameralism.  
 
Notwithstanding the widespread demand for bicameralism, all the interest groups, 
including the CPP Government, agreed that matters’ concerning the internal 
organization of chieftaincy as well as chieftaincy-local community relations – or 
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what was called ‘local constitutional matters’ – “should be kept outside the realm of 
politics.”245 The general consensus was that “local constitutional affairs were entirely 
the business of the state or locality concerned, and the people should be left to settle 
their own problems according to their own customs without any outside 
influence.”246 The CPP, the Asanteman Council, and the Joint Provincial Council of 
Chiefs favoured the creation of a national Judicial Committee consisting of all the 
Presidents of the Provincial Councils of Chiefs and a Judge of the Supreme Court to 
act as an appellate tribunal with the final authority for determining local 
constitutional matters.
247
 The key issues of local constitutional matters under native 
customary law were defined to include the following:
 248 
 
a. The election, installation, deposition or abdication of any Chief, or the right 
of any person to take part in any such election, installation or deposition;  
 
b. The recovery or delivery of Stool property in connection with any such 
election, installation, deposition or abdication; and  
 
c. Political or constitutional relations between Chiefs.  
 
What one is dealing with here is the internal organization of the rules of chieftaincy 
under native customary law. Undoubtedly, they include the rules that define the 
mandate and responsibilities of Chiefs in the administration of stool lands. It is 
interesting to note that while the general consensus was that the definition of the 
internal rules of chieftaincy should be left for the local communities concerned, it 
was also recognised that a national Judicial Committee was required to enforce local 
rules. Nkrumah and his CPP Government were not going to wait for all the 
traditional states or localities to clearly define their local constitutional rules of 
chieftaincy before political independence was granted. But the opposition parties 
used the delicate matters of chieftaincy to their political advantage. 
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The contentious politics over the structure of the legislature was transformed by the 
opposition parties into a demand for a federal form of government (Austin 1964). 
The period 1954 and 1956 was defined by intense political struggles between the 
CPP and opposition political parties over the demand for federalism. In the Northern 
Territory, at the eleventh hour of the 1954 elections, the Northern Territories 
Territorial Council (NTTC) threw its political weight behind the formation of the 
Northern Peoples Party (NPP) to fight for the interest of the Northern region. The 
NTTC argued that the decolonisation process was being rushed to the disadvantage 
of the North’s political, economic, and educational development. The politics of 
regionalism crept into the politics of independence. In the 1954 elections, the CPP 
managed to win only 8 out of 26 seats in the Northern Territory.  
 
The most serious challenge to Nkrumah’s decolonisation project was to come from 
Chiefs in the Ashanti region. Opposition groups in Ashanti, strongly backed by the 
Asanteman Council and the Kumasi State Council, formed the National Liberation 
Movement (NLM) to demand a federal form of government. The formation of the 
NLM was led by the Asantehene’s Chief Linguist, Bafuor Osei-Akoto.249 The NLM 
argued that a federal form of government was the best mechanism to manage their 
cultural, economic and political development (Osei-Akoto 1992). On 11 October 
1954, over 50 Chiefs under the Kumasi State Council met at the Asantehene’s palace 
to swear an oath of support for the NLM.
250
 The Chiefs were also tasked to mobilise 
revenue from their stool lands, subjects and other sources to support the NLM.
251
 
Chiefs who refused to support the NLM were destooled by the Asanteman Council. 
The CPP Government responded by enacting the State Councils (Ashanti) Ordinance 
which gave the destooled Chiefs the right to appeal to the Governor.   
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The intensity of the lawlessness, violence, and political campaign that characterised 
the NLM’s demand for federalism forced the Governor and the Secretary of State for 
the Colonies to appoint Sir Frederick Bourne as Constitutional Advisor, to advise the 
Gold Coast Government and all the parties on the matter of federalism. The NLM 
refused to negotiate its demands with either the Constitutional Advisor or the CPP 
Government. The NLM and its allies
252
 insisted on fresh general elections to 
determine the matter. As the final test of the CPP Government’s popularity and the 
country’s preparedness for independence, the die was cast by the British Government 
for general elections on 17 July 1956. The CPP once again won the elections.  
 
Contrary to the interpretations of many Ghanaian scholars (Aryeetey et al. 2007; 
Ninsin 1991), I argue that the electoral triumph of the CPP over the NLM and its 
chiefly allies did not completely settle the question of federalism to produce “Unitary 
State Power” (Ninsin 1991:226). Rather, it produced a stable political platform for 
Nkrumah’s CPP government, the leaders of the NLM, powerful Chiefs, and British 
government official mediators to negotiate a political settlement. The negotiated 
settlement was a constitution that restrained the powers of government and the 
legislature from reforming institutions of chieftaincy (Austin 1964; Rathbone 
2000a). Crucially, the parties agreed the “The office of a Chief in Ghana as existing 
by customary law and usage shall be guaranteed.”253 The chiefs did not only secure a 
“constitutional chieftaincy” (Arhin 1991), but they had managed to reproduce the 
core legacies of the traditional-federal state. This shaped the path of the 1969, 1979 
and 1992 constitutions that prohibit government and parliament from reforming 
institutions of chieftaincy without the authoritative consent of the chiefs. 
 
The rules of customary law were also integrated into the laws of Ghana. The 
integration of the institution of chieftaincy into the Ghanaian state was now not 
simply based on untested general cultural support, but on the demonstrated power of 
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Chiefs to make or break the country. The rules of customary law that organized 
political relations within chieftaincy, and political relations between Chieftaincy and 
its local communities, became integrated into the constitutionally enforceable laws 
of Ghana. The rules of customary law differed from one traditional state to the other, 
if not from one local community to the other. Crucially, the definition of the 
constitutional relations between chiefs as well as between chiefs and their subjects 
was left to the chiefs and their subjects to determine by themselves.  
 
On 6 March 1957 the country was decolonised with the new name Ghana. Ghana 
became the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from colonial 
rule. The African political kingdom that Kwame Nkrumah preached was reached. In 
the view of Austin (1964:357), the opposition parties and the chiefs “prided 
themselves on their ability to outwit the CPP in devising constitutional limits to the 
power of the new government.” Nkrumah was dissatisfied with the constitutional 
settlement. The political settlement that reproduced the core legacies of the 
traditional-federal state was necessary to pave way for the granting of independence 
from British colonial rule (Austin 1964; Gocking 2005). The state that was produced 
was not a ‘unitary state’ as propagated by the CPP Government (Nkrumah 1957) and 
generally conceptualized by Ghanaian scholars (Ninsin 1991). Nkrumah’s 
dissatisfaction with the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government 
explains why in the post-independent period he sought to reverse what he called the 
“feudalistic” features of chieftaincy from the 1957 Constitution (Nkrumah 
1957:128). Subsequent chapters will show that while the chiefs have been unable to 
mobilize the huge resources required to reform their internal constitutional rules and 
informal institutions of customary land administration, governments have lacked the 
authority to autonomously reform the institutions of chieftaincy.  
 
6.5 Conclusion: The Legacies of the Traditional-Federal State Matter 
 
Political settlements between Chiefs and non-chief ruling elites concerning the 
organization of the state authority over the nature of the dominant ruling coalition, 
land ownership, stool land administration, and chieftaincy are very crucial for 
understanding the nature of land administration in Ghana. There is no doubt that 
organizations of chieftaincy are part of the institutions of the post-colonial state. 
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However, the political settlements reached by chiefs and non-chief political elites to 
separate chiefs from the dominant ruling coalition, separate organizations of 
chieftaincy from the local government system, and limit the authority of government 
to reform institutions of chieftaincy, turned the Ghanaian state backwards to the 
organizational default of traditional-federalism. Chiefs have retained control over 
stool land administration but they no longer have the accountable formal-legal 
institutions of the local government system. It would thereafter become more 
difficult for government, state agencies, chiefs and citizens to ensure transparency 
and accountability in stool land administration. The consolidations of the traditional-
federal state in the 1969, 1979 and 1992 constitutions have constrained government 
from reforming institutions of chieftaincy governing land administration. 
 
Theoretically, from the above analysis, the reversal of organizational reforms in 
chieftaincy-government relationships of authority at the level of local government 
sits uncomfortably with the argument by some historical institutionalists that “once a 
particular [institutional] option is selected, it becomes progressively more difficult to 
return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 
2001:113). Rather, the analysis supports the view that “There is nothing automatic, 
self-perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements. Rather, a 
dynamic component is built in; where institutions represent compromises or 
relatively durable though still contested settlements based on specific coalitional 
dynamics, they are always vulnerable to shifts” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:8-9). 
States are created by political actors and specific institutional configurations persist 
because of the dynamics of power relations that underlies them. The historical 
institutional perspective should emphasize the role of political agency in the creation, 
maintenance and change of institutions – whether formal or informal. The structure-
agency debate among diverse strands of institutionalists is needless.   
 
Empirically, I emphasize that the legacies of the critical juncture of state formation 
matter in the process of state development. The lessons from the era of the 
traditional-unitary state reinforce the point that the reform of the informal rules of 
customary law that organize chieftaincy matters for ensuring transparency and 
accountability in chieftaincy administration of stool lands. The gradual evolution of 
Botswana’s Land Boards through cooperation between chiefs and non-chief political 
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elites also supports this perspective. Informal state institutions do not promote 
transparency and accountability in the governance of public resources. We shall see 
that the failure of post-independent governments and chiefs to reform the informal 
rules of chieftaincy governing stool land administration weaken the capacity of all 
stakeholders to ensure vertical and horizontal accountability of chiefs. 
 
Towards an understanding of the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters, it is 
important to re-emphasize the political settlements negotiated by the Coussey 
Committee. The decision of the Coussey Committee that stool land revenues should 
be shared between Chiefs and local government structures would shape future 
constitutional negotiations over the sharing of stool land revenues. Moreover, the 
consolidation of stool land ownership under chieftaincy would require chiefs and 
government to cooperate in the reform of the land administration system. We shall 
see that in spite of strong external pressures from the World Bank on Ghanaian 
governments to reform the communal land tenure system into individual freehold 
interests, the political, economic, and cultural basis of power that support the 
bifurcated authorities of chiefs and government within the traditional-federal state 
reinforce the consolidation of communal land ownership. It is therefore crucial that 
government, chiefs, citizens and external interests cooperate to support the 
communal land administration system with transparent, accountable and effective 
formal-legal administration structures that promote development. The crucial point is 
that the post-colonial consolidation of the traditional-federal Ghanaian state matters 
in shaping the nature of the politics of land administration reform.      
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Chapter 7 
 
Public Sector Land Administration in Ghana: 1957-2000 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses how the consolidation of political settlements over land 
ownership, chieftaincy, and government in the traditional-federal state has shaped 
the post-independent development of public sector agencies of land administration to 
manage the diverse interests of chiefs, government, ordinary citizens, and other 
actors. The public sector agencies that I discuss are the Office of the Administration 
of Stool Lands which collects and disburses stool land revenues, the Lands 
Commission which manages the power of government to compulsorily acquire 
communal land from local communities with compensation, the Land Valuation 
Board which manages the payment of compensation for lands compulsorily acquired 
by government, and the Land Title Registry which manages the registration of land 
titles. I argue that the legacies of state authority concerning land ownership, 
chieftaincy and government are what have largely shaped the development of these 
public sector agencies of land administration. The chapter emphasizes that the 
organization of state authority matters in shaping land administration reform.  
  
The chapter begins with a discussion of the current distribution of land ownership in 
Ghana and the consolidation of the communal land ownership system. I then 
examine how the historical political settlements of state authority over land 
ownership have shaped the development of public sector agencies of land 
administration to govern the interests of chiefs, government, local communities and 
other actors with interests in gaining access to communal land. I also look at how the 
lack of effective institutions of horizontal accountability between the public sector 
agencies constrained the inter-organizational coordination of their functions 
concerning land title registration. I shall then discuss how the lack of an effective 
organizational framework for land administration shaped reform agendas. I conclude 
that the organization of state authority between chiefs and government over land 
administration has shaped the development of public sector land agencies.   
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7.1 The Nature of Land Ownership in Ghana 
 
Ghana’s turbulent quest for effective political leadership between 1957 and 1992 did 
not in any way affect the historical political settlements of state authority over 
communal land ownership and the institution of chieftaincy. Until the current fourth 
republic democratic state was created in 1992, the 34 years of post-independence 
politics of state organization was largely shaped by military rulers rather than 
democratically elected rulers. The country’s chequered path in the search for an 
effective dominant ruling coalition is presented below in Table 16.   
 
Table 16: The search for effective Government since 1957 
 
Constitution Government Mode Period 
Independent member of the 
Commonwealth: 1957-1959 
Convention People’s Party (CPP) 
Government 1 
Civilian 1957-1960 
First Republic: 1960-1966 CPP Government 2 Civilian 1960-1964 
CPP Government 3 Civilian 1964-1966 
Military Rule National Liberation Council (NLC) 
Government 
Military-
Police 
1966-1969 
Second Republic: 1969-1972 Progress Party (PP) Government Civilian 1969-1972 
Military Rule: 1972-1979 National Redemption Council (NRC) 
Government 
Military 1972-1975 
Supreme Military Council (SMC) 
Government 1 
Military 1975-1978 
SMC Government 2 Military 1978-1979 
Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) Government 
Military 1979 
Third Republic: 1979-1981 People’s National Party (PNP) 
Government 
Civilian 1979-1981 
Military Rule: 1981-1992 Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) Government 
Military 1981-1992 
Fourth Republic: 1992-Present National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) Government 1 
Civilian 1992-1996 
NDC Government 2 Civilian 1996-2000 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
Government 1 
Civilian 2000-2004 
NPP Government 2 Civilian 2004-2008 
NDC Government 3 Civilian 2008-2012 
 
The nature of governments in Ghana has not mattered for the consolidation of 
institutions of chieftaincy in the state. Indeed, the institutions of chieftaincy have 
enjoyed greater support from military rulers who sought to legitimise their rule at the 
local level (Austin and Luckham 1975; Arhin 2007; Owusu 1986, 1989, 1996). 
Military rulers did not attempt to reform the communal land tenure system nor the 
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institution of chieftaincy. Democratically elected governments also either barely had 
time to reform chieftaincy or were too afraid to tamper with the indigenous informal 
organizations that had enjoyed greater political support from military rulers. Both the 
communal land ownership system and the institution of chieftaincy were 
consolidated and strengthened under periods of military and democratic rule. 
   
Many scholars have estimated that the land compulsorily acquired by Ghanaian 
governments (public land) is less than 20% of the total land, while traditional 
authorities manage about 80% (Antwi 2006; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Quan et al. 
2008; World Bank 2003c, 2011). From 1979 the state banned the creation individual 
freeholds from stool lands managed by Chiefs. Article 190(4) stated that “no interest 
in, or right over, any stool land in Ghana shall be created which vests in any person 
or body of persons a freehold interest howsoever described.” This legal prohibition 
has been consolidated in the 1992 Constitution. It appears that even the World Bank 
which sought to transform the communal land ownership system into individual 
freehold lands has now accepted the status quo (World Bank 2003c, 2011). Support 
for and resistance to the communal land ownership system shall be discussed later. 
 
There are four types of land tenure ownership in Ghana namely (a) public land 
compulsorily acquired by Governments on behalf of the state, (b) stool lands owned 
by local communities, (c) family lands communally owned by families, and (d) 
individual lands privately owned by individuals. In 1994, the High Court
254
 ruled 
that family lands are not bound by the constitutional restrictions that prohibit the 
creation of individual freeholds from stool lands. This means that communally 
owned family lands can be sold outright to individuals (Kasanga et al. 1996). Many 
Ghanaian scholars define ‘customary land tenure ownership’ to include lands that are 
communally owned by families, clans, and local communities (Amanor 2010; 
Kasanga and Kotey 2001). This is the definition that I also use. Given the rapid 
transformation of family lands into private lands, the question that arises is whether 
it is still the case that “The customary sector holds 80 to 90 percent of all the 
undeveloped land in Ghana” (Kasanga and Kotey 2001:13). In Table 17 below, the 
Lands Commission registers family land transactions under ‘private lands’. 
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Table 17: Formal Registration of Land Transactions in 2007 and 2009 
  
Types of 
Land 
Nature of Transactions  2007 2009 
% increase (+) or decrease 
(-) in land registration  
State/Public  
Land 
Applications received 814 398 - 51.1% 
Allocations made 556 269 - 51.6% 
Leases executed 775 521 - 32.7% 
Consent to assign or sublet 250 277 + 10.8% 
Consent to mortgage 180 134 - 25.5% 
 
Stool/Skin 
Land 
Applications for Concurrence 7153 5579 - 22.0% 
Concurrence granted 9558 2598 - 72.8% 
Consent to assign or sublet 714 1363 + 90.8% 
Consent to mortgage 311 383 + 23.1% 
 
Private Land 
Land documents lodged 6607 7213255 + 9.1% 
Documents Plotted 6593 5580* - 15.3% 
Documents Queried 867 1287* + 48.4% 
 
Source: Compiled from the 2007 and 2009 Lands Commission Annual Reports  
 
It can be seen from Table 17 that from 2007 to 2009 while there was a decrease of 
22% in applications to the Lands Commission for its concurrence in stool land 
transactions, there was an increase of 9.1% in private land transactions, from 6607 to 
7213. The queries raised by the Lands Commission over the validity of many private 
land transactions, however, increased from 867 to 1287. Against the uncertain claim 
that about 80-90% of land is held under communal land tenure ownership, some 
officials of the Lands Commission point out that the low level (and decrease in) 
formal registration of stool/skin land transactions “could be due to the many 
bureaucratic processes that one has to go through within chieftaincy institutions.”256  
 
Many scholars claim that people who have acquired stool lands are less interested in 
registering their transactions because they consider the authority of Chiefs as final 
(Antwi 2002; Kasanga et al. 1996; Kasanga and Kotey 2001). The point is that 
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* In the 2009 report it is recorded that “A total of 7,213 private land documents were lodged. Out 
of these, 5580 documents were plotted (77.36%) while 1,287 (23.06%) documents were queried” 
(p.vii). The conversion of the percentages into actual figures produces slightly different figures.     
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 This view was shared by Mr. Jonathan Abossey, former Director of the Survey Department 
(Interview with Mr. Jonathan Abossey, 22/12/2010). I interviewed two officials of the Lands 
Commission (Head office, Accra), namely Mr. Jonathan Abossey and Mr. Afoakwa (7/07/2011), to 
try to clarify the interesting statistics on landholdings in Ghana. The officials also expressed doubt 
about the authenticity of the statistics on customary land holdings. Mr Abossey said “sometimes we 
doubt the accuracy of that statistics.”  
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although the state has consolidated communal land tenure ownership in Ghana, the 
statistics on stool, communal or customary land ownership is unclear. I move on to 
explain why the communal land ownership system has been consolidated. 
 
7.1.1 Explaining the Consolidation of the Communal Land Ownership   
 
There is no question about the fact that the system of communal land tenure 
ownership has been consolidated by post-independent Ghanaian governments. The 
question is why has the communal land tenure system not been transformed into 
individual freeholds? Samuel Huntington (1996:384), in his analysis of the politics 
of land tenure reform in changing societies asked the question, “Under what 
conditions…does land reform become feasible?” And he answered:  
 
Like other reforms, changes in land tenure require the concentration and 
expansion of power in the political system. More specifically, they involve, first, 
the concentration of power in a new elite group committed to reform and, second, 
the mobilization of the peasantry and their organized participation in the 
implementation of the reforms. Analysts of land reform processes have at times 
attempted to distinguish ‘reform from above’ from ‘reform from below.’ In 
actuality, however, a successful land reform involves action from both directions. 
 
If successful land reform depends on support from the political elites and peasants or 
farmers, does it mean that there has been the absence of reform action from both 
directions in the post-independent period? The simple answer is yes.  
 
The consolidation of stool land ownership in the 1979 and 1992 Constitutions is 
clear evidence of the lack of support from the political elite to reform the communal 
land tenure system (Amanor 2010; Aryeetey et al. 2007; Ubink 2008; Amanor and 
Ubink 2008). In Kwame Nkrumah’s famous ‘Motion of Destiny’, made on 10 July 
1953 in the Legislative Council, he extolled the ARPS for “its excellent aims and 
objects, and by putting up their titanic fight for which we cannot be sufficiently 
grateful” (Nkrumah 1957:199). Recently, in August 2011, Nana Akuffo Addo, 
presidential candidate of the major opposition party (the New Patriotic Party), 
extolled the work of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) at a public 
lecture: “The Society mounted an effective, successful campaign, mobilizing the 
chiefs and people, to oppose the infamous 1897 Crown Lands Bill, which sought to 
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expropriate our lands to the British Crown. … Ghanaian control over Ghanaian lands 
was preserved through the agency of the Society” (Akuffo-Addo 2011:2).  
 
If the ruling elites have not been willing to reform the communal land tenure system, 
what about the ordinary ‘peasantry’? Researchers have recognised that an important 
condition for the mobilisation of strong support from the peasantry for land reform is 
the existence of high concentration of land ownership in a small group of landlords 
(Huntington 1996; World Bank 1975). Ghanaian scholars generally agree that the 
system of communal land tenure ownership in the country prevents the concentration 
of land ownership in Chiefs, family heads, or traditional authorities (Asante 1975; 
Bentsi-Enchil 1964; Brobbey 2008; Nkrumah 1964; Ollenu 1964; Woodman 1996). 
The generally accepted legal position is that communal land belongs to every 
member of the family or community and not the Chief, family head or traditional 
authority. Therefore, it will be difficult to mobilise support from the ‘peasantry’ 
against the Chiefs, family heads, and traditional authorities who manage the land on 
behalf of all. In any case, since the colonial era, the unemployed educated youth 
have not been interested in land matters “owing to their disdain for manual 
labour”257 and their condescension towards farming (Hill 1963; 1970).  
 
Consequently, in the absence of strong political support from above and below – 
ruling elite, chiefs, intelligentsia, farmers, and the youth – to reform the communal 
land tenure system, communal land ownership has survived to date. The 
consolidation of communal land ownership in Ghana does not mean that there has 
been no attempt by some actors to end the legacy. I discuss below some recent 
attempts made by some actors to end the legacy.   
 
7.1.2 Controversy over the Concept of ‘Customary Freehold’: Ending the 
Legacy of Communal Land Tenure? 
 
In 1973, Bentsi-Enchill who was a member of the Law Reform Commission at the 
time proposed that the term “customary freehold” (or its expanded form ‘customary 
law freehold’) should be used to describe lands apportioned by traditional authorities 
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of the land-owning community to members of the community (Woodman 1996). The 
term ‘customary freehold’ which was adopted by the Law Reform Commission in its 
1973 report on the ‘Reform of Land Law in Ghana’ found its way into the 1986 
Compulsory Land Title Registration Law. A revised version of the Law Reform 
Commission’s report was also used by members of the National Land Policy 
Committee to formulate the National Land Policy between 1994 and 1999.  
 
Strongly opposed to the usage of customary law freehold are the traditional 
authorities (mainly chiefs). Chiefs argue that the land right held by indigenous 
members of the land owning community is only use right (or usufruct) which does 
not extinguish the community’s allodial title but only continues to persist on the 
authority of the land owning community. The National House of Chiefs proposed 
that the term ‘usufruct’ should be used instead of “that horrible terminology called 
customary law freehold”.258 However, the notion of ‘usufruct’ favoured by chiefs has 
been strongly attacked by many scholars and development agencies as the basis of 
insecurity in customary land tenure. Surely, informal rules of customary law 
commonly create contradictory interpretations of the exact nature of the rules.  
 
From the 1980s, internal and international (external) neo-liberal market forces have 
been actively advocating for the transformation of individual rights in communal 
land into individual freeholds (Aryeetey et al. 2007; Ninsin 1989). The World Bank 
has been the leading external actor in advocating for the conversion of communal 
land tenure rights into individual freehold rights. In line with its aim to promote 
competitive market structures, the Bank uses its Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs) 
as “the right ‘door’ through which to enter into dialogue with client countries on 
topics as sensitive as land policy reform.” (Bruce 2006a:20) The core sensitive 
matter is the transformation of rights in communal land tenure in developing 
countries such as Ghana into individual freehold rights in land (Bruce 2006a; Bruce 
et al. 2006; Deininger and Binswanger 1999; World Bank 1975).
259
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 The Mamponghene (Paramount chief of the Mampong traditional area and occupier of the second 
highest traditional office in the Asante Kingdom) described the term customary law freehold in that 
manner during a workshop organized by the Land Administration Project Unit for members of the 
National House of Chiefs (NHC) at the National House of Chiefs in Kumasi. The workshop was held 
on 29 July, 2010, at the National House of Chiefs.  
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 John W. Bruce, former Senior Counsel in the Legal Vice Presidency of the World Bank, discusses 
in some detail the Bank’s Operational Policies that concern the reform of communal usage rights 
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In the early 1980s, the PNDC military government turned to the World Bank for 
financial assistance to deal with the crippling economic problems. The World Bank 
used the opportunity to pressure the PNDC government to shift the country from its 
colonial legacy of communal land tenure ownership into individual land ownership 
rights. This was a period when World Bank Country Task Managers were 
“comfortable with nothing less than full private ownership” (Bruce 2006a:34). There 
is agreement among some researchers (Herbst 1993; Hutchful 2002; Oquaye 2004) 
that until the PNDC Government begun to implement World Bank sponsored neo-
liberal economic reform programs in 1983, the PNDC Government did not know 
which way it was heading (World Bank 1984a, 1984b).
260
 Ghana became the “Star 
Pupil” of the World Bank (Hutchful 2002). As part of the World Bank sponsored 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), the PNDC government was forced to enact 
the Land Title Registration Law (PNDC Law 152). In a military fashion, the law 
made it compulsory for all landowners to register their titles to land. The rational for 
the shift from deeds registration to the title registration was given as follows:  
 
The purpose of a system of land title registration is twofold: first, to give certainty 
and facilitate the proof of title; secondly, to render its dealings in land safe, simple 
and cheap and prevent frauds on purchasers and mortgagees. The effective 
characteristic of land title registration is that land is placed on the folio of the land 
register as a unit of property and transactions are recorded by reference to the land 
itself and not merely through instruments executed by the parties as is the case 
with deeds registration. Registration constitutes a warranty of title in the person 
registered as proprietor and as a bar to adverse claims.
261
   
 
The World Bank sponsored land titling project sought to achieve nothing less than 
the creation of individual freehold titles. The objective remained the same in the 
                                                                                                                                          
(Bruce 2006a). Paragraph 17 of the Bank’s Operational Policy 4.10 (May 2005) set forth an action 
plan for the legal recognition of “Conversion of customary usage rights to communal and/or 
individual ownership rights.” (Bruce 2006a:19) In February 2006, John Bruce was hired by the World 
Bank and the UK’s DFID as a private consultant to review and advice on legal and institutions issues 
affecting land administration reform in Ghana (Bruce 2006b). I shall talk more on that later in chapter 
9. The key point is that the main focus of the World Bank in supporting land administration reform is 
on the promotion of stronger private property rights in support of competitive market structures.      
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 Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah, one of the seven original members of the PNDC ruling coalition, wrote 
in his resignation letter: “Right from the beginning of the 31st December Revolution I have had 
serious reservations about the way and manner certain policies have been formulated and executed but 
I had always cherished the hope that with time the dust would settle and common sense and 
pragmatism would prevail. It is almost eleven months now since we launched the country unto a 
revolutionary path yet it is not clear to most people including myself, which way we are heading.” 
(Letter of Resignation from the PNDC, 22 November, 1982, in Oquaye 2004:128)    
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World Bank’s support of the Ghana Land Administration Project implemented from 
2001-2010 (Bruce 2006a; World Bank 2003c). Towards the ‘smooth’ conversion of 
individual rights in communal land into individual freehold rights, the 1986 Land 
Title Registration Law used the concept of ‘Customary Law Freehold’ to describe 
the individual customary rights in communal land to be registered. A customary law 
freehold (also referred to as ‘customary freehold’) was defined as follows.   
 
Rights of user subject only to such restrictions or obligations as may be imposed 
upon a subject of a stool or a member of a family who has taken possession of 
land of which the stool or family is the allodial owner either without consideration 
or on payment of a nominal consideration in the exercise of a right under 
customary law to the free use of that land.
262
    
 
The alienation of customary freeholds would gradually extinguish the authority and 
power of chiefs over communal land (Blocher 2006; Woodman 1996). In the 
‘revolutionary’ military political culture prevailing under the PNDC, described by 
opposition groups and writers as a “culture of silence” (Adu-Boahen 1992; Baffour 
1987), Chiefs saw the naked threat to their power over communal land 
administration but they were largely silent (Adu-Boahen 1992; Oquaye 2004). 
Between 1990 and 1992, when the PNDC government initiated a process to return 
Ghana to constitutional democracy, the chiefs used the political space of constitution 
making to consolidate the historical political settlement that “no interest in, or right 
over, any stool land in Ghana shall be created which vests in any person or body of 
persons a freehold interest howsoever described.” The chiefs appeared to have struck 
the coup de grace to the military progress of the capitalist forces.  
 
Although the 1992 Constitution clearly prohibited the creation of freehold interest 
“howsoever described” from stool lands, the concept of customary freehold was still 
used by interest groups who sought to end the legacy of communal land ownership. 
The conflict over the term customary freehold  boils down to whether the community 
that holds the allodial title have the right or authority to expropriate the right of the 
customary freeholder or to restrict the uses to which the freeholder put the land 
(Woodman 1996). Woodman argues that “Customary law has reached the point 
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where the community’s allodial title is effectively extinguished when a customary 
freehold arises in the land” (Woodman 1996:80). Some officials within the MLF 
have also argued that the customary freehold “assumes indefinite duration and 
prevails against the whole world including the allodial titleholder” (MLF 2003:9). 
The implication of these definitions for the continued existence of communal land is 
clear. With time, communal lands would become extinguished. The creation of 
customary freeholds would also undermine the basis for the state to invest in the 
creation of transparent and accountable formal institutions to govern communal 
lands because such institutions would become dead in the short term.  
 
In the absence of a prevailing power among the stakeholders who produced the 1999 
National Land Policy, contentious interpretations of the nature of the rules of 
customary law were accommodated in the Policy. A circular definition 
accommodating the contentious concepts of ‘usufruct’ and ‘customary freehold’ was 
provided in the glossary of the policy as follows: “Usufruct: Rights in land held by a 
member of the land-holding community or a stranger, who has obtained an express 
grant from the landholding community, using customary mode of alienation. It is at 
times referred to as customary freehold, proprietary occupancy or determinable title” 
(MLF 1999:26). It has been noted that prior to the implementation of the LAP in 
2004 not a single land had been registered by the Land Title Registry under the term 
customary freehold (Blocher 2006). Perhaps it is the consequence of a policy that 
was “not intended to be law” (Kotey et al. 1998:59). The debate about the nature of 
‘customary land tenure’ persisted into the design and implementation of the land 
administration reform project from 2001-2010. I analyse the politics and outcomes of 
the Land Administration Project in chapter 9.  
 
The point is that the consolidation of the legacy of communal land ownership now 
faces strong opposition from internal and external forces of capitalism. The question 
is whether democratically elected governments have the ideological and political 
will, as well as widespread support, to change the constitutional settlements that 
constrain the transformation of communal land into individual freeholds. Are the 
chiefs powerful enough to continue their resistance to the ideological strength of 
capitalism? Will the powerful unelected chiefs get support from their subjects who 
have embraced democratic governance? The prospect for the security of communal 
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land ownership looks gloomy for a country that has become largely aid-dependent on 
external development agencies that seek to promote competitive market structures. 
However, under the fourth republic constitutional democracy, the government cannot 
reform matters affecting chieftaincy without the cooperation of chiefs.          
  
I move on to discuss how the consolidation of communal land ownership in the state 
(at least for now) has so far shaped the development of state agencies of land 
administration. I shall first discuss the development of the so-called ‘public sector’ 
organizational framework of land administration and then the complex ‘customary 
sector’ organizational framework of land administration.  
 
7.2 The Public Sector Organizational Framework of Land Administration 
 
The argument here is that the consolidation of historical political settlements of state 
authority over land ownership, more than any other factor, have shaped the creation 
of public sector agencies of land administration (or the public sector land agencies as 
they are commonly referred to). For the purposes of my analysis of the politics and 
outcomes of the LAP-PSLAs organizational reform, I shall focus my discussion on 
the six PSLAs that were involved in the reform. The six LAP-PSLAs are the Lands 
Commission, the OASL, the Town and Country Planning Department, the Land 
Valuation Board, the Survey Department, and the Land Title Registry. In fact, the 
term ‘public sector land agencies’ is used by the Ministry of Lands and Forestry to 
refer to these six agencies (MLF 2003; World Bank 2003c).   
 
Generally, Ghanaian scholars and political elites recognised the lack of inter-
organizational coordination of functions and cooperation that existed between the six 
PSLAs (Kasanga 2000a, 2000b; Kasanga and Kotey 2001; Larbi 2006; Somevi 
2001). In 1991, the Committee of Experts that drafted the 1992 Constitution had 
noted that there was “lack of effective coordination among the various agencies 
concerned with land management.”263 Kasanga and Kotey (2001:6) also wrote that 
“Indeed, departmental jealousy, bickering and lack of cooperation have characterised 
relations between these…institutions.” There is no gain emphasizing a problem that 
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everybody recognised. I argue that the problems existed due to the lack of legally 
enforceable institutions of horizontal accountability between the PSLAs to compel 
them to cooperate in the performance of their functions. In other words, the PSLAs 
functioned autonomously from the authority of each other.  
 
The six PSLAs existed by 1991. The question therefore is why the Committee of 
Experts that drafted the 1992 Constitution recognised the problem of lack of 
effective coordination among the various PSLAs and yet did not create effective 
institutions of horizontal accountability between the PSLAs. I argue that the political 
elites were more interested in creating state agencies of land administration that fulfil 
the obligations imposed on them by historical political settlements over land 
ownership, the authority of chiefs and the authority of government within the 
traditional-federal state. These historical political settlements shaped the creation of 
public sector agencies of land administration.   
 
For the purpose of this study, I shall group the origins of the PSLAs into three types. 
The first type is the ‘colonial originated agencies’ of land administration, which 
include the Survey Department (1907) and the Town and Country Planning 
Department (1945). The second type is the ‘constitution originated agencies’ of land 
administration, which include the Lands Commission (1969, 1979, and 1992) and 
the OASL (1979 and 1992). The third type is the ‘World Bank-Structural 
Adjustment Program (SAP) originated agencies’ of land administration, which 
include the Land Valuation Board (1986) and the Land Title Registry (1986). The 
origins and functions of the six PSLAs are discussed in turn.  
 
7.2.1 Colonial Originated Public Sector Land Agencies     
  
The colonially created agencies of land administration include the Survey 
Department and the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD). The TCPD 
had continued to operate mainly on the basis of its 1945 legal authority (CAP 84).
264
 
In 1993, in line with the decentralisation of local government to the district level, the 
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 The decentralisation of its functions became linked with the following legal instruments: National 
Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479), National Development Planning (Systems) 
Act, 1994 (Act 480), National Building Regulation, 1996 (LI 1630), and Local Government Act, 1993 
(Act 462). 
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TCPD was also decentralised as one of the departments of the District Assembly.
265
 
Prior to the LAP, the TCPD had decentralised its operations to 80 districts 
(WaterAid 2009). The TCPD however had a complex organizational structure. As a 
decentralised department under the District Assembly, the TCPD functioned under 
the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). At the 
national policy level, it was the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology 
(MEST) that had oversight responsibility over the operations of the TCPD. The 
TCPD was the only agency of land administration that was not under the Ministry of 
Lands and Forestry. In chapter 9, I shall discuss how the complex organizational 
structure of the TCPD somehow strengthened its resistance to be merged with the 
other PSLAs into a single agency of land administration.     
 
The Survey Department was originally created in 1907. When the 1925 Guggisburg 
Constitution was reformed in 1946, the Survey Department never again featured in 
the constitutional arrangements of the state.
 
Significantly, the Survey Department 
had lost its Lands Section in 1928 to the new Lands Department. The Lands 
Department also took over the registration of deeds and begun to play a prominent 
role in the increasing importance of land questions to both government and Chiefs.  
This shaped the path of bitter inter-departmental conflict between the two agencies 
(Somevi 2001). In the post-independent period, its legal existence was consolidated 
in 1962 by the Survey Act (Act 127). Its functions however remained almost the 
same; namely, to undertake geological, soil and land surveys. The only significant 
addition to its functions was the authority to license private surveyors to ensure that 
only qualified surveyors are employed to survey land.  
 
The important point is that the Survey Department and the TCPD continued to 
operate as independent agencies of land administration largely on the basis of their 
colonial functions. Notwithstanding the crucial technical roles that these two 
agencies played in land administration, the post-independent political elite rather 
created new agencies of land administration to accommodate their constitutionally 
negotiated conflicting interests in land ownership. I move on to discuss the new 
constitutionally created agencies of land administration.  
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7.2.2 Constitutionally Originated Public Sector Land Agencies: Managing the 
Conflicting Interests of Chiefs and Government 
 
I emphasize that the legacies of historical political settlements over land ownership, 
the authority of chiefs and the authority of government, more than anything else, 
shaped the creation of the Lands Commission and the Office of Administrator of 
Stool Lands (OASL). The historical political settlements date back to the 1949 
Coussey Committee. The political agreement of the Coussey Committee to 
consolidate stool land ownership meant that the conflicting interest of Chiefs and 
Government have to be managed by an appropriate agency of land administration. 
Moreover, the Coussey Committee agreement that stool land revenues should be 
shared between Chiefs and local government structures also called for an appropriate 
agency to manage the collection and sharing of the revenues. Managing these 
historical political settlements explain the origins of the Lands Commission and the 
OASL. I shall begin with the political emergence of the OASL.  
 
(i) The OASL and the Politics of Sharing Stool Land Revenues: The Legacy 
of the 1949 Coussey Committee Political Settlements.  
 
Despite the 1949 Coussey political settlement that stool land revenues should be 
shared between Chiefs and local government agencies, Chiefs and the CPP 
Government officials were unable to reach an agreement over how the revenues 
should be shared. In 1962, the Minister of Lands was given the authority to collect 
all stool land revenues which “includes all rents, dues, fees, royalties, revenues, 
levies, tributes and other payments, whether in the nature of income or capital, from 
or in connection with lands.”266 The revenue was put into a Stool Lands Account to 
be shared between local government agencies and Traditional Authorities, according 
to whatever formula was determined by the Minister as appropriate.
267
 The 
discretionary powers of the Minister in the sharing of the stool land revenues not 
only created conflicts between Chiefs and the CPP Government, but it also became a 
tool for rewarding and punishing Chiefs who supported or did not support the CPP 
(Austin 1964; Ninsin 1989; Rathbone 2000a).     
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Following the military overthrow of the CPP Government in 1966, the 1969 
constitutional makers decided that the collection and disbursement of stool land 
revenues should be undertaken by the Regional Councils.
268
 However, the 1969 
constitutional makers could not agree on any specific formula for sharing the stool 
land revenues. They could only recommend that: “Where any Stool, traditional 
authority, Council or District Council is dissatisfied with the apportionment 
determined by the Regional Council it may appeal to the Lands Commission which 
shall determine the issue taking into consideration the relative needs of the Stool, 
traditional authority or the Councils concerned.”269 Certainly, determining the 
relative needs of traditional authorities and local government agencies was bound to 
produce dissatisfaction and conflicts. The matter was therefore to be put on the 
reform agenda of the next constitutional designers.   
 
In 1979, the Third Republican state constitutional makers decided to establish the 
Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (OASL) to collect and disburse the stool 
land revenues between Chiefs and local government agencies.
270
 Crucially, the 
contentious politics surrounding the specific formula for sharing the stool land 
revenues could not be settled. Once again the matter was to be put on the agenda of 
the next politics of constitutional reform which occurred in 1991-1992.   
 
The 1992 Constitution makers succeeded in negotiating a mutually acceptable 
formula for the sharing of stool land revenues between Chiefs and local government 
agencies.
271
 The agreed formula is this: 10% of the revenue shall be paid to the 
OASL to cover administrative expenses, and the remaining 90% shall be disbursed 
in the following proportions – (i) 25% to the Stool through the traditional authority 
for the maintenance of the Stool in keeping with its status, (ii) 20% to the traditional 
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 Strangely, the Act of Parliament enacted in 1980 to establish the Lands Commission (Act 401) 
created the office of the OASL within the Lands Commission. It has been argued that the OASL could 
not survive without gaining access to the records and personnel of the Lands Commission because the 
Lands Commission also assumed the functions of deeds registration (Kasanga 2000, Kasanga and 
Kotey 2001, Somevi 2001). This technical marriage between the two constitutionally separate 
agencies later created inter-organizational conflicts when the OASL finally gained its organizational 
autonomy from the Lands Commission from 1994. 
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 According to Kasanga and Kotey (2001:4), prior to the 1992 Constitution, the PNDC Government 
distributed the stool land revenue as follows: (i) Stool - 10%, (ii) Traditional Council - 20%, (iii) 
Local Government Council - 60%, and (iv) OASL - 10% (for administrative expenses).  
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authority, and (iii) 55% to the District Assembly, within the area of authority of 
which the stool lands are situated.
272
  
 
Apart from the agreed formula for the sharing of stool land revenues and the 
administrative role of the OASL, it is clear that the language of the 1992 settlement 
originated from the 1949 Coussey Committee. It had taken 43 years for the Chiefs 
and non-chiefs political elite to finally reach a constitutional settlement over how 
stool land revenues should be shared between traditional authorities and local 
government agencies. Clearly, the 1949 Coussey Committee political settlement 
shaped the origins and functions of the OASL. Notwithstanding the country’s 
unstable historical path of governance, it appears that the political elite still had faith 
in constitutional settlements. For that matter, Chiefs and Government also sought to 
settle the historical legacies of their conflicting interests in land ownership through 
constitutional mechanisms.   
 
(ii) Lands Commission and the Politics of Compulsory Land Acquisition and 
Payment of Compensation to Chiefs.    
 
The failure of colonial powers to obliterate the powerful traditional states shaped the 
emergence of a new state in which both the new central Government and the 
traditional states had conflicting interests in the acquisition, ownership, and 
administration of stool land. The consolidation of stool land ownership in the 
Ghanaian state, as already discussed above, is the legacy of the traditional-federal 
state. The consolidation of that legacy called for an appropriate agential-organization 
that could manage the conflicting interests of Chiefs and Government in land. The 
Lands Commission was to be that state agency. The interesting political processes 
through which the Lands Commission evolved is what I discuss in turn.  
 
During the post-independent reign of the CPP Government, from 1957-1966, the 
Chiefs complained bitterly about the increasing tendency of the government to 
compulsorily acquire large acres of stool lands for state farms without compensation 
(Amanor 2001; Kasanga et al. 1996). The Chiefs were alarmed at extensive intrusion 
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of the CPP Government in the management of stool lands.
273
 The intrusion of the 
CPP Government into stool land administration violated the terms of the political 
settlement that limited the authority of government to interfere in matters affecting 
chieftaincy administration. Government was using its powers to gradually dismantle 
the historical political settlements that affirmed stool land ownership and guaranteed 
chieftaincy. Nkrumah’s government was overthrown by the military in 1966. 
 
When the country decided to return to constitutional democratic rule, the Chiefs and 
the non-chief political elites negotiated the creation of the Lands Commission in the 
1969 Constitution to perform the following responsibilities: (a) to manage the 
process of compulsory government acquisition of land and the payment of 
compensation; (b) to grant concurrence to stool land alienations; and (c) to manage, 
to the exclusion of any other person or authority, any land or minerals vested in the 
President, or in the Commission, or acquired by the Government.
274
 The 
constitutional makers however reaffirmed the historical political settlements that 
“All stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate Stool on behalf of, and in trust 
for, the subjects of the Stool.”275 The Secretariat of the colonially established Lands 
Department unofficially became the home of the Lands Commission (Kasanga and 
Kotey 2001). The second republican state lasted for only three years, and from 1972 
to 1979 the military once again seized political power to rule the country.  
 
When the third republic state was created in 1979, the constitutional makers re-
affirmed the role of the Lands Commission. Furthermore, it was decided that the 
administrative independence of the Lands Commission should be constitutionally 
insulated from government political interferences. The administrative control of the 
Lands Commission was therefore subject to only the Constitution and no other 
person or authority.
276
 Furthermore, the representatives of interest groups such as the 
National House of Chiefs, the Ghana Institution of Surveyors, and the Ghana Bar 
Association were included on the governing body of the Lands Commission.  
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122), and the State Lands Act, 1962 (Act 125).  
274
 1969 Constitution of Ghana, Articles 162-164. 
275
 1969 Constitution of Ghana, Articles 164(1). 
276
 1979 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, Article 189(7) 
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It is interesting to note that in the 1969 and 1979 Constitutions, the Lands 
Commission and the OASL were the only constitutionally established PSLAs. The 
reason, I have argued, is that Chiefs and the non-Chief ruling elite were more 
interested in consolidating their historical political gains. Although the overall 
political environment had proved to be very volatile to attacks from military coup 
makers, the non-military political elite still had faith in the endurance of 
constitutional settlements. The third republic state however lasted for only two years. 
It was overthrown in 1981 by the same military ruler, Jerry John Rawlings, who had 
handed over power to a democratically elected government in 1979.   
 
Jerry John Rawling’s PDNC military government ruled until 1992 when the country 
was returned to democratic rule under the 1992 fourth republic constitution. 
According to Kasanga and Kotey (2001:3), “in the mid-1980s, however, the Lands 
Department was officially turned into the Secretariat of the Lands Commission”; 
and, the Lands Commission “carried out all the day to day land administration 
functions” concerning deeds registration (ibid). It appears that the military politics 
that enabled the Lands Commission to capture the Lands Department and its Lands 
Registries did not legally transfer the assets and obligations of the Lands Registry to 
the Lands Commission. The military politics of organizational capture that took 
place appears to have been so successful that Ghanaian scholars with interest in land 
administration have not considered it necessary to delve into this process of 
organizational reform.
277
 In 2008, the “assets, obligations and rights” of both the 
Lands Commission and the Lands Registry would be transferred to a new Lands 
Commission. The politics of this organizational reform is discussed in chapter 9.   
 
The Committee of Experts that drafted the 1992 Constitution questioned the 
functional basis for the 1979 constitutional guarantee of the autonomy of the Lands 
Commission.
278
 The Committee of Experts made the following argument: 
 
Whatever the merits of autonomy in the abstract sense, it would seem unrealistic 
to insulate a vital economic agency from the entire apparatus of Government 
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 Report of the Committee of Experts (Constitution), Proposals for a draft Constitution of Ghana, 31 
July, 1991, paragraph 306. 
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concerned with the management of the economy. One of the serious impediments 
to effective land management in this country is the lack of co-ordination among 
the various agencies with responsibility in this area. In principle, a 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of any one of such institutions seems 
unrealistic.
279
 
  
The constitutional rule that guaranteed the autonomy of the Lands Commission was 
therefore removed and the authority of the Lands Commission was subjected to the 
authority of the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources. Interestingly, the 1992 
constitutional designers did not create any institutions of horizontal accountability 
between the Lands Commission, the OASL and the other related-related agencies. 
The Committee of Experts only urged the Lands Commission and the OASL to co-
operate with each other in the performance of their related functions.
280
  
 
In the absence of formally specified authoritative institutions of horizontal 
accountability between the PSLAs, it became impossible for the PSLAS to compel 
each other to cooperate in the performance in related functions. The question of how 
far the Minister of Lands and Forestry uses his ministerial authority to ensure inter-
organizational co-ordination of functions between unwilling autonomous public 
agencies is an age-old contentious subject in the field of public administration (Svara 
2008). In the opinion of Kasanga (2000a), the decision to subject the Lands 
Commission to the authority of the Minister of Lands mainly enhanced the sharing 
of public lands between the non-chief ruling elite.  
 
In a nutshell, it is clear that the creation of the OASL and the Lands Commission 
were shaped by the obligations imposed by historical political settlements of state 
authority over land ownership and the administration of stool land revenues. These 
settlements reflected the legacies of the traditional-federal state created in 1821-
1831. However, African state-makers consolidated the legacies of the traditional-
federal state and also created new path dependent processes concerning the 
administration of stool lands. Theoretically, it could be argued that the 
developmental obligations imposed by political settlements are more likely to be 
achieved if the conditions that shaped the political settlements are present or 
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sustained. The failure of governments to sustain the condition of constitutional 
democracy that shaped the 1949 Coussey Committee settlement over the sharing of 
stool land revenues prolonged the fulfilment of the terms of that settlement for a 
period of 43 years. It appears that the constant interventions of the military in 
Ghana’s democratic advancement have been developmentally costly. While the 
military governments truncated the path of constitutionally negotiated conditions for 
state development, they were unable to create alternatives that were acceptable to the 
majority of the non-military political elite. I move on to discuss the nature of the 
‘World Bank originated agencies’ of land administration that were established by the 
PNDC military government in 1986.  
   
7.2.3 World Bank Originated Public Sector Land Agencies: External 
Pressures for Reform of Customary Land Tenure into Freeholds 
 
I discuss here the origins and functions of the Land Valuation Board and the Land 
Title Registry created through World Bank sponsored neo-liberal economic reform 
programs in the 1980s. I analyse the functions of the Land Valuation Board and the 
Land Title Registry, both created in 1986, largely within the context of the World 
Bank sponsored land administration reform programs in the 1980s.  
  
(i) The Land Valuation Board: Property valuation and the payment of 
compensation for compulsory acquired lands  
 
One of the key areas on which the World Bank sponsored reforms focused was how 
to help the government generate enough internal revenue from property taxation 
(World Bank 1985). The PNDC Government was advised to merge into a single 
agency all the property valuation units scattered under various Ministries. This 
reform program produced the Land Valuation Board, under Section 43 of PNDC 
Law 42. The World Bank argued that “with budgetary and administrative autonomy, 
the LVB [Land Valuation Board] would provide a better vehicle for updating the tax 
base of Accra and other urban areas” (World Bank 1985:2). The main functions of 
the Land Valuation Board included: (i) the valuation of landed property for taxation 
and compulsory government acquisition, (ii) the preparation of valuation lists for 
purposes of property taxation by government; and (iii) the payment of compensation 
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for lands compulsorily acquired by government. The Land Valuation Board operated 
on its military legal foundations even when the country was returned to 
constitutional rule in 1992. The Board’s lack of an enabling legislative Act 
constrained the development of its human and material resource capacity and made it 
dependent on the resources of other PSLAs (Kasanga 2000a). 
 
When the Land Valuation Board took over the functions of the Lands Commission 
concerning the payment of compensation for land compulsorily acquired by 
government, the Board began to be served with legal suits against Government over 
the failure to pay compensation for compulsory acquired lands (Kasanga and Kotey 
2001). Professor Kasim Kasanga, chairman of the Land Valuation Board, from 1998-
2001, reported that “outstanding compensation claims owed by Government 
nationwide as at December 1999 was estimated at 800,000,000,000 cedis (US$110m 
at current rates of exchange)” (Kasanga and Kotey 2001:24). Unfortunately, “the 
Land Valuation Board has no legal staff of its own and has to rely on the stretched 
legal staff of Lands Commission and the Attorney General’s Department in all those 
cases” (Land Valuation Board 2008 Annual Report, Appendix D). The Land 
Valuation Board therefore always cooperates with the legal staff of the Lands 
Commission to map out strategies of defence at the Courts. In the absence of 
incentives for cooperation with the Lands Commission to perform related functions, 
officials of the Land Valuation Board sometimes argued that “the laws that govern 
the Lands Commission do not bind the Land Valuation Board” (Somevi 2001:17).281 
This shows that horizontal accountability between state agencies cannot be based on 
voluntary cooperation but on negotiated authoritative institutions.  
 
(ii) The Land Title Registry and Compulsory Land Title Registration 
 
The Land Title Registry was the new agency created to implement the Land Title 
Registration Law enacted by the PNDC Government in 1986. Kasanga (2000a) 
argues that the establishment of the land title registration system should have been 
built on the institutional foundations of the system of deeds registration. It appears 
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 The World Bank also reported that its sponsored property revaluation projects led by the Land 
Valuation Board, from 1994-2003, successfully achieved the project targets but encountered problems 
of coordinating the activities of the various land-related agencies (World Bank 2003e).  
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that historical legacies did not seem to matter to either the World Bank or the PNDC 
military government. The new organizational structure for the registration of land 
title became a complex process that involved the Land Title Registry, the Lands 
Commission, the Survey Department, and the Land Valuation Board and other 
agencies. Rebecca Sittie, Chief Registrar of Lands at the Land Title Registry, 
summarises the process of land title registration as follows:  
 
As part of the registration process the Survey Department is required to prepare a 
parcel/cadastral plan which is recorded in the records of the Survey Department 
and the Land Title Registry to prevent multiple registration. The plan is vital to 
the whole process. Until an applicant’s plan is received from the Survey 
Department, publication cannot be placed in the newspaper, a search cannot be 
conducted at the Lands Commission and there can be no spatial description in the 
Land certificate to be issued (Sittie 2006:5). 
 
The imperative for strong inter-organizational cooperation and coordination of 
functions between the agencies involved in land title registration cannot be over-
emphasized. Between 1991 and 1999, the World Bank sponsored the implementation 
of land titling pilot projects in two urban cities – Accra and Kumasi. The Land Title 
Registry was able to issue 1,200 land titles as against the target of 1,000 titles (World 
Bank 2000:7). In spite of the success, it was noted that “differences between the 
newly created land title registry and the old deeds registry hindered the progress of 
land titling activities” (World Bank 2000:6). According to the World Bank, the 
lessons from many World Bank sponsored land titling pilot projects provided 
government “the basis for initiating major land reforms, including the merger of the 
deeds and title registries” (World Bank 2000:10). The process of setting the agenda 
for a comprehensive reform was completed in 1999 when the National Land Policy 
was formulated by the Ministry of Lands and Forestry (Ministry of Land and 
Forestry 1999). The politics of National Land Policy making and the land 
administration reforms pursued are discussed in chapter 9.   
 
The development of public sector agencies of land administration is just one part of 
the story of land administration in the traditional-federal state. The other part 
concerns customary land administration controlled by organizations of chieftaincy. 
In the next chapter I analyse how the consolidation of the political settlements 
concerning land ownership and chieftaincy have constrained the development of 
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transparent and accountable institutions of customary land administration. It is clear 
that the unwavering commitments of political elites to historical settlements may 
enhance or constrain the development of an effective state.   
  
7.4 Conclusion: Political Settlements over State Organization Matter 
 
The consolidation of the legacy of communal land ownership now faces formidable 
opposition from internal and external forces of capitalism advocating the creation of 
individual freeholds. The development of an effective organizational framework for 
land title registration continues to be a reform agenda that is largely pushed by 
external development actors rather than by Ghanaian governments. Since the 1980s, 
the World Bank has strongly advocated the transformation of communal land into 
individual freeholds. Chiefs and governments have so far resisted reform.  
 
The legacies of the traditional-federal path of state organization have shaped the 
creation of public sector land administration agencies to manage the interests of 
traditional authorities, the non-chief ruling class, and citizens in land. The Lands 
Commission, the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands, and the Land Valuation 
Board all derive their functional existence from the consolidation of communal land 
ownership by the state. The consolidation of the political structures of chieftaincy, 
communal land ownership, and modern government, explains the origins of the 
above public sector land administration agencies. Chiefs and the non-chief political 
elites have demonstrated unwavering commitment to abide by their historical 
political settlements and develop appropriate agencies to manage their interests. The 
historical political settlements have both enabled and constrained the development of 
effective state agencies of land administration in the post-colonial period.  
 
The consolidation of stool land ownership, the authority of chiefs and the authority 
of government in the post-independent state led to the creation of the Lands 
Commission to manage the conflicting interest of Chiefs and Government. Similarly, 
the Land Valuation Board was created to manage the payment of compensation for 
communal lands compulsorily acquired by government. The OASL also emerged in 
direct response to the 1949 Coussey Committee political settlement over the sharing 
of stool land revenues between Chiefs and government. The theoretical significance 
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of these findings is that developmental obligations imposed by constitutionally 
negotiated political settlements are more likely to be pursued, and achieved, by the 
Ghanaian political elites if the constitutional settlement is sustained.   
 
The study makes an interesting finding that developmental intentions and obligations 
negotiated between political elites under conditions of constitutional democracy are 
more likely to be achieved if the conditions of constitutional democracy are 
sustained. The failure of the political elites to sustain colonial conditions of 
constitutional democracy appears to be the main reason why it took 43 years for the 
chiefs and non-chief political elites to finally reach agreement over how to share 
stool land revenues between chiefs, local communities, and local government 
agencies. In spite of constant military interventions in government, the non-military 
political elites are still committed to their colonial democratic agreements.  
 
It should however be noted that the sustainability of political settlements within the 
organizational sphere of land administration is dependent on the stability of the 
entire state. The failure of political ruling elites to meet their economic 
developmental obligations to citizens might result in interventions from internal or 
external actors that threaten the stability of political settlements within the sphere of 
land administration. In the next chapter I show how the failure of chiefs to develop 
the largely informal institutions in the organizational sphere of chieftaincy – without 
the intervention of government as historically agreed – has affected transparent and 
accountable customary land administration.  
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Chapter 8 
 
The Organization of Chieftaincy in the Post-Colonial State and the Politics of 
Customary Sector Land Administration: 1957-2000 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the role of chieftaincy in stool land administration. The 
informal-legal institutions of chieftaincy simultaneously complement and substitute 
for formal-legal institutions concerning land administration. Particularly I will show 
that the informal rules of customary law integrated into the laws of Ghana tend to 
substitute for formal-legal institutions of accountability that seek to hold chiefs 
responsible for the performance of their fiduciary functions in stool land 
administration. Although chiefs continue to emphasize the need for governments to 
support the ascertainment and codification of the rules of customary law, 
governments have not responded. It is therefore difficult to ensure transparency and 
accountability in customary land administration. Moreover, in the absence of formal-
legal rules specifying how chiefs are to use stool land revenues, it has become 
difficult for both the courts and Audit Service to ensure effective transparency and 
accountability in traditional governance. My objective is to show how state 
integration and consolidation of the institutions of chieftaincy have mattered in 
shaping the role of chiefs in land administration. 
 
The chapter is divided into five sections. It begins with a discussion of how 
institutions of chieftaincy have been integrated into the Ghanaian state. I also discuss 
the formal role of chiefs in stool land administration. Second, I discuss the nature of 
state integration of customary law. Third, I discuss some attempts made by the 
political elites to develop horizontal institutions of accountability to govern the 
fiduciary role of chiefs in communal land administration. Fourth, I discuss how the 
failure of governments and traditional authorities to effectively reform informal rules 
of customary law has constrained transparency and accountability in communal land 
administration. I conclude that the path towards the creation of accountable 
institutions of chieftaincy for stool land administration lies in effective cooperation 
between government, chiefs and other actors with interests in land administration.  
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8.1 State Integration of Formal Organizations of Chieftaincy 
 
At the dawn of independence on 6 March 1957, the formal organizations of 
chieftaincy that had been developed and integrated into the state were the State 
Councils, the Provincial Councils, and the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs. These 
local, regional, and national organizations of chieftaincy were largely innovated by 
chiefs and their local communities. Today, these formal organizations of chieftaincy 
have been consolidated in the state under new names. The State Councils are now 
known as Traditional Councils, the Provincial Councils are now known as Regional 
Houses of Chiefs, and the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs have metamorphosed 
into the National House of Chiefs. The major difference between the colonial and the 
post-colonial periods is that these formal organizations of chieftaincy no longer elect 
their representatives into Parliament. However, they continue to exercise important 
judicial, administrative, and political statutory functions that I discuss below. 
 
There are 196 Traditional Councils of Chiefs that have been given original 
jurisdiction to hear and determine matters affecting Chiefs who are below the rank of 
a Paramount Chief.
282
 Above the Traditional Councils are 10 Regional Houses of 
Chiefs with original and appellate jurisdiction to hear and determine chieftaincy 
disputes.
283
 Each Regional House of Chiefs also appoints a representative to the 
Lands Commission that manages lands acquired by Government within the region.
284
 
A Regional House of Chiefs also elects two of its members to the Regional Co-
ordinating Council which is responsible for the co-ordination and direction of the 
administrative machinery in the region.
285
 Above the Regional House of Chiefs is the 
National House of Chiefs made up of five Paramount Chiefs elected from each 
Regional House of Chiefs. The National House of Chiefs supervises the activities of 
the Regional House of Chiefs and the Traditional Councils. The National House of 
Chiefs has representation on the governing Board of the Lands Commission.
286
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The 50-member National House of Chiefs has been given original and appellate 
jurisdiction in any cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.
287
 Cases determined by the 
National House of Chiefs can only be appealed at the level of the Supreme Court 
(Brobbey 2008; Kludze 1998, 2000).
288
 It is important to emphasize that outside the 
judicial committees of the Traditional Councils, the Regional Houses of Chiefs, and 
the National House of Chiefs only the Supreme Court has final appellate jurisdiction 
over all matters concerning chieftaincy. Chieftaincy in Ghana therefore wields 
statutory authority within the judicial system of the state.    
 
Chiefs are also somewhat connected to the highest level political decision-making by 
the Presidential-Executive. In policy decision-making, as well as in the appointment 
of many high level political positions within the state, the Presidential-Executive is 
advised by a 25-member Council of State of which the President of the National 
House of Chiefs is an automatic ex-officio member.
289
 Usually, many of the members 
of the Council of State are Chiefs who have been elected by their Regional Co-
ordinating Councils to represent the region on the Council of State. And through the 
Council of State Chiefs influence policy decisions of the Presidential-Executive. 
 
Crucially, due to the history of political conflicts between Chiefs and the non-Chief 
ruling elite, the Presidential-Executive and Parliament cannot reform matters 
concerning chieftaincy without the cooperation of Chiefs (Brobbey, 2008). The 
constitutional veto points specify that “Parliament shall have no power to enact any 
law which (a) confers on any person or authority the right to accord or withdraw 
recognition to or from a chief for any purpose whatsoever; or (b) in any way detracts 
or derogates from the honour and dignity of the institution of chieftaincy.”290 The 
authority of the Legislature is further constrained in Article 106(3) of the 
Constitution which states that “A bill affecting the institution of chieftaincy shall not 
be introduced in Parliament without prior reference to the National House of 
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Chiefs.” The National House of Chiefs thus functions as a quasi-Second Chamber of 
legislature.
291
 The political implications of these constitutional constraints are that 
the successful reform of stool or customary land administration cannot be achieved 
by any democratically elected Government without the cooperation of Chiefs.  
  
The organization of state-chieftaincy relations in the fourth republic constitution 
consolidated the crucial political settlements that underpinned the formation of the 
traditional-federal state during the colonial era. A Supreme Court judge, Justice S.A 
Brobbey, commented that the constitution not only entrenches institutions of 
chieftaincy, but, more crucially, “takes away the power of the government or 
Parliament to control chiefs” (Brobbey 2008:3). From the lowest level of local 
communities to the highest level of the Presidential-Executive, we can see that 
organizations of Chiefs (Traditional Councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and the 
National House of Chiefs) have significant state authority and power to shape 
support for or resistance to Government policies concerning land administration.  
 
In light of the constitutional authority and power of Traditional Councils, Regional 
Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs within the state, the view of 
Kludze (2000:556) that “the Constitution does not provide for a formal position for 
the institution of chieftaincy or for chiefs as part of the organs of national 
government” does not reflect the reality of state organization. Moreover, Kludze’s 
view that “the chiefs do not share power with the executive, the legislature or the 
judiciary” (ibid) is untenable. The formal authority of chieftaincy within the 
judiciary system is taken more seriously by other legal scholars (Brobbey 2008; 
Kunbour 2002). I turn next to discuss the role of chieftaincy in land administration. 
 
8.2.1 Is There a Formal Role for Chiefs in Stool Land Administration? 
 
Defining the specific functions or mandates of Chiefs in customary land 
administration within the state is important in knowing exactly what specific 
responsibilities Chiefs could be held to account for, and to whom they are to account. 
Interestingly, none of the four republican Constitutions categorically defines the 
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authority of Chiefs to manage or administer stool lands. The 1992 constitutional 
position is that “All stool lands in Ghana shall vest in the appropriate stool on behalf 
of, and in trust for the subjects of the stool in accordance with customary law and 
usage.”292 The affirmation of land ownership is however not synonymous with the 
formal definition of the responsibilities of Chiefs in stool land administration.  
 
Kotey et al. (2004:39) point out that “It is difficult to reconcile the notion of stools, 
families and individuals owning land and managing it from day to day, whilst the 
government and its officials control important decisions affecting the land, including 
the collection and disbursement of the income accruing from their land.” Perhaps, 
one can logically assume that the rules and actors of chieftaincy, as established in 
accordance with the rules of customary law for the purpose of stool land 
administration, are constitutionally guaranteed within the state.
293
 Chiefs are not 
constitutionally constrained from performing their functions of managing Stool land 
on behalf of their subjects within the confines of the rules of customary law.  
 
It should also be emphasized that Governments have also not been constitutionally 
constrained from creating agencies of land administration in public sector to 
administer Stool lands. In fact, the formal organizations of chieftaincy – Traditional 
Councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and National House of Chiefs – and the so-
called public sector agencies of land administration – particularly, the Lands 
Commission and the OASL – are in constant conflict over matters concerning the 
administration of stool lands. The conflicts largely stem from the fact that the 
authority of chiefs in stool land administration has not been outlined within the 
constitution or in any legislative enactment. The public sector organizational 
framework of land administration controlled by government shall be discussed later.  
 
In a nutshell, the institutions and actors of chieftaincy have been integrated into the 
state but the informal functions of Chiefs in Stool land administration have not been 
formally defined in the state. Within the state, Chiefs are legitimately authorised by 
their subjects to manage stool lands on behalf of the entire community, in accordance 
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with the unwritten rules of customary law guaranteed within the state. The nature of 
the rules of customary law in Ghana is discussed next. 
 
8.3 Informal Institutions of Chieftaincy: Who Defines Customary Law? 
 
There is no doubt among Chiefs, the Courts, and legal scholars that the laws of 
Ghana include the rules of customary law that organizes chieftaincy in specific local 
communities. After the dawn of independence in 1957, if anyone was still in doubt 
about the legal status of customary law in the state, then all the four republican 
Constitutions that followed the 1957 Constitution categorically emphasized that the 
laws of Ghana include the rules of customary law applicable to particular 
communities.
294
 Moreover, it is also stated categorically that “the land law of Ghana 
is the customary law and no other law.”295 The unsettled question is what exactly is 
customary law? It is important that we know the answer to this question before we 
attempt to understand the nature of the rules that the LAP project tried to create to 
govern the administration of land by the CLS.  
 
Political elites and legal scholars in the newly independent Ghana were fully aware 
of “a problem common to Ghana and to other emergent African states with a legacy 
of imperial and colonial laws; namely, the relationship between those laws and the 
customary laws of the country.”296 Knowing the problem is one thing; and finding an 
appropriate solution to deal with the problem is another thing. The official definition 
of ‘customary law’ was to lay the foundation for “official legal pluralism” (Crook et 
al. 2007:26) in the ascertainment of customary law.  
 
In 1960, Mr. Ofori Atta, then Minister of Local Government, presented to the 
Constituent Assembly the Interpretation Bill that sought to define, among other 
concepts, the meaning of customary law. The Bill stipulated that the rules of 
customary law that had been assimilated by the Courts shall prevail over any 
informal rule of customary law, in the case of inconsistency.
297 
 Mr Ofori Atta 
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explained that this legal approach to the ascertainment of customary law “envisages 
the development of a distinctive common law of Ghana embracing rules of 
customary law suitable for general application.”298 But after Mr Ofori Atta’s 
presentation, the legal implications of the Bill were not understood by every Member 
of the Constituent Assembly. Mr. Abayifaa Karbo, the Member representing the 
Lawra Nandom local community, outlined his confusion to the Minister as follows:  
 
It will appear that we will have to get the Courts Act of 1960, which this House 
has not at present, before we will be able at least to discuss this Bill properly. At 
present we do not know what that Act contains. The position is that we have to 
administer our customary rules in so far as they are not contrary to equity. But, as 
it is, we do not know whether the provision in the existing Courts Ordinance will 
be included in the Courts Act. … As it is, it is very difficult to debate the whole 
Bill, because we do not know what rules are contained in the Courts Act, and how 
the rule is to be considered as an assimilated rule so as to enable it to prevail over 
the ordinary customary law obtaining in say, Lawra.
299
  
 
Even if all the rules contained in the Courts Act were made available to Mr. Karbo, 
he would not have found any of the assimilated rules of customary law that operated 
within Lawra. The reality was that the assimilated rules existed in scattered 
documents of Court rulings. Thus, it was the turn of Mr. Ofori Atta to be confused 
by Mr. Karbo’s understanding of the new statute. Mr. Ofori Atta responded: 
 
It is difficult for me to understand the point raised by the Hon. Member. The 
interpretation Bill is in short a legal dictionary. … ‘While any of the statutes of 
general application continue to apply by virtue of the Courts Act, 1960 they shall 
be treated as if they formed part of the Common law,…prevailing over any rule 
thereof other than an assimilated rule.’ I do not see why that, in any way, raises 
any sort of problem in his understanding of this Interpretation Bill.
300
 
 
Generally, Chiefs and other traditional authorities do not agree that the authoritative 
expositions of the Courts on specific rules of customary law are what should prevail. 
It appears that the Interpretation Act sought to extinguish the authority, legitimacy, 
and power of Chiefs to make new rules of customary law or modify existing ones. 
Chiefs and other traditional authorities cleave to their own knowledge of specific 
rules of customary law, as well as their power to modify existing rules.   
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According to the 1992 Constitution, “‘customary law’ means the rules of law which 
by custom are applicable to particular communities in Ghana. …including those 
determined by the Superior Court of Judicature.”301 Clearly, the rules of customary 
law are not exhaustive of those determined by the Superior Court of Judicature (High 
Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court). However, it appears that the 
lawyers and judges have cleaved to their rules. According to the 1993 Courts Act 
(Act 459), “Any question as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law is 
a question of law for the court and not a question of fact.”302 Interestingly, other sub-
sections of the Courts Act (Act 459) appear to contradict the entrenched view that 
the ascertainment of a rule of customary law is a question of law. The contradictory 
sub-sections stipulate the following: 
 
If there is doubt as to the existence or content of a rule of customary law relevant 
in any proceedings before a court, the court may adjourn the proceedings to 
enable an inquiry to be made …The court may request a House of Chiefs, 
Divisional or Traditional Council or other body with knowledge of the customary 
law in question to state its opinion which may be laid before the inquiry in 
written form.
303
 
  
The above statements indicate a lack of certainty about the rules of customary law 
even within the Courts. Text-books cannot be considered as statements of law or 
rules of customary law assimilated by the Courts. Moreover, the recourse to 
Traditional Councils and other organizations of chieftaincy is not consistent with the 
view that there exist out there in the Courts uncontroversial principles of customary 
law applicable to local communities. While organizations of chieftaincy are clearly 
recognised as having original knowledge of customary law in local communities, as 
well as their authority to reform customary laws found to be inconsistent with the 
times, lawyers and judges have followed their assimilated versions of customary law 
(Asante 1975; Kludze 1987; Kunbour 2002).  
 
The result is that there are now two types of customary law operating in Ghana. They 
are (a) the judicial customary law and (b) the practised customary law (Crook et al. 
2007; Kludze 1987). Kludze (1987:108) offers a comprehensive definition of these 
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two types of customary law as follows: “The practised customary law consists of the 
rules of customary law sanctioned by general acceptance and long usage of the 
general populace of a community and which have crystallised over the years and are 
binding as rules of law”; and, “The judicial customary law is the body of rules, 
purportedly rules of ‘customary’ law, applied by the courts of the regular court 
system established under the various Courts Ordinances and Courts Acts.” In other 
words, the judicial customary law are the formal rules purportedly derived by the 
Courts from the informal rules practiced in local communities. 
 
The problem is that while the ‘practised customary law’ changes in response to new 
ideas and practices in society, the lawyers and judges in the Courts cleave to the 
static ‘judicial customary law’. Legal scholars have observed that the Courts are very 
reluctant to enforce conflicting rules of ‘practised customary law’ “although the 
judicial customary law has often been wrong” (Kludze 1987:108). The Courts 
regarded their static expositions of customary law as authoritative and binding on 
traditional authorities and local communities. Later I will show how the prevailing 
conflict and contradictions between the two legal perspectives of customary law 
impacted on the effort of the LAP to help chiefs create transparent and accountable 
formal organizations of customary land administration. 
 
The 2008 Chieftaincy Act (Act 759) provides the legal processes for the formal 
organizations of chieftaincy to voluntarily assimilate informal rules of customary law 
into the formal system of common law.
304
 If a Traditional Council considers that an 
informal rule of customary law in force within its area is uncertain, and “considers it 
desirable that it should be modified or assimilated by the common law”,305 the legal 
processes of assimilation are as follows. The Traditional Council drafts a declaration 
of what in its opinion is the customary rule and makes a representation on the matter 
to its Regional House of Chiefs which in turn considers the declaration and submits 
the final accepted draft to the National House of Chiefs. Where the National House 
of Chiefs is satisfied that the draft submitted is a correct statement of the customary 
rule in question, it submits a written request to the Minister of Chieftaincy that the 
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customary law rule be given effect in the local area concerned. The Minister, after 
consultations with the Attorney-General, may cause a Legislative Instrument (LI) to 
be passed by Parliament to give effect to the rule of customary law in question. If the 
draft LI is passed by Parliament, the rule of custom is referred to as a Common law 
rule of customary origin. It must be added that, almost always, an Act of Parliament 
requires presidential assent.  
 
Through the same legal processes of assimilation of informal rules of customary law, 
the existing rules of customary law – whether formal or informal – can be altered by 
Traditional Councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs. 
The National House of Chiefs is authorised to “undertake the progressive study, 
interpretation and codification of customary law with the view to evolving, in 
appropriate cases, a unified system of rules of customary law, and compiling the 
customary laws and lines of succession applicable to each Stool.”306 The problem is 
that the above agencies of chieftaincy have continued to back their 1927 demand that 
governments should provide technical and financial assistance for the codification of 
informal rules of customary law. However, it appears that governments have refused 
to back down on the historical political settlement that the internal organization of 
chieftaincy is entirely the business of the traditional state or locality concerned.  
 
At the inception of the LAP-CLS project in 2003, none of the 196 Traditional 
Councils in the country had formally declared or codified the rules of customary law 
governing customary land tenure administration in their local communities. The 
question is whether the time-bound LAP-CLS project had enough time to patiently 
go through the long legal processes of ascertainment and declaration of uncertain 
rules of customary law in local communities concerning stool or family land 
administration. In the absence of any set of codified rules that specify the fiduciary 
responsibilities of chiefs in stool land administration, one cannot expect to have any 
transparent, secure, and accountable system of stool land administration. As at 2010, 
only 11 out of the 196 Traditional Councils had successfully codified and declared 
their rules of customary law concerning the political succession, installation, and 
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destoolments of Chiefs.
307
 The rules of customary law governing stool land 
administration in those 11 traditional areas are yet to be declared.  
 
In sum, under the fourth republic constitution of Ghana, government does not have 
the authority to reform institutions of chieftaincy without the cooperation of Chiefs. 
This constitutional rule that limits the power of government to reform chieftaincy is 
nothing new. It is only a consolidation of the political settlements negotiated 
between chiefs and the non-chief ruling class since colonial rule. It has been one of 
the key pillars of the traditional-federal state. Today, the customary obligations of 
Chiefs to manage stool lands on behalf of their subjects are discharged through 
informal rules of customary law that obstruct legal certainty, transparency and 
accountability. Chiefs rightly argue that the internal organization of political 
relations between traditional authorities and their local communities are entirely the 
business of the traditional state or locality concerned, and the people should be left to 
settle their chieftaincy problems according to their own customs without any 
government interference. Governments have also been reluctant to provide the 
resources for the reform of chieftaincy. Informal state institutions of chieftaincy for 
stool land administration have remained undeveloped. In this dual system of state 
authority, the extent to which traditional authorities can be compelled by local 
communities, and state agencies of horizontal accountability, to account for their 
stewardship of communal land is left to anybody’s guess. I move on to discuss some 
limited reforms that have been attempted by political elites.  
 
8.4 Military and Constitutional Politics over the Accountability of  Chiefs 
 
The fiduciary responsibility of chiefs in stool land administration is derived from the 
constitutional rules of the Ghanaian state. There have been general demands that 
chiefs should account for their fiduciary responsibility over the management of stool 
land alienations and stool land revenues. I have already discussed how the 
organizations of chieftaincy were separated from the local government system and 
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lost the formal-legal rules of accountability, prior to the post-independent era. The 
issue of accountability of chiefs to their subjects however continues to draw the 
attention of government and constitutional makers. Military and democratic 
approaches have been used at different times to ensure the accountability of chiefs.   
 
In 1985, the military government of the Provincial National Defence Council 
(PNDC) backed its revolutionary cry of “Probity and Accountability”308 by issuing a 
decree that traditional authorities should be accountable to their local communities 
for their fiduciary roles. Interestingly, the accountability decree that was issued, 
PNDC Law 114, focused on only Heads of extended families and not Chiefs. 
According the Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 114): 
 
A head of family or a person who is in possession or control of, or has custody of, 
a family property is accountable for that property to the family to which the 
property belongs. A head of family or a person who is in possession or control of, 
or has custody of, a family property shall take and file an inventory of the family 
property. Where a head of family fails or refuses to render account or file an 
inventory of the family property, a member of the family to which that property 
belongs who has or claims to have a beneficial interest in the property, may apply 
by motion to a Court for an order compelling the head of family to render account 
or file an inventory of the family property to the family.
309
 
 
The PNDC military ruling elite clearly recognised that informal customary rules of 
authority commonly fail to enable individual family members to effectively hold 
their traditional authorities accountable. Without recourse to the view that 
governments – whether military or democratic – uphold the historical political 
settlements that guarantee the legitimacy, authority, and quasi-autonomy of Chiefs 
within the Ghanaian state, it would be difficult to explain why the law was targeted 
at only family heads without extending it to Chiefs. Crucially, the ‘Head of Family 
Accountability’ decree went beyond empowering individual family members to 
empower the Courts to order the accountability of head of families as follows:     
 
A Court may make an order compelling the head of family to render account or 
file an inventory in respect of the family properties in the possession, control or 
custody of the head as the Court may specify in the order.
 310
 
                                                 
308
 Contained in the preamble of the 1992 Constitution.  
309
 The Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 114), Sections 1-2 
310
 The ‘Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 114), Section 3   
229 
The Head of Family Accountability law marked a significant development in 
attempts by the non-chief political elites to hold traditional authorities accountable in 
the administration of communal property, particularly land. The Courts were now 
empowered as an agency of horizontal accountability to enforce informal rules of 
customary law that required family heads to be accountable to their members. But 
the arms of this new law could only reach family heads, not the powerful chiefs.  
 
Prior to PNDCL 114, the Courts, following their own ‘judicial customary law’, 
provided immunity to family heads and Chiefs from accountability. The classical 
entrenched ‘judicial customary law’ developed by the Ghanaian Courts regarding the 
accountability of Chiefs to their subjects was this: “It is an accepted principle of 
Native Customary Law that neither a chief nor the head of a family can be sued for 
account either of state or family funds.”311 The Subjects of an unaccountable Chief 
who find informal rules of customary law to be ineffective neither found the Courts 
to be effective agents of horizontal accountability. It is for this reason that the PNDC 
Law 114 emphasized that the head of family is accountable “Despite a law to the 
contrary.”312 It appears that politics was in command in defining the rules of 
accountability that should be enforced by the judiciary. But has the judiciary been 
willing to let go of their ‘judicial customary law’ that granted immunity to Chiefs?   
 
From the many World Bank sponsored structural adjustment reforms, the PNDC 
government had learnt many lessons to shape their conviction that the creation and 
maintenance of developmental state institutions of accountability occurs through 
political processes and not through judicial processes. The PNDC government 
therefore extended its revolutionary cry of ‘Probity and Accountability’ into the 
politics of fourth republic constitution making. The ‘Directive Principles of State 
Policy’ outlined in the 1992 Constitution included the following: 
  
                                                 
311
 Abude v. Onano (1946) 12 W.A.C.A. 102, 104 (quoted from Ollenu 1962). Some of the favourite 
judicial cases used by lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to support the view that individual members 
of land owning communities have no locus standi to sue the head of family or chief includes the 
following: Pappoe v. Kweku (1924) F.C. 23-25, 158; Nelson v. Nelson (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215; 
Mahamadu v. Zenua (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172, 175; Koran v. Dokyi (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78, 80. Many 
other cases are provided by Ollenu (1962).   
312
 The Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 114), Sections 1-2 
230 
The State shall recognise that ownership and possession of land carry a social 
obligation to serve the larger community and, in particular, the State shall 
recognise that the managers of public, stool, skin and family lands are fiduciaries 
charged with the obligation to discharge their functions for the benefit 
respectively of the people of Ghana, of the stool, skin, or family concerned and 
are accountable as fiduciaries in that regard.
313
  
 
The commitment to ensure accountability now went beyond family heads to 
explicitly include Chiefs who manage stool lands on behalf of their subject. The state 
took a step forward although the internal rules of customary law within organizations 
of chieftaincy remained uncodified. If the Courts are willing to embrace their role in 
Ghana’s developing democracy, then it appeared that the ruling elite had provided 
the launch pad for the Courts to become effective agents of horizontal accountability, 
in matters concerning the administration of land by family heads and Chiefs.  
 
The complex 1992 constitutional settlements both enabled and constrained the 
accountability of traditional authorities. On one hand, the 1992 constitutional makers 
appeared to have recognised that the informal institutional environment of 
chieftaincy constrained the accountability of chiefs to their subjects. On the other 
hand, the Chiefs appeared to have recognised the creeping steps of government into 
matters concerning the internal organization of chieftaincy. The Chiefs therefore 
successfully negotiated constitutional veto points to insulate themselves from the 
powers of the Presidential-Executive and Parliament. The question that I examine 
next is whether the external formal rules that compel Chiefs to be accountable have 
enhanced the powers of the relevant state agencies of horizontal accountability in 
enforcing the accountability of Chiefs to their subjects in stool land administration.  
 
8.5 Chieftaincy and Horizontal Accountability within the State 
 
I argue that the internal informal rules of customary law within chieftaincy have 
largely constrained the horizontal accountability of Chiefs to these relevant state 
agencies, in the context of stool land administration. I examine below the relations of 
horizontal accountability between organizations of chieftaincy and three state 
agencies, namely, the OASL, the Courts and the Auditor-General’s Department. 
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8.5.1 The OASL as an Agency of Horizontal Accountability 
 
The OASL is best placed to ensure the accountability of Chiefs in stool land 
administration. However, the institutional relationship of accountability between the 
OASL and Chiefs is an interesting one-way traffic. In the previous chapter I 
discussed fully the origins and functions of the OASL. Here, I emphasize the 
important fact that the OASL is constitutionally mandated to collect and disburse 
into the Stool Land Accounts of local communities all relevant rents, dues, royalties, 
revenues or other payments. Moreover, the OASL is obliged to make available to the 
relevant stools “all relevant information and data”314 as well as yearly “statement of 
revenue and expenditure”315 concerning its administration of the stool land revenues.  
 
Chiefs therefore have the legal authority to demand accountability from the OASL. 
Chiefs know that formal institutions of administration are the surest way to promote 
the accountability of the OASL. However, the OASL has not been given any such 
authority to hold Chiefs accountable in how the stool land revenues are used in local 
communities. The OASL only disburses the rents, dues, royalties and other stool 
revenues that it collects into the stool land account of the appropriate stools. The 
OASL is therefore accountable to Chiefs but not vice versa. The furthest that OASL 
can go is to “consult with the stools and other traditional authorities in all matters 
relating to the administration and development of stool land”.316 Interestingly, in the 
next chapter, I discuss how the Chiefs strangely joined forces with the Lands 
Commission to demand the demise of the OASL. Let us see how the Courts have 
also fared as agents of horizontal accountability for Chiefs.  
 
8.5.2 The Court as an Agency of Horizontal Accountability 
 
Every state requires an effective judiciary system to ensure that all actors abide by 
the legal rules of the state – whether the rules are customary laws or common laws. 
The effective functioning of the Courts in enforcing the accountability of Chiefs is a 
matter that is rarely discussed by Ghanaian non-legal scholars. Legal scholars in 
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Ghana are fully aware that informal rules of customary law do not provide credible 
restraints on the actions of Chiefs (Asante 1985; Brobbey 2008; Kludze 1987, 1998). 
However, as I have discussed above, until recently, the Courts provided family heads 
and Chiefs with judicial immunity from accountability.  
 
Following the military intervention of the PNDC government in the enactment of the 
Head of Family Accountability Law in 1985, the position of the Courts appears to be 
changing. In December 1991, some citizens of the Kumawu Traditional Area, “as 
representatives of the oman or the Kumawu State”,317 finally succeeded in getting an 
order of the Supreme Court to compel their Chief (the Kumawuhene) to account for 
money paid to him by Government as compensation for the compulsory acquisition 
of Kumawu stool lands. More significantly, the Supreme Court emphasized: 
 
The fear of embarrassment to a chief should not be the ground for a chief not to 
account when a genuine demand for an account is made by his subjects ... It was 
Mensah Sarbah who enunciated the principle of immunity of the head of family 
from accountability which was later extended to cover occupants of stools. Now 
that by the Head of Family (Accountability) Law, 1985 (PNDCL 114), a head of 
family is made accountable to his family, I would recommend a similar law to be 
made by the legislature to cover occupants of stools.
318
 
 
Without the intervention of the PNDC government in 1985, it might have been very 
difficult for the citizens of Kumawu to get the Supreme Court to overturn an earlier 
decision by the Court of Appeal that the citizens had no locus standi to sue their 
Chief and Kingmakers (Brobbey 2008). One should also not lose sight of the fact 
that the Supreme Court has also urged Governments to make a law that governs the 
accountability of Chiefs in matters concerning stool land administration. The 
implication of that is that developmental institutions of accountability are created 
through political processes and not judicial processes.  
 
Some legal scholars have pointed out that while the subjects of a Chief might 
succeed in getting a Court order to compel their Chief to account for stool land 
revenues, the informal nature of the rules of customary law poses many practical 
challenges of enforcement (Kludze 1987). The expenditure of Chiefs is not approved 
                                                 
317
 Owusu and others v. Agyei and others [1991] 2 GLR 493 – 517.  
318
 Owusu and others v. Agyei and others [1991] 2 GLR 493 – 517.   
  
233 
by any state agency and therefore the Chief and his elders have unfettered discretion 
to spend stool land revenues as they wish. Kludze (1987:115), in his analysis of the 
implications of the Head of Family Accountability Law, outlines the following 
problems that the Courts might face:  
 
Our courts apply legal principles of accounting which are based upon and are 
derived from the rules and practices of English courts. There is, therefore, inherent 
in this a difficulty of reconciling the English practice with the established 
principles of the Ghanaian customary law. The incompatibility lies in the conflict 
between the unfettered discretion of the head of family in the handling of family 
property on the one hand, and on the other hand, the right of the applicant to 
challenge the state of account. … The court will have to determine which of the 
contentious items of expenditure or disbursement of family property should be 
disallowed. … Whether it is desirable to substitute the wisdom of the judge for the 
discretion of the head of family is an issue which may lend itself to debate (ibid).   
 
The above emphasizes the point that without formal-legal rules of accountability that 
specifies the mandates, rewards, and sanction mechanisms governing positions of 
public trust, it would be almost impossible to hold public authorities accountable for 
their actions. Not even the Courts would have the power to restrain “an avaricious 
chief, with the assent of venial elders, [from] effectively alienating tribal lands for 
personal gain or some temporary enrichment.”319 The Courts and the Chiefs know 
that informal-legal rules constrain the accountability of public agents.  
 
It is not only the OASL and the Courts that find themselves constrained by informal 
rules of customary law. I briefly show below how the informal rules of customary 
law similarly constrain the Audit Service Department in the performance of its 
constitutional mandate of auditing the revenue and expenditure Traditional Councils, 
Regional Houses of Chiefs and the National House of Chiefs. 
 
8.5.3 The Auditor-General as an Agency of Horizontal Accountability  
 
Here, the crucial point is that it is impossible to effectively audit the revenue and 
expenditure of chieftaincy within an informal institutional context. The initial 
institutional relations of accountability between the Audit service and chiefs were 
laid under the 1944 Native Authority system of local government. When chieftaincy 
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became separated from Local Authorities from 1951, the State Councils continued to 
function as a state agency of administration in local communities. The Audit Service 
has continued to audit the revenue and expenditure of Traditional Councils but 
within an informal institutional context where the stool land revenues and 
expenditure of Traditional Councils are no longer subject to the approval of any state 
agency. The implications for the effective auditing of the expenditure of Chiefs in an 
informal institutional environment need not be over-emphasized. I examine below 
how the Auditor-General has fared with his authority to hold chiefs accountable in 
the use of public revenue.  
 
The Auditor-General’s department has been auditing the accounts of the National 
House of Chiefs, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and Traditional Councils. So far, the 
reports of the Auditor-General show that many organizations of chieftaincy are 
unable to account for the revenue that they receive from Parliament (Auditor-
General’s Report 2009; Quartey 2003; Sakyi 2003). From the 2009 report of the 
Auditor-General, I present below a summary of the status of the public accounts of 
184 agential-organizations of Chieftaincy (comprising 173 Traditional Councils, 10 
Regional Houses of Chiefs, and I National House of Chiefs).
320
  
 
Table 18: Status of horizontal accountability of Traditional Councils (TCs), 
Regional Houses of Chiefs (RHCs) and the National House of Chiefs 
(NHC) to the Auditor-General from 2005-2009 
 
Agency No Arrears 1–5 yrs 6–10 yrs 11–15 yrs 
16 yrs and 
above 
Total  
TCs 47 58 41 22 5 173 
RHCs 5 1 4 - - 10 
NHC 1 - - - - 1 
Total 53 59 45 22 5 184 
 
In Table 18 above, only 53 (28.8%) organizations of chieftaincy had been able to 
keep their accounts up to date. The above report however conceals a great deal of 
important information that cannot be fully discussed here. For instance, in the 
Central Region, three Traditional Councils had not accounted for their expenditure in 
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over twenty years. Moreover, all the organizations of chieftaincy in the Greater 
Accra, Upper East, and Upper West regions had not prepared their public accounts 
from periods between 4-12 years. It is only in the Ashanti region where the majority 
of the Traditional Councils (14 out of 19) have always accounted for their use of 
revenue. The reason for the failure of many Traditional Councils and Regional 
Houses of Chiefs to publicly account for their expenditure is not always due to their 
unwillingness to do so. A major constraint faced by chieftaincy is the failure of the 
state to provide qualified administrative personnel and technical resources to Chiefs 
(Quartey 2003; Sakyi 2003). The 2009 report of the Auditor-General stated:  
  
As indicated in previous reports, the default in the preparation and submission of 
the financial statements for audit are due to a number of factors, including 
chieftaincy disputes, civil strife, as well as weak administrative and accounting 
capacities existing at the Houses of Chiefs and Traditional Councils.
321
     
 
It is important to emphasize that all administrative agencies require financial, 
technical and human resources to effectively perform their responsibilities. Even the 
Audit Service does not have adequate personnel to provide up to date reports on all 
the 184 formal organizations of chieftaincy in the country (da Rocha 2001). When it 
comes to financing organizations of chieftaincy to perform their functions, many 
scholars and government officials find it hard to appreciate the crucial fact that 
institutions of chieftaincy are state institutions (Kludze 2000; Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry (MLF) 2003). Organizations of chieftaincy are usually seen as private 
institutions and not as public institutions of the state (MLF 2003). Chiefs are 
therefore commonly asked to self-finance their administrative structures. Traditional 
Councils that are able to generate enough revenues from stool lands and other 
sources have been able to maintain effective traditional structure of administration. 
The typical example of the Kumasi Traditional Council is shown below.  
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KUMASI TRADITIONAL COUNCIL 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE ACCOUNTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31
ST
 DECEMBER 2002322 
EXPENDITURE ESTIMATE ACTUAL INCOME ESTIMATE ACTUAL 
Staff Salaries 360,000,000 394,834,315.69 Otumfuo 300,000,000 306,753,902.18 
Allowance to Asantehemaa 12,000,000 11,000,000 Administrator of Stool Lands 750,000,000 680,454,148 
Allowance to Nhinkwaa 20,000,000 27,190,891 KMA Grants 120,000,000 140,000,000 
Allowance to Security 15,000,000 17,849,000 Fees & Petitions 15,000,000 7,500,000 
Travelling & Transportation, Council Staff 10,000,000 2,841,000 Interest 20,000,000 1,340,000 
Maintenance of Council Building/Equipment 50,000,000 59,030,000 Kumasi Traditional Council 25,000,000 19,009,208 
Medical Expenses 20,000,000 22,563,787.64 Donations --- 127,500 
Printing & Stationery 25,000,000 9,506,000    
Entertainment 45,000,000 32,743,457    
Light & Water 15,000,000 3,493,698.71    
Office Expenses 25,000,000 5,033,300    
Purchase of Stool Property 10,000,000 1,256,000    
Miscellaneous Expenses 20,000,000 69,122,120    
Accommodation 50,000,000 30,334,250    
Weekend Expenses 25,000,000 64,158,908    
Customary Expenses 150,000,000 224,125,050    
Akwasidae 20,000,000 35,348,000    
Household Expenses 40,000,000 20,000,000    
Running and Maintenance of Vehicles 85,000,000 83,106,687    
Awukudae 15,000,000 16,868,500    
  1,130,404,964.86   1,155,184,758.18 
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From the revenue and expenditure accounts of the Kumasi Traditional Council for 
the year 2002, it can be seen that the chiefs derived about 59% of their income from 
their share of stool land revenues distributed by the Office of the Administrator of 
Stool Lands (OASL). Only about 1.6% of its income came from money given to the 
Kumasi Traditional Council. The Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) also 
provided some grants. The crucial point is that traditional authorities in Ghana 
largely survive on the resources they generate by themselves and not on the financial 
and material support of government. In 2006, the NPP Government transformed the 
Chieftaincy Secretariat into the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture. It is hoped that 
the new Ministry would be able to secure enough yearly budgetary allocations to 
support the development of a more transparent and accountable system of traditional 
governance in the 196 traditional areas that the Ministry currently supervise.    
 
Due to the limited formal-legal rules that govern chieftaincy-society relations, and 
the predominance of informal rules of customary law, the Audit Service as a state 
agency of horizontal accountability faces difficult hurdles in holding traditional 
authorities responsible for their usage of revenue. Many Traditional Councils have 
no agreed estimates of expenditure with the Audit Service to compare with the actual 
figures of expenditure submitted for auditing. For instance, the Apam District Office 
of the Audit Service wrote the following after auditing the accounts of the Ajumako 
Traditional Council: “There were no significant findings, however, validation of the 
Annual Accounts from 2000 to 2009 have been done. There were no estimates to 
compare with the actual figures.”323 Interestingly, informal rules of customary law 
governing the administration of chiefs in their traditional areas have become both 
substitutive of, and complementary to, the formal-legal rules of accountability.  
 
The rules of customary law complement the constitutional obligation of traditional 
authorities to be “accountable as fiduciaries”324 in their administration of communal 
(stool) land. At the same time, the rules of customary law governing political 
relations of accountability between traditional authorities and their subjects in the 
administration of communal land substitute for the formal-legal rules of 
accountability that used to govern the administration of chiefs in the local 
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 Audit Service, Apam District Office, Letter to the Auditor-General, 13 December, 2010.  
324
 1992 Constitution, Article 36(8) 
238 
government system before 1951. It could be seen that the substitutive informal rules 
of customary law governing the administration of Chiefs “seek outcomes compatible 
with formal rules and procedures” (Helmke and Levitsky 2006a:16); and, they 
“achieve what formal institutions were designed, but failed, to achieve” (ibid). It is 
important that Ghanaian scholars pay serious attention to the reasons why the Audit 
Service and other agencies of horizontal accountability within the State have failed 
to effectively enforce formal-legal rules of accountability in the domain of 
chieftaincy, rather than usually proclaiming blanket statements that chiefs have not 
been transparent and accountable in the discharge of their fiduciary mandates.    
 
The creation of formal rules of horizontal accountability is one thing: The power of 
state agencies to enforce the rules of accountability within organizations of 
chieftaincy is another matter that has so far been ignored by governments. In 2010, a 
district office of the Audit Service recommended to the Auditor-General that an 
embargo be imposed on all government remittances to three Traditional Councils in 
the district that had refused to prepare their public accounts from January 2005 to 
December 2009.
325
 The Auditors stated: 
 
We require that all remittances from the underlisted institutions should cease 
forthwith until the annual accounts are submitted for audit: (i) Central Regional 
House of Chiefs, (ii) Stool Land Administration, and (iii) Municipal Assembly. 
This will facilitate the Auditor-General fulfilment of its mandate to report to 
parliament accordingly.
326
       
 
The above recommendation in the letter shows some kind of commitment by some 
officials of the Audit Service to enforce the rules of horizontal accountability that 
govern chieftaincy. However, it should be noted that the Auditor-General does not 
have the power to force the OASL to impose an embargo on the remittance of stool 
land revenues to Chiefs (Fiadzigbey 2006). The power of the Auditor-General to 
compel recalcitrant Traditional Councils to publicly accounts for their expenditure 
would be constrained. Where customary institutions of vertical accountability 
between local communities and their Chiefs fail, the creation of effective institutions 
of horizontal accountability is likely to require recursive institutions of restraint 
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 Audit Service, Agona Swedru District Office, Letter to the Auditor-General, 6 December 2010.  
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 Audit Service, Agona Swedru District Office, 6 December 2010.  
239 
between numerous state agencies. The process may involve the OASL, the Auditor-
General, the Regional Houses of Chiefs, the National House of Chiefs, and 
Parliament. Building effective institutions of horizontal accountability is a complex 
political process (O’Donnell 2010; Przeworski et al. 1999; Schedler et al. 1999).    
 
Informal rules of customary law constrain the authority of the Auditor General as an 
agent of horizontal accountability to hold chiefs responsible for their actions. 
Although the Audit Service may be willing to enforce its rules of horizontal 
accountability concerning the expenditure of Chiefs, the internal informal rules of 
customary law usually substitute formal procedures. It is clear that satisfactory 
results from Traditional Councils cannot be obtained without the provision of 
qualified administrative personnel and relevant material resources to the Traditional 
Councils. These are the practical challenges of ensuring accountability in 
chieftaincy. However, even if administrative personnel and material resources are 
provided, it would still be a mirage to expect effective transparent and accountable 
chieftaincy administration in a system governed by informal-legal rules. In the next 
chapter I shall examine reform attempts made from 2003-2010 to create transparent 
and accountable agencies of customary land administration in the domain of chiefs. 
 
8.6 Conclusion: Informal Rules of Customary Law Hinder Vertical and 
Horizontal Accountability in Chieftaincy Administration 
 
The historical political settlements of state authority concerning chieftaincy have 
certainly shaped chieftaincy-government relations in the post-independent period. 
Stool land ownership has been consolidated, the institution of chieftaincy has been 
integrated into the state, and government has refrained from interfering in the 
definition of local constitutional rules of chieftaincy-society relations. 
Democratically-elected governments have demonstrated their commitment to abide 
by historical political settlements that constrain government from interfering in local 
constitutional matters of chieftaincy. The failure of Chiefs and their subjects to 
formalise their informal rules of customary law has constrained the vertical and 
horizontal accountability of Chiefs in the administration of stool lands. Political 
settlements do matter in enabling or constraining chieftaincy development.  
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There is little doubt that the informal state constrains vertical and horizontal 
accountability of Chiefs in the context of stool land administration. Not all the 
political actors with interest in the development of chieftaincy have the authority to 
pursue unhindered reforms. The subjects of Chiefs in local communities do not have 
the power (or the locus standi as lawyers say) to reform the informal rules of 
customary law. The Presidential-Executive and Parliament also appear to rigidly 
abide by the terms of the historical political settlements that constrain them from 
reforming the informal rules of chieftaincy without the cooperation of Chiefs. The 
reform of informal rules of customary law can be initiated by the relevant formal 
organizations of chieftaincy (Traditional Councils, Regional Houses of Chiefs, and 
the National House of Chiefs). However, the National House of Chiefs has 
emphasized that it requires financial and technical resources from government to 
reform the informal rules of customary law that govern chieftaincy-society relations.  
 
On the one hand, it could be argued that Governments have shown little interest in 
providing resources for the development of organizations of chieftaincy. On the 
other hand, one could argue that the historical political settlement of the state 
absolves Government from any blame because the traditional states and their 
localities agreed to deal with their own internal problems without any external 
influence. Whatever the case, it is clear that the agencies of horizontal accountability 
that are supposed to help enforce the vertical accountability of Chiefs to their 
subjects have found it extremely difficult to work within informal institutional 
environment of customary law. The Courts and the Audit Service are unable to 
define the limits of informal rules of customary law that operate within chieftaincy.  
 
It can be seen that the integration of chieftaincy into the State presents both 
opportunities and challenges for development. Formal agential-organizations of 
chieftaincy play significant judicial, political, and administrative roles in the 
development of the country. However, it is also clear that the informal rules of 
customary law that organize political relations of rule between Chiefs and their 
subjects must be reformed to enhance transparent and accountable traditional 
governance by Chiefs. The legal procedures for the reform of informal rules of 
customary law are clear. But there are also legal constraints concerning who has the 
authority to reform the rules of customary law in local communities.  
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In sum, it should be emphasized that institutions of accountability – whether vertical 
or horizontal – are created, maintained, and reformed by political actors, particularly 
the political ruling elite. The political intervention of the PNDC government in the 
accountability of family heads to their communities occurred outside the democratic 
conditions of constitutional politics that shaped the historical political settlements 
concerning chieftaincy. With Ghana’s return to that democratic path of constitutional 
politics, the only approach to the reform of informal rules of customary law 
governing stool land administration lies in the politics of cooperation and 
negotiations between Chiefs and Government. Under the fourth republic 
constitutional democracy, there are no alternative reform paths. Depending on the 
reform approach, there is little doubt that the historical political settlements of state 
authority over communal land ownership and chieftaincy could either enable or 
constrain the reform of the informal institutions of customary land administration.  
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Chapter 9 
 
The Politics of Land Administration Reform in the Traditional-Federal 
Ghanaian State: 1994-2010 
 
The Project should consider what [i]s doable under the current Constitutional 
provision since failure in attempt to amend the Constitution would stall the whole 
Project (Government’s advice to the Land Policy Steering Committee, 2007).327  
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I discuss the politics, challenges and outcomes of the land 
administration reforms negotiated and implemented from 1994-2010. From 1994-
1999, Ghana formulated its first post-colonial National Land Policy document. And 
from 2000-2004, six international development agencies provided financial support 
for the Government of Ghana to implement land administration reforms outlined in a 
National Land Policy produced in 1999. While some of the external actors like the 
World Bank sought to end Ghana’s legacy of communal land tenure system in 
favour of tradable individual freeholds, other external actors like the DFID provided 
financial support for strengthening the communal land tenure system. I examine the 
extent to which external demands or support, internal political support or resistance, 
and state organization shaped the outcomes of renewed attempts to create transparent 
and accountable institutions of land administration. I argue that the nature and 
outcomes of the reforms have been shaped by the political settlements of state 
organization concerning land administration.   
 
The discussion is divided into four sections. Section 9.1 outlines the nature of the 
land administration reforms that I analyse throughout this chapter. The nature of the 
external and internal actors that implemented the Land Administration Project is also 
discussed. Section 9.2 discusses the outcomes of renewed reforms to create 
transparent and accountable agencies of communal land administration in the domain 
of chiefs. Section 9.3 discusses the outcomes of reforms to restructure six public 
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provide policy guidance and supervise the Land Administration Project (LAP), Minutes of the 10
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meeting of the LPSC, 2 October, 2007. p.8 
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sector agencies of land administration into a single agency. Section 9.4 concludes the 
chapter by summarizing how the organization of the State shaped the reforms.  
 
9.1 The Nature of the Land Administration Reforms: 1994-2010     
 
Land administration reforms involve complex activities. I shall focus on two specific 
objectives that shaped the design and implementation of land administration reforms 
in Ghana from 1994-2010. The reform objectives are (1) the creation of transparent 
and accountable agencies of communal land administration, and (2) the restructuring 
of six public sector agencies of land administration into a single agency. The reforms 
occurred in three stages namely (i) the setting of reform agenda in the 1999 National 
Land Policy, (ii) the design of the Land Administration Project (LAP) from 2001-
2004, and (iii) the implementation of the first phase of the LAP from 2003-2010 
(referred to as LAP-1 but I shall use the abbreviation LAP).  
 
9.1.1 Setting the Agenda for Land Administration Reforms: 1994-1999 
 
The formulators of the National Land Policy set the agenda (referred to as Policy 
Actions) for the reform of the land administration system. According to the Ministry 
of Lands and Forestry (MLF), the formulation of the National Land Policy began 
immediately after the Law Reform Commission submitted its “Final Report” on the 
‘Reform of Land Law in Ghana’ to Government in 1994 (MLF 1999). The Law 
Reform Commission’s draft report was written in 1973 (Woodman 1996).  
 
The making of the 1999 Land Policy involved all the actors that wielded state 
authority related to the reform of land administration, namely the Presidential-
Executive (Cabinet), Parliament, and Chiefs (Kotey et al. 1998; MLF 2003). Kotey 
et al. (1998) have indicated that the political ruling elites shirked much of the 
responsibilities to the “senior civil/public officials” who had the technical 
knowledge. The National Land Policy formulation process is narrated by Kotey et al 
(1998) and the MLF (2003) in Box 1 below.
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 The in-depth narrative given by Kotey et al (1998) unfortunately ends in mid-1997 when the final 
draft of the policy was completed. How the draft became policy from mid-1997 to June 1999 is 
narrated by the MLF in its 2003 ‘Country Paper’ titled ‘Ghana – Emerging Land Tenure Issues’.  
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Box 1:  The Politics of Formulating the 1999 National Land Policy  
 
“The Ministry of Lands and Forestry (MLF) established a National Land Policy Committee in January 
1994, to undertake this task [of formulating a National Land Policy]. The Committee was made up of 
representatives (the MLF selected the institutions but not the representatives) of: Lands 
Commission Secretariat, Department of Town and Country Planning (under Ministry of Local 
Government), Survey Department, Forestry Department, Department of Wildlife, Environmental 
Protection Agency (under Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology), Forestry Commission, 
National Development Planning Commission, Land Valuation Board, National House of Chiefs (two 
representatives), Water and Sewerage Corporation, Ministry of Environment, Science and 
Technology, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Geography and Resource Development 
(University of Ghana), Faculty of Law (University of Ghana), Land Administration Research Centre 
(University of Science and Technology), Department of Land Economy (University of Science and 
Technology), Water Resources Research Institute, and Soil Research Institute. 
 
The full Committee elected its chairman (there was not a single woman on the Committee) and met 
on four occasions to determine its modus operandi, delineate the parameters of the assignment, 
assemble relevant data, information, previous studies, etc. The Committee then divided into 5 
subcommittees: Ownership and Tenure, Use and Conservation, Administrative and Institutional 
Arrangements, Inventory and Information, and Legislation. Each subcommittee was tasked with 
preparing a report on the status quo, causes, problems, possible solutions and possible policy 
options available to government. Subcommittees had powers to co-opt and consult others and some 
did. Subcommittees deliberated and worked for about three months. Reports were modified and 
amended by the full committee. A small group of three was appointed to synthesise these 
subcommittee reports into a final report. The final report was further summarised into a draft policy 
document and both were approved by the full committee. 
 
The MLF then appointed a consultant to draft a policy document as the basis of formulating a policy. 
The Draft was circulated to a wide number of stakeholders including those represented on the 
National Land Policy Committee and: the Ghana Institute of Surveyors; Ghana Bar Association; 
Institute of Planners; Institute of Renewable Natural Resources; all Regional Lands Commissions; 
all Regional Houses of Chiefs; the Parliamentary Sub-Committees on Lands and Forestry, Food and 
Agriculture, Environment, Science and Technology, Mines and Energy, and Local Government; the 
Ghana Real Estate Developers Association (GREDA); and the Ghana Cocoa, Coffee and Sheanut 
Association. Many stakeholders including the National House of Chiefs submitted memoranda on 
the Draft.  
 
A new draft policy was then prepared by the consultant and Lands Commission staff and discussed 
at a three-day workshop in April 1997. The workshop was attended by the institutions represented 
on the National Land Policy Committee and a representative of each regional lands commission; the 
President or representative of each regional House of Chiefs; NGOs; representatives of migrant 
farmers’ groups; representatives of GREDA; the Managing Director of the Home Finance Company; 
and some individual experts. At the end of the workshop, the MLF and Lands Commission 
undertook to finalise a draft national land policy for submission to the President. In mid-1997, the 
Deputy Minister for Lands and Forestry announced that the draft would be submitted to the 
President for his approval soon” (Kotey et al. 1998:58-59). 
 
“The final draft policy document was presented to Cabinet in December 1997 for consideration and 
approval. Cabinet then organised a day’s seminar in May 1998 to deliberate on the policy 
provisions. At this seminar experts on land tenure and land use were invited to provide inputs and 
comments on the draft policy document. The consensus at the seminar was that the document was 
a workable one but needed further revision. The revisions were made and the proposals received 
final government approval in January 1999 and the policy document was launched in June 1999” 
(MLF 2003:23).  
245 
There is very little research work on how the different actors influenced the ideas in 
the policy (Kasanga 2000b). Kotey et al. (1998:7) however make three important 
remarks about the policy making process: first, that much of the policy was “actually 
formulated by senior civil/public officials” rather than by government; second, that 
“the ideas and attitudes of such senior officials [were] often influenced by data 
(reports) from below” (ibid); and, third, that the policy was “not intended to be law” 
(p.59). I move on to outline the reform agenda outlined by the policy makers. The 
analysis of my thesis shall focus on the ‘Policy Actions’ that concern the two reform 
objectives that I have stated above. The relevant specific policy actions that were to 
be undertaken to achieve the broad objectives are in Table 19 below. 
 
Table 19: National Land Policy Actions towards Transparency and 
Accountability in Customary Land Administration 
 
Facilitating Equitable Access to Land 
Security of Land Tenure and Protection of 
Land Rights 
a.  Collaborate with the traditional authorities 
and other land stakeholders to review, 
harmonise and streamline customary 
practices, usages and legislations to govern 
land holding, land acquisition, land usage 
and land disposal.  
b. Encourage, through appropriate incentives, 
stools/skins, clans and land owning families 
to create land banks for present and future 
generations. 
c. Collaborate with and support the traditional 
authorities and other stakeholders to: 
 facilitate development of land 
management knowledge and skills among 
stool, skin, clan and family landowners; 
 institute an administrative mechanism to 
guide the allocation and disposal of land 
by traditional authorities and family land 
owners throughout the country; 
 develop systems that would facilitate 
proper record keeping in respect of 
allocation and disposal of stool/skin, clan 
and family lands by all traditional 
authorities and other land stakeholders; 
 assist the various traditional authorities 
and other land owning families and clans 
to establish Land Secretariats to facilitate 
the work of government departments and 
agencies involved in land service delivery. 
a. With full participation of traditional and 
customary land owners, undertake tenurial 
reform process which documents and 
recognises the registration and classification 
of titles under (i) the allodial owner; (ii) 
customary law freeholder; (iii) an estate of 
freehold vested in possession or an estate or 
interest less than freehold under common law; 
(iv) leasehold interest; and (v) interest in land 
by virtue of any right contractual or share 
cropping or other customary tenancy 
arrangement. 
b. Speed up title registration to cover all interests 
in land throughout Ghana, and phase out 
deeds registration.   
c. Pursue the following actions to resolve or 
minimise land tenurial disputes and their 
associated ethnic conflicts: 
 implementation of a programme for the 
production of large scale maps of land parcels 
and buildings in all urban areas and locations; 
 enactment of legislation to require stool, skin, 
clan, family and other land owners to survey 
and demarcate their land boundaries with the 
approval of the Survey Department; 
 The Chief Justice shall create a special division 
of the High Court properly equipped to deal 
solely with land cases. 
Source: 1999 National Land Policy, Sections 5.2 and 5.3 (pages 15-17)        
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Within the public sector of land administration, the policy makers recommended that 
the best way to deal with the “lack of consultation, coordination and cooperation” 
among the public sector land agencies (MLF 1999:4) is to “restructure” them into a 
single agency and strengthen their capacity to deal effectively and efficiently with 
land administration delivery (MLF 1999:18). There appear to have been some 
general understanding among officials of the public sector land agencies that the 
autonomous agencies should be re-organized under a single agency (Kasanga 2000).  
 
Within the customary sector of land administration, the policy actions generally 
focused on “facilitating equitable access to land” and ensuring “security of tenure 
and protection of land right” (MLF 1999). It could be seen from Table 19 that the 
policy makers were more concerned with the development of a clear system of 
customary laws and legislations, transparent administrative structures for communal 
land administration, and the registration of interests in communal land. However, the 
conflict among the policy makers over the contentious concept of ‘customary law 
freehold’ as a registrable interest in communal land could not be resolved. The 
concept that originated from the Land Reform Commission’s 1973 report pre-dated 
the creation of the 1992 constitution which prohibited the creation of “a freehold 
interest howsoever described”. Perhaps, the failure of the policy makers to subject 
the policy to legal tests (as it was not intended to be law) was its Achilles heel as 
Chiefs would later contest the constitutional validity of a reform agenda to register 
‘customary law freeholds’ as an interest deriving from communal land tenure.  
 
It is important to point out that in the ‘policy guidelines’ “intended to guide policy 
action and execution” (MLF, 1999:8), the policy makers stated that decision making 
with respect to the disposal of communal land should take into consideration 
“accountability to the subjects for whom the land is held in trust, in accordance with 
the provisions of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123) and the Head of 
Family Accountability Law, 1985 (PNDC Law 112).” (MLF 1999:9) Later, the 
implementation of the policy actions through the Land Administration Project (LAP) 
largely focused on the creation of agencies that could promote the accountability of 
traditional authorities to the members of their community. I discuss in turn how the 
1999 policy actions were designed into the LAP.          
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9.1.2 The Politics of Designing the Land Administration Project: 2001-2004 
 
In the ‘Budget Statement and Economic Policy’ approved by Parliament in 2000, the 
MLF was given a three-year budget, from 2000-2002, to begin the implementation of 
the National Land Policy Actions (Ministry of Finance 2000, 2001). Officials in the 
Lands Commission began to design a land administration reform project.
329
 
However, the Government of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) lost the 
December 2000 presidential elections to the New Patriotic Party (NPP). In January 
2001, the NPP formed a new Presidential-Executive and ruled for eight years before 
losing power back to the NDC. It was during the eight-year Rule of the NPP that the 
LAP was fully designed and the first phase implemented. It is important to note the 
power transition because the political commitment and power of the new NPP 
government to implement the inherited policy actions would become crucial.   
  
In 2001, Ghana, led by the NPP Government, applied to the World Bank and IMF to 
join the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative to seek debt relief and 
financial aid from international creditors. For Ghana to obtain debt relief the NPP 
Government was expected reach the ‘Completion Point’ of the HIPC Initiative by 
establishing a track record in the implementation of reforms approved by the World 
Bank-IMF (IMF 2004, 2011). The National Land Policy readily offered to the NPP 
Government a set of defined policy actions that received support from the World 
Bank and IMF (Ghana, World Bank, and IMF 2003). From 2001 to 2003, the 
Ministry of Lands and Forestry (MLF) collaborated with officials of the World Bank 
to refine the 1999 ‘Policy Actions’ into the LAP (World Bank 2003b, 2003c).  
 
The World Bank used the window of opportunity to push for the radical reform of 
the communal land tenure system into “marketable” or “tradable” freehold titles 
(Ghana 2003). The World Bank argued that “the 1992 Constitution affects the land 
titling subcomponent of the project” (World Bank 2003c:33) because “only freehold 
private ownership obtained prior to the enactment of the 1992 Constitution is legally 
recognized as Article 267 (5) bars creation of freehold interests in land out of Stool 
land and by implication Skin land as well” (World Bank 2003c:88).  
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 Interviews with Dr Odame Larbi (1/12/2010), LAP Project Director (2005-2010) and Professor 
Kasim Kasanga (25/01/2011), Minister of MLF (2001-2003).  
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The Minister of Lands and Forestry, Professor Kasim Kasanga, who had for decades 
championed the strengthening of the customary land tenure system opposed the 
move to end the legacy of communal land ownership.
330
 Mr Sulemana Mahama, an 
official of the MLF who co-ordinated the design of the LAP lamented that “the 
relative short period of project preparation (August-November 2001) by Consultants 
whose knowledge of the customary land tenure regime was limited, did not allow for 
sufficient consultations throughout the country” (Mahama 2003:4). The hurried 
manner in which the LAP was prepared appears to have been influenced by 
Government’s urgency to meet IMF-World Bank deadlines for a decision to be made 
in February 2002 on the debt reduction packages for Ghana (IMF 2004).  
 
Consequently, the initial design of the components of the LAP reflected both (a) the 
interest of the World Bank to transform the customary land tenure system into 
individual freeholds, and (b) the contradictory interest of Ghanaian political elites to 
strengthen the customary land administration system (World Bank 2003b, 2003c). 
The World Bank therefore tied political conditions to the disbursement of its loan for 
the implementation of the project. The World Bank agreed to provide technical and 
financial support for the implementation of the LAP subject to the condition that 
Government provides “assurances, satisfactory to the IDA, with respect to the 
continuing validity of customary freeholds” (World Bank 2003c:33). From 2003 to 
2010, the disbursement of World Bank funds for the implementation of the LAP 
became a contentious issue between the World Bank and officials of the LAP. 
     
Professor Kasim Kasanga, the Minister of the MLF, and other political elites who 
supported the strengthening of the customary land tenure system negotiated with the 
UK Department for International Development (DFID) to provide financial support 
to strengthen the customary land administration system.
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 Four other international 
development agencies also supported different aspects of the LAP. The four external 
actors were the German Technical Assistance Cooperation (GTZ), Nordic 
Development Fund (NDF), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
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 Interview with Professor Kasim Kasanga (25/01/2011).  
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 Interview with Professor Kasim Kasanga (25/01/2011). Professor Richard Crook and Mr Julian 
Quan who worked as Consultants to the DFID in the design and implementation of the CLS project 
also emphasized the instrumental played by Professor Kasanga to get the CLS project inserted into the 
LAP. Interviews with Prof Richard Crook (8/03/2010) and Mr Julian Quan (18/02/2010).   
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and Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KFW). What is known as the LAP is in fact a 
project with different components designed by the MLF in collaboration with 
different external actors who provided financial support. Sulemana Mahama, the 
LAP Coordinator (2001-2005), pointed out that “Despite the overwhelming evidence 
of the need for the project, the sense of ownership by stakeholders requires to be 
dramatically improved upon” (Mahama 2003:4). The reform components negotiated 
and financed by each external actor is presented in Table 20 below.    
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Table 20: The Politics of LAP Components Ring-fencing 
 
Donors 
Budget  
US $m 
Percent (%) 
used as at 
31/12/2010 
Reform Component Supported 
Date of 
Funding (with 
extension) 
World Bank (IDA) 
20.51 
Loan 
99% 
1. Land policy and regulatory framework revised and harmonised with customary land 
laws (includes legally conclusive confirmation of the continued validity of customary 
freehold and other customary titles.) 
2. Institutional reform and development:  
2.1 Restructuring public sector land agencies into a single agency 
2.2 Decentralisation of restructured single agency to the regions  
3. Improving land titling registration, valuation and information systems 
4. Project coordination, monitoring and evaluation 
18/08/2003 –  
30/06/2011 
Department for International 
Development (DFID) 
9.02 
Grant 
81% 
2.3 Strengthening customary land administration through the development of publicly 
accountable Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) 
08/06/2004 – 
31/08/2009 
Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) 
1.03 
Grant 
62% 
1.4 Policy studies on gender and analysis 
3.4 Improving deed and title registration 
3.7 Piloting demarcation and registration of allodial boundaries 
30/06/2011 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau 
(KfW) 
6.03 
Loan 
43% 
2.1 Construction of new head office for the unified new land agency 
3.2 Cadastral mapping 
3.7 Piloting demarcation and registration of allodial boundaries 
3.8 Piloting systematic land titling and registration 
26/11/2004 – 
30/09/2011 
German Technical 
Assistance Corporation (GTZ) 
3.98 
Grant 
19% 
1.1 Revision of policies, laws and regulations for effective and efficient land 
administration (specifically the ascertainment and codification of the rules of 
customary law in local communities) 
11/10/2001 – 
31/03/2008 
Nordic Development Fund 
(NDF) 
6.92 
Loan 
92% 3.5 Land use planning and Orthophoto Mapping 
20/12/2004 – 
30/09/2011 
Government of Ghana 7.56 36% All components as required for counterpart funding 31/12/2011 
Total  55.05    
 
Source: compiled from DFID (2010), World Bank (2003c, 2008), MLF (2006), MASDAR (2011b) 
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It could be seen that the HIPC Government of Ghana struggled to meet its share of 
13% of the budgeted project cost, and therefore became highly susceptible to 
external controls. The World Bank provided the largest financial support, touching 
on almost every aspect of the project. The challenge faced by the HIPC Government 
was the need to meet the World Bank’s loan conditions without stirring the hornets’ 
nest at the National House of Chiefs. The NPP usually like to praise the work of its 
founding fathers that played leading roles in the Aborigines Rights Protection 
Society (APRS) to resist colonial governments from expropriating communal 
lands.
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 The NPP government therefore found itself in a delicate political situation.  
 
While the World Bank was the main financier of the public sector organizational 
restructuring project, many external actors supported different aspect of customary 
land administration reform. The DFID was the major financier of the project to 
strengthen customary land administration. However, GTZ also provided funding for 
the ascertainment and codification of the rules of customary law in local 
communities (sub-component 1.1); CIDA and KfW provided funding for the 
demarcation and registration of allodial boundaries (sub-component 3.7); NDF 
provided funding for land use planning and mapping (sub-component 3.5). 
Moreover, the external actors who supported the strengthening of the customary land 
administration system did not usually agree on the best approach to develop a 
transparent and accountable agency for communal land administration.   
 
From 2003-2010, the turf of land administration reform in Ghana witnessed many 
uncompromising ideological battles between the six external actors. I shall not delve 
into the conflicts except to highlight where it affected the implementation of the 
Project, particularly the objective to development a transparent and accountable 
agency of communal land administration. Dr Odame Larbi, the LAP Project Director 
(2005-2010), rued that the ring-fencing of project sub-components by the external 
actors was “the worst thing that ever happened to the project. It made the project 
implementation very very very difficult and nothing but very difficult.”333 The 
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ineffective coordination of financial aid between the external agencies raises a 
question about their numerous commitments “to harmonise and align aid delivery” to 
developing countries (OECD 2005:1). How the LAP was designed and implemented 
raises serious questions about the capacity of aid dependent African countries like 
Ghana to be assertive and assume ownership of aid-dependent development 
processes (Whitfield and Jones 2008). It also raises question about the judicious use 
of foreign aid poured by different international development ‘partners’ into Ghana 
for the implementation of different components of the same project. I discuss below 
the internal agencies that were mandated to implement the LAP.   
  
9.1.3 The LAP Implementation Actors: State Authority Matters 
 
As already discussed, State authority for reforming the public sector land agencies, 
customary land administration, and the rules of customary law governing 
chieftaincy-society relations of accountability is shared between the Presidential-
Executive (or government), Parliament, and the National House of Chiefs. The 
reform of constitutionally established agencies and institutions would however 
require the consent of voters through a national referendum on the proposed 
constitutional amendments. The question was whether or not the government, 
parliament, chiefs and citizens were ready to review the constitution.  
 
It should also be noted that the procedure for reforming rules of customary law in 
local communities is a bottom-up process that begins at the level of the Traditional 
Council, and moves through the Regional House of Chiefs, the National House of 
Chiefs, Parliament, and finally receives assent from the Presidential-Executive 
(Chieftaincy Act, 1971, Act 370; Chieftaincy Act, 2008, Act 759). The decision 
making structure of the National House of Chiefs concerning the reform of 
customary laws in a local community is a long democratic process that is shaped at 
level of the local community by citizens, family heads, clan heads, sub-chiefs and 
paramount chiefs that comprises a Traditional Council.  
 
The World Bank, government and other internal stakeholders agreed to create three 
new political agents to facilitate the implementation of the project. The new 
implementation agents were the Land Administration Project Unit (LAPU), the Land 
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Policy Steering Committee (LPSC) and the Land Sector Technical Committee 
(LSTC). I describe below the nature of these three new agents.  
 
(i) Land Administration Project Unit (LAPU) 
 
LAPU was created as the project secretariat responsible for collaborating with 
external actors to design the LAP, coordinating the implementation of the LAP, 
managing financial support from external donors, and facilitating the work of other 
project implementing agencies. LAPU was initially created within the office of the 
Chief Director of the MLF but was separated to function independently. The 
independent LAPU was manned by a team of six professionals headed by the Project 
Director.
334
 They were supported by administrative personnel provided by the public 
sector land agencies and the National Service Secretariat. The DFID negotiated the 
creation of a Unit called the Customary Land Administration Project Unit (CLAU) 
within LAPU to manage the customary land administration reform sub-component 
of LAP. The CLAU worked almost independently within LAPU.  
 
LAPU was severely plagued by lack of qualified personnel with specialised 
knowledge about institutional reform and project management (LAPU 2006; 
MASDAR 2011a, 2011b). LAPU therefore relied heavily on the recruitment of 
consultants. A review of the project in 2011 showed that “At just under $14 million, 
expenditure for the hire of consultants took up more than one third of all costs for 
LAP in the period up to 31st December 2010” (MASDAR 2011b:52). It appears the 
World Bank is right in raising a red flag over Ghana as lacking the bureaucratic 
capacity for implementing complex reforms such as LAP. However, there is much 
evidence to suggest that the World Bank and other external development partners 
have not usually supported the use of their project funds to hire and train local 
human resources (Kotey et al. 1998; MASDAR 2011b; Whitfield and Jones 2008).  
 
Many external consultants recruited by LAPU had little knowledge about the 
complex organization of the Ghanaian State and therefore provided ‘expert advice’ 
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 The six professionals comprised (i) The Project Director/Coordinator; (ii) Legal Advisor; (iii) 
Social Science Specialist; (iv) Public Administration Specialist; (v) Communications Specialist; and 
(vi) Internationally Recruited Project Management Advisor (World Bank 2003c:14). 
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that sometimes proved to be legally unworkable. Sulemana Mahama pointed out that 
the preparation of the project was done by “Consultants whose knowledge of the 
customary land tenure regime was limited” (Mahama 2003:4). By 2006 it had 
become clear to LAPU officials that the Customary Land Secretariats they had 
established had failed to function as publicly accountable agencies. But it appears 
that LAPU listened to the advice that “it was not possible to stop the establishment 
of new ones” because “failure to establish new ones could be interpreted to mean 
non delivery of the project outputs.”335 The reform outcomes shall be discussed later.   
 
(ii) Land Sector Technical Committee (LSTC)  
 
The majority of members of the LSTC were the heads of public sector land agencies 
and it was chaired by the Chief Director of the MLF (World Bank 2003c).
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 The 
LAP Project Director was the Secretary to the LSTC. Due to the depth of technical 
knowledge about the institutional reform issues possessed by the heads of the public 
sector land agencies, the LSTC became the think-tank of the project that provided 
technical advice to both LAPU and the Land Policy Steering Committee (LPSC) on 
what needed to be done. Unlike the LAPU and the LPSC which were plagued with 
high turnover of professional expertise and political appointees, the LSTC was a 
relatively stable coalition. A key problem was that many of the heads of the public 
sector land agencies on the LSTC resisted the restructuring of their agencies into the 
proposed single agency. Therefore, the role assigned to the LSTC to supervise the 
implementation of the public sector organizational reform became problematic as 
many of its members not only resisted the reforms, but also carried their inter-
departmental conflict and squabbling into the LSTC meetings.  
 
During the mid-term review of the LAP in 2006, the reviewers remarked that “The 
biggest challenge to the LAP is that it is the agencies to be reformed that are being 
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used for implementation” (MLF 2006:66). Considering the powerless of the public 
sector land agencies to bring about the intended unified agency without the political 
ruling elites, it is questionable whether their advisory and supervisor roles 
constituted the biggest challenge to the LAP. The heads of the public sector agencies 
however appeared to encounter difficulties in combining their official civil service 
responsibilities in the day-to-day management of their agencies with the ‘unofficial’, 
less rewarding, and demanding task of supervising the reforms within and outside 
their agencies (Aryeetey et al. 2007; MASDAR 2011b; MLF 2006). For the above 
reasons, many of the heads of the agencies were less committed to the reforms.            
 
(iii) Land Policy Steering Committee (LPSC) 
 
The LPSC was created to be the highest supervisory agent for the LAP. It was 
composed of the Ministers and Deputy Ministers of various Ministries with interest 
in the reform, a representative of the National House of Chiefs, the Chairman of the 
Select Committee of Parliament on Lands, and a host of representatives described as 
“the principal stakeholders and prominent professionals in Ghana’s land policy 
scene” (World Bank 2003c:14).337 The LPSC was chaired by the Minister of the 
MLF and the LAP Project Director was the Secretary to the Committee. Frequent 
changes of Ministers across the Ministries and the change in government in 2008 
made the LPSC a highly unstable coalition of elites. Some of the representatives 
rarely attended the Committee’s meetings (particularly representatives of the 
Attorney-General’s Department and the Ministry of Finance and Economic 
Planning). The meetings of the LPSC were “especially successful because members 
of the LSTC were available to provide technical and professional insights into the 
policy considerations.”338 In fact, the LPSC held its first meeting eight months after 
members of the LSTC had hit the ground running with five meetings.    
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The LPSC membership instability and late take-off affected its capacity to provide 
effective direction and guidelines to the LAPU. On rare occasions when the LPSC 
gave directions to the LAPU, “decisions made by the LPSC were sometimes rejected 
by the World Bank.”339 In 2006, the LPSC complained to a DFID project visitation 
team that “A major problem of the Committee was that it was not certain as to who 
was the decision maker when it came to Project Implementation. This was because 
there had been circumstances when LPSC had taken decisions and DPs had objected 
to the implementation of those decisions.”340 The LPSC was not able to “discourage 
donors from operating as “policemen”, using disbursements and authorisations as 
instruments of control” as it had hoped.341 Three years into the implementation of the 
LAP, the Minister for the MLF, complained to members of the LPSC that “it was 
still not clear as to who was the final decision maker for LAP.” The reality was that 
the LPSC lacked economic power and state authority to shape the reforms.
342
  
 
In sum, the organization of state authority for the reform of the land administration 
system depended on political action between the Presidential-Executive, Parliament, 
and the National House of Chiefs. The new political agents that were created to 
facilitate the reform (LAPU, LSTC and LPSC) did not have state authority to reform 
the institutions of land administration by themselves. The LAP Project Director, Dr 
Odame Larbi, rightly emphasized that “The processes of reforming institutions are 
political processes. LAP is to make recommendations”.343 The roles of the new 
internal actors in facilitating the reform were important but what mattered most was 
the political support or resistance of the political ruling elites who wielded state 
authority for reform. The World Bank, notwithstanding its economic power, realised 
that Ghana’s constitutional settlements on land administration constrained its interest 
to promote individual land titling. Constitutional rules do matter in enabling or 
constraining the interest of even powerful economic actors in Ghana. How the 
external and internal actors interacted within or outside the rules of the traditional-
federal State to implement the reform mattered significantly. The nature of 
interaction between the reform actors is depicted in Diagram 4 below. 
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Diagram 4: External and Internal Actors in the implementation of the LAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Diagram 4 above, the design of the sub-components of the LAP as well as the 
negotiation of financial aid for the project involved the relevant Ministries (MLF and 
the Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology - MEST), Parliament, the 
Presidential-Executive, and the six international development agencies. However, 
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the organization of state authority for reform is shared between the Presidential-
Executive, Parliament, and the National House of Chiefs. Five of the public sector 
land agencies to be reformed into the single agency were under the MLF. The 
headquarter of the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) is within the 
MEST although the department is decentralised to the District Assemblies that are 
supervised by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). 
Members of the LPSC were appointed by the Presidential-Executive, Parliament, the 
National House of Chiefs and other stakeholders. As I have discussed, although the 
LPSC tried to shape the implementation of the LAP, it is questionable whether it has 
any major influence in shaping the restructuring of the public land agencies into a 
single agency or the creation of the Customary Land Secretariats. The heads of the 
six agencies that were supposed to be reformed into a single agency were members 
of the LSTC that provided technical advice to LAPU. In the domain of traditional 
states, the cooperation of chiefs was crucial in the creation of the publicly 
accountable agencies of customary land administration (the CLS). The traditional 
authorities were seen by LAPU to be key actors in the implementation of that aspect 
of the project (Toulmin et al. 2004; World Bank 2003c).  
 
I move on to discuss the outcomes of the reform objectives. I shall begin with the 
customary sector of land administration. The ability of the Government to access the 
World Bank’s loan for the restructuring of the public sector agencies depended on its 
ability to meet the World Bank’s loan conditionality concerning “confirmation of the 
validity of customary freehold” within the customary sector. It is therefore logical to 
start the analysis from the complex customary sector because how the matter was 
settled shaped the reform of the public sector agencies.  
 
9.2 The Politics of Customary Land Administration Reform: Creating 
Transparent and Accountable Customary Land Secretariats (CLSs) 
 
Customary land administration is embedded in the complex rules of customary law 
governing organizations of chieftaincy-society relations to land ownership. I have 
showed that the ‘increasing returns’ (Pierson 2004) to the demands for transparent 
and accountable customary land administration by chiefs is shaped by four key 
political settlements of state organization: (1) the consolidation of stool (communal) 
259 
land ownership; (2) the prohibition of the creation of freehold lands from stool lands; 
(3) the integration of the rules of customary law into the laws of the state; and, (4) 
the consolidation of the institution of chieftaincy. In chapters 5-8, I discussed the 
political and administrative challenges of ensuring transparent and accountable 
customary land administration since colonial rule. Demanding transparent and 
accountable customary land administration is not a simple matter. I discuss below 
the reform objective and outcomes.  
 
9.2.1 Customary Land Administration Reform Objectives      
 
The World Bank’s project appraisal document outlined the reform objective as 
follows: “the project would seek to assist traditional authorities to develop local land 
administration in a transparent and accountable manner and with increased 
participation of community members on whose behalf they act” (World Bank 
2003c:8). However, “a detailed work program [was to] be developed during project 
implementation with technical and financial support by DFID” (World Bank 
2003c:48). I have explained why some political elites felt that the strengthening of 
customary land administration was more likely to be achieved through collaboration 
with the DFID than through World Bank support. The World Bank’s loan 
accessibility condition that required government to provide satisfactory confirmation 
of the validity of so-called customary freehold was seen by some political elites as 
contradictory to the objective of strengthening customary land administration.  
 
The Project Memorandum developed by DFID consultants in collaboration with 
LAPU stated that “The purpose of this project is to support the development of 
Customary Land Secretariats [CLS] in Ghana as effective, publicly accountable local 
structures for administration of land” (Toulmin et al. 2004:1). Concerning the issue 
of accountability of traditional authorities, the CLS project emphasized that “Article 
36(8) of the 1992 Constitution makes clear that customary land managers are 
accountable as fiduciaries to the nation and the stool, skin and family land members 
that they represent” (Toulmin et al. 2004:31). The specific reform outputs sought by 
the CLS project are shown in Table 21 below.  
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Table 21: CLS Project Objectives and Verifiable Indicators 
 
Objectives/Outputs Verifiable Indicators  
1 Institutions:   
 
CLSs established and/or 
strengthened in pilot 
areas, in partnership with 
government land sector 
agencies. 
1.1. Relative responsibilities of CLSs and Land Sector Agencies 
(LSAs) clarified, and validated by both parties. 
 
1.2. A range of pilots identified and strengthened (up to 50 in 
number), representing the broad range of allodial authority types.  
 
1.3. Procedures, processes and information systems at CLS-level 
established and tested in up to 50 pilot areas. 
 
1.4. Evidence that pilot CLSs are operating effective and 
sustainable administrative systems. 
 
1.5. Greater adherence to legal procedures for allocation and 
recording of land holding and land use planning. 
 
1.6. Mechanisms for lesson learning from the pilots established, 
and lessons disseminated. 
2 Information:  
 
Improved quality of 
records and accessibility 
of information at CLS 
level on land use and 
holdings, land 
transactions and 
availability, and 
associated financial and 
cadastral records. 
2.1. Customary secretariats land records are updated and made 
publicly available in appropriate formats. 
2.2. Evidence that CLS records functioning in ways which allow for 
rationalisation with the records of the LSAs and District 
Assemblies (DAs). 
 
2.3. Customary secretariats publish exhaustive regular accounts 
of revenues received, and make these widely available in 
appropriate formats. 
 
2.4. Customary secretariats publish exhaustive regular accounts 
of CLS expenditure, and make these widely available in 
appropriate formats. 
3 Accountability:  
 
CLS accountability 
improved, in line with the 
Constitutional provisions, 
in a way that protects the 
rights of all land holders, 
recognises the public 
interest in land 
management and 
provides an effective 
interface with democratic 
local and national 
governments.  
3.1. Evidence of cooperation between customary and elected local 
government authorities in development spending and land use 
planning.  
 
3.2. Dispute resolution procedures put in place which operates 
effectively to balance interests of primary and derived-rights 
holders and give impartial judgements on the actions of CLS land 
managers.  
 
3.3. Greater legitimacy of customary authorities as evidenced by 
reduction in chieftaincy disputes and destoolments. 
 
Source: DFID (2010) Project Completion Report 
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DFID project consultants who designed the project emphasized, “The DFID 
component is centrally concerned with accountability, and indicators relating to the 
size and deployment of revenues will be crucial to developing the required 
transparency” (Toulmin et al. 2004:54). In other words, CLS accountability, “as far 
as the mind frame of those who prepared the project document is concerned is to see 
that revenues accruing into stools or families, and for that matter to the occupant of 
the stool or head of family, are well accounted for.”344 Developmental states with 
transparent, accountable, and enforceable institutions are purposely created by 
political ruling elites and not wished into existence. The political support of the NPP 
Government and chiefs were crucial for the success of the project to create a 
transparent and accountable CLS. The important question therefore is whether there 
was strong internal political support for the CLS project. 
 
9.2.2 Political Support or Resistance to the CLS Project 
 
DFID consultants and CLS project consultants who designed or implemented the 
project have pointed out that the NPP government did not strongly support the effort 
to ensure the creation of an accountable agency of communal land administration 
managed by chiefs and representatives of community members. Quan et al. (2008) 
have argued that “the [NPP] government’s clear political choice at the inception of 
LAP was that CLSs should fall under the aegis of traditional authorities, rather than 
seeking to develop more community based approaches to the management of 
customary land” (Quan et al. 2008:188). Richard Crook also argued that “The chiefs 
were and are defended by the parties of the Danquah-Busia tradition, of which the 
New Patriotic Party (NPP) is the latest manifestation” (Crook 2005:3). 
 
President J.A. Kufour is a direct descendant of the Oyoko royal family from which 
the Asantehene is chosen (Agyeman-Duah 2003). His father was the head of the 
royal family (ibid). In a biography of J.A. Kufour, according to Agyeman-Duah 
(2003) narrated that J.A. Kufour in his young days “would accompany his father to 
the Manhyia Palace where the Asantehene would sit in court on Mondays and 
Thursdays to adjudicate cases – civic and land litigation.” Growing up in the royal 
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house at the heart of the Asante Kingdom, became “a strong believer in traditional 
values” (Agyeman-Duah 2003:10). Perhaps this could explain why the Presidential-
Executive preferred the CLS to be developed under the authority of the chiefs rather 
than rather than supporting the development of an agency similar to Botswana’s 
Land Boards. It should be noted that President J.A. Kufour had faced the dilemma of 
a ‘royal-citizen’ similar to the challenge faced by Seretse Kharma of Botswana. 
However, President Seretse Kharma used his dual status as a royal-citizen to 
effectively reform the existing informal institutions of chieftaincy that governed 
communal land administration into the transparent, publicly accountable, and 
renowned Lands Boards. The path chosen by the NPP Government therefore stood in 
sharp contrast to the path chosen by Seretse Kharma in Botswana. 
 
At this juncture it is important to link the discussion to how the government 
responded to the World Bank’s demand for the provision of “assurances, satisfactory 
to the IDA, with respect to the continuing validity of customary freeholds” (World 
Bank 2003c:33). In 2004, the NPP Government, through the office of the Attorney-
General, provided assurance to the World Bank that customary freeholds are valid. It 
appears that the World Bank was initially satisfied with the Attorney-General’s 
interpretation that customary freeholds are backed by the rules of customary law and 
should not fall under the constitutional prohibition of the creation of freeholds from 
stool lands. The National House of Chiefs, and particularly chiefs in the Ashanti 
region, vehemently opposed the Attorney-General’s interpretation of the 
constitutional position on customary freehold (LAPU 2004, NHC 2005). Later, 
World Bank legal experts noted that the Attorney-General’s persuasive interpretation 
which would allow recognition and registration of new customary freeholds “is not 
binding” (Bruce 2006b:7). In 2010, the LAP legal team also appears to have 
accepted the forceful argument of the Stool and Skin Lands Committee of the 
National House of Chiefs that the 1992 constitution clearly prohibits the creation of 
any freehold whatsoever from stool lands. The LAP legal team and the NHC agreed 
that the term “customary tenancy” should rather be used.345 Clearly, constitutional 
settlements over the organization of state authority matters.  
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Chiefs supported the creation of the CLS to help ensure transparency and good 
records keeping in communal land transactions (NHC 2005, 2009; Quan et al. 2008). 
However, many chiefs have not been willing to subject their use of stool land 
revenues to public scrutiny (Quan et al. 2008). For instance, the Paramount Chief of 
Mampong (Mamponghene), a legal expert, told the LAP team at the National House 
of Chiefs that “if any of my citizens should be bold enough to ask me to account for 
how I use the stool land revenues, I will tell him to start from the District Assembly 
where the bulk of the money meant for infrastructural development is sent.”346 
Technically, the Mamponghene was justified in referring to the constitutional 
settlement underpinning the sharing of the stool land revenues. Many chiefs maintain 
the position that the share of stool land revenues given to the chiefs “remains the 
perquisites of the traditional authority for the maintenances of the positions of the 
chiefs.”347 In the previous chapter I showed how the Kumasi Traditional Council 
uses its share of the stool land revenue to maintain the stool. 
 
The irony is that the designers of the CLS project did not even notice the institutions 
of horizontal accountability that exist between the Auditor-General’s Department (or 
the Audit Service) and Traditional Councils of chiefs. The reason could be that those 
institutions of horizontal accountability were innovated by chiefs and non-chief 
political ruling elites during the colonial era. Although the institutions have been 
consolidated in the post-colonial state, policy makers, customary land administration 
project designers and scholars have not paid serious attention to them. Certainly, the 
design of the CLS project was done without “serious analysis of where the country 
is, [or] where it is coming from” (Booth et al. 2005:2). Particularly, discussions by 
scholars and legal experts on the issue of accountability of chiefs in the use of stool 
land revenues fail to examine the origins of the current constitutional rules governing 
the sharing of stool land revenues between chiefs and local government agencies.    
 
                                                                                                                                          
Mampong) had finally been removed by the LAP legal team from the new draft of the Bill based on 
an agreement reached with the Stool and Skin Lands Committee of the NHC. In satisfaction, and 
partly with anger, the Mamponghene stated,“It took us so many hours to agree on this!”  
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One might ask whether there were strong demands from citizens for the 
accountability of their chiefs in stool land administration. I argued that such a 
technical matter should be examined from among Ghanaian officials who 
implemented the LAP or from officials of the public sector land agencies who are 
better informed about the issue. Is there any ordinary non-chief citizen who is “bold 
enough” to ask his chief to account for the use of stool land revenues? Mr Jimmy 
Aidoo, LAP Monitoring and Evaluation officer offered the following advice when I 
asked him whether chiefs are accountable to the CLSs that have been created: 
 
You don’t ask ‘Are the Chiefs accountable?’, even if you are trying to use those 
words, the word you should use is ‘cooperation’. You have to ask, ‘Do the 
traditional authorities cooperate with the CLS?’ …So the word is cooperation, not 
accountability. …The word accountable, you are looking at democratic process. 
Some people are even saying they are not transparent. You don’t choose or use 
those words when you go to the Chiefs. I took the World Bank to the Asantehene 
and I coached them the words to use. …So if you say accountable and all that, 
you are threading in a very dangerous territory, they won’t mind you, they will 
say pack your things and go.
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Dr. Odame Larbi, LAP Project Director, agrees with Mr Jimmy Aidoo as follows: 
 
It is the way the traditional system is organized. You know when you go to the 
chiefs in their palace, in our culture when the chief sits in public and he is 
adjudicating any case or performing any function, he is the last person to speak, 
and once he speaks no one else speaks again. When the chief speaks nobody 
challenges him, in public; when the chief speaks nobody can tell him that he is 
lying, in public. …Their own subjects cannot call them to account because of the 
way the traditional institutions are organized. If you go and demand in public that 
the Chief should account, I am sure that before you leave that durbar grounds to 
your house, if you are in a village they would have burnt your house or whatever 
they do they would intimidate you to leave so those structures do not allow the 
people to demand accountability.
349
        
 
The answer to the question on the presence of bottom-up demand for accountability 
from chiefs is clear. Officials of LAPU could demand accountability within the 
public sphere of government but not within the palaces of chiefs where the rules of 
customary law reign. The attempt to create vertical institutions of accountability 
between citizens and chiefs therefore appears to have been misplaced. Jimmy Aidoo 
explained what Ghanaians demand: “Those buzz words ‘transparency’ and 
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‘accountability’ came from the project Memorandum of Understanding between 
DFID and the Project. So that is why it found itself into the project. In effect we 
want simple and efficient land transaction at the local level.”350 This view supports 
the point made by Sulemana Mahama, LAP Project Coordinator, that “Despite the 
overwhelming evidence of the need for the project, the sense of ownership by 
stakeholders requires to be dramatically improved upon” (Mahama 2003:4).  
 
The CLS project did not only lack strong local ownership but its focus on 
accountability of chiefs in stool land administration lacked strong support from 
among those who were supposed to implement it. Dr. Adarkwah Antwi, CLS 
National Facilitator from 2005-2006, questioned the basis for demanding the 
accountability of chiefs in stool land ownership by arguing as follows:  
 
We got the accountability issue wrong to some extent, because in the forest areas 
a significant proportion of farm land transactions are organized without reference 
to the Stool. … As I understand our traditional land holding system, …the chiefs 
are custodians or trustees; they don’t hold direct beneficiary ownership of the 
land. In villages where the customary land system is still being practised, chiefs 
do not have the power to sell land or to dispose of it. It is individual families and 
extended families that are doing that. … Payments for land acquisition are not 
made to the Stool but made directly to the family or individual that transacts the 
land. Now if the Stool doesn’t receive payments for transactions, where lies the 
question of accountability that we are fixated on?
351
 
 
Dr. Adarkwah Antwi was therefore less interested in pursuing the objective of the 
CLS to create publicly accountable agencies of stool land administration. Mr. Mark 
Kakraba-Ampeh, who took over from Dr. Adarkwah Antwi as CLS National 
Facilitator from 2007-2009, also argued that the focus of the CLS project should be 
on the creation of transparent agencies rather than the demand for accountability.
352
 
He explained his position as follows:   
 
You don’t need to demand accountability. The system must lend itself to 
accountability. You don’t need to prescribe the form that it should take. The 
system must itself make it possible. Throw more light on the dealings at the local 
level. Let people see what is happening. That would be 90% of accountability.
353
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It could be seen that the implementation of the CLS project “without proper 
diagnostics and consultations with stakeholders” (Aryeetey et al. 2007:61) made 
each CLS Facilitator to work based on how he understood the problems of, and 
solutions to, customary land administration. While Dr Adarkwah Antwi questioned 
the claims of chiefs to the beneficiary ownership of stool lands, Mr Mark Kakraba-
Ampeh also questioned the basis for demanding accountability from chiefs. The 
general lack of strong interest in the accountability of chiefs was not only shaped by 
cultural constraints but also inadequate understanding about the institutional 
character of chieftaincy. At the time the CLS project was designed, there was 
confusion among legal experts and officials of the MLF about the character of 
chieftaincy institutions. The MLF had classified the institutional arrangements for 
land administration into public institutions’ and ‘private institutions (MLF 2003:15-
16). The two institutional categories were explained by the MLF as follows:  
 
By public is meant the Government land agencies which collaborate to manage all 
state acquired and vested lands and enforces regulations regarding the 
administration of customary lands. The institutional arrangements for land 
administration are shared among six (6) public agencies under the Ministries of 
Land and Forestry, and Environment and Science. …The private institutions 
comprise the customary landowners (Chiefs and Family Heads) and individuals 
who may possess land…and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). 
 
The MLF stated the implication for the development of Customary Land Secretariat 
as follows: “Since these institutions [CLSs] are mainly private, the level of 
assistance expected to be received by them, has been the subject of debate” (MLF 
2003:26). Many officials of LAPU adopted the position that Customary Land 
Secretariats are private institutions and not public institutions. Professor Kasim 
Kasanga who pushed for the CLS project to be inserted into the LAP and 
implemented pointed out that “there was little or no support” among officials in the 
MLF for the CLS project.
354
 The MLF had undermined the political basis on which 
to negotiate with chiefs for the development of publicly accountable agencies of 
customary land administration as intended by the CLS project. I turn next to discuss 
the outcomes of the CLS project. The outcomes of the CLS project reported by 
DFID are shown in Table 22 below.   
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Table 22: CLS Project Outcomes (Source: DFID 2010)
355
 
Objectives/Outputs Objectively Verifiable Indicators Outcomes 
1 Institutions:   
 
CLSs established 
and/or strengthened 
in pilot areas, in 
partnership with 
government land 
sector agencies. 
1.1. Relative responsibilities of CLSs 
and LSAs clarified, and validated by 
both parties. 
 
1.2. A range of pilots identified and 
strengthened (up to 50 in number), 
representing the broad range of allodial 
authority types.  
 
1.3. Procedures, processes and 
information systems at CLS-level 
established and tested in up to 50 pilot 
areas. 
 
1.4. Evidence that pilot CLSs are 
operating effective and sustainable 
administrative systems. 
 
1.5. Greater adherence to legal 
procedures for allocation and recording 
of land holding and land use planning. 
 
1.6. Mechanisms for lesson learning 
from the pilots established, and lessons 
disseminated. 
1.1. Although operating guidelines and training were delivered, comprehensive guidance for use by 
MLNR and customary institutions on the governance of CLS was not in place by the time of project 
closure. Although chieftaincy institutions see the CLS as an integral part of the traditional authority, 
some secondary legislation regulating aspects of CLS functions may be required.  Delays in 
development of planned new substantive land legislation, and the associated policy dialogue, have 
meant that the discussion of these issues continues. 
 
1.2.  37 Pilots have been established, across all 10 regions of Ghana.  Most have been in stool land 
areas, but the pilots include sites in family lands, and in northern Ghana where differing customary 
land management systems prevail.  
 
1.3. A range of procedures, processes and information systems have been piloted. Database formats 
have been piloted and tested for land registration, as well as mechanisms.   A range of home-grown 
CLS innovations include use of mobile phone cameras to capture images of land users / tenants.  
 
1.4. Several pilot CLS appear to be running effective and sustainable systems, but a fuller field 
assessment would be needed.  
 
1.5. Mixed story.  Legal procedures generally being improved, but the risk remains that customary 
usufruct rights may be downgraded to leasehold rights, as a result of existing legislation and legal 
instruments for land registration.                                              
 
 1.6. Initial lesson-learning undertaken in August 2009, with support of Technical Consultants, but the 
depth of evaluation and lesson learning was curtailed due to project closure.  Lesson-learning 
mechanisms not yet institutionalised. 
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 The DFID CLS Project Completion Report (2010) is a more refined version of the CLA-LAPU Project Completion Report (2009). But there is no significant difference 
between the content of the two reports with regards to the outcomes of the CLS project.    
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Table 22 continuation: CLS Project Outcomes 
 
Objectives/Outputs Objectively Verifiable Indicators Outcomes 
2 Information:  
 
Improved quality of 
records and 
accessibility of 
information at CLS 
level on land use and 
holdings, land 
transactions and 
availability, and 
associated financial 
and cadastral records. 
 
2.1. Customary secretariats land records are updated 
and made publicly available in appropriate formats. 
2.2 Evidence that CLS records functioning in ways 
which allow for rationalisation with the records of the 
LSAs and DAs. 
 
2.3. Customary secretariats publish exhaustive 
regular accounts of revenues received, and make 
these widely available in appropriate formats. 
 
2.4. Customary secretariats publish exhaustive 
regular accounts of CLS expenditure, and make these 
widely available in appropriate formats. 
2.1. Records are updated, but public availability and access varies between CLS.   
Several thousand potential CLS users have been informed of the role of the CLS in 
strengthening customary land record-keeping through direct meetings (in district 
halls, churches, mosques, open air venues) as well as through community radio 
phone-in and TV.   
 
2.2. Over 140,000 land records held at CLS level.  CLS establishment is creating a 
demand for rationalisation of records and access at decentralised level to records 
previously only held at the centre. At least 5 CLS have exchanged data and 
information with DAs on planning layouts.  
 
2.3 / 2.4.   Some CLS (e.g. Gbawe) publish accounts including land revenues, but 
CLS revenue / expenditure accounts are not widely published or disseminated.  
3 Accountability:  
 
CLS accountability 
improved, in line with 
the Constitutional 
provisions, in a way 
that protects the rights 
of all land holders, 
recognises the public 
interest in land 
management and 
provides an effective 
interface with 
democratic local and 
national governments. 
 
3.1. Evidence of cooperation between customary and 
elected local government authorities in development 
spending and land use planning.  
 
3.2. Dispute resolution procedures put in place which 
operates effectively to balance interests of primary 
and derived-rights holders and give impartial 
judgements on the actions of CLS land managers.  
 
3.3. Greater legitimacy of customary authorities as 
evidenced by reduction in chieftaincy disputes and 
destoolments. 
3.1 In some CLS (such as Bole, Paga, Bongo, Damango, and Wassa Amenfi) 
District Assemblies have provided accommodation for the CLS.  There is some 
evidence of cooperation in land use planning, but discussions with DAs on 
development spending have been limited. 
 
3.2. Dispute procedures have helped to resolve multiple sales of land. ADR baseline 
studies and training given for Chiefs' Land Management Committees and CLS staff.  
MLNR reports that over 770 land disputes have been resolved through ADR at CLS.  
The contribution of CLS to dispute resolution was confirmed in an August 2009 
survey (Bugri 2009) which reported that all of the 17 CLS that were visited reported 
resolution of land disputes. 
 
3.3. Some pilot CLS have broadened the membership of existing chieftaincy Land 
Management Committees to include outsiders.  One CLS (Bekwai) has allocated 
10% of all land revenues to CLS funding, so providing de facto information on the 
otherwise hidden value of "drinks money". 
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Three important points about the reform outcomes should be added. First, according 
to the DFID Project Completion Report, “Legally, CLS have been established under 
the authority of the chiefs, and are not public (state) entities.” The reality of the CLS 
as an agency of customary land administration is that there are no new formal-legal 
rules that makes it obligatory for a CLS to provide information or accountability to 
members of the local community. At the time of writing this study, the LAP legal 
team and the National House of Chiefs were still negotiating over the nature of the 
formal-legal rules that should govern the mandate-responsiveness of the CLS.
356
 
External and internal actors with interest in the CLS project are waiting for the 
National House of Chiefs and the LAPU legal team to finish the negotiations. The 
mandates and authority of the CLSs are being defined in an omnibus Lands Bill. 
Interestingly, the constitutional provisions concerning the consolidation of stool, 
skin, and family land ownership and the accountability obligations of traditional 
authorities to their communities have all been reproduced.  
 
Second, during the discussions on the Lands Bill at the National House of Chiefs, the 
chiefs vehemently opposed a section of the Bill that seeks to criminalise the failure 
to discharge the fiduciary obligation of accountability. The Mamponghene, 
vociferously demanded, “That clause should completely be deleted. Delete it and 
leave it for the people to determine.”357 Kunbun Na, Chairman of the Stool and Skin 
Lands Committee, advised that “If a chief is imprisoned it is tantamount to destool 
the Chief. But in customary law, if you are not a kingmaker you have no right to 
destool the chief. The law should comply with the customary law existing within the 
particular area.”358 Kwame Gyan, Head of the LAP Legal team agreed to remove the 
clause. He further explained to the chiefs, “I deliberately put it there to provoke 
discussion. It is not my intention to put Nananom in prison.” In the face of “lack of 
bottom-up demand” (Development Institute 2009)359 from citizens for the 
accountability of their chiefs, one wonders whether anything new would emerge. 
                                                 
356
 On 29 July, 2010, at a workshop at the National House of Chiefs, members of the National House 
of Chiefs and the LAP Legal Team discussed the content of the first and second draft of the Lands 
Bill (Draft 1&2) and agreed on further amendments.  
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 Mamponghene’s contribution at the workshop organized by the LAP for the National House of 
Chiefs to discuss progress made in the drafting of the Lands Bill.  
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 Kunbun Na’s contribution at the workshop organized by the LAP for the National House of Chiefs.   
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 Development Institute (DI) is one of ten NGOs recruited by the LAPU to sensitize the public about 
the LAP, particularly the CLS project.   
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Third, the DFID has not seen the outcome of the CLS project as a successful 
enterprise that warrants its further technical and financial support; and, consequently, 
after August 2009, the DFID pulled out of the project.
360
 Interestingly, according to 
the LAP Project Director, “some of the Customary Land Secretariats have died.”361 It 
is easy for a public service delivery agency that lacks legal foundations to die 
because no one is obliged to provide the resources for its survival. The LAP Project 
Director, Dr Odame Larbi, however rightly emphasized, 
 
Making chiefs accountable means understanding the way the traditional 
institutions are organized and changing that organizational structure, those 
arrangements, and then to make their deeds more transparent and more 
accountable. So it is something that has to do with institutional reform. If you are 
going to deal with reforming an institution like chieftaincy then you don’t need 
five years because you need to really work on the softer parts and then bring them 
up to a point where they themselves would recognise that there is the need for 
them to be more accountable.
362
 
 
Notwithstanding what appears to be a gloomy picture for the CLS following the 
withdrawal of DFID financial and technical support, the LAP legal team and the 
National House of Chiefs have continued to negotiate about the nature of the legal 
rules that should govern the nature and responsibilities of the CLS. I shall use three 
CLS projects at the heart of the Asante Kingdom to highlight other challenges 
encountered by the CLS project.  
 
9.2.3 The CLS Project in the Golden Asante Kingdom 
 
The Kumasi traditional area is traditional ruled by the Kumasi Traditional Council 
headed by the Asantehene. The KTC plays a central role in the political 
administration of the Asante Kingdom. The prominent role played by the Asante 
Kingdom in the politics of traditional-federal state organization during the colonial 
period has already been discussed. The bitter politics of land administration between 
the Asante Kingdom and governments have well been documented by scholars. The 
LAP established three CLSs in the Kumasi Traditional Area, namely, the Asantehene 
CLS, Nkawie CLS and Toase CLS. The Asantehene CLS project began in 2003 
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 Interviews with Dr Adarkwah Antwi, Dr Odame Larbi, and Mr Mark Kakraba-Ampeh.  
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under a reform approach which the LAPU refer to as the ‘supply-led approach’. The 
Nkawie CLS and Toase CLS projects were implemented in 2008 under a new reform 
strategy which the LAPU refer to as the ‘demand-led approach’. I shall explain these 
strategies under the relevant CLS created with the strategy. 
 
(i) The Asantehene CLS Project: The Supply-led reform approach 
 
The Asantehene Lands Secretariat which was created in 1943 administers all the 
stool lands vested in the Asantehene, King of the Asantes. The Secretariat has 
employed its own Land Economist/Valuer, a Surveyor/Quantity Surveyor, a 
Planning Officer, Recording Officers, and Clerical staff from the labour market. 
Under the supply-led reform approach, the Customary Land Administration Unit 
(CLAU) of LAPU attempted to reform the existing Asantehene Lands Secretariat 
into a more efficient and publicly accountable agency (Toulmin et al. 2004). The 
CLAU supplied the Asantehene Lands Secretariat with computers, printers, office 
furniture, photocopiers and other items.  
 
The Asantehene and his traditional council however refused to give audience to the 
CLS implementation team.
363
 Nana Asomadu,
364
 Head of Administration of the 
Secretariat, provided some explanations as to why the CLS team was not given 
audience with the Asantehene. He explained that the CLS project had sought to 
change the name of the Asantehene Lands Secretariat to Customary Land Secretariat. 
Changing the name of the Secretariat was not something that the Asantehene and his 
council of chiefs were going to tolerate. Nana Asomadu explained as follows:  
 
They [CLS Team] call this place Asantehene Customary Land Secretariat but we 
do not consider here as Customary Land Secretariat. It is Asantehene Lands 
Office. ... This office cannot be dismantled. The Lands Commission and others 
can be dismantled and a new organization created but this Office cannot be 
dismantled. We have our own autonomy. ...This office has existed since 1943.
365
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Nana Asomadu further explained that the CLS project had ignored the customary 
rules of accountability that governed stool land administration in the Kumasi 
traditional area. He explained the unwritten customary rules as follows:  
 
Within the Kumasi Traditional area, there is a formula for sharing the money 
from the sale of land. One-third of the money goes to Asantehene. The remaining 
two-thirds is divided into five and shared among the following: (1) the Obrempon 
(divisional chief), (2) the stool, (3) the family with usufructuary rights, (4) 
Nkonyasefo (stool elders including the Adikrofo in that area), and (5) community 
development. … This formula is not on paper. We pass it on from generation to 
generation. We have sat down to develop our own customary rules.
366
 
 
Moreover, Nana Asomadu explained that the CLS project team brought to the 
negotiation table things that the Secretariat could easily purchase from the market 
and not things that the Secretariat had requested. He explained as follows:  
 
We were here when they came here under the LAP to give us support. They 
brought us 2 or 3 computers, chairs, office cabinets, and tables. These are not 
things that we need at all. We need the whole expansion of this block, if they can 
do that for us to enable us employ more personnel. And they should pay them to 
help us do our work, this will help us. So if they can come and build an additional 
building block and staff it with personnel paid by them that will be good. Before 
computers were discovered we were doing everything manually.
367
  
 
It should be noted that officials of the MLF and LAPU argued that chieftaincy 
institutions are “private institutions” and so the chiefs should find their own 
resources (MLF 2003). Consequently, the staff of the Asantehene Lands Secretariat 
in Kumasi rebuffed attempts made by the LAP to reform the Asantehene Lands 
Secretariat into a publicly accountable agency by arguing, “This is a private 
institution. It is not under Government. So why would anyone want to come here and 
ask us what we use our money for?”368 The Asantehene Lands Secretariat therefore 
did not see the need to negotiate with the CLS Team on grounds of accountability.  
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 The nature of stool land administration in the Kumasi Traditional area was further clarified in 
interviews with Nana Nsuase Poku Agyeman III (Chief Linguist or Akyeamehene of the Asantehene 
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Finally, members of the Asante Regional House of Chiefs had become angry and 
deeply suspicious about the CLS project when they were informed at a workshop 
that the government, through the office of the Attorney-General had provided 
confirmation to the World Bank concerning the validity of customary freeholds.
369
 
The issue “generated a heated argument”370 at the workshop because “Majority of 
the Nananom [chiefs] supported the proposition that in Ashanti subjects have only 
rights of use and no more.  Thus subjects do not have proprietary interests in the land 
they occupy.”371 The National House of Chiefs was yet to resolve the subject with 
the government when the CLS Team went to the Asantehene’s palace in 2005 to talk 
about transparency and accountability in stool land administration.  
 
The combination of the above factors led to the refusal of the Kumasi Traditional 
Council to grant audience to the CLS establishment team. The supply-led reform 
approach only managed to supply materials to the Asantehene Lands Secretariat. On 
many occasions, officials of the Asantehene Lands Secretariat rejected offers from 
the LAP to train the staff of the Secretariat. LAPU struggled to establish cordial 
relations with the Secretariat. Ironically, the Asantehene Lands Secretariat had been 
used as a model to design the CLS project (Toulmin et al. 2004). 
 
In 2007, the CLS National Facilitator resigned and a representative of the NGOs on 
LSTC, Mr Mark Kakraba-Ampeh, was recruited as the new CLS National 
Facilitator. According to Kakraba-Ampeh, “By June 2007, it was abundantly clear 
that the top-down approach (what is now known as the supply-led approach) was not 
working towards project expectations and the rate of progress was too slow.” Some 
members of the LPSC argued that LAPU should focus on findings ways to 
strengthen the 10 CLSs that had been created under the supply-led approach rather 
than creating new ones.  Other members argued that “it was not possible to stop the 
establishment of new ones” because “failure to establish new ones could be 
interpreted to mean non delivery of the project outputs.”372 The CLAU changed its 
strategy and returned to the Asantehene’s Kingdom where the new CLS National 
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Facilitator had established personal relations with many of the chiefs in the course of 
his work as a real estate developer which involved numerous land transactions.
373
  
 
(ii) Nkawie CLS and Toase CLS: The demand-led reform approach 
 
Under the demand-led approach, the CLAU would supply the same items to only 
those traditional authorities who demanded that CLS should be established in their 
jurisdiction of traditional rule. In return, the chiefs were to meet the following 
responsibilities: Provide suitable office accommodation for the CLS; meet the 
recurrent expenditure of the Secretariat; provide details of all land transactions to the 
Secretariat; constitute Land Management Committee/Board; and, allow changes 
where necessary to existing land management structures. 
 
The CLS Team, led by a new National Facilitator returned once more to the 
Asantehene’s Kumasi traditional area to establish two CLSs at Nkawie and Toase. 
Nkawie and Toase are two divisional traditional areas under the Kumasi traditional 
area ruled by the Asantehene. The two divisional areas share land boundaries and are 
ruled by Divisional chiefs, with the title of Abrempon within the structure of 
chieftaincy in the Asante Kingdom, who owe allegiance to the Asantehene and the 
Kumasi Traditional Council. Moreover, the Asantehene possesses the allodial title to 
the land managed by the Nkawie and Toase divisional chiefs.
374
 Thus, the Nkawie 
CLS and the Toase CLS can only function with the permission of the Kumasi 
Traditional Council presided by the Asantehene.  
 
The Nkawie and Toase divisional chiefs applied to LAPU for the establishment of 
CLSs in their divisional areas. In 2008, the CLAU established the Nkawie CLS and 
the Toase CLS. However, the divisional chiefs had not obtained the permission of 
the Asantehene. The Asantehene therefore became angry and placed injunctions over 
the operations of the CLSs. Unfortunately for the Nkawie CLS, before the matter 
could be resolved by the Kumasi Traditional Council, the Nkawie Divisional Chief 
died and the Kingmakers have since become embroiled in conflict over should be his 
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successor. The chieftaincy conflict has also crippled the work of the Nkawie CLS as 
the chiefs constituting the Land Management Committee have been divided into two 
factions supporting different candidates. The success of stool land administration by 
chiefs depends upon the success of chieftaincy as a whole. When the work of the 
Nkawie CLS was reviewed in 2010 by a private consultant hired by LAPU, the 
consultant reported, “It is obvious that the Nkawie CLS has not been successful. 
Currently it is virtually moribund” (MASDAR 2011a:89). Concerning the Toase 
CLS, the Toase divisional chiefs have amicably resolved their differences with the 
Asantehene and the Kumasi Traditional Council. Since they do not owe the allodial 
title over their lands they have agreed to send all stool land transactions to the 
Asantehene Lands Office to be completed (MASDAR 2011a, 2011b).  
 
The works of the Nkawie CLS, Toase CLS and Asantehene Lands Secretariat could 
enhance transparent and accountable customary land administration. The Asantehene 
CLS, Nkawie CLS and Toase CLS are inclusive of the 37 CLSs that have been 
reported to have been established under the aegis of willing and unwilling chiefs. 
There is some general agreement that all the CLSs that have been established are not 
publicly accountable agencies of customary land administration (Bugri 2009). John 
Bugri (2009:22), in his survey of the operations of 17 CLSs, reported that “No CLS 
was able to provide convincing evidence that revenues generated and expenditures 
made were subject to public scrutiny or auditing for purposes of transparency and 
accountability.” Ironically, the horizontal rules of accountability between the Kumasi 
Traditional Council and the Auditor-General department have not died. The practical 
human resource challenges face by Traditional Councils in their attempts to ensure 
transparency and accountability in the administration of their income and 
expenditure remains almost the same.  
 
9.2.4 Summary: Increasing Returns to Communal Land Ownership, Informal 
Institutions of Chieftaincy, and Accountability of Chiefs 
 
The organization of state authority for the reform of institutions concerning 
chieftaincy certainly matters. The CLS project rested on the premise that the state not 
only vests stool land ownership to traditional authorities of land-owning 
communities, but also the state obliges traditional authorities to be accountable to 
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their subjects for whom communal lands are held in trust. What the project failed to 
seriously examine is whether the accountability of chiefs to their subjects through 
existing rules of customary law as well as through annual audited reports submitted 
by Traditional Councils to the Auditor General falls short of the constitutional 
obligations of chiefs to their subjects.  
 
So long as the constitutional rules of the state ensures increasing returns to the 
survival of chieftaincy, communal land ownership, and rules of customary law there 
shall also be increasing returns questions over the public accountability of chiefs to 
their subjects. The administrative capacity of chiefs to enable them perform their 
agential functions in the administration of communal land should be developed. But 
it should be understood that institutions of chieftaincy are not private institutions. 
Institutions of chieftaincy have been part of the Ghanaian State since colonial rule. 
The nature of the informal state embedded in chieftaincy should be seriously 
researched and developed to support Ghana’s economic development.   
 
Chiefs share the functions of land administration with numerous public sector land 
agencies. I shall therefore move on to discuss the politics and outcomes of the 
organizational restructuring of six public sector land agencies into a single agency.  
 
9.3 The Politics of Public Sector Organizational Restructuring: 
Restructuring Six Public Sector Land Agencies into a Single Agency        
 
The focus of the reform was to restructure six public sector land agencies into a 
single agency and to strengthen the administrative capacity of the new agency to 
improve land administration. The six agencies were the Office of the Administrator 
of Stool Lands (OASL), the Lands Commission, the Land Valuation Board, the Land 
Title Registry, the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD), and the Survey 
Department (World Bank 2003). This reform component (sub-component 2.1) was 
funded by the World Bank. The reform objective did not encounter strong 
ideological conflicts among the six external actors as the CLS project encountered. 
The background to the World Bank’s support for this aspect of the project was 
discussed in chapter 7. I discuss below the nature of the reform, the political and 
institutional reform challenges encountered, and then the reform outcomes.  
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The World Bank’s appraisal of the project remarked that, 
 
Establishing a single land sector agency combining all the current six agencies 
and providing a one-stop-shop service (OSS) to customers may be difficult at the 
beginning, given the entrenched identities and interests of the public land sector 
agencies. However, this should be the preferred model to be considered. General 
agreement was obtained, during project preparation, that a model combining all 
land sector agencies…would be feasible. (World Bank 2003c:46)  
 
The political support or resistance of the civil servants working within the OASL and 
the Lands Commission did matter but the political ruling elites would not be legally 
constrained by any resistance from civil servants. Interestingly, the proposal for the 
restructuring of the public sector land agencies into a single agency was developed 
by officials of the Lands Commission.
375
 The Lands Commission therefore strongly 
support the reform. But the staff of the OASL strongly opposed the reform. Mrs. 
Christina Boboobe, Administrator of the OASL, argued that “The mandate of the 
Lands Commission and the mandate of the OASL are parallel. They are both 
creations of the 1992 Constitution....Nobody has the right to amend the constitution 
except the good people of Ghana.”376 The question was whether the political ruling 
elites had the will and resources to pursue constitutional reforms. Officials of the 
OASL were not the only ones who opposed the reform. Even before the LAP was 
designed, advocates of the reforms had recognised that “constitutional amendments 
and legal reforms are required” in order to restructure the agencies into a single 
agency (Kasanga 2000a:ii). The institutional and political challenges to the reform 
are examined in turn. 
 
9.3.1 Political and Institutional Constraints to Public Sector Reform 
 
The historical institutional analytical framework emphasize that institutions are 
created by political actors; and, the process of institutional change is in turn enabled 
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or constrained by the institutions that have been created. At the onset of the LAP, a 
comprehensive review of the legal rules governing the public sector agencies was 
undertaken with some recommendations about which rules needed to be changed 
(Kotey et al. 2004). However, the review was silent on the institutional reform 
processes and political challenges that faced the reformers in their attempt to 
restructure the six agencies into a single agency. State authority for the reform of 
institutions of land administration, I have argued, is shared by the Presidential-
Executive, Parliament and the National House of Chiefs. However, the reform of 
statutory created agencies and constitutionally created agencies of land 
administration entailed different reform processes and political challenges.  
 
Unlike the procedure for reforming the constitutional rules that guaranteed the 
institutions of chieftaincy, the constitutional provisions establishing the Lands 
Commission and the OASL were not entrenched provisions that required a 
referendum to be held throughout Ghana before they could be restructured.
377
 That 
notwithstanding, the constitutional procedure (Article 291) for the amendment of the 
constitutional provisions establishing these two agencies were not very easy to 
overcome. The constitutional procedure is as follows: 
 
(1) A bill to amend a provision of this Constitution which is not an 
entrenched provision shall not be introduced into Parliament unless: 
 
(a) it has been published twice in the Gazette with the second publication 
being made at least three months after the first; and  
 
(b) at least ten days have passed after the second publication  
 
(2) The Speaker shall, after the first reading of the bill in Parliament, refer it 
to the Council of State for consideration and advice and the Council of State 
shall render advice on the bill within thirty days after receiving it.  
 
(3) Where Parliament approves the bill, it may only be presented to the 
President for this assent if it was approved at the second and third readings of 
it in Parliament by the votes of at least two thirds of all the members of 
Parliament.  
 
(4) Where the bill has been passed in accordance with this article, the 
President shall assent to it.   
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Therefore, government did not only have to secure the support of at least two thirds 
of all members of parliament but also the support of the National House of Chiefs 
whose interest was at stake. The acrimonious politics that shaped the separation of 
chieftaincy from the local government system in the colonial era the consequent 
establishment of the OASL to manage the sharing of stool land revenues between 
chiefs and local government structures (District Assemblies) have already been 
discussed. The question now is whether or not the chiefs were going to support the 
restructuring of the OASL into a new single agency.  
 
The National House of Chiefs argued that the role and functions of the OASL should 
no longer be maintained but should be dismantled and “the ten percent share of the 
stool land revenue currently paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool lands be 
given to the Customary Lands Secretariats to enable them to manage their 
organization efficiently” (NHC 2005:8). The chiefs argued that the CLSs would be 
able to meet its expenses if the 10% is given to them. The implication of the proposal 
made by the chiefs is that they wanted to manage their own stool lands; particularly, 
the collection of their stool land revenue. The crucial question that arises is what 
would happen to the share of stool land revenue disbursed to the District 
Assemblies? The National House of Chiefs agreed to a proposal by LAPU that the 
collection and management of stool lands revenue should be undertaken by the 
Customary Land Secretariats.  
 
The National House of Chiefs (NHC) further suggested that “there should be a 
partnership between the traditional authorities and the District Assemblies in the 
management and control of the District Assemblies’ share of stool lands revenue” 
(NHC 2005:23). Among the reasons assigned by the chiefs was that “the 55% share 
of stool lands revenue paid to the District Assemblies is not being used for 
development projects. The result of this is that pressure being put on Nananom to use 
their share of the stool land revenue to undertake infrastructural development in their 
areas” (NHC 2005:22-23). The chiefs further proposed that “Article 267 (6) of the 
1992 Constitution which contains the formula for sharing stool lands revenue be 
amended” with this new formula: “District Assembly Forty percent (40%); 
Traditional Authority Twenty Five percent (25%); Stool Twenty five percent (25%); 
and Customary Land Secretariats Ten percent (10%)” (NHC 2005:23, original in 
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bold and italics). Could the chiefs be trusted by the non-chief elites to administer 
stool land revenues in a transparent and accountable manner? If the above new 
political settlement offered by the chiefs were accepted by the Presidential-
Executive, then, all that was needed was at least two-thirds of the members of 
parliament to also support the reform of the OASL.  
 
Reforming the statutory created agencies of land administration into a single agency 
would require the support of civil servants within the agencies. The statutory created 
agencies that largely supported the reform were the Land Valuation Board, the Land 
Title Registry.
378
 Bureaucratic elites of the Land Title Registry largely supported the 
reform because the registration of land titles also depended on technical clearances 
from the Lands Commission, the Survey Department and the Land Valuation Board 
(refer to discussion in chapter 7). Interestingly, the Land Valuation Board which 
existed without a legislative act of parliament saw its integration into a single agency 
as an opportunity to finally acquire a solid legal status and therefore its bureaucratic 
elites supported it (Kasanga 2000a). Thus, officials of the Land Valuation Board 
wholeheartedly supported the organizational reform. Crucially, Kasim Kasanga, 
Chairman of the Land Valuation Board who had argued that “the Land Valuation 
Board and the Compulsory Land Title Registry all of which deliver property services 
should come under one roof” (Kasanga 2000a:15) was made the Minister of the 
MLF during the period of designing of the LAP.   
 
Not every agency supported its restructuring into the proposed single agency. Staff 
of the Survey Department embarked on demonstrations and strike actions to strongly 
protest their restructuring into the single agency. In a memorandum to the 
Parliamentary Committee on Lands and Forestry in 2008, the Survey Department, 
supported by the Ghana Institute of Surveyors (GhIS) and the License Surveyors 
Association of Ghana (LISAG), argued that, 
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 LAPU organized workshops for bureaucratic elites of the public sector land agencies across all the 
10 regions of Ghana. The analysis of support for and resistance to the reform is also based on the 
written comments on the proposed single agency submitted by the agencies in all ten regions (see 
bibliography for the workshop reports used). I also used the Report of the Parliamentary Committee 
on Lands and Forestry on the Lands Commission Bill, 9
th
 October 2008, was also used in the analysis.   
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Historically, the Survey Department operated as a single autonomous body unlike 
the other land sector agencies that have been fragmented. This autonomous status 
stems from the specialised nature of surveying. According to them, apart from 
cadastral surveys that have direct relationship with land administration, there are 
other aspects of surveying currently undertaken by the Survey Department that do 
not integrate with land administration. …According to this school of thought, the 
importance of these other aspects of surveying is likely to be down-played if they 
are integrated into a single unit.
379
   
 
The resistance of the Survey Department was not simply based on technical matters. 
The history being recalled in the above was the history of state organization in the 
colonial period when the Survey Department was created in 1909 and the Survey 
General was even made a member of the Executive Council of the ruling 
government in 1926. I have discussed how the Lands Division within the then 
Survey Department gradually became autonomous under the new name Lands 
Commission and acquired constitutional authority at the expense of the Survey 
Department. Officials of the Survey Department now argued that if they should 
agree to the reform at all then the Lands Commission and the other fragmented 
agencies should rather be the agencies to be restructured under the Survey 
Department which gave birth to all the agencies.          
  
The restructuring of the TCPD faced strong resistance from several fronts. First, the 
headquarters of the TCPD was located under the Ministry of Environment, Science 
and Technology (MEST) and the MEST resisted the restructuring of the TCPD to the 
proposed single agency that would be created under the Ministry of Lands and 
Forestry. Second, bureaucratic elites at the headquarters of the TCPD also argued 
that the TCPD should rather be transformed into an autonomous authority to 
effectively perform its functions of town planning. Third, to complicate matters, the 
regional and district level offices of the TCPD were decentralised under the District 
Assemblies managed by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
(MLGRD). Ironically, the regional and district level staff of the TCPD favoured the 
restructuring of the TCPD into a revamped Lands Commission under the MLF 
because they argued that conditions of service under the existing Lands Commission 
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were far better than under the local government service.
380
 Members of the LPSC 
were in disagreement over what to do with the TCPD: “While some argued that it 
should be brought under the Ministry of Lands and Forestry, others argued for the 
Department to be moved from its current location in the Ministry of Environment to 
the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.”381 Everybody agreed 
that the TCPD should be reformed but there was no agreement over how to do it.    
 
The organization of state agencies of land administration reflects Kwame Nkrumah’s 
observation of the nature of state development: “Unfortunately, our planning hitherto 
has been largely piecemeal and unpurposeful. It has not been linked in an organized 
manner. …Too often the relation of these bodies and departments with each other 
and with the different sectors of the national economy has been unco-ordinated.” 
(Nkrumah 1961:3) Nkrumah’s observation remained valid after four decades of state 
development. The restructuring of the TCPD, the Survey Department, the Lands 
Commission, the Land Title Registry, the Land Valuation Board, and the OASL not 
only generated institutional and political challenges for the political ruling elites, but, 
crucially, it tested the ability of the political ruling elites to create a more 
developmental system of land administration that is well co-ordinated to the relevant 
sector of the economy. Perhaps, how to link the public sector agencies of land 
administration to the largely undeveloped customary institutions of communal land 
administration posed the greatest challenge to the political ruling elites. The outcome 
of the reform is discussed in turn.         
 
9.3.2 Public Sector Reform Outcomes: Constitutional Settlements Matter 
 
In December 2008, four of the six agencies were restructured into a revamped Lands 
Commission. The restructured agencies are the Survey Department, the Land Title 
Registry, the Land Valuation Board, and the old Lands Commission. The OASL and 
the TCPD were not included. Why was the OASL not restructured in spite of the 
support of the National House of Chiefs? More curiously, how was it possible for the 
constitutionally created old Lands Commission to be restructured without the 
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OASL? Surely the outcome raises many interesting questions. I explain the 
outcomes by first looking at the response of the Presidential-Executive.  
 
In a new Lands Commission Bill submitted by the Minister of the MLF to the 
Presidential-Executive (specifically Cabinet) for approval, the Bill sought to make 
the Survey Department, Land Valuation Board, Lands Commission Secretariat, the 
OASL and the Land Title Registry “Divisions of the new Lands Commission”.382 
The Presidential-Executive however did not agree to pursue constitutional 
amendments to reform the OASL. For unknown reasons, the Presidential-Executive 
informed the LPSC that “The Project should consider what was doable under the 
current Constitutional provision since failure in attempt to amend the Constitution 
would stall the whole Project.”383 It is fair to say that the NPP Government had been 
re-elected in the 2004 elections but the NPP had won only 128 out of the 230 seats in 
parliament. Therefore, the Presidential-Executive did not have the “two-thirds 
members of all the members of parliament” required to guarantee a successful 
constitutional amendment. The main opposition party, National Democratic 
Congress (NDC), controlled 94 of the parliamentary seats and therefore the 
government needed the support of the NDC to successfully amend the constitution. 
However, prior to the election of the NPP in 2000, it was the NDC Government that 
initiated the land administration reforms in the 1999 National Land Policy. Therefore 
it was likely that the NDC could have been persuaded to support a reform that they 
had initiated. The NPP Government decided not to test such political grounds.  
 
There are strong grounds to argue that the NPP Government was not committed to 
amend the constitution. According to Deputy LAP Co-ordinator, Mr Jimmy Aidoo, 
on two occasions the LAP legal team tried to integrate the OASL into the new Lands 
Commission following the insistence of the World Bank but “when we went to 
Parliament the Parliamentary Select Committee shot us down.”384 Faced with the 
prospect of failing to reform both the Lands Commission and the OASL, the LAP 
legal team decided that it was better to integrate the statutorily created agencies into 
the existing Lands Commission under a new Lands Commission Act (Act 767). The 
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functions and governing structures of the old Lands Commission outlined in the 
constitution could not be changed in the new Act. The Land Title Registry, Land 
Valuation Board, and Survey Department were restructured to become divisions of 
the new Lands Commission. The nature of the new Lands Commission is explained 
by the Deputy LAP Coordinator, Mr Jimmy Aidoo, as follows:   
 
It is important to note that the Lands Commission as it exists in the Constitution 
has not been changed. What we did was that the Secretariat of the Lands 
Commission was dismantled. We could not change the Lands Commission 
because it was created by the Constitution, what we changed was the Secretariat, 
that is, the Chief Executive’s office and the Administration. That is why we still 
call the newly created organization Lands Commission. We even wanted to 
change the name Lands Commission completely because we thought it has a bad 
name in the public; it is tainted with lack of accountability and corruption here 
and there. So we wanted a new name to reflect a period of new thinking and new 
born baby. But we realise that for the new baby we cannot change the name 
because of the Constitution.
385
 
 
Many officials of LAPU and the heads of the four divisions of new Lands 
Commission point out that the institutional reform could not override the 
constitutional provisions. But I argue that LAPU failed to fundamentally reform the 
OASL and the Lands Commission because of the failure of the Presidential-
Executive to politically negotiate with the NDC due to reasons that are best known to 
the NPP Government. Developmental states are created by political actors through 
processes of cooperation and negotiation. The failure of the Presidential-Executive to 
pursue developmental politics is what led to the failure to reform the OASL. 
Whether or not the old governing structures that still live within the new Lands 
Commission will enable the new agency to function effectively remains to be seen. 
Whatever is the case, it should be noted that the 1992 constitutional settlements of 
state organization mattered in shaping the public sector reform outcomes.   
 
We are left to explain why the TCPD was not restructured into the new Lands 
Commission as originally intended. Bureaucratic elites at the TCPD’s headquarters 
claim that their arguments against reform prevailed.
386
 Thus, Mrs Rebecca Sittie, the 
Director of the Land Title Registration Division of the Lands Commission, argues 
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that the restructuring of the TCPD failed because bureaucratic elites at the MEST 
resisted the reform.
387
 Dr Odame Larbi, LAP Project Director offered the following 
explanation as to why the LAP did not restructure the TCPD into the single agency: 
 
We think that it is better if the TCPD stays outside the Lands Commission 
because Town and Country Planning is as of now supposed to be a decentralised 
agency and therefore they are part of the District Assemblies being part of the 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development. When we were 
discussing the institutional reform processes one of the cogent pieces of advice 
that we got which I thought was very phenomenal was an advice that we should 
be very careful not to create a monstrous organization that would be too unwieldy 
and too difficult to manage. And we think that bringing Town and Country 
Planning would create that unwieldy organization because they also have a very 
huge organization out there going out to the district level; and if we are to bring 
all that under the Lands Commission it will be too unwieldy and too big to 
manage; and so I think they should be there on their own.
388
             
 
In essence, it is more plausible to argue that LAPU lost interest in the initial proposal 
to integrate the TCPD into the single agency. The Lands Commission Bill that was 
submitted by the Minister of the MLF to the Presidential-Executive (specifically 
Cabinet) for scrutiny and approval did not include the TCPD as one of the divisions 
of the new Lands Commission that was to be created.
389
 Bureaucratic elites of the 
Survey Department who tried to resist the reforms were told by the political elites 
that “if you want to be a law abiding citizen then you have to agree; if you disagree 
then of course you want to walk out of the merger or out of the Commission.”390  
 
9.4 Conclusion: The Legacies of the Traditional-Federal State Matter 
 
I examined the extent to which the organization of state authority for land 
administration reform, the demands or support of powerful international 
development agencies, and the demands or support of national actors shaped the 
politics and outcomes of the land administration reforms. It is clear that the 
agreement of actors with state authority is paramount in driving change. The limited 
reform successes achieved in the restructuring of the four agencies into a single 
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agency were the result of increasing returns to the collective authority of the 
Presidential-Executive, Parliament, and the National House of Chiefs to reform both 
statutory created and constitution created agencies of land administration.  
 
The constitutional choices made by political elites to consolidate chieftaincy and 
stool land ownership, prohibit the creation of freehold lands from stool lands, 
integrate the rules of customary law into the laws of Ghana, and divide state 
authority for land administration reform between Chiefs, the Executive, and the 
Legislature have mattered in shaping reform processes and outcomes in diverse 
ways. The 1999 National Land Policy that set the reform agenda was “a product of 
its time, of prevailing conditions and of the results of past action” (Kotey et al. 
1998:7). Although the land policy was not intended to be law, the actors, ideas, and 
interests that shaped the policy were the result of historical choices of state 
organization made by political elites from 1821 to 1992.  
 
It is clear from the analysis that the collective action of Chiefs, Government, and 
Parliament is required to effectively reform the land administration system. Chiefs 
have demonstrated their willingness to negotiate with government and other 
stakeholders about how to strengthen customary land administration. Government 
officials have not shown the same level of preparedness to support chiefs with the 
appropriate resources required by all public agencies to function effectively. There is 
no guarantee that if the non-chief political elites reverse the constitutional settlement 
that vests communal land ownership in traditional authorities, it is going to produce 
transparent and accountable public sector agencies of land administration. The nature 
of state organization of authority does not make the reversal of the current paths of 
land administration easy for any democratically elected government.  
 
The analysis also shows that within the public sector of land administration reform, 
the unwillingness of the Presidential-Executive and Parliament to pursue reforms 
supported by the National House of Chiefs led to the failure of LAP to 
fundamentally reform the Lands Commission and the OASL. Conversely, the 
willingness of the Presidential-Executive to pursue reform supported by Parliament 
and the National House of Chiefs led to the successful reform of the Land Title 
Registry, the Land Valuation Board, and the Survey Department as intended. The 
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resistance or protests of the public sector land agencies did not have significantly 
effect on the reform outcomes. The politics and outcomes of the LAP has shown that 
the political will of chiefs, government, and members of parliament to cooperate in 
the pursuit of desired reforms matter most in shaping the outcomes of land 
administration reforms in Ghana’s constitutional democracy. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis shows that well-resourced Customary Land Secretariats 
could help local communities to ensure transparency and accountability in communal 
land administration only if the rules of customary law that govern chieftaincy-society 
relationships are ascertained, reformed where necessary, and codified into formal-
legal rules. The lessons from chieftaincy administration reforms during the colonial 
era support the long-standing demand of Chiefs for the codification of the rules of 
customary law to enhance transparency and accountability in traditional governance. 
Many reports from the courts and the Audit Service also show that failure to do so 
only leads to a situation where informal rules of customary law substitute for the 
formal-legal rules defined in the constitution and statutes (such as the Head of 
Family Accountability Law). It would be naïve to think that horizontal agencies of 
accountability can function effectively when the vertical rules of accountability 
between chiefs and their subjects remain informally defined.   
 
Finally, within the customary sector of land administration, the constitutional 
settlement that obliges chiefs to be accountable to their local communities was only 
an affirmation of the increasing political returns to fiduciary role of chiefs arising 
from state consolidation of communal land ownership. The failure of government to 
support chiefs to reform the informal rules of customary law that govern chieftaincy-
society relations of accountability unavoidably yields demands for transparency in 
stool land administration. If chiefs are to meet such demands, then, Government, 
citizens, and scholars should understand that chiefs also require the appropriate 
administrative resources and formal-legal institutions to administer communal lands 
“for the benefit respectively of the people of Ghana, of the stool, skin, or family 
concerned.”391 Of course transparency and accountability do not usually occur within 
systems of informal rules of customary law. However, even if the rules are 
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ascertained and codified, chiefs cannot deliver transparent and accountable 
governance without the key role of professional human agency and material 
resources. It is therefore important that government, chiefs, parliament and actors 
with interests in land administration (both external and internal) understand how the 
organization of the traditional-federal state authority shapes the politics of reform.  
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Chapter 10 
 
Conclusion: The Legacies of the Traditional-Federal State Matter 
 
The people of this country cherish chieftaincy as an institution of such 
significance that it is inconceivable to think of a situation where the subjects of a 
chief may contemplate the abolition of the status of their chief or chieftaincy, at 
least not for now. …The 1992 Constitution consolidates this view [by entrenching 
chieftaincy]. …The entrenchment obviously implies that the only way by which 
chieftaincy may be abolished is by a referendum, the cost of which is so 
prohibitive that no government may easily find the resources to conduct one, 
specifically for the purpose of abolishing that institution. Furthermore, attempting 
to abolish chieftaincy will amount to committing political suicide as almost every 
indigenous Ghanaian is subject to one chief or the other. The chief has pervading 
influence over the people who are his subjects.
392
 
 
Introduction 
 
This study has investigated the provenance and causal effects of the bifurcation of 
state authority in Ghana between chiefs and government concerning land 
administration. The provenance of the current traditional-federal state with 
bifurcated authority between government and chiefs is located in the politics of war-
making, negotiations and political settlements that defined the critical juncture of 
state formation in the colonial era, from 1821-1831. The critical juncture and causal 
effects of the traditional-federal state were not destined. They have been shaped by 
diverse forms of politics between chiefs and non-chief political elites. Crucially, this 
study argues that the traditional-federal state has constrained the development of 
transparent, accountable and efficient institutional framework of land administration 
due to the failure of chiefs and government to comprehensively settle the formal-
legal complementarity, unification, or substitution of their bifurcated public 
institutions. The study reinforces the historical institutional argument that the critical 
juncture of institutional development matters in shaping the politics and outcomes of 
subsequent development. The implications of the research findings for conceptual, 
theoretical and practical development are highlighted below.   
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The chapter is divided into six sections. Section 10.1 deals with the 
conceptualization of the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and 
government. Section 10.2 summarizes the causal effects of the critical juncture of 
traditional-federal state-making on subsequent chieftaincy-government relations 
within the state, particularly in the context of land administration. Section 10.3 
highlights the implications of the interactions between formal-legal rules and 
informal rules of customary law within the current traditional-federal state for 
transparent and accountable land administration. Section 10.4 links the research 
findings to the mandate of the Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) established 
by government in 2010 to review, among other matters, ‘the public character of 
chieftaincy institutions’. Section 10.5 discusses the theoretical contributions of the 
study to historical institutional explanations of institutional formation, maintenance 
and change. Section 10.6 concludes the study.  
 
10.1 The Traditional-Federal State: Conceptualizing the Bifurcation of State 
Authority between Traditional Authorities and Government 
 
Chiefs and government in Ghana uneasily share power and state authority over ‘two 
public’ organizational structures simultaneously created by ‘citizens’ of the modern 
state who are also the ‘subjects’ of traditional state authorities (Ekeh 1975; Ray 
1996). It is generally acknowledged that the bifurcation of state authority between 
chiefs and government is a legacy of colonialism (Dia 1996; Ekeh 1975; Englebert 
2000; Mamdani 1996; Ray 1996; Ray and Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1996; Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal 1987). The study demonstrably concurs with the view of Richard 
Sklar (2003:6) that “The durability of traditional authority in Africa cannot be 
explained away as a relic of colonial rule. Africa agency in the construction of 
colonial institutions was largely responsible for the adaptation of traditional 
authorities to modern systems of government and the legitimacy they continue to 
enjoy among ordinary people.” However, the study of the nature and resilience of 
traditional institutions, as well as the bifurcation of state authority between 
traditional authorities and government in Africa, “has suffered from the lack of 
analytical perspectives willing to engage deep explanations that utilize critical 
interdisciplinary perspectives and local discourses” (Vaughan 2003:xvi). It is my 
view that it is important to appropriately conceptualize the bifurcation of state 
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authority between traditional authorities and government to facilitate research about 
its causal effects. The concept that I have proposed in this study is the traditional-
federal state. I argue that at the ‘formative moment’ of colonial states across African 
countries, the traditional-federal state was the dominant form of state organization 
due to economic, political and administrative factors. The critical juncture and path 
dependence (CJ-PD) theoretical framework of comparative historical analysis can be 
used by researchers to examine the legacies of the politics of traditional-federal state 
formation on post-colonial state development in African countries. 
 
In the context of land administration in Africa, it is known that the ‘de facto 
dominant type’ of land tenure in about 80% of African countries is customary tenure 
administered through organizations of traditional authorities (Bruce 1998a).
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Interestingly, there has been limited success in reforming the informal organizations 
of customary land administration across African countries. It is important that 
scholars and development practitioners understand why customary land 
administration remains the dominant feature of land administration in Africa. The 
concept of traditional-federal state can help us to examine not only the provenance of 
African states but also the causal effects of the colonial politics of traditional-federal 
state-making on the current dominance of customary land administration.  
 
It is erroneous to assume that informal organizations of chieftaincy cannot embrace 
transparent and accountable governance. The case of colonial state making in Ghana 
clearly shows that if traditional authorities are appropriately integrated into the state, 
they have the political capacity to help government in the effective mobilization of 
internal revenue and citizens for development. In Botswana, chiefs played a key role 
in the gradual development of transparent and accountable Land Boards from 
informal organizations of chieftaincy for customary land administration (Nkwae 
2008; Subudubudu and Molutsi 2009). We need comparative historical analyses of 
why many African countries with dominant structures of customary land 
administration have failed to create similar transparent and accountable agencies of 
customary land administration. From the initial ‘choice point’ of traditional-federal 
                                                 
393
 Out of 43 African countries surveyed by Bruce (1998b), only 8 did not have customary tenure as 
their de facto dominant type. The World Bank (2003a) suggests that only 2-10% of land in Africa is 
governed by formal-legal institutions, while Toulmin (2008) notes that only about 2-3% of land in 
West Africa is governed by formal-legal institutions.  
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state formation across colonial Africa, a comparative historical analysis can be 
undertaken across African countries to understand how subsequent processes of state 
development account for different and similar developmental outcomes. The 
research findings concerning the case of Ghana are summarized below.  
 
10.2 Legacies of Traditional-Federal State Formation on State Development 
and Land Administration in Ghana 
 
The initial condition of land administration prior to the creation of the colonial state 
is a contested subject among Ghanaian scholars. But it is generally accepted that “in 
the highly centralized traditional states…the stool was at once overlord of the state 
and owner of the land within its territorial boundaries. The scheme of interests in 
land was anchored on the fundamental premise that absolute ownership of the land 
was exclusively vested in the stool, with the subjects merely enjoying rights of 
beneficial user or usufruct” (Asante 1965:850). On this foundation of initial 
conditions, the study hypothesized that the creation of the initial traditional-federal 
colonial state between British officials and the existing traditional states, in 1821-
1831, is the critical juncture that subsequently shaped the bifurcation of state 
authority between chiefs and government over land administration.  
 
The study however shows that the division of state authority between chiefs and 
government over land administration in Ghana has been a politically contested 
matter that spans across three stages of state development. The three stages have 
been divided as follows: the first stage was the initial development and consolidation 
of the traditional-federal state, from 1821-1901; the second stage was the 
transformation of the traditional-federal state into the traditional-unitary state, from 
1902-1953; and the third stage was the return of the traditional-unitary state to the 
path of the traditional-federal state, from 1954 to the present. The causal effects of 
the initial traditional-federal state on subsequent chieftaincy-government relations 
over land administration under these three stages are summarized below.    
 
Under the first stage of state development, the study showed that the dominant ruling 
coalition of British officials tried unsuccessfully to claim ultimate ownership of all 
lands for the colonial state. The attempts were met with fierce political resistance not 
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only from chiefs but also from non-chief indigenous educated elites. Chiefs and non-
chief indigenous elites united to form the Aborigines Rights Protection Society 
(ARPS) to successfully defeat the infamous Land Bills of 1894 and 1897 (Adu-
Boahen 2000; Aryeetey et al. 2007). These bills had sought to claim ultimate 
ownership of all unoccupied lands for the colonial state. The failure of British 
governments to appropriate the stool lands from the traditional states led to the 
consolidation of stool land ownership and administration in the subsequent phases of 
state development. The first stage of state development laid the foundations for the 
emergence of the dual organizational framework of land administration in Ghana – 
namely, (a) the customary sector of land administration managed by traditional states 
through their informal rules of customary law, and (b) the public sector of land 
administration managed by public sector agencies controlled by government. 
Ghanaian scholars have not failed to point out that “It is difficult to reconcile the 
notion of stools, families and individuals owning land and managing it from day to 
day, whilst the government and its officials control important decisions affecting the 
land, including the collection and disbursement of the income accruing from their 
land” (Kotey et al. 2004:39). However, many scholars have failed to investigate the 
underlying logic of state organization that sustains this legacy.  
 
Under the second stage of state development, from 1902-1953, British governors 
gradually integrated chiefs into the Executive and the Legislature. The new dominant 
ruling coalition collaborated to transform organizations of chieftaincy into local 
government agencies. Local government in Ghana was gradually developed on the 
foundations of chieftaincy – particularly the Traditional and Divisional Councils of 
chiefs. The traditional-federal state was therefore transformed into a de facto 
traditional-unitary state in which the Executive and Legislative powers of chiefs and 
British officials became unified (Hailey 1956). The creation a new dominant ruling 
coalition of chiefs, British officials, and, later, non-chief indigenous elites largely 
removed the gap of distrust between chiefs and British government officials. The 
transformation of chieftaincy into local government agencies impacted on the 
administration of stool lands. Stool lands came to be administered by chiefs within 
the local government system. The dominant ruling coalition cooperated to create 
horizontal and vertical formal-legal institutions to govern the revenue and 
expenditure of chiefs within the local government system. Horizontally, the Audit 
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Service held chiefs responsible for the administration of communal revenues. 
Vertically, subjects of chiefs also tried to hold their traditional leaders accountable 
for how they managed communal revenues, including stool land revenues. These 
events shaped new processes of democratization in chieftaincy governance within 
local communities. Very little research has been done by Ghanaian scholars on these 
political and institutional reforms that occurred under the traditional-unitary state.  
 
Under the current third stage of state development, from 1954 to the present, the 
traditional-unitary state was ended and the state was returned to the path of 
traditional-federalism. The political struggles between chiefs and non-chief 
indigenous elites that led to the demise of the traditional-unitary state actually began 
before 1954. The legacy of the traditional-unitary state was gradually ended from 
1949. In 1954 the chiefs in the Executive and Legislature were replaced by the new 
class of nationalist non-chief indigenous political elites (commonly referred to as the 
intelligentsia). The clock of state development was turned backwards towards 
traditional-federalism. Final state authority over the reform of matters concerning 
chieftaincy institutions became constitutionally divided between chiefs and central 
government. During the last decade of the transition to post-colonial independence, 
from 1947-1957, the growing distrust between chiefs and non-chief indigenous 
political elites finally led to the creation of constitutional rules that insulated 
organizations of chieftaincy from government political interferences. However, 
between 1958 and 1966, Kwame Nkrumah’s dictatorial government and one party 
state promulgated various laws that sought to reverse the negotiated settlements that 
insulated chiefs from government control (Austin 1964; Rathbone 2000a). After the 
military overthrow of the CPP government in 1966, the chiefs renegotiated 
constitutional rules (in the 1969, 1979 and 1992 constitutions) that guaranteed the 
existence of chieftaincy and limited the authority of government and parliament to 
reform matters concerning chieftaincy. The causal effects of the return to the path of 
traditional-federalism on land administration are summarized below.   
 
10.2.1 Effects on Public Sector Land Administration 
 
Within the public sector of land administration, chiefs and governments have 
negotiated the establishment of agencies that would manage their conflicting 
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interests in land. The immediate consequence of the separation of chieftaincy from 
the local government system was the creation of an agency that would manage the 
collection and sharing of stool land revenues between chiefs and the new local 
government agencies. Currently, the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands 
(OASL) is the constitutionally created agency that collects and shares stool land 
revenues between chiefs and local government agencies. The Lands Commission has 
also been constitutionally created to manage the process of government compulsory 
acquisition of stool lands with compensation. Other agencies including the Land 
Valuation Board, Survey Department, and Land Title Registry have been created to 
help the Lands Commission in granting concurrence to stool land transactions. 
 
The constitutional rules of land administration matter for reform. The 1992 
constitutional rules that created the OASL and the Lands Commission subsequently 
constrained the 2001-2010 Land Administration Project (LAP) from reforming these 
two agencies into a single agency. The study showed that the inability of the LAP to 
restructure these two agencies into a single agency was not because of lack of 
financial resources to implement the reforms. Financial resources required to 
implement the reforms were readily provided by many international development 
agencies. However the constitutional rules that established the OASL and the Lands 
Commission as independent agencies proved formidable for government to 
overcome in the short term. The constitutional rules of state organization of land 
administration also matter in shaping reform directions and processes. The 
formulation of the 1999 National Land Policy provided ample evidence to support 
the point that successful land administration reform will depend largely on 
negotiations and effective collaboration between chiefs and government. The 
legacies of constitutional settlements between chiefs and non-chief political elites 
matter as much as the politics of cooperation between these two ruling classes. 
Politics within the constitutional rules is important for reform outcomes.   
 
10.2.2 Effects on Customary Sector Land Administration 
 
The causal effects of the critical juncture of traditional-federal state-making on 
subsequent chieftaincy-government relations in land administration appear to be 
more significant in the customary sector of land administration than in the public 
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sector of land administration. These effects have shaped the consolidation of stool 
(or customary) land ownership and administration, the integration of the informal 
rules of customary law into the laws of Ghana, and the constitutional limitations on 
the authority of government and parliament to reform the customary land 
administration system without the consent of chiefs.   
 
Stool land ownership has not only been constitutionally consolidated but, more 
crucially, the state also prohibits the creation of freehold land from stool lands. This 
is intended to preserve communal lands for future generations. It is not surprising 
that advocates of individual property rights such as the World Bank have sometimes 
sought to use unconstitutional windows of opportunity opened by military 
governments to try to end the legacy of communal land ownership. The political 
choice faced by democratically elected governments who want to reform stool land 
administration was clearly recognized by the formulators of the 1999 National Land 
Policy. Governments have to collaborate and negotiate with chiefs about the kind of 
land administration reforms that could promote economic development as well as 
enhance the political legitimacy of each ruling class. Political negotiations between 
chiefs and government over land administration reform have rarely occurred outside 
the turbulent politics of constitution making that follow periods of military rule. 
 
The separation of organizations of chieftaincy from the local government system has 
deprived the chiefs of the civil service administrative staff required to perform the 
complex and costly tasks of communal land administration. What remains in the 196 
Traditional Councils is a largely incompetent skeletal administrative staff incapable 
of meeting the challenges (Ninsin 2010; Quartey 2003; Sakyi 2003). Subjects of 
chiefs and horizontal state agencies of accountability (such as the Audit Service) 
have also been deprived of the formal-legal rules that governed how stool land 
revenues could be used by chiefs. Consequently, it has become difficult for all 
stakeholders in stool land administration to ensure transparency and accountability.  
 
The 2001-2010 multi-donor supported Land Administration Project (LAP) sought to, 
among other things, create transparent and accountable agencies for stool land 
administration in local communities. The implementers of the LAP ignored the fact 
that government cannot supply customary land administration reforms that are not 
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demanded or supported by the chiefs. The lack of consultation and negotiations with 
chiefs led to the lack of cooperation from many chiefs and lack of local ownership of 
the reform packages supplied to chiefs (CIKOD 2009; Development Institute 2009; 
MASDAR 2011b). When the ‘supply-led’ reform approach failed to produce the 
intended results, the LAP officials pursued an alternative approach of supplying only 
reform packages that are demanded by chiefs (Kakraba-Ampeh 2008). Booth et al. 
(2005:2) assessed the ‘drivers of change in Ghana’ and correctly noted:  
  
Donors are accustomed to explaining away the failure of development policies 
and pro-poor reforms by referring to a ‘lack of political will’ in the country. 
However, the underlying reasons for the apparent unwillingness of country 
stakeholders to confront the need for fundamental change are rarely examined. 
Programmes continue to be based on where donors think the country ought to be, 
not on serious analysis of where the country is, where it is coming from or where 
it is heading. National stakeholders who interact with donors are sometimes 
complicit in this evasion. 
 
From the colonial history of chieftaincy organizational reform under the traditional-
unitary state, 1902-1953, we know that chiefs are unlikely to demand formal-legal 
institutions of accountability that would hold them responsible for their actions in 
traditional governance unless such institutions can simultaneously produce economic 
and political benefits that enhance their traditional authority. There is therefore the 
need for ‘high-level’ political negotiations between chiefs and government over the 
kind of political and economic incentives and sanctions mechanisms that are 
required for the creation of an effective, transparent and accountable system of stool 
land administration. It should be recognized that both political and economic forces 
of demand and supply are at stake in communal land administration reform.  
 
10.3 Traditional-Federalism and the Interactions Between Informal Rules of 
Customary Law and Formal Rules of Common Law in Land 
Administration: Competitive, Substitutive, and Complementary 
 
The public and customary sectors of land administration are both governed by 
formal-legal constitutional rules and statutory enactments. However, the customary 
sector of land administration is simultaneously governed by informal rules of 
customary law that are constitutionally recognized as part of the laws of Ghana. 
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There is therefore a complex interaction between formal-legal rules and informal 
rules of customary law in customary land administration. Legal practitioners know 
that informal rules of customary law have the capacity to substitute for unfavourable 
formal-legal rules (Brobbey 2008; Kludze 1987, 1998, 2000; Kunbour 2002). The 
effect of the complex interactions between formal-legal rules (constitutional rules 
and statutory enactments) and informal-legal rules of customary law on transparent 
and accountable customary land administration needs to be comprehensively 
examined by Ghanaian scholars.  
 
There is less certainty among Ghanaian legal scholars and practitioners about the 
statutory character of the informal rules of customary law that organizes chieftaincy 
in local communities. In a case that was brought before the Supreme Court to 
determine the jurisdiction of the High Court to adjudicate cases concerning 
Traditional Councils of chiefs, the majority view of the Supreme Court was that 
“The question of the existence, nature and composition of a Traditional Council has 
consistently been judicially regarded as a statutory or administrative matter which is 
not a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy.”394 The minority who disagreed with the 
view that matters affecting Traditional Councils are not matters affecting chieftaincy 
argued that it is impossible to separate “the body of chiefs comprising 
the…Traditional Council” from the Traditional Council as a statutory agency.395 
Supporting the view of the minority, Justice Jones Dotse argued, “There was no way 
the High Court was going to determine” the legality or illegality of the establishment 
of specific Traditional Councils “without considering those constitutional relations 
under customary law” between the interested chiefs.396 Interestingly, Section 76 of 
the Chieftaincy Act, 2008, Act 759, defines a cause or matter affecting chieftaincy to 
include “the Constitutional relations under customary law between chiefs.”397 
Notwithstanding this definition, the nature of the interactions between formal-legal 
                                                 
394
 The Republic vs. High Court, Koforidua, Ex-parte Nana Otutu Kono III, No.J5/9/2008. The 
majority view (3-2) expressed by Justice W.A. Atuguba, Justice R.C. Owusu and Justice Baffoe 
Bonnie was that matters affecting Traditional Councils of chiefs are not matters affecting chieftaincy. 
Justice Baffoe Bonnie arrived at his decision based on the strange argument that “there is no need to 
go into the merits of the application” because the applicant had only sought the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court after the applicant had lost the initial case at the level of the High Court.  
395
 The minority comprised Chief Justice G.T. Woode and Justice Jones Dotse. The quotation is from 
the submission made by Justice Jones Dotse.  
396
 Justice Jones Dotse, The Republic vs. High Court, Koforidua, No.J5/9/2008.  
397
 This law was used by Chief Justice G.T. Woode and Justice Jones Dotse to support their case.  
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rules governing chieftaincy and the informal rules of customary law that organizes 
chieftaincy in local communities remains uncertain for many legal practitioners. 
 
 It is important for scholars, government, legal practitioners and development actors 
to critically examine the nature of the informal rules of customary law that underpin 
organizations of chieftaincy and how those rules interact with the formal-legal 
statutory rules governing chieftaincy. Unless this is done, the informal state would 
continue to undermine the quest for a transparent, accountable and effective 
developmental chieftaincy. Given the acceptance by legal practitioners that 
Traditional Councils are a creature of statute (or state agencies), it is important that 
government provides the 196 Traditional Councils that exist throughout the country 
competent administrative staff and appropriate resources for the chiefs to effectively 
manage communally owned stool lands within their geographical jurisdictions of 
authority. The National House of Chiefs has consistently advocated that the informal 
rules of customary law that governs relations between chiefs, as well as relations 
between chiefs and their subjects, should be codified. It may be recalled that the 
demand from chiefs for the codification of informal rules of customary law goes as 
far back as 1927 when Nana Ofori Atta introduced the Native Jurisdiction Bill in the 
Legislative Council. Unfortunately, governments have rarely responded to the 
demand from chiefs for the codification of informal rules of customary law. It is 
crucial that the informal rules of customary law are codified to ensure transparency 
and certainty in the traditional governance of communal lands.  
 
During the implementation of the LAP, the Ministry of Lands and Forestry (MLF) 
argued that organizations of chieftaincy are private institutions and therefore cannot 
be supported by the state with administrative staff and offices demanded by chiefs to 
enable them perform their functions of stool land administration (MLF 2003). The 
unanimous position of the Supreme Court that Traditional Councils of chiefs are 
state agencies makes it untenable for the MLF to argue that the 196 Traditional 
Councils of chiefs scattered throughout the country are not public institutions of the 
state but are private institutions outside the state. Such erroneous positions stem from 
the general lack of understanding about the character of the Ghanaian state.  
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The study has shown that informal rules of customary law that govern organizations 
of chieftaincy compete with, and undermine, the formal-legal constitutional rules and 
statutory enactments affecting the roles of chiefs. But chiefs cannot be singled out 
for blame since they are not the ones who advocated for their organizations to be 
separated from the formal-legal rules of the local government system. The Courts 
and officials of the Audit Service have usually considered the informal rules of 
customary law as complementary to the general constitutional rules that require 
chiefs to be accountable as fiduciaries of stool lands to their local communities. In 
the Ghanaian courts of law, informal rules of customary law that specify relations of 
accountability could as well be considered as substitutive of the formal-legal 
constitutional rules of accountability (Brobbey 2008; Kludze 1987). 
 
In an environment of informal-formal legal pluralism, it is difficult to see how 
informal rules of customary law could be “seen to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of formal institutions” as argued by Helmke and Levitsky (2006:13). 
Informal-legal rules of customary law that complement formal-legal constitutional 
rules do not violate the latter. However, the complementarity of informal rules of 
customary law to formal-legal constitutional and statutory rules does not imply the 
institutional efficiency and effectiveness of the Ghanaian state as Helmke and 
Levitsky (2004, 2006) suggest. Formal-informal legal pluralism implies equal 
probability of enforcement or substitutability and not equal probability of 
effectiveness. O’Donnell (1996, 1998, 1999, 2010) pointed out that informal 
institutions do not enhance the effectiveness of formal state institutions of 
accountability; particularly, informal-legal institutions undermine the political and 
administrative accountability of public office holders within any political system of 
representative governance because they are difficult to pin down (Harrington 2008; 
Galligan 2007; Oliver and Drewry 1996). Demands from chiefs for the codification 
of their informal rules of customary law should be acted upon by interest groups.   
 
10.4 The Constitutional Review Commission and the Task of Clarifying “the 
Public Character or Otherwise of the Chieftaincy Institution” 
 
In 2010, the government of Ghana established a Constitutional Review Commission 
(CRC) to review and clarify, among many other issues, “the public character or 
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otherwise of the chieftaincy institution and whether or not a chief may hold public 
office”.398 There is little doubt that this matter requires urgent attention. During the 
regional level consultations of the CRC in the Ashanti, Greater Accra, Eastern, and 
Western Regions, I attended the thematic group discussions on ‘Chieftaincy and 
Traditional Authorities’. However, the issue of the public character of chieftaincy 
was never raised by any CRC official or member of the public. Usually, only chiefs 
joined the thematic group to discuss matters affecting chieftaincy. The chiefs 
themselves detested attempts by ordinary citizens to take part in the deliberations. 
The issue that was usually raised by the CRC discussion facilitators was the 
controversial matter of whether or not a chief should play an active part in multi-
party politics. How the public character or otherwise of the chieftaincy institution 
has been defined by the CRC remains to be known.
399
 
 
Kunbun Naa Yiri II,
400
 a member of the CRC and chairman of the Stool/Skin Lands 
Committee of the National House of Chiefs, pointed out that the public character of 
chieftaincy has two dimensions, namely “public character by legality” and “public 
character by tradition.” He explained that the public character of chieftaincy by 
legality is the process of creating chieftaincy institutions through formal-legal 
statutory rules as is the case with the statutory creation of Traditional Councils, 
Regional Houses of Chiefs, and the National House of Chiefs.  The public character 
of chieftaincy by tradition refers to the installation of chiefs by their subjects as 
public office holders within the traditional sphere of governance. Kunbun Naa Yiri II 
then asked the question, “In which of these two public dimensions, legality and 
tradition, should the CRC review the public character of chieftaincy institutions?”401 
The issue of ‘the two publics’ raised by Kunbun Naa Yiri II was at the core of the 
disagreements among the Supreme Court Justices concerning whether or not legal 
cases concerning ‘statutorily created’ Traditional Councils should be considered as 
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 The CRC is made up of two paramount chiefs and seven non-chiefs. The paramount chiefs are 
Osabarimba Kwesi Atta II, and Kumbun-Naa Yiri II (Naa Alhaji Iddirisu Abu). The non-chiefs are 
Prof. Albert K. Fiadjoe (Chairman), Mr. Akenten Appiah-Menka, Mrs. Sabina Ofori-Boateng, 
Reverend Prof. Samuel K. Adjepong, Dr. Nicholas Amponsah, Mr. Gabriel Pwamang, and Mrs. Jean 
Mensa. The Executive Secretary of the CRC is Dr. Raymond Atuguba. The work of the CRC could be 
found at http://www.crc.gov.gh/ (last accessed 25/03/2012).  
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 The final report of the CRC it yet to be made available to the public.    
400
 Interview with Kunbun Naa Yiri II during the break period of the CRC regional consultation at 
Koforidua (Eastern region), 2/09/2010.  
401
 Interview with Kunbun Naa Yiri II. 
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matters affecting chieftaincy. The question posed by Kunbun Naa Yiri II captures the 
less understood duality of state authority within the traditional-federal state. 
 
Clearly, there is much confusion about the implications of (i) the integration of “the 
rules of customary law which by customary are applicable to particular 
communities” into the laws of Ghana,402 and (ii) the constitutional consolidation of 
“The institution of chieftaincy, together with its traditional councils as established by 
customary law and usage.”403 The interaction between informal rules of customary 
law and formal-legal statutes confuses legal practitioners today in the same manner it 
confused colonial government officials. The institutional legacies of chieftaincy 
within the traditional-federal state remain to be taken seriously.  
 
From the historical institutional perspective of political science and public law 
(Loughlin 2010; Smith 2008), the state is the foundation of public law in countries. 
Public law is defined by the constitutional rules of the state. I therefore argue that it 
would be more fruitful for constitutional designers to delineate the statutory 
character of chieftaincy institutions, rather than to pursue the less promising 
objective of clarifying ‘the public character of chieftaincy institutions’. This is 
because all state institutions – statutory enactments and informal rules of customary 
law – are public institutions. Clarifying the statutory character of chieftaincy would 
help to determine the public character of chieftaincy institutions.  
  
Informal rules of customary law concerning chieftaincy in local communities remain 
an integral part of the laws of Ghana. Informal rules of customary law constitute the 
informal state. It is untenable to argue that institutions of chieftaincy established 
according to the appropriate customary rules or usages are not state institutions. I 
emphasize that chieftaincy is not a single institution. It is an organization of complex 
rules of customary law that defines political relationships between chiefs, customary 
procedures of traditional governance, and political relationships between chiefs and 
their subjects. It is not possible to separate the position of the chief as a public office 
holder from the rules of customary law that created the public office of the chief. It is 
however possible to determine whether or not chieftaincy institutions constitute a 
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 Article 11(3) of 1992 Constitution.  
403
 Article 270(1) of 1992 Constitution. 
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part of the Ghanaian state. If the rules of customary law that structures chieftaincy 
are part of the laws of Ghana, then it is important for constitutional makers to clarify 
the responsibilities of chiefs, government, and citizens in the renewed attempt to 
create effective, transparent and accountable agencies of chieftaincy. Reforming the 
informal sector of chieftaincy and clarifying its relations in the state matters.  
 
10.5 Historical Institutionalism – Critical Juncture Matters  
 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010:7) emphasize that historical institutionalists “view 
institutions first and foremost as the political legacies of concrete historical 
struggles.” However, they argue that all leading approaches to institutional analysis 
face problems in explaining institutional change in a manner that comprehends both 
exogenous and endogenous sources of change. Interestingly, they claim that “We 
have good theories of why various kinds of basic institutional configurations – 
constitutions, welfare systems, and property rights arrangements – come into being 
in certain cases and at certain times” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010:2). Hall (2010) 
points out that in order to understand institutional change, we must be able to explain 
the origins and stability of institutions. Therefore, the claim that we have good 
theories to explain the sources of institutions but lack good theories to explain the 
sources of institutional change is quite puzzling. Notwithstanding this puzzle, 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010:3) suggest that “If theorizing is going to reach its 
potential, however, institutional analysts must go beyond classification to develop 
causal propositions that locate the sources of institutional change – sources that are 
not simply exogenous shocks or environmental shifts.” I suggest that the critical 
juncture-path dependence analytical framework can help us comprehend both 
‘endogenous’ and ‘exogenous’ sources of institutional change.  
 
It is however important to point out some potential analytical misunderstandings 
among historical institutionalists surrounding explanations of institutional change 
that call attention to “critical junctures”. First, there is some conceptual 
inconsistency regarding what is meant by a ‘critical juncture’ (Capoccia and 
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Kelemen 2007; Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000; Rokkan 1968).
404
 I 
emphasize that if ‘history matters’ then historical institutionalists need to explain the 
origins of their ‘critical juncture’ blocks to ensure consistent intellectual 
development. Second, there is conceptual ambiguity regarding what constitute 
‘endogenous sources of change’ and ‘exogenous sources of change’. Mahoney and 
Thelen (2010:32) advise that “rather than promote abstract debate about metatheory 
or definitions”, contributions to theoretical development should aid substantive 
analysis of institutional change. But it is important that theoretical development 
should be grounded on unambiguous definitions of key concepts.   
 
The concept of critical juncture used in this study builds on the conceptual and 
analytical blocks laid down by Rokkan and Lipset (1967), Rokkan (1968), and 
Collier and Collier (1991). In their conceptions, actual change in existing conditions 
(called antecedent conditions) is a necessary element for hypothesizing the causal 
effect of that critical juncture of change on a subsequent outcome. The concept is 
therefore used only with reference to actual “political legacies of concrete historical 
struggles” (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). The theoretical claim is that those choice 
points “proved most significant” (Rokkan 1968:199) in shaping actual subsequent 
outcomes or processes. The subsequent processes and outcomes are what Pierson 
refers to as path dependent. For that matter, he argues, “Claims about path 
dependence typically suggest that beginnings are very important” (Pierson 2004:11). 
The theoretical thrust of the CJ-PD model is to explain the historical development of 
“a limited range of institutions within a limited range of politics” (Rokkan 
1968:175). Some scholars who have sought to provide alternative definitions of what 
is meant by a critical juncture (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007; Chingaipe 2011) have 
                                                 
404For instance, Capoccia and Kelemen (2007:348) define critical junctures “in the context of the 
study of path-dependent phenomena…as relatively short periods of time during which there is a 
substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest.” The 
definition does not only seek to introduce limitations on the duration of a critical juncture, it also 
departs from existing definitions of Rokkan (1968) and Collier and Collier (1991) based on the actual 
effect (not heightened probability) of a process on an outcome. The duration of a critical juncture 
should not be specified independent of the actual processes of institutional development because the 
period could be long or short. Mahoney (2000:513) also introduces rational choice notions of 
preference ordering in his definition by arguing that “Critical junctures are characterized by the 
adoption of a particular institutional arrangement from among two or more alternatives. These 
junctures are "critical" because once a particular option is selected it becomes progressively more 
difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.” Who defines the 
“multiple alternatives” from which a particular choice is made?    
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not provided clear justifications for their alternative conceptions. For instance, 
Chingaipe (2010:ii) suggests that “the concept of critical junctures should be defined 
based on people’s expectations for, rather than effects of, institutional change.” Such 
a definition clearly misses the thrust of the CJ-PD model of historical analysis which 
deals with actual political outcomes within a limited range of time.      
 
Following Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Collier and Collier (1991), I argue that by 
holding constant the critical juncture of institutional development, one is able to 
explain the subsequent changes in institutional development by examining variables 
such as (i) changes in the ideas of the actors, (ii) the entry of new actors with new 
ideas, power or resources to aid or displace old actors, (iii) changes in the economic 
conditions within which the institutions were initially developed, (iv) changes in the 
political conditions within which the institutions were initially developed, and (v) 
changes in the environment within which the institutions were initially developed. It 
is important to emphasize that changes in the last three conditions would not 
automatically lead to changes in institutions unless the political actors who are 
affected by such changes decide to change the institutions to suit the new conditions. 
What is crucial for historical institutional explanations of institutional change is that 
institutional legacies are created and changed through human agency.  
 
The distinction between endogenous and exogenous sources of institutional change 
has not been clearly defined by historical institutionalists. Particularly, it is uncertain 
as to whether ‘ideational change’ should be treated as an endogenous or exogenous 
sources of change (Blyth 2002a, 2002b, 2007; Lieberman 2001; Rittberger 2003; 
Rueschemeyer 2006). For instance, the widespread acceptance of new ideas of 
‘republican democracy’ by educated Ghanaians led to the displacement of 
chieftaincy from the local government system in the famous 1949 Coussey 
Committee political settlements. This “new interpretive frame” of political 
governance may be considered by Mahoney and Thelen (2010:5) as an “exogenous 
entity or force...imported or imposed from the outside” (Mahoney and Thelen 
2010:5). How does one separate the internal indigenous actors from the imported 
interpretive frames of politics? Again, the recommendations made by the all-British 
Watson Commission in 1948 may have had some influence on the decisions of the 
1949 Coussey Committee. It is not always easy to analytically distinguish 
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endogenous or exogenous sources of ideas in the process of institutional change. 
Usually, it is practically impossible to separate internal political actors from the ideas 
that they use to shape the process of institutional change.  
 
My study focused on discovering the critical juncture for the bifurcation of state 
authority between chiefs and government and how that juncture shaped land 
administration reforms. I argued that the critical juncture was the initial formation of 
the colonial state from 1821-1831. Subsequent changes in the economic environment 
led to the current attempts to reform the informal institutions of customary land 
administration that were integrated into the critical juncture of state formation. 
Furthermore, I showed that the integration of traditional states into the initial 
colonial state explains the current division of state authority between chiefs and 
government concerning the reform of matters affecting chieftaincy, particularly land 
administration. The CJ-PD framework is therefore able to account for the sources of 
institutional formation, stability (or maintenance) and change. Fundamentally, the 
Ghanaian state remains constitutive of organizations of chieftaincy and ‘public 
sector’ agencies of modern government. There lies the stability of the bifurcated 
state established at the critical juncture. However, many of the rules of governance 
between chiefs, government, and citizens have changed due to changes in some of 
the variables that existed at the critical juncture of state formation. Such variables 
include the rise of non-chief educated elites, the replacement within government of 
British officials with non-chief indigenous elites, the increasing commercialization 
of land, and changes in the economic conditions of citizens.  
 
Mahoney and Thelen (2010:8-9) rightly argue that “There is nothing automatic, self-
perpetuating, or self-reinforcing about institutional arrangements. Rather, a dynamic 
component is built in; where institutions represent compromises or relatively durable 
though still contested settlements based on specific coalitional dynamics, they are 
always vulnerable to shifts. On this view, change and stability are in fact inextricably 
linked.” The dynamic components of institutions are the human actors who have 
dynamic interpretive frames, diverse power relations and resources. It is for this 
reason that Levi (2006:10) remarked that “Institutions are empty boxes without 
leaders and staff who have the capacity to produce the public goods, the public 
demands, and the facility to evoke popular confidence even among those who 
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disagree with particular policies.” The nature and role of human agency in the 
political process of institutional development should be taken seriously. 
 
Notwithstanding the central claim of historical institutionalists that institutions are 
political legacies (Hay and Wincott 1998; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Steinmo et al. 
1992), many scholars have noted that the nature and role of human agency in the 
process of institutional formation, maintenance and change is yet to be taken 
seriously (Leftwich 2007, 2008, 2009; Moe 2006; Rogers 1992). In critical juncture 
explanations of institutional stability and change, what matters is whether the social, 
economic, political, institutional and ecological conditions that prevailed at the 
critical juncture of institutional development have been sustained, modified, or ended 
by political actors. The analytical concept of critical juncture is useful for explaining 
the sources of institutional change by pointing to the nature of the ideas, power and 
resources of actors that have either remained constant or have subsequently been 
produced by the variables that existed at the critical juncture. 
 
10.6 Conclusion: Towards A Traditional-Unitary State?       
 
The Committee of Experts that designed the current 1992 Constitution was asked to 
take into account “the abrogated Constitutions of Ghana of 1957, 1960, 1969 and 
1979 and any other Constitutions.”405 The 1992 Constitution consolidated past 
constitutional settlements that divided state authority between chiefs and government 
over land ownership, land administration, and chieftaincy. Under the 1992 
constitutional rules of state authority, elected governments and parliaments do not 
have the authority to reform all matters affecting the rules and actors of chieftaincy 
without the authority of the chiefs. Invariably, governments are constrained from 
reforming the institutions of land administration that manage the stool lands of chiefs 
without the consent of the chiefs. Organizations of chieftaincy are acknowledged to 
manage about 80% of the country’s land. Governments are therefore obliged to 
negotiate with chiefs over appropriate land administration reforms within the dual 
‘public’ and ‘customary’ organizational frameworks of land administration.  
 
                                                 
405
 Report of the Committee of Experts (Constitution) on Proposals for a Draft Constitution of Ghana 
Presented to the PNDC, July 31, 1991, p.1.   
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The study sought to find out the provenance of the bifurcation of state authority 
between Chiefs and Government over land administration in Ghana, and, how this 
institutional configuration of state authority shaped the politics and outcomes of land 
administration reforms. Using a historical institutional framework of analysis, I have 
argued that the critical juncture for the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs 
and government took place in the Gold Coast between 1821 and 1831. The impact of 
this critical juncture on the organization of the current traditional-federal state was 
not, however, predetermined. The transition has been characterized by political 
negotiations and conflicts between chiefs and non-chief political ruling elites.  
 
The study provides strong grounds to argue that the constitutional bifurcation of state 
authority between chiefs and government over land administration has largely been 
shaped by growing distrust between the two ruling classes ever since the chiefs and 
their organizations were separated from the Executive, Legislature and the local 
government system. Within the public sector of land administration, the key 
institutional legacies of distrust between chiefs and government have been the Office 
of the Administrator of Stool Lands and the Lands Commission created to manage 
the conflict of interests. Prior to the separation of chieftaincy from these three arms 
of the state, chiefs managed stool lands through the local government system. The 
separation of chieftaincy from the local government system left the chiefs and their 
subjects with inadequate formal-legal rules of stool land administration.  
 
Beneath the fabric of land administration in Ghana are complex institutional legacies 
shaped by war-making and distrust between chiefs and non-chief political ruling 
elites. Formal-legal institutions and informal institutions of customary law largely 
compete for control, authority and power. But in the absence of formal-legal rules to 
govern how chiefs should manage their stool lands, the informal rules of customary 
law have imperfectly held the fort. Chiefs have managed communal lands mainly 
through informal rules of customary law governing chieftaincy. Traditional Councils 
of chiefs have been deprived of the administrative capacity required for effective 
communal land administration. It has also become difficult for state agencies of 
horizontal accountability (the Courts and the Audit Service) to hold chiefs 
responsible for their actions as fiduciaries of communal lands.  
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Ghana’s dual public and customary land administration systems are the outcome of 
the bifurcation of state authority between chiefs and government within the 
traditional-federal state. Regardless of the wishes of institutional reformers, the 
bifurcation of state authority between government and chiefs regarding land 
administration has been the major variable that enables and constrains the attainment 
of reform objectives. It is therefore important for constitutional makers to clearly 
clarify the statutory character of chieftaincy institutions. This is likely to help chiefs, 
government, and other interested parties to negotiate appropriate institutional 
reforms that could promote transparent and accountable land administration.  
 
There is an on-going land administration reform programme intended to create 
transparent and accountable agencies of land administration across the public and 
customary sectors of the state. Unfortunately, the reform programme has largely 
been “based on where donors think the country ought to be, not on serious analysis 
of where the country is, where it is coming from or where it is heading” (Booth et al. 
2005:2). Moreover, the reform programme proceeded on the erroneous assumption 
that organizations of chieftaincy are private institutions and not state institutions. The 
reformers have not considered it obligatory for the state to provide the administrative 
and material resources required by chiefs to perform their functions effectively. As a 
result there has been limited progress in customary land administration reform.  
 
The critical juncture and path dependence theoretical framework of analysis help to 
understand how and why specific features of the colonial traditional-federal state 
have been consolidated or ended in the post-colonial state. The study suggests that 
there is a causal relationship between the colonial critical juncture of traditional-
federal state formation and the current constitutional bifurcation of state authority 
between chiefs and government over the reform of land administration. Subjects of 
chiefs supported their traditional leaders in military wars against British colonial 
state-makers. Subjects of chiefs have also supported the entrenchment of chieftaincy 
in the constitutional rules of Ghana, and are now demanding for an increase in the 
authority of chiefs in political governance (Logan 2008, 2011). The resurgence of 
traditional governance in an era of democratization may lead to the Ghanaian state’s 
reform as a traditional-unitary state in which chiefs are incorporated into the local 
government system, the Legislature and the Executive. 
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Each African country has its own distinctive experience of state formation. 
Nonetheless, the Ghanaian experience of colonial state formation shares common 
features with other African states. The literature on state development in Africa 
suggests that the choice point of colonial state-making in many countries was the 
traditional-federal state with bifurcated authority between traditional authorities and 
colonial governments. Historical institutionalism offers appropriate analytical tools 
to enable scholars to examine how critical junctures of traditional-federal state 
formation across Africa explain the current dominance of customary land 
administration, the complex interactions between formal-legal statutes and informal 
rules of customary law, and the resurgence of chieftaincy in an era of 
democratization. History matters.  
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